From this context, the establishment of the policy was criticized and rejected by civil society organizations (CSOs) and the Victims. This led to the Jokowi-Ma'ruf administration establishing a mechanism to resolve cases outside the Human Rights Court. Starting with the PPHAM team, the dynamics remained worthy of investigation regardless of the outcome.
The fundamental essence of the concept of Transitional Justice focused on the patterns by which a transforming state or society addresses previously committed atrocities. One factor that influenced the choice of the Transitional Justice mechanism was also the nature of the political transition itself. In terms of transplacement, democratization occurred as a result of negotiations or compromises between the ruling elite of the old regime and the opposition.
Based on Wahyuningroem, the transitional element influenced the outcome of the Human Rights Court mechanism that ultimately failed. This annulment was expected to have a negative impact on the transitional justice process, as the Constitutional Court's decision legitimized the "means by which" the government sought reconciliation through political policies of rehabilitation and amnesty. Quoted from Wiratraman et al., the court's decision prioritized a perspective based on the interests of the state over the victims.30.
10 McGregor and Setiawan also noted that “culturalist arguments” were continually advanced by the elites of Jokowi's government to demonstrate the irrelevance of Transitional Justice mechanisms such as the Human Rights Court.
Presidential Decree 17/2022: A Critical Review
- The Problem of Truth “Disclosure”
- Simplified Reparation
- PPHAM Team: Substitute or Complement Judicial Process?
- Actor Map and Interest Analysis
In addition, the office of the PPHAM Team was limited until December 31, 2022, before the subsequent extension with the issuance of the Presidential Decree. The implementation of the PPHAM Team mechanism as a 'truth', 'investigation' or 'fact-finding' commission was still unclear. However, the Presidential Decree only articulated "discovery" in the entire policy-making process.38 In line with this, the 1965-66 Assassination Victims Research Foundation (YPKP65) stated that the PPHAM Team's primary task was not "discovering the truth." .
Subsequently, the task of the PPHAM Team was able to slightly expand the results of the National Human Rights Commission. In this case, the results of the National Human Rights Commission were more significant. 45 For example, in the Executive Summary of Cases of Enforced Disappearances 1997-1998, the National Human Rights Commission analyzed the level of command responsibility down to perpetrators on the ground.
According to Presidential Decree 17/2022, no statement emphasized the closure of PPHAM Group's judicial resolution channel. However, none of the provisions in the Presidential Decree a quo stated that the group's “out-of-court settlement efforts” could not replace or substitute for the court process. This was due to the importance of the provision to ensure the alignment of the out-of-court process with the judicial process.
In the public discourse, confusion was also noted about the position and character of the PPHAM Team. Meanwhile, the state has repeatedly stated that the PPHAM Team has not replaced the judicial mechanism of the Human Rights Court.58 In this case, the confusion appeared due to the lack of guarantee for the principle of complementarity. Al-Rahab stated that the launch of the Team was a form of the state's commitment to solving the GHRV series.
These representatives gave a call to reject the PPHAM team as a legitimizing tool for the state to apologize to the PKI. The post-New Order regime of the Indonesian government also improved its image as a country with good human rights. This study asserted that the state's creation of the PPHAM team was a pragmatic decision driven by two factors.
In conclusion, the initiation of the PPHAM Team primarily benefited state interests and did not fully address victims' demands for accountability and truth. Based on these results, the team initially indicated that the state prioritized resolving past GHRV cases through non-judicial channels.
34; Laporan nasional disampaikan sesuai dengan paragraf 5 Lampiran Resolusi Dewan Hak Asasi Manusia 16/21*: Indonesia." Siklus ketiga – A/HRC/WG.6/27/IDN/1. Metodologi." Dalam Metode Penelitian Hukum: Konstelasi dan Refleksi, Cetakan Ketiga, diedit oleh Sulistyowati Irianto dan Shidarta. Tim penyelesaian non-yudisial pelanggaran HAM berat masa lalu dan komposisi anggotanya telah merugikan korban dan merusak penegakan HAM.
Ketika Usman Hamid menolak ajakan Mahfud MD untuk bergabung dalam tim penyelesaian pelanggaran HAM berat secara non-yudisial. 34;Pencarian Keadilan Transisi di Indonesia: Pelajaran dari Kasus Aceh, Papua dan Timor Timur." Tinjauan Konstitusi 1 (2). 34;Perkembangan Keadilan Transisi." Dalam Research Handbook on Transitional Justice, yang diedit oleh Cheryl Lawther dkk.
34; Memikirkan Kembali Negara Organik: Hak Asasi Manusia dan Demokrasi di Indonesia Pasca Reformasi." Dalam Budaya Hak Asasi Manusia di Negara-Negara Iliberal, diedit oleh Robertus Robet & Todung Mulya Lubis. 34; Pengadilan Hak Asasi Manusia: Merangkul Impunitas." Dalam Politik Reformasi Peradilan: Perubahan Peradilan dan Budaya Hukum di Indonesia, diedit oleh Melissa Crouch. Presiden sebaiknya mencabut dan menganulir Perpres yang membentuk tim penyelesaian non-yudisial terhadap pelanggaran HAM berat di masa lalu.
Solidaritas Perempuan menolak keputusan presiden tentang pembentukan kelompok penyelesaian di luar hukum atas pelanggaran HAM berat di masa lalu dalam operasi Kamisan. 28 https://www.solidaritasperempuan.org/solidaritas-perempuan-menolak-keppres-tangan-besar-tim-pengelesaian-non-judisial-pelanggaran-ham-Berat-masa-lalu-di-aksi-kamisan/. 34; Prinsip-prinsip dasar dan pedoman mengenai hak atas pemulihan hukum dan kompensasi bagi korban pelanggaran berat hukum hak asasi manusia internasional dan pelanggaran serius terhadap hukum humaniter internasional.” A/RES/60/147.
34; Melanggar Janji: Keadilan Transisi antara Konsesi Taktis dan Warisan Rezim Otoriter di Indonesia." Jurnal Internasional Keadilan Transisi. 34;Menuju Keadilan Pasca Transisi: Kegagalan Keadilan Transisi dan Peran Masyarakat Sipil di Indonesia." Jurnal Hak Asasi Manusia Asia Tenggara 3 (1). 34;Budaya lokal, menneskerettigheder dan udvikling di Papua." I Budaya Hak Asasi Manusia di Negara yang Tidak Liberal, diremajakan oleh Robertus Robet & Todung Mulya Lubis.
