The Role of Independent Third Parties

B. Institutional Design Strategies

4. The Role of Independent Third Parties

A number of psychological biases are derived from an indi- vidual's inaccurate perceptions about herself (positive illusions, illu- sion of transparency), suboptimal preferences based on her self- interest (loss aversion), and inaccurate perceptions about others'

291 Of course, vetogates might suboptimally prevent too many wars as well, particularly in the case of humanitarian interventions.

292 For an argument that congressional authorization might perversely lead to a President's selecting into riskier wars, see Nzelibe, Congressionally Authorized Wars, supra

note 7, at 910.

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behavior (fundamental attribution error, reactive devaluation). At least in some cases, these biases can be mitigated by the participation of independent third parties in the decisionmaking process.

²⁹³

For example, the research on reactive devaluation shows that when arms control proposals were framed as originating from the Soviet Union, they were largely dismissed, particularly as compared to the same pro- posal framed as originating from the United States.

²⁹⁴

This effect was not present, however, when the proposal was framed as coming from a neutral third party, the United Nations.

^{2 95}

Incorporating independent third parties into decisions about war and peace could mitigate some of the behavioral biases identified in this Article. These third party actors are effective for two basic rea- sons. First, even though the third parties are not allies who share the same preferences as the President, they might be more "epistemically competent," because they are not afflicted by psychological biases derived from participation in the foreign relations crisis.

²⁹⁶

Second, even in cases where the third party is not any more epistemically com- petent, they may simply have biases that are uncorrelated or nega- tively correlated from the relevant group of decisionmakers (e.g., the

President and her advisors).²⁹⁷ Adding participants to a group

decisionmaking process can improve the accuracy of the ultimate deci- sion if the group has uncorrelated biases.

²⁹⁸

The most obvious design strategy is multilateralism. When the use of force has broad multilateral support, it is more likely that the decision to use force was made by a diverse group of people, with varied interests. Even close international allies have different inter- ests, domestic political pressures, and preferences. And as the interna- tional coalition becomes more diverse, there is a greater likelihood of sound decisionmaking.

²⁹⁹

Thus, when the U.N. Security Council- which gives a veto to Russia and China, countries that, at least today, have different preferences from the United States-decides to authorize force, its decision is likely to be more sound than a decision by the United States alone. Of course, multilateral participation

293 Ross, supra note 80, at 41-42.

294 Id. at 29.

295 Id.

296 Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 20, at 2215.

297 Id. at 2218.

298 Id.; see also Vermeule, supra note 116, at 6 ("Even if particular voters make biased guesses, the group as a whole will be unbiased on average if guessers' biases are uncorrelated, which is the nub of independence.").

299 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 220, at 905 (arguing that participation of multilateral coalitions with diverse interests improves the credibility of decisions to use force).

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makes it less likely that the group of nations will agree, and this in turn might lead to a failure to intervene in cases where intervention is justified.

³⁰⁰

A second option is for Presidents to rely on independent commis- sions to evaluate decisions about war and peace.

³⁰¹

Independent com- missions are usually bipartisan, and if designed to include a wide variety of people, they can increase the diversity of views that are involved in the decisionmaking process. This increased epistemic diversity should help counteract group decisionmaking biases within a given administration, the problem of unified government, and other biases as well. Consider what might have happened if President George W. Bush had created an independent commission on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction prior to the 2003 Iraq war. As Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule have noted, it is possible that the com- mission would have reached different, or more nuanced, conclusions in assessing the evidence, which in turn would have affected public opinion regarding-and raised the political costs of-the invasion.

^{30 2}

To be sure, decisionmakers need not always follow the recom- mendations of an independent commission. In 2006, think tanks came together to form the independent Iraq Study Group (ISG) at the urging of Congress and with the cooperation of the Bush Administration.

^{30 3}

The ISG's role was to review the progress of the war and make recommendations.

^{30 4}

Interestingly, the ISG's recom- mendations were opposed to the Bush Administration's decision to initiate a troop surge in Iraq.

³⁰⁵

To the extent that the Bush Administration's surge policy fits the sunk cost narrative, the ISG's report did not prevent the ultimate policy from taking effect. But it did increase the political costs to the Administration of taking that course of action.

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A third possibility is to merge the two strategies, and rely on international actors to assess information relevant to decisions on war and peace or to assist with negotiations. Perhaps the best example is

300 Id. at 906-07.

301 For a general discussion, see id. at 899-900.

302 Id.

303 Letter from James A. Baker, III, and Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs of the Iraq Study Group, to Members of Congress (undated), available at http://www.usip.org/node/3700.

304 Id.

305 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Bush's Strategy for Iraq Risks Confrontations, N.Y. TIMES

(Jan. 11, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/11/washington/llassess.html?_r=0 ("By stepping up the American military presence in Iraq, President Bush is ... rejecting the central thrust of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group .... ").

306 Id. (discussing political risks to President Bush resulting from disregarding the ISG's recommendations).

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the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA acts as a third-party, international, independent monitor of nuclear mater- ials.^{30 7} Among other things, it is often called upon to inspect coun- tries' nuclear facilities and assess whether they are on the path toward nuclear weapons.^{30 8} The IAEA's credibility stems in part from the IAEA's diverse membership and interests that are independent of the foreign policies of any particular state.^{30 9}