STRUCTURE
5. Unanswered questions
rights, through the use of special polling precincts or other provisions to citizens unable to come to the polls. The authors find that the voting out- comes are ‘unusually high’ for incumbents and ‘unusually low’ for opposi- tion in such precincts. Having tested for several alternate hypotheses, they conclude that special polling stations seem to be conducive to vote theft.
However, more work should be done to try to understand whether such vote theft is more likely in PR or single-member district races.
Notes
1. The Economist, 3 September 1999.
2. For a review of these scandals and the existing evidence, see Hildebrandt (2005).
3. The Guardian(London) (2002), ‘How to succeed in politics without really lying: the charmed career of Jacques Chirac’.
4. More accurately, the French system can act as either presidential or parliamentary depending on whether the president’s party controls the majority in the legislature. The president of the Republic is elected for a seven-year term in a runoffsystem. The presi- dent then appoints a prime minister, who selects a cabinet. Since the cabinet faces a vote of confidence, this is only a binding constraint if the president’s party does not control the parliament. France’s president is not simply a ceremonial head of state: he presides over the Council of Ministers, promulgates the acts of parliament, and is commander in chief of the armed forces. The extent of presidential de factopowers also depends on whether his party controls the National Assembly: if this is the case, then the prime min- ister becomes a mere ‘fuse’ that is replaced when the administration becomes unpopular.
On the other hand, if the president’s party does not have the majority in the legislature, a period of ‘cohabitation’ ensues, in which the president still directs the foreign policy, but needs to consult with the minister of foreign affairs.
5. Agence France Press, 1999a, ‘German conservative leader calls on Kohl to reveal secret donors’.
6. Agence France Press, 1999b, ‘Schroeder slams Kohl at opening of party congress’.
7. The concept of corruption as a breach of an implicit contract between voters, the prin- cipal, and their agent, the politician, was pioneered by Rose-Ackerman (1978); see also Rose-Ackerman (1999) and Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman (2005).
8. The relationship in which voters entrust control rights over resources to the politicians is modeled by Kunicová (2005a).
9. On electoral fraud in presidential elections in Russia and Ukraine, see Myagkov et al. (2005).
10. District magnitude refers to the number of representatives elected from the district.
Thus, single-member districts are those that elect only one representative, while multi- member districts elect several. At the other end of the spectrum, there are national dis- tricts where the entire legislature is elected in a single district.
11. The authors then twist the argument to imply that presidential systems have fewerveto points than parliamentary systems and hence should be more corrupt, which is rather different from the original concept of the veto players as used by Tsebelis (1995).
12. For formal arguments about the interaction between incumbents and opposition in the context of a corruption game, see Kunicová (2005a) and Kunicová and Mattes (2005).
13. For an analysis of the Russian case, see Slinko et al. (2005).
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