Despite being charged with this important task, given its accessibility in the community, many have argued that congressional oversight of the IC has become increasingly inadequate. A review of limited scholarly articles and opinion pieces offered by experts on the subject suggests that Congressional oversight of the IC has, in fact, been broken. However, researchers have largely refrained from defining adequate congressional oversight of the IC and have largely failed to evaluate the function holistically.
In order to answer this question for a general audience, this thesis is formatted in a way that builds the average reader's knowledge of the IC through the history of the relationship between Congress and the United States intelligence apparatus, the current mandate for congressional oversight of the IC, and the methods of oversight most commonly used by Congress. The IC is a large and complex bureaucratic structure that many citizens outside the national security sphere do not fully understand. After developing necessary foundational knowledge, this thesis lays out several important factors for adequate congressional oversight of the IC and evaluates current congressional practices against those factors through anecdotal case studies of various sizes on recent oversight actions.
The unclassified open source articles are used primarily to create a historical context for Congressional oversight of IC and to incorporate the comments of professionals who use the media to share their opinions on the issue. The historical context includes not only how oversight of the CI came to be, but also the opinions of national leaders and commentators during periods of increased scrutiny of the CI and its congressional oversight.
Background A Large, Secretive Bureaucracy
The public and interest groups are limited in their ability to oversee the IC, unlike other USG organizations, given the classified nature of the IC's work. Intelligence leaders have long agreed, despite some representations to the contrary, that external oversight of the IC is essential in a country struggling for democratic values. For example, then-CIA Director Leon Panetta said in 2009, “In our democracy, effective congressional oversight of intelligence is essential.
The push for congressional oversight of the United States intelligence apparatus began long before the late 1970s, when oversight of the IC became paramount following infamous allegations of various abuses of power. According to the CIA, "It was only after World War II and the enactment of the National Security Act of 1947 that Congress again attempted to control US intelligence." The National Security Act of 1947 primarily established the Department of Defense, the CIA, and the National Security Council (NSC). After these revelations, the first act by Congress to limit the power of the CIA and other offending intelligence organizations was the passage of the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which, according to DOS, “the CIA was .
The discovery and response of Congress to the abuses committed at the time by the CIA and other existing components of the IC play an instrumental role in the need for congressional oversight and the seriousness with which the legislature assumes its duties takes. The United States has held that while there are limits to the Legislature's oversight capabilities, “the power of Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process.
Congressional Oversight Functions Today The Committee Conundrum
Congress usually carries out its oversight authorities of the IC through legislation, investigations, hearings, briefings, and roundtables. According to the Congressional Research Service, “Annual intelligence authorization acts were first passed in 1978 after the creation of the two. The committee directed the declassification review so that the material could serve the public interest and help demystify bin Laden and al-Qaeda without jeopardizing national security.”33 Unlike other surveillance activities, which serve as ways to obtain information from the To obtain IC, these legislative measures can limit the operational power of the IC and compel it to act in accordance with congressional directives by reforming the law.
In doing so, Congress called attention to potentially problematic aspects of IC, which could then prompt remedial action by the executive branch or Congress through legislation. 34 HPSCI, “Report on the Activity of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to the One Hundred Fourteenth Congress,” 10. A review of the Congressional Record shows that the vast majority of hearings conducted by HPSCI and SSCI are classified and closed. to the public.
36 HPSCI, “Report on the Activity of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for the One Hundred Fourteenth Congress,” 11. A review of the Congressional Record also indicates that HPSCI has held 25 hearings, 79 briefings, 17 roundtables, and 12 business conferences . meetings during the 114th Congress.37 Oversight activities were scheduled regularly throughout the months of the session, with only four hearings open to the public.38 The open hearings generally consisted of the annual Worldwide Threats Hearing, where IC leaders Congress testifies about the major threats the United States faces every year. This is likely explained by the fact that most intelligence committee business is conducted in a closed environment, which requires the use of sensitive compartmentalized information facilities (SCIFs).
38 HPSCI, “Report on the Activity of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for the One Hundred Fourteenth Congress,” 16. Isolation from individuals and groups outside the national security community creates an entirely different dynamic than the other, more open Congress. the committees. For example, former CIA director John Brennan's confirmation hearing was postponed shortly after the release of the SSCI report on the CIA's use of EITs.
This put Brennan in a difficult position, as he would reject the former controversial operations for the sake of political expediency, while also remaining supportive of the workforce he would lead. Rizzo continued to serve in an acting capacity until the end of the Bush administration. While Congress has the aforementioned tools to check the power of the executive branch and precise oversight of the IC, the lack of staffing, lack of transparency, and poor organizational structure of the congressional oversight apparatus have resulted in "little [to] full confidence have in the ability of the House Intelligence Committee to perform properly.”44.
Understanding the Challenges to Adequate Oversight Factors for Adequate Oversight
Information sharing among the branches of government and within Congress is essential for the legislative institution to provide adequate oversight of the IC. In his formal response to the SSCI report, then-CIA Director John Brennan said. We disagree with the investigation's conclusion that the Agency actively obstructed Congressional oversight of the CIA's detention and interrogation program.
In fact, according to the rules of the HPSCI Committee of the 115th Congress, “Committee members and. Adequate congressional oversight of the IC likely requires a commitment to nonpartisanship in assessing IC deficiencies and other matters of concern. Just as the IC's intelligence analysis should be impartial, so too should congressional oversight of the IC's shortcomings and errors.
SSCI's study of the CIA's detention and interrogation program delegitimized the Committee's ability to conduct fair oversight of the CIA and further undermined the confidence necessary to conduct proper oversight of the rest of the IC. This case serves as an example where Congress, itself, cast doubt on the general public about its ability to conduct adequate oversight of the IC. The IC and its former officials involved in the program devised a fierce public relations campaign to bring issue to bear on problematic elements of the study.
Acting in this regard is likely to delegitimize the work of oversight committees and undermine trust between the IC and Congress. Very few lawmakers take advantage of such meetings.”83 The politicization of FISA oversight by members of Congress has probably done more harm than good to national security and to instilling public confidence that Congress exercised adequate congressional oversight of the IC. Adequate congressional oversight of IC requires modernized, well-resourced committee structures that adequately centralize oversight activities.
Separately, given the large size of the IC and its multi-billion dollar budget, it is important for oversight committees. Given the size of the IC and the involvement of organizations from at least seven departments at the executive level, oversight is dispersed across Congress. According to LegBranch.org, the average HPSCI staff member has been on the board for less than four years—hardly enough time to develop deep-rooted institutional knowledge of the oversight role of the IC and Congress.
According to Fred Eckert of Politico, "Each committee can handle part of the puzzle. According to the Brookings Institution, "HPSCI members cannot draw on the full measure of advice from their personal office.
Concluding Thoughts
34;POGO Calls for Removal of House Intelligence Committee Members After Vote to Release Memo." Project On Government Oversight. Accessed December 4, 2018. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov the- cautionary-tale-of- the-house-intelligence-committees-recent-failures/. 34;CIA Comment on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report on the Extradition, Detention, and Interrogation Program." John O.
34;Major CIA operation reported in US against anti-war forces, other dissidents in Nixon years." New York Times, December 22, 1974. 34;House Benghazi report finds no new evidence of wrongdoing by Hillary Clinton." The New York Times.
