weaknesses of each of their arguments and then apply the Principle of Generic Consistency to these scenarios to show how Gewirth would address these moral conflicts. Gewirth’s moral theory would appeal to the consistency principle found in the arguments presented by Hauptman and Constant, while preserving the categorical nature of morality, as exhibited by both Kant and Dowd. Such a resolution supports neither unlimited access to information nor strong censorship;
it supports intellectual freedom.
Hauptman argues that autonomy is essential to professionalism. But does this autonomy come at the expense of the autonomy of the library patron? The question goes further than just whether access to information should come at the expense of the common good; it posits whether the autonomy of the librarian and the autonomy of the library clientele are mutually exclusive. It implies that they are, but are they?
Hauptman recognizes that in its Code of Ethics, the American Library Asso- ciation recognizes professional librarians as “independent thinkers functioning in a societal context,” but argues that this is counter to the claim made by ALA advocates (Hauptman & Stichler, p. 292). Advocates of Libraries: An American Value, drafted by the 21st Century Intellectual Freedom Statement Committee, a division of the American Library Association, argue for unlimited access to information. Unlimited access to information insists that the freedom of the library clientele should not be impeded for any reason. Hauptman argues that this abjures moral responsibility (Hauptman, 1976, p. 627).
The American Library Association’s stance implies a form of liberty in the negative sense, the least restrictive liberty. It is obvious that Hauptman’s position does not align with that of the American Library Association; he argues that that there are times when it is morally justified to limit the access to information. But can it be said that Hauptman is preserving liberty in the positive sense?
Liberty in the positive sense, as defined by Berlin in Two Concepts of Liberty, is a form of liberty that entails the freedom to pursue a particular end. This particular end is the state of liberty achieved when the agent acts autonomously, free of the persuasion of one’s passions. Hauptman suggests that the librarian act in a way that will prevent the patron from using information in a way that will be detrimental to the common welfare. Hauptman is trying to deter an action, rather than promote a particular behavior. He does not suggest that a particular end be sought by the patron, only those acts that infringe on the liberty of others should be deterred. Therefore, he is not suggesting the promotion of liberty in the positive sense.
Hauptman’s argument suggests that all agents have the duty to not intentionally harm others. John Stuart Mill, described by Berlin in Two Concepts of Liberty as an advocate for liberty in the negative sense, argues that liberty must be restricted when the exercise thereof hinders the freedom of another agent (Berlin, 1998, p. 199). Isn’t this what Hauptman is attempting to do?
To clarify Hauptman’s position on liberty and its relationship to intellectual freedom, I will review a contrasting position taken by Robert Dowd. Dowd’s experiment followed a format very similar to that of Hauptman. Dowd, like Hauptman, surveyed thirteen libraries – six public and seven academic. Contex- tually, the studies were similar. Hauptman’s request for information on how to
build a bomb was done in the mid-1970s, a time when terrorism was a topical issue. In his study, dating from the late 1980s, Dowd requested information on how to free-base cocaine. Dowd chose free-basing cocaine because at the time of the study this behavior was a hot topic – it was illegal and was considered to be anti-social and dangerous (Dowd, 1989, p. 485).
In Dowd’s study there was little question of what would be done with the information sought and the legal implications thereof. Dowd reported that none of the librarians in the survey (public or academic) followed the usual protocol of a library request. The reference librarian is expected to ask questions to determine the specific information needs of the patron and to assist the patron in finding this information. This is referred to as the reference interview. The librarians in this study did provide minimal to good service in finding information for Dowd, but none of them tried to refine the question or show him how to find information on his own (Dowd, 1989, p. 490).
Dowd went into this survey expecting to find righteous librarians, or morally indifferent librarians. Dowd did not view the behavior of these librarians as morally indifferent, but as morally judgmental (Dowd, 1989, p. 491). Because these librarians did not follow the library protocol of the reference interview, Dowd felt that they were not respecting his autonomy. He concluded that reference service should not discriminate on the basis of the nature of the query or the character of the person requesting the information; such judgment violates the autonomy of the agent requesting the information (Dowd, 1989, p. 491). In his argument, Dowd argues that there should be no restriction on the information service provided to the library clientele. Dowd is arguing for the “freedom from,”
an aspect of negative liberty.
