in the Networked Polity
Nicholas Low
Introduction
A feature of modernity is self-improvement, and “planning” is modern society’s official approach to social “self-improvement” – whether improvement of the city or improvement of the decision and implementation process. In this skep- tical post-modern world, such a statement sounds a little ludicrous. Yet, if in the late 1960s some French philosophers could tire of the endless appeal to social self-improvement of the Stalinist parties of the left – giving birth to post- modernism – it may be that today, faced with a world tumbling again into global war and the insidious creep of global environmental degradation, it is time to rekindle the flame of social self-improvement. What has to be rejected, though, are two nineteenth-century beliefs about society and its processes of change:
that a small coterie at the apex of a representative parliamentary government can garner the wisdom to steer society toward a better future; alternatively, that a simple set of rules held in place by such a government can automatic- ally mobilize the collective wisdom to steer society toward a better future. On the one hand the hierarchy, on the other the market. Useful though these two kinds of institutions have been in many ways, they do not exhaust the des- cription of modern society. A third institutional form is the network, which is increasingly seen as a necessary supplement to hierarchy and market.
We have Manuel Castells, among many others, to thank for the observation of the “network society.” Albrechts (2003: 264) observes that planning “forms knowledge, produces discourse, constitutes a productive network and builds 1111
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institutions that act as a catalyst for change” – and sometimes not only change, but also continuity.
In this chapter I do not want to debate whether the “network society” is a new social form or simply an aspect, now thickened and intensified, of a social form that has always been present in modern societies, but has been ignored. I want to argue that planners, as political agents, need to pay atten- tion to a particular aspect of the network society; the “networked polity.”
I then want to propose that networks be viewed as institutionally stabiliz- ing features of modern societies, and that stable networks of people are held together by stable networks of ideas: “discourse networks.” In order to make the concept more concrete I refer to conventional transport planning, which has proved extremely resistant to attempts to introduce a change of direction.
The context is Australian but there are parallels with other wealthy developed countries. I conclude by reflecting on the normative consequences of such a perspective.
The Networked Polity
Castells and others have noted how the geography of urban centers and busi- nesses is influenced by the speed and information-bearing capacity of the means of communication, whose basic material organization is a network of circuits and nodes. Castells’ point is that the spatial form of cities and regions today is constituted by the network: “the spatial articulation of dominant functions does take place in our societies in the network of interactions made possible by information technology devices” (Castells 1996: 412). He continues, “places do not disappear but their logic and their meaning become absorbed in the network” (ibid.). Places thus become, primarily, nodes or hubs. Such is the impact of advances in communications technology on the organization of spatial relationships. But what of the organization of political relationships?
There is a substantial and growing body of work on the impact of networks on the polity – that is to say the structure of relationships linking civil society and the state. Thatcher (1998) provides a comprehensive survey so we need not cite directly the many scholars who have contributed to this perspective. It is possible to identify a political form that we might, with Ansell, term “the networked polity”: “a distinctive form of modern polity that is functionally and territorially disaggregated, but nevertheless linked together through a web of interorganizational and intergovernmental relationships” (Ansell 2000: 303).
Ansell immediately qualifies this statement by saying that “it is doubtful that such a polity does or could exist in a pure or extreme form” (ibid.). However, two different observations of modern politics suggest that the network is playing an increasing role in political structures. The first is the observation that networks importantly help government function in circumstances of increasing complexity. The second is that political issues increasingly transcend both estab- lished spatial boundaries and functional bureaucratic divisions – environmental Nicholas Low
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problems being a striking case in point. Eckersley (2004: 111), for instance, argues that those affected by environmental risks have a right to be represented in the processes of decision making that impose such risks. Environmental risks typically extend across territorial, temporal, and even species boundaries. She explores the moral and prudential ramifications of this “ambit claim” for ecolog- ical democracy. We will not go further down that track but rather concentrate on the implications of networks for systems of governance with particular emphasis on networks of persons and concepts.
