The pagan-Christian polemic of Late Antiquity often resembled a schoolyard fight.
In order to understand the gravity of the labels used in these altercations, it is important to unpack their significance on both sides. No rebuttal was precisely sui generis; the attack and response employed analogous methods. After any accusation, the accused quickly became the accuser, lofting similar epithets against the opposing party. This was exactly the tactic the church father Tertullian employed in late second-century Carthage. Tertullian rebuked the pagans for their insipid superstition, attempting to turn the tables against his opponents.3 Tertullian asserted that the Romans were not always steeped in superstitio, and the most learned of their society attack such practices. Prior to Romulus’ heir the Roman king Numa
3 See Introduction note 25, and also Tertullian’s Apology 12.7; 21.30; 24.7; 25.12; 38.4; 46.4, using the term superstitio.
Pompilius, he claimed “not yet among the Romans did service of the gods rest on images or temples. It was a frugal religion.” Even the philosophers, he said, “openly destroy your gods, they attack your superstitions in their treatises.”4 Superstitio was obviously not the only dirty word used against the Christians by their pagan opponents. “Magicians, soothsayers, too, diviners, and astrologers,” terms portraying any association with magic were employed as well.5
Plutarch, who lived from 50-120 CE, described the divergent roles of superstition and atheism in his essay, “On Superstition.”6 Plutarch was not against religion. He believed that for a citizen, “the pleasantest things that men enjoy are festal days and banquets at the temples, initiations and mystic rites, and prayer and adoration of the gods.”7 Plutarch made it quite clear that the gods are not evil in any way, are not involved with divine punishment, and while prone to manipulation are benevolent in every facet. The superstitious person induced the gods with spurious rites and rituals. For Plutarch, deisidaimonia included magic and incantations.8 His descriptions of the erroneous rituals of the superstitious person depicted the workings of a magician in antiquity. Plutarch described the strict attention to detail and correctness of the superstitious sacrifice, for example paying attention to the tongue of the sacrificial animal.9 Superstition made demands of the gods instead of
4 Tertullian, Apol. 25.12; 46.4 (Rendall, LCL).
5 Tertullian, Apol. 43.1 (Rendall, LCL): “tum sicarii, venenarii, magi, item aruspices…”
6 Plutarch, On Superstition 170A. While the essay has usually been ascribed to Plutarch, it is questionable whether he is its true author or not. For further reading see Smith, “De Superstitione,” in Plutarch’s Theological Writings and Early Christian Literature (ed. by Hans Dieter Betz; Leiden: Brill, 1975), 6-7.
7 Plutarch, Superst. 169D (Babbitt, LCL).
8 See Introduction, 7-10 for a treatment of the terms superstitio and deisidaimonia. While the terms are better described as cousins than siblings, in Plutarch’s treatise it synonymous with superstitio.
9 Plutarch, Superst., 166B.
supplicating to the gods.10 In his depiction of people plagued with superstitious fear, Plutarch claimed their fatal flaw was their susceptibility to magic. While atheism was the polar opposite of superstition, Plutarch understood why one would choose ignorance over depraved magic.11 His task was not to equally condemn superstition and atheism, but to show how both ways of thinking avoided the waters of “true religion” that lay between the opposing realms.12
True religion for Plutarch was the tradition of Roman cultic practice ingrained in Roman life. Moreover, true religion was the mean between the extremes of deisidaimonia and atheism. The problem with Plutarch’s description of a gulf separating superstition and atheism is that it leaves many things open to interpretation. Supernatural elements were part of cultic practice. In Plutarch’s case, anything that did not involve excessive fear of the gods or pure ignorance was safely in the comfortable middle. In Plutarch’s other works, he attempted to provide rational explanations for seemingly miraculous events while revealing his belief in the efficacy of physicians’ cures.13 However, he ultimately left room for the transcendent. Miracles can happen in the worship of the gods, just as visions occur during sleep. In his life of Camillus, following the sack of Veii, the statue of Juno was disassembled and readied for transport to Rome. Camillus prayed to the statue, asking Juno to get along with the other deities of Rome, and observers claimed the statue answered she was ready and
10 See H. Armin Moellering, Plutarch on Superstition (Boston, MA: Christopher Publishing House, 1962), 78.
11 Plutarch was more concerned that those that are superstitious are not similarly condemned as the atheists.
See Superst. 169F. Also see Wilken, The Christians, 61. Plutarch wondered why atheists then are accused of impiety while superstitious people are not. He cited the case of Anaxagoras from The Odyssey who called the sun a stone and was brought to trial, while the Cimmerians who never believed in the sun were never accused of impiety. See Moellering, Plutarch on Superstition, 78-79.
12 Plutarch, Superst. 171F.
13 Plutarch, Cato Major, 23.3-4. He explained Cato’s assertion that all Greek physicians were murderers by claiming he had mixed up his versions of the Hippocratic Oath. Also see Table Talk 8, 9: 731B-734D for a discussion for the origins of disease. Plutarch believed diseases were not divine punishment but were individual cases.
willing.14 Plutarch realized that many may question such an event, and others claim to witness statues sweating or bleeding. In his view, it was best to accept the miracle without excessive credulity or incredulity and go to no extremes.15
Outside of Plutarch’s mean of religion dwells atheism and despicable magic. Within the mean of true religion, there was indeed room for miracles and dramatic events to occur.
Whether intentional or unintentional, Plutarch did not make his position regarding miracles and ineffable healings very clear. For Plutarch, any event that steers into realms of
superstition should be avoided, and if it involves healing, even efficacious healings, it was best to credit the gods and go no further.
Plutarch’s view was echoed by Marcus Aurelius in 170 CE and Plotinus in 250 CE, as they similarly ridiculed magical or superstitious thinking. Marcus Aurelius credited Diognetus for advising him “not to busy myself about trifling things, and not to give credit to what was said by miracle-workers and jugglers about incantations and the driving away of demons and such things…”16 For Marcus Aurelius, the practice of magic was a distracting nuisance, as one should always consider the source of anything said by or about magicians.
Plotinus criticized any believer in exorcisms or magicians who attempt to “make themselves more impressive in the eyes of the masses, who wonder at the powers of
magicians,” when the riddle to their power has a much more logical and mundane answer.17 Plotinus was clearly speaking not only about exorcisms but healings as well. He claimed that healers attempt to explain their cures as the scaring away of demons in the body. Plotinus
14 See Plutarch, Camillus 6; 5.22.
15 Plutarch Camillus 6. He also wrote treatments of the oracles of Apollo in On the E at Delphi, as well as a treatment On Isis and Osiris, and was a priest at Delphi late in his life.
16 Marcus Aurelius, Meditations 1.6 (Long). See Marcus’ praise of divine healing at 1.17, and see 12-13 in the Introduction.
17 Plotinus, Enneads 2.9.14 (Armstrong, LCL).
argued that the actual cure was more grounded in science and reality, such as “a vigorous movement of the bowels,” or “blood-letting.”18 Plotinus also provided a glimpse into the true religion that Plutarch mentions; the desired way of piety according to the philosophers.
True religion, for Plotinus, was a philosophy that “displays simplicity and
straightforwardness of character along with clear thinking, and aims at dignity, not rash arrogance, and combines its confident boldness with reason and much safeguarding and caution and a great deal of circumspection.”19 Superstition was not the path to true religion, and any element of Christianity would bear the stain of superstition if it persisted in
outwardly displaying signs of a magical or otherworldly nature. The pagan philosopher Celsus attacked Christianity with a similar understanding of superstition. His attack,
however, focused on the person and work of Christ as he chose to malign the representative of Christianity with the term “magician.”