Negative liberty is realized when each agent is allowed to seek her own good in her own way (individual liberty), provided it does not put the welfare of others in danger (common welfare). Dowd argues that each library patron be allowed, through access to information, to seek her own good in her own way. Dowd argues for the autonomy of the library clientele. Out of respect for such autonomy, Dowd argues that reference service should be free of any moral judgment (Dowd, 1989, p. 491). But could this individual liberty – the right to seek one’s own good in one’s own way – put the welfare of others in danger?
Both Hauptman and Dowd argue for the spirit of negative liberty. Dowd argues for the library patron’s right to seek her own good in her own way, and that there should be unlimited access to information, regardless of what the request of such information may imply. Hauptman argues that the library patron has the right to seek her own good in her own way, but there are instances in which the librarian has a moral duty to impede such access. These instances would include circumstances in which the well being of others is at stake, e.g. an attempt to find the chemical
properties necessary to blow up a house. Individual liberty and the common good are both necessary for negative liberty. So, can the positions of Hauptman and Dowd be reconciled?
Isaiah Berlin in Two Concepts of Liberty refers to John Locke and John Stuart Mill as proponents of liberty in the negative sense. According to Berlin, Locke and Mill agree, “The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way” (Berlin, 1998, p. 199). Berlin goes on to explain why such philosophers believe that this is the only kind of freedom that deserves to be called freedom. Berlin quotes Mill,
unless the individual is left to live as he wishes in ‘the part [of his conduct] which merely concerns himself,’ civilization cannot advance; the truth will not, for lack of a free market in ideas, come to light; there will be no scope for spontaneity, originality, genius for mental energy, for moral courage. Society will be crushed by the weight of ‘collective mediocrity’
(Berlin, 1998, p. 199).
Both are necessary, but which is more important to negative liberty, individual liberty or the common good? Neither is more important than the other. Negative liberty is distinct in the freedom that it ensures to the individual, but this does not mean that individual welfare precludes the common welfare, or vice-versa.
Mill argues, “The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way” but notes that this freedom cannot be exercised when it directly brings harm to others. “The principle is that the sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection” (Mill, 1985, p. 68). Mill argues for individual liberty, but not at the expense of the welfare of others.
According to Mill, negative liberty ensures not only a person’s liberty but a similar liberty for others as well. But individual liberty and the common good are not always congruent. Mill gives one primary circumstance under which an individual’s liberty can be restrained: when the exercise of such a liberty would cause harm to others (Mill, 1985, p. 68). But does limiting the accessibility of information prevent harm to others? A better question when attempting to apply Mill’s position to the current debate is does unlimited access to information bring harm to others, or would the limitation of this accessibility bring an even greater harm? Supporting access to information does not indicate an approval of how that information may be used. One may protect access to information simply out of concern for the dangers of suppressing information.
Mill would not advocate Hauptman’s restriction of access to information. But would Mill’s stance on the free expression of ideas support Dowd’s argument?
Dowd argues for individual liberty on that grounds that, “the patrons [Dowd and Hauptman] requesting information on these two admittedly controversial
topics neither intended to blow up a house nor use cocaine. What better argument in favor of wholesale information dissemination could there be?” (Dowd, 1989, p. 491). Mill’s argument in regard to the freedom of ideas is not that the suppression of free ideas is not warranted because we cannot know the conse- quences/correctness of such expression, as Dowd argues, but because we do know the consequences of the suppression of ideas, regardless of whether these ideas are right or wrong, and these consequences are detrimental to a free society (Mill, 1985, p. 82). Mill would not support the grounds for Dowd’s argument that the greatest argument for the free exchange of ideas is that we cannot know the result of such dissemination.
The moral positions of both Robert Hauptman and Robert Dowd raise important concerns for the reference librarian, but they each address only part of library service’s promotion of negative liberty through intellectual freedom, the common good and individual liberty, respectively. They each argue for negative liberty, but in so doing imply that the liberty of one must come at the expense of the other.