To crystallize the definition of the networked polity it may be helpful to contrast the network with the two other key political structures of modern societies: the market and the hierarchy. The social relations of the market center on the contract. Exchange takes place according to a matrix of legally binding promises among formal equals. The hierarchy organizes social rela- tions through structures of command, obedience, and defined function – actors carry out designated functions in exchange for a variety of positionally distinc- tive rewards. The social relations of the network combine a sense of equality among the participants with a sense of mutual obligation that is not, how- ever, normally legally binding. Actors in a network do not command and obey.
Nor do they buy and sell. But they do exchange, and what they exchange is information, political support, and trust.
Ansell enlarges on the hierarchy–market–network distinction. The hier- archy, he says, is characterized by a vertical form of organization with the strategic “thinking” part at the top, while operatives at the bottom of the chain of command suffer from “structured ignorance” limited to narrowly specified routine tasks. Networks, within and between bureaucratic hierarchies, can operate both horizontally and vertically, enriching communication and diffusing the thinking capacity of the organization. Their participants work by “mutual adjustment” rather than command (Lindblom 1959). The “organic organization”
(Burns and Stalker 1994) actively encourages lower level units to communi- cate with higher level units in “many-to-many communication.” Front line operatives are granted more discretion, and there is increased emphasis on projects on which multifunctional teams work, rather than programs in which staff are dedicated to routine tasks (Ansell 2000: 305–6).
Markets, according to Ansell, are characterized by “discrete” exchanges in which the goods or values to be exchanged are carefully measured. The parties to the exchange are “well defined” and “act authoritatively on the agreed terms at a pre-specified time and over a narrow time horizon” (Ansell 2000:
308). Markets are also “impersonal” and the parties’ knowledge of one another is narrow and limited. It is surprising that Ansell seems to miss what is central to markets, namely the legally binding contract between parties to any exchange, though it is implied in what he says. Networks, by contrast, have “thick rather than thin” communication and the “goods” exchanged are characterized by unclear or ambiguous values. The absence, normally, of contractual exchange must mean that mutual trust plays a much more significant role in networks than markets, though it is far from lacking in the former.
The Discourse Network
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Paraphrasing Ansell then (2000: 311), the networked polity is a structure of governance in which both state and societal organization are vertically and horizontally disaggregated (as in pluralism) but linked together by cooperative exchange (as in corporatism).1 Knowledge and initiative are decentralized and widely distributed. Horizontal relationships are at least as important as vertical relationships and, accordingly, communication is many-to-many rather than many-to-one (the upward chain of accountability). Exchange is diffuse and social, rather than discrete and impersonal. The logic of governance empha- sizes the bringing together of unique configurations of actors around specific projects oriented toward integrative solutions rather than dedicated programs.
Ansell’s is, on the whole, a positive and even optimistic account of the direction of modern European politics. The networked polity defeats such negative-sounding phenomena as “structured ignorance,” “many layers of middle management,” “command and control,” “mechanistic organization” (Ansell 2000: 306), a “program-oriented mentality,” “compartmentalization of informa- tion,” and “turf boundaries” (p. 310). It embodies positive sounding features such as: “many-to-many” relationships, a “high degree of connectivity,” “heter- archical organization,” “project teams,” “shared common commitments” (pp.
308–9) and “cooperative exchange” (p. 311). Nevertheless, the author in the final paragraph raises three crucial questions which he does not attempt to answer: Who benefits? Is it effective? Is it democratic?
If the networked polity is symptomatic of the network society and “the space of flows,” then Castells’ answer to “who benefits?” would probably be,
“the techno-managerial elite” (Castells 1996: 415–16). In answer to the last two questions, Habermas’ critique provides some useful insights. He finds a profound contradiction between democracy read as the responsiveness of governments to the diverse needs and demands of their constituents (the state
“knowing itself ”) and “effectiveness,” meaning the capacity of the state to act decisively in the interests of those constituents (the state’s “steering” capacity).
However, he contends that to be democratic, a society must be able both to
“know itself ” and “steer itself ” (Habermas 1996). Democracy is therefore beset with antinomy.
To know itself, a society must understand its challenges and the options available, and employ rational, inclusive, and empowering arguments to define and inquire into societal problems. To steer itself, a society must have the capacity to take action to deal with the challenges it faces in knowing itself.
