After the death of Max Immelmann in June 1916, Leutnant Oswald Boelcke, his fellow Fokker pilot in Feldflieger Abteilung 62 at Douai, continued to score at a steady rate, and by June 1916 he was credited with nineteen victories.
Anxious that his possible death in action might have an adverse effect on morale, the German High Command sent Boelcke on an inspection tour of German aviation units in the south-east. While on the tour Boelcke wrote a report, putting forward proposals as to how fighter units should be organised, and the tactics which should be employed for fighting in the air.
In the winter of 1915/1916 the German Air Force had been strengthened with the formation of further Kampfstaffeln. In addition, lessons learnt from the battles of Verdun and the Somme had led to the formation of the first Jagdstaffeln (literally, hunting units) in August 1916. These Jagdstaffeln were each to be equipped with fourteen of the new single seater biplane fighters of the D category, the Albatros, Halberstadt and Fokker D types, replacing the now obsolete E Type Fokker and Pfalz monoplanes. The first of these new Jasta to be formed was Jasta 2 and the command was given to the now Hauptmann Oswald Boelcke.
Boelcke was able to hand pick some of the pilots for his new command. One was an erstwhile cavalry man, Leutnant Manfred von Richthofen; another, ironically, was Leutnant Erwin Böhme. Boelcke's grasp of air fighting tactics and the personal tuition of his young pilots were to instill them with great confidence and earned him the reputation as the father of German fighter tactics.
By 26 October 1916 Boelcke had scored another 21 victories, bringing his total to 40, and the novice pilots of his new command were also gaining valuable experience and victories. Manfred von Richthofen, only a year and a few days younger than his mentor had scored his sixth victory only the previous day.
In the afternoon of 28 October 1916, two RFC DH2s took off from 24 Squadron's aerodrome at Bertangles with orders to fly a defensive patrol over the Pozières-Bapaume area. Visibility was good and the two little pushers climbed
steadily to gain their height as they made towards the front lines. Lieutenant McKay had been delayed at the start of the patrol by engine trouble, and as the DH2s arrived over their designated area he was flying at 6,500 feet, some 1,500 feet below his companion, Lieutenant A G Knight.
Six enemy fighters were seen at 10,000 feet over Pozières, but they hesitated five minutes before attacking the DH2s, one Albatros diving under Knight, presumably to attack McKay, while the others dived on Knight. The Albatros D.II series was superior in speed and firepower to the British 'pushers', and pilots flying the DH2 had learnt that their best tactic in fighting them was to keep turning and rely on their superior manoeuvrability to avoid being shot down.
During the fighting the initial six enemy fighters were reinforced by a further six, some of which went down to attack McKay. The Albatros pilots dived in turn under the tails of the DH2s, before climbing back for another pass, but the British pilots resisted the temptation to dive after each opponent and kept turning, firing short bursts at any enemy fighter which came into their sights.
These tactics were effective and the DH2s held their own against the heavy odds.
After five minutes of strenuous fighting two of the German fighters were seen to collide. One had dived at Knight, who had turned hard to the left to evade the attack. The Albatros zoomed to the right and collided with another, which was also diving on Knight. 'Bits were seen to fall off; only one EA was seen to go down, and it glided away east, apparently under control, but was very shortly lost to sight as the DHs were too heavily engaged to watch it.'
The fight continued for another fifteen minutes, the enemy fighters driving the two DH2s down to 5,000 feet over Bapaume before breaking off the action and flying east. Knight and McKay returned to Bertangles.
The two Albatros that had collided were flown by Oswald Boelcke and Erwin Böhme, Böhme's undercarriage striking Boelcke's left top wing. Boelcke began to glide down, but there were clouds at lower level and in the increased turbulence the damaged Albatros became uncontrollable. Boelcke crashed near a German gun battery and was killed. Böhme attempted to land nearby but the area was broken ground and full of shell holes so he flew back to Jasta 2's base at Lagnicourt, overturning his Albatros on landing. Böhme was so distracted by the loss of his friend and his part in the collision that he ignored his own crash and went with the other pilots in a car to the scene of Boelcke's crash. Böhme later wrote that he felt that Boelcke would have survived if he had been wearing a crash helmet and had been firmly strapped in, as the actual impact had not been very great. On 31 October Böhme wrote to his girlfriend: 'now everything is empty for us. Only gradually are we beginning to realise the void Boelcke leaves
behind, that without him the soul of the whole squadron is lacking. In every relation he was our unparalleled leader and master.'
After the death of Oswald Boelcke, Jasta 2 was renamed Jasta Boelcke in his honour. Erwin Böhme went on to score 12 victories with the Jasta until he was posted to the command of Jasta 29 on 2 July 1917. Böhme scored only one additional victory with his new Jasta, before being given command of Jasta Boelcke on 18 August. On 29 November 1917, Böhme scored his last victory, a Sopwith Camel over Zonnebeck, but was shot down later in the day by the crew of a British Armstrong Whitworth FK8 from 8 Squadron RFC. Erwin Böhme had survived his 'master' Boelcke by a year and a month.