In this section, I have tried to deconstruct the theories of Hauptman and Dowd in order to examine their respective moral implications. In so doing, I argued that, though both Hauptman and Dowd make arguments advocating negative liberty, that neither position is able to preserve such liberty.
In “A Philosophical Approach,” I initially will review the work of two 18th century philosophers, Immanuel Kant and Benjamin Constant. Kant and Constant address a very similar argument regarding the right to truth. They debate the limitations on such a right, taking positions similar to Dowd and Hauptman, respectively. Kant argues for the categorical nature of morality. Constant argues that in his preservation of moral truths, Kant disregards the rights of the moral agents that are affected by such an action. In this section, I will attempt to analyze the argument made by Kant and that made by Constant. I will identify the strengths and weaknesses of each of their arguments and apply them to the argument presented by Dowd and Hauptman, respectively.
In the second part of this section, I will present another moral position advocating the rights of the moral agent and the rights of the recipients of such an action – Alan Gewirth’s argument for the Principle of Generic Consistency.
I will review how he defines moral agency and moral action. I will explore how Gewirth addresses both duty and rights, while preserving the categorical nature of morality. In so doing, I hope to show that Gewirth’s moral theory is able to preserve the strengths of Kant’s Categorical Imperative without neglecting the theory of rights exemplified by Benjamin Constant. I will then extrapolate this to the arguments presented by Hauptman and Dowd. I will then apply the Principle of Generic Consistency to the moral arguments presented by Hauptman and Dowd.
A PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH
The quandary presented by Hauptman and Dowd is not new to moral philosophy.
In this section I will review a similar argument between two 18th-century moral philosophers, Immanuel Kant and Benjamin Constant. In their moral argument, Kant and Constant agree that the truth-telling principle is an important moral imperative, but they disagree on the relationship duty has to rights. Hauptman and Dowd would agree that information access is a duty upheld by the reference librarian, but they disagree on how this duty applies to rights. It is my hope that Kant and Constant as moral philosophers will bring light to the fundamental differences between the positions of Hauptman and Dowd. I will begin this discussion by reviewing the moral theory of Kant.
Immanuel Kant’s moral theory centers upon morality as duty, and the categorical nature of morality. An imperative is an obligatory act or duty (Webster, s.v. ‘im- perative’). According to Kant, there are three forms of imperatives: the technical imperative, belonging to art; the pragmatic imperative, belonging to welfare; and the moral imperative [Categorical Imperative], belonging to free conduct (Kant, pp. 26–27). Kant’s moral theory is unique in two ways; the law governing the moral imperative is categorical, and this imperative is derived from strictly formal principles.
In Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals: On a Supposed Right to Lie Because of Philanthropic Concerns, Kant begins by clarifying good will: “There is no possibility of thinking of anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be regarded as good without qualification, except a good will” (Kant, p. 7).
Kant goes on to refer to duty as that which emerges from good will. An action is moral if the agent is acting out of duty, not simply in accordance with duty. The action must be done out of principle, not simply in accordance with a principle.
Kant does not try to formulate rules for ethical action, but provides a test for the rules of conduct – a principle on the basis of which to determine whether or not an action is moral, the Categorical Imperative. The three formulations of the Categorical Imperative are:
(1) one must always act in a way that can be willed, at the same time, that it may become a universal law;
(2) one must always treat the rational agent as an end, and never as a means to an end, without at the same time as an end;
(3) act in conformity with the idea of the will of every rational being as a will which lays down universal laws of action (Hastings, 1928, p. 252).
The first formulation of the Categorical Imperative applies directly to action; it prescribes the moral action. The second formulation addresses how moral agents
should be treated in such an action. The third formulation applies to moral agency and the qualifications thereof. Next, I will review the limitations in the Categorical Imperative.
First, I shall address the categorical nature of action in Kant’s moral theory. A criticism of Kant’s Categorical Imperative is its inability to consider the context or consequences of an action to determine the moral weight of such an action. It is the categorical nature of action prescribed by the Categorical Imperative that precludes, for example, the action of telling a lie, even under dire circumstances, in attempt to prevent a greater injustice. Kant argues that “telling a lie can never be justified by the evil that it is intended to prevent. An action done from duty has its moral worth, not in the purpose that is to be attained by it, but in the maxim according to which the action is determined” (Kant, 1928, pp. 12–13).