Habermas considers “mediatization” the central impediment to democratic knowing and steering. Despite the apparent existence of constant debate, govern- ment increasingly relies on steering mechanisms based on the logics of instrumental reason, rather than on conscious collective deliberation (Habermas 1984: 187, 1996: 35). Instrumental reasoning leads to choices based upon achieving success in a given sphere. In a market society money and law instru- mentally coordinate action such that individuals act for economy or profit – the medium’s success criteria. The medium of money tends to “steer” society via
“markets,” as many individuals act according to the same logic.
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A similar analysis can be applied to hierarchy as a structural form, with professionalism and bureaucracy working as the steering media (Habermas 1984: 65, 214). Professional training acts with hierarchy to create mediatized responses to policy needs. The effect of mediatization can be seen in the resist- ance to change of transport infrastructure and housing policy. Investment continues to be poured into transport infrastructure when open debate might suggest alternative priorities; market principles appear to encourage the contin- uing construction of highly unsustainable housing estates and office buildings when an inclusive debate might suggest different principles based around, for example, sustainability and zero greenhouse emissions, principles that are already well understood and have been implemented in isolated instances.
Accordingly, the various media (law, bureaucracy, professionalism, markets) represent one pole of a dilemma: instrumental steering in the interest of deci- sive action versus the deliberative formation of norms. In liberal democracies media both facilitate democracy by making it effective, but also restrict it by preventing discursive norm development and rational dialogue.
It seems likely that networking may facilitate effectiveness in an instru- mental sense, that is, may help actors in the network achieve their goals. But in focusing on the responsiveness of the system to the diversity of actors within it, it is important not to neglect the wider responsiveness of the system to actors beyond it, populations whom democracy is meant to serve. The advan- tage of a hierarchy for democracy is that the trail of accountability leads with reasonable transparency to an elected official. The danger with a net- worked polity is that the trail becomes utterly confused (see Hart et al.: 1996).
The danger is that the network could become, indeed has already become, yet another steering medium with its own internal logic defeating public, discursive, normative planning.
Only passing attention is given by Ansell to another aspect of network governance: the effect of discursive structures in coordinating network activity.
Ansell (2000: 308) notes that the parties to a network “share common norma- tive commitments.” In fact, these normative commitments are the filaments that link the nodes of a network together. Recent work in institutional analysis by North and his colleagues has placed considerable emphasis on “shared mental models.” Denzau and North (1994: 4) divide the institutional field into two parts: “Mental models are the internalrepresentations that individual cogni- tive systems create to interpret the environment; the institutions are the external (to the mind) mechanisms individuals create to structure and order the environment” (emphasis added). These mental models are resilient. Denzau and Grossman (1993) and Denzau and North (1994: 22–6) discuss the process of discursive change. A critically important, prior distinction they make is between change within the “model space” (learning) and change of the model space or “representational redescription.” What then do they mean by
“model space?” It seems that they mean something like (but not exactly like) the notion of “paradigm” in the history of science identified by Kuhn (1970). The dimensions of the “model space” are shaped by one or more key The Discourse Network
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assumptions that generally do not change as learning from new observational data occurs.
These assumptions define the parameters of a discourse network. It could even be argued that discourse is what forms a network, allowing ideas to travel, rather than the network shaping discourse. It is the discursive factor in networks, I want to propose, that makes them such formidable and impenetrable barriers to paradigm change. Equally, perhaps, exposing the discursive filaments to the public gaze and public debate may be a way of introducing some public self- reflection and eventually fundamental change, when it is needed, in policy settings.
