2 I do not intend to limit discussions of egalitarian justice to the context of the state. My discussion of the first of these questions, that of the "equality point," will conclude Section 1.1.
Distributivism
Debates in Distributivism (2) Equality of what?
Egalitarians often remain unclear as to whether the locus of justice is limited to political institutions, or whether it can be expanded to cover institutions that are usually considered part of the private sphere such as the family and the economy. The question of the locus of egalitarian justice is important because where egalitarian justice is located will determine who is responsible for it, and who or what can make demands in order to try to achieve it.
Relationalism
Egalitarian Critiques of Distributivism
He is often seen as one of the earliest critics of luck egalitarianism specifically, although he expresses reluctance to characterize himself in this way (Wolff 2010, 346). They either count too much in the category of being the individual's responsibility, or too little.
Debates in Relationalism
The main goals of the rest of this dissertation will be to provide a systematic analysis of the most promising answers to this question in the existing literature. Unfortunately for the relationalist, the site issue becomes more complicated when the focus of the account is on relationships.
Mixed Approaches
He goes on to argue that in each respect something important is lost if it is subordinated to another. As noted earlier, Lippert-Rasmussen's view is also mixed (although I will examine the relational component of Lippert-Rasmussen's account as one candidate for what relational egalitarians mean by "relationships of equality").
Other Approaches to Equality
A relational egalitarian theory that does not meet any of the conditions I propose would seem to be flawed especially in certain respects, but such a theory might still be the best available relational egalitarian view. The final, sixth requirement is specific to relational theories and is intended to ensure that the theory clearly exemplifies the specific kind of egalitarian theory intended.
The Justice Requirement
It is also the way in which the concept of justice is usually framed in contemporary discussions. It is clear, then, that an account of justice is the prerequisite for a minimally adequate egalitarian theory of justice.
The Egalitarian Requirement
As mentioned, many theorists who are not considered egalitarian (or even who are anti-egalitarian) share the assumption of basic moral equality. Even Robert Nozick justifies his Entitlement Theory of justice at least implicitly in terms of basic moral equality. In contemporary egalitarian theories, both the justification in the assumption of basic moral equality and the inference to equalize manifest in very different ways.
The Avoiding Problematic Perfectionism Requirement
The anti-perfectionist position, on the other hand, holds that the state must be impartial as to which conception of the good is right or best. For example, it could be argued that using the fact of fundamental moral equality to justify what is due according to justice (that something be made equal) presupposes some conception of the good life, even if only in a very modest sense. Moreover, it must be justified to those who hold different and even contradictory views of the good.
The Real World Requirement
However, it is with Anderson that attention to real-world social justice movements becomes an explicit and central part of the theorizing of justice itself, rather than a move that comes only after the theory is in place. However, it is not always clear what being able to inform and be informed by real world social movements would entail, taken as a requirement for a theory. This is why a theory of justice must be applicable to the real world but remain critical as well as aspirational.
The Dialectic Requirement
The fourth requirement for a minimally adequate theory of egalitarian justice thus ensures the relevance of the theory, and can be summarized as follows: A theory does not meet the requirements of the real world if it completely ignores real world social justice movements, there fails to include specific issues and cases that are widely considered unjust by real-world social justice movements, or fails to exclude issues and cases that are considered unjust. These are clearly not cases of injustice in most social justice movements in the real world. A theory does not meet the dialectical requirement if it avoids or ignores healthy criticism and is subject to the same criticism that it applies to other theories.
The Relational Requirement
To summarize, the final requirement for all minimally sufficient egalitarian theories of justice can be stated as follows:. But the fact that this is an objection commonly raised throughout the literature indicates that a relational egalitarian theory of justice must be irreducibly relational if it is to be adequate as a relationalist theory. Accounts that are not irreducibly relational may still be minimally adequate as egalitarian theories of justice.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I will take the framework developed in Chapter 2 and use it to test four theories that provide the most promising current candidates for answering the question, “What kinds of relationships are relationships of equality?” There are probably also many other possible ways in which relations of equality can be defined by a. There are at least two different ways in which the question 'what kinds of relations are relations of equality?' can be answered. can be understood and responded to.
Samuel Scheffler: the Egalitarian Deliberative Constraint
Is Scheffler’s Account Minimally Adequate?
However, the egalitarian deliberative constraint provides enough indication of the relational ideal that some general decisions can be made. Since Scheffler's account suffers from some of the same important shortcomings that led him to reject luck egalitarianism, it seems that the account is weak in terms of its dialectical robustness, even if it does not meet this requirement outright. Although Scheffler's account meets two of the requirements, it fails to meet at least two requirements (the real-world requirement and the dialectical requirement), while two others are difficult to determine (the fairness requirement and the relational requirement). earth).
Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen: A Pluralist Relational Egalitarianism
Is Lippert-Rasmussen’s Account Minimally Adequate?
The first requirement poses a problem with this theory because of the many dimensions along which Lippert-Rasmussen thinks about what it means to interact as equals. However, Lippert-Rasmussen doesn't really seem to pay much attention to such real-world claims. For the purposes of this project, it will suffice to say that Lippert-Rasmussen's view of equality relations does not meet the minimum suitability requirements for a relational egalitarian theory of justice, and that there is thus still a need for an alternative view of what it means . means: dealing with each other as equals.
Christian Schemmel: Liberal Non-Domination and Social Status Norms
Is Schemmel’s Account Minimally Adequate?
It is also the result of false dominance arising from its agentic nature. Of course, Schemmel admits that relations of dominance alone are not enough to explain all the inequitable relationships that concern egalitarians. Of the three I have discussed so far, Schemmel's account comes closest to meeting the minimum requirements for relevance.
Elizabeth Anderson: Democratic Equality
Is Anderson’s Account Minimally Adequate?
Now that Anderson's candidate is clear, it is time to test it against the six adequacy requirements. He describes what he calls “the relationendum” of Anderson's democratic equality as “the expression of equal respect” (Lippert-Rasmussen 2018, 70). While Anderson's story clearly meets three of the requirements, she fails at least one (the real world requirement) and has questionable results when it comes to another (the dialectical requirement).
Conclusion
It is clearly an egalitarian theory of justice and touches on something about relations of equality that all three other theories miss. However, this assessment has shown that each of the theories in question fails to meet at least one of these minimum requirements for relevance. However, feminist theorists of social reproduction provide resources for a better theoretical understanding of the dynamics of the overall system and how it can create inequality and injustice.
Anderson’s Democratic Equality and the System of Cooperative Production
46 With this analysis in place, I will propose an account of the relations of equality necessary for equality, as those that enable participation as equals in systems of cooperative production and reproduction, without being structured in such a way that the development of some is parasitic on others. . However, the idea of interpersonal justification is also linked to the understanding of the economy as a system of shared, cooperative production. To do so, I will now delve deeper into these strengths of Anderson's theory by elaborating on her conception of the system of cooperative production and its role in relational egalitarian justice.
Adding Social Reproduction to the System
In addition, identifying a facilitating explanation for the relationships also helps the theory avoid the kind of problematic perfectionism that conflicts with the minimum adequacy requirements set out in Chapter 2. Anderson's attention to such cases is a strength of her account, but she offers minimal theoretical development. of how such work, usually done at home, is part of the system of cooperative production. They are also, arguably, the normative grounds for the creation of state and political institutions.
The Relations Required
People behave as equals when society is structured in such a way that no one's participation in socially necessary systems of cooperative production and reproduction depends on giving up capabilities that are valuable to them. In both cases, the capabilities that a person must sacrifice in order to participate in a system of cooperative production cannot be understood in terms of the contribution he makes (directly or not) to participation as a democratic citizen. However, it must also be possible to justify the skills in question within a cooperative system of production and reproduction.
Testing Against the Minimum Adequacy Requirements
- The Justice Requirement: Is this account clearly an account of justice?
- The Egalitarian Requirement: Is this account justified by the assumption and inference that defines egalitarianism?
- The Avoiding Problematic Perfectionism Requirement: Is this account not problematically perfectionist?
- The Real World Requirement: Is this account able to address real world egalitarian movements?
- The Dialectic Requirement: Is this account dialectically robust?
- The Relational Requirement: Is this account irreducibly relational?
The use of a facilitative approach further ensures that it remains an account of justice, as the account does not prescribe the specific nature of the relationships between the members of a society. This account is thus able to inform and be informed by all the real-world claims about injustice and inequality that Anderson's account captures, but also by some that it misses. As a result, principles, policies and practices based on a theory that foregrounds distribution will fail to address important elements of the system of cooperative production and reproduction.
Conclusion
Relational Equality, Non-Domination, and Vulnerability” in Social Equality: On What It Means to Be Equal, ed. Choice, Circumstance, and the Value of Equality” in Equality and Tradition: Questions of Value in Moral and Political Theory Oxford, Oxford University Press: 208-235. The Practice of Equality” in Social Equality: On What It Means to Be Equal, ed.