Kant’s Categorical Imperative is based on purely formal principles. Kant argues that morality is based on logical grounds, that context plays no role in the moral situation. How one should act in regard to the welfare of others is addressed in the pragmatic imperative, not the moral imperative. Here, Kant differs from moral philosophers, such as Alan Gewirth, who argue that morality is primarily concerned with how one’s actions affect others. Kant views moral truths as existing independent of the agents and the affects on others, while Gewirth argues, “Morality, however, is primarily concerned with interpersonal actions;
that is, with actions that affect persons other than their agents” (Gewirth, 1979, p. 129).
While Kant argues that moral truths are independent of moral agents, he does take the treatment of moral agents into consideration when determining a moral action. The second formulation of the Categorical Imperative – treat the rational agent as an end, and never as a means to an end, solely – dictates how moral agents should be treated. It is important to note that Kant equates rational agency with moral agency, and equates rational agency with that which accepts the moral truth of the Categorical Imperative. The moral agent is duty-bound to reason and those of rational agency, and is not obligated to those outside of rational agency, as Kant defines it.
The moral agent’s obligation to reason is apparent in the third formulation of the Categorical Imperative – act in conformity with the idea of the will of every rational being as a will which lays down universal laws of action. The truth of the third formulation of the Categorical Imperative rests on the premise that morality can be derived through reason alone. In which case, the formulation makes an analytic claim. An analytic statement is a statement whose truth or falsehood can be derived through the analysis of the statement (Magee, 1998, p. 228). Analytic statements are analytic because they do not reveal anything to the agent. If it does not reveal anything to the agent, it is superfluous.
French political theorist Benjamin Constant, a contemporary of Kant, explicitly challenged the truth in the Categorical Imperative. Constant argued that moral imperatives cannot be derived through reason alone and exist independent of the moral agent. Constant wrote a rebuttal to Kant’s Categorical Imperative entitled
“On Political Reactions.” Constant had a different approach to interpreting duty.
According to Constant, duty cannot be addressed without also considering rights;
where there is duty, there must also exist the right to what that duty entails. An example of a moral duty where Kant and Constant find disagreement is in the duty of truth telling.
Constant uses the scenario of a moral agent being questioned by a potential attacker as to the whereabouts of a potential murder victim: is the moral agent obligated to tell the perpetrator whether or not the person is hiding in his house?
Constant states, “no one has the right to a truth that harms others” (Kant, p. 65). It is Constant’s view that if the moral agent were to divulge that the potential victim is in his house, then this agent should be held morally responsible for the murder.
Constant argues that it is necessary to take into consideration more than just the maxim served when determining the moral character of an action. This is because,
In every case where a principle that has been proved to be true appears to be inapplicable, the reason for this lies in the fact that we do not know the middle principle that contains the means to its application (Kant, p. 65).
Constant goes on to argue that what may be morally sound, generally, is not always true in particular cases. Constant does not question the moral importance of the maxims produced by Kant’s theory. He only questions whether these maxims apply in all cases.
What is this middle principle to which Constant refers? The middle principle is the individual’s contribution to the formation of the moral imperative to be followed; it is consent to this moral principle. Constant writes “no man can be bound by any laws other than those to whose formation he has contributed”
(Kant, p. 65). According to Constant, the moral agent must contribute to the formation of the law, in this case the moral law, either in her own person or through representation, if she is to be under such a law. In the case of truth telling, the moral agent cannot be bound to tell the truth if it is in conflict with a moral duty she deems more urgent.
How does this argument relate to the debate between Robert Hauptman and Robert Dowd? The most obvious parallel between these two debates is that in each case, Kant versus Constant and Dowd versus Hauptman, the authors debate whether the obligation of truthfulness is in conflict with other moral precepts. Kant and Dowd each argue that there is no real conflict, that truth is always mandated.
Constant and Hauptman each disagree.