In this chapter, I have presented a framework of six requirements that form the minimum
threshold that an egalitarian theory of justice, and specifically a relationalist theory, must pass in
order to be considered adequate as this kind of theory. The next step in trying to determine the most viable conception of relational egalitarian justice will be to apply each of these minimum adequacy requirements to various relational egalitarian theories. Such a project should begin with examining the most well fleshed out theories of relational egalitarian justice in the current literature, such as those proposed by Anderson (1999), Samuel Scheffler (2003, 2010, and 2015), Schemmel (2021), and Lippert-Rasmussen (2018). Examining the most well developed accounts of relational egalitarianism through the lens of the requirements outlined in this paper will give a starting point for determining how flawed current relationalist conceptions are, and what
directions should be taken to develop better, viable theories of egalitarian justice. This is the first step towards determining the best version of relational egalitarianism, to be used as an alternative to distributive egalitarianism in further debates.
CHAPTER 3
What Kinds of Relations are Relations of Equality?
The first two chapters of this dissertation have mapped the terrain of contemporary egalitarian literature by surveying key debates and positions within them, and then provided a framework for evaluating such theories based on their ability to meet certain minimum requirements. In this chapter, I will take up the framework developed in Chapter 2, and use it to test four theories that provide the most promising current candidates answering “what kinds of relations are relations of equality?”
As Lippert-Rasmussen has pointed out, the topic of what it means to relate as equals has not received the attention it deserves in discussions of relationalist theories to date (Lippert- Rasmussen 2018, 6). This is to the detriment of relationalism as a whole, since without a clear account of what kinds of relations are relations of equality it is next to impossible to provide a satisfactory answer most of the other questions about a theory of justice that egalitarians must address. By evaluating these four relationalist theories, using this set of adequacy requirements and focusing specifically on what each account proposes as the kind of relations required for equality, I intend to contribute to remedying that gap in the literature.
I chose these specific theories because they are the most completely articulated theories of relational egalitarian justice in current literature and are therefore closest to viability, although in some of them the account of relations of equality is only implied. By testing these theories in
this way, I intend to introduce a framework for diagnosing the strengths and the failures of the most promising articulations of relational egalitarian justice. By identifying the account (or accounts) that best fulfill these requirements, this project will provide a foundation for further discussions within relational egalitarianism about what such a theory of equality demands, as well as providing more robust grounds for engaging in debates with other kinds of egalitarian theories. The four theories that I will consider are:26
(1) Samuel Scheffler’s egalitarian deliberative constrain (2) Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen’s pluralist account (3) Christian Schemmel’s liberal non-domination (4) Elizabeth Anderson’s democratic equality
It should be noted from the start that all four of these candidates fall short of at least one of the minimum adequacy requirements. Still, the ways in which these theories succeed and fail provides a framework for diagnosing the strengths and the failures of both current and future articulations of relational egalitarian justice. For each of the four theories in turn, I will first summarize the main points of the theory as a theory of justice and identify what the theory proposes as relations of equality. I will then evaluate that concept against the six minimum adequacy requirements outlined in Chapter 2, and discuss how the theories’ success or failure regarding these requirements indicates their plausibility as a viable relational egalitarian theories of justice. Each of these theories does hit on important aspects of what it means for relations to be structured in ways that ensure people stand as equals, but since all four fall short of at least
26 I do not claim this chapter to be an exhaustive analysis of existing theories. There are several other theories that could have been examined in this chapter. However, I find that each of them provides a less developed account of what it means to “relate as equals” than the ones discussed here. Although I have chosen to analyse two theories that only imply an answer to what kinds of relations are “relations of equality” rather than addressing the question, from Anderson and Scheffler, those two theories have a robust positive theory of relational egalitarianism, as well as prominence in the current literature on relational egalitarianism.
There are also likely to be many other possible ways in which relations of equality could be defined by a
relationalist theory, which haven’t articulated in the literature. Some are implied within the theories discussed here, through the use of terms such as recognition or care. However, as they have not yet been made central to any theory
one of the minimum adequacy requirements, in Chapter 4 I will suggest and evaluate an alternative candidate.
There are at least two different kinds of ways that the question “what kinds of relations are relations of equality?” can be understood and answered. I will describe these as the enabling and the entailment approaches to this question. The enabling approach focuses on what people need to be able to do in order to be rendered equal, and claims that relations of equality are precisely the kinds of relations that enable them to do those things. These kinds of answers to what it means to relate as equals do not characterize the relationships of equality directly, but instead describe the social effects that such relationships should have. The entailment approach, on the other hand, focuses on identifying what characteristics the relationships themselves must have in order for them to count as ones where the people involved relate as equals. Enabling and entailment approaches may manifest in a variety of ways, including some that are not explored here, but this basic categorization can help to clarify an important difference among the
candidates I am examining in this chapter. I view Scheffler and Anderson as primarily presenting enabling approaches, while Lippert-Rasmussen and Schemmel present entailment approaches.
It is important to state now that I do not intend to argue that any viable relational
egalitarian theory will put forward only one kind of relationship as what is meant by relations of equality. I intend to leave open the possibility of a pluralist account, both within relationalism and in the debate between relationalists and distributivists. My intention is instead to give grounds for setting aside those conceptions of relations of equality that are less plausible due to their inability meet the minimum requirements necessary. Additional viable alternatives may arise, and it is possible that combining the inadequate conceptions relayed here could serve to eliminate or at least mitigate the flaws that make them inadequate when examined separately.
Chapter 4 serves to put forward what I think is one such, more promising, alternative for to building to building a relational egalitarian theory of justice.