Discourse Networks and Urban Transport in Australia
Within the policy network literature, different kinds of analysis point to the structuring connection between groups of ideas and groups of people (Rhodes and Marsh 1992; Smith 1993). The concept of “policy community” emphasizes the social structure of mutual influence with implicit rules of inclusion and exclusion (Laumann and Knoke 1987). At international level, members of an
“epistemic community” may come from different scientific disciplines but share a common body of knowledge which they interpret in a similar way with similar policy implications (Haas 1992; Toke 1999). The work of Sabatier and his colleagues locates shared core beliefs centrally in the coordination of policy (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). Hajer focuses upon the discourses that influ- ence conceptions (Hajer 1995: 42–72). These discourses are comprised of particular “storylines” that tell what the problem is and what to do about it (Davies and Harré 1990). Storylines connect different core belief systems with policy solutions. All these analytical systems illuminate the connection between social interaction and the beliefs of policy actors within and among more formally structured organizations.
Knowledge about how to make urban transport sustainable is reasonably widespread in Australia. Planners and politicians in Sydney, Melbourne, and Perth have even expressed serious commitment to the idea. What is interesting now is what is blocking its implementation. For instance, the metropolitan plan for Melbourne – Melbourne 2030 – unveiled in early 2003 after much internal turbulence, presented an uncompromising vision of Melbourne as a compact city, complete with brownfield development, transit villages, and commitment to public transport, walking, and cycling (State of Victoria 2002).
Yet the government (of the State of Victoria) is going ahead with the construc- tion of an outer ring motorway costing AU$2.5 billion or more (about £1.02 billion, 1.46 billion euros) which will displace funds from public transport and encourage a car-dependent “edge city.” This infrastructure policy is guaranteed to increase outward-sprawling pressures which, in the longer run, governments will find hard to resist. A theory is needed not only of what promotes social transformation but also of what resists it.
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No doubt resistance to social change is overdetermined. It is not difficult to pick the usual suspects: the “road lobby,” the oil and automobile companies, the engineering profession, the weakness of the public transport agencies, the propaganda of the road service agencies (e.g., the Royal Automobile Club of Victoria), all constantly reinforced by the shock jocks of talkback radio, as well as cowardly or blinkered politicians responding to what they perceive to be public demand (see Mees 2000). But apportioning blame does not serve as an explanation. The idea of a conspiracy among these various actors is intuitively unappealing, as is the notion that any one of them gets what it wants by simply going to the government of the day and lobbying for it. Positions have to be argued, reasons given. It is not as though counterarguments or oppositional lobbies do not exist. The rise of the Green Party throughout Australia in recent years (commanding up to eight percent of the vote nationally and much more in some places) is evidence of the considerable dissatisfaction of a substantial proportion of the electorate with the major parties. The uptake of “sustain- ability” rhetoric by governments shows the impact of the “green lobby” as well as simple common sense on the part of the public. Whether the substance of sustainability will follow is still very much in question.
There is a wealth of public documentation containing reasoning for trans- port and land use policy. This not only sets the terms of public debate, but it also defines the parameters of what is debatable. It contains a range of “story- lines,” and implicitly filters acceptable from unacceptable stakeholders. As Maarten Hajer discovered in relation to the acid rain debate in Europe, story- lines cover metaphors, analogies, historical references, clichés, and appeals to collective fears or senses of guilt. Because storylines are what hold discourse together, they are “prime vehicles of change” (Hajer 1995: 63). Storylines both legitimate an actor’s political stance, and position other actors – e.g., as helpful and politically relevant or the reverse. As well as excluding actors from influence, storylines facilitate coalitions.
However, while discourse is important, it does not explain the influence of budgetary and socio-organizational factors: the division of responsibility for transport infrastructure funding in a federal system (resource dependency), the cohesion of infrastructure planning agencies (policy community), and the power position of their personnel in the public service (authority). These are the
“external” structures mentioned by Denzau and North (1994). Formal institu- tional structures limit what action can occur and what storylines are influential.
Moreover, the concept of “storyline” is insufficient to capture all aspects of discourse. First, in environmental planning, especially where it impinges on infrastructure projects, formal logics play a key role in policy making, espe- cially environmental impact statements which contain closely argued logical structures. Although they may make reference to storylines, they need to be treated differently from government policy documents and other documentary sources. The logic needs to be carefully unpacked and the black box of a statis- tical model’s assumptions opened up. Second, arguments often need to be backed by evidence of an external reality, so discourse is not always mere The Discourse Network
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