No individual at any time has the most of everything—net worth, love, happiness, security, companionship, fame, food, land, grandchildren, or whatever else he or she values.1 Nevertheless, a utopian strain in intellectual thinking that emerges as the afterglow of the Enlightenment,2 continues to place its faith in the public construction of a tort equity that never naturally existed.3 The Myth of Ownership, a recent book by two New York University law/philosophy professors, Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel, is a striking example of this stubborn belief in the ability of government to eradicate inequality.
THE AUTHORS' ARGUMENT
The authors of The Myth of Ownership show no similar reluctance to confront libertarian premises. Murphy and Nagel are critical of the current structure of wealth transfer taxation, but do not propose its complete abolition.
THE ARGUMENT CRITIQUED
Certain constitutional obstacles to the proposal would indeed exist.23 Nevertheless, the authors' aim is to present the ideal and not, as they readily admit, the achievable or constitutionally permissible.24.
The Overarching Claim of the Collectivity
There is No Single Claimant
30 Some commentators recognize this as a shortcoming of the partnership model – that is, despite its apparent validity, it may not result in sufficiently strict taxation. The overvaluation the authors place on the government's contribution is further revealed in their reluctance to consider the contribution of those outside the government's sovereign jurisdiction.
The Government is Not the Collectivity
Despite the filthy conditions that these workers go through for our benefit, including that of our least advantaged, the authors, with a single footnote, suspend consideration of the case for another day.35 The internal communal focus of the authors is difficult to face a deep commitment to socio-economic justice.36. For example, the federal structure and the political philosophy that supports that structure cannot support a characterization of. Government can also be regarded as an agent of the collectivity or at least of certain influential segments.38 As such, the government has no claim as a collectivity, but only as an agent acting on its behalf.3 9 Private persons fall agree through political processes how much private wealth is available for redistribution.
Another perspective might model the government as a self-interested actor, in competition with private sector actors, no less greedily seeking a share of the common wealth to which it can gain access. Government can also be seen as a potential adversary or usurper of the community's best interests, rather than its embodiment. 40 A long-term view of the negative economic consequences of over-allocation of funds to the public sector could harm the government.
In fact, however, the time horizon of the politicians – and even the bureaucrats – who form the government militates against serious consideration of the long-term interests of the collectivity and the government itself. If this portrayal of government is correct, the authors' proposals would facilitate the destruction rather than the strengthening of the interests of the collectivity. The image of an organism, each part of which is devoted to the same ends and means, should not be accepted uncritically.
The Randomness of Existence
There may be a compelling government "story" to justify redistributive support to the least disadvantaged in society; however, the authors simply fail to offer convincing arguments in favor of their particular "totalitarian" construct. The above discussion assumes, as do the authors, that there is a "collectivity" at all. Taken to its logical conclusion, the authors' argument is self-defeating, and quite sinister in addition.
The authors inform the reader that existence, whether chaotic or determined, is beyond individual control; yet they provide no explanation as to why or how this "reality" will change as a result of government intervention. This is not to deny some value to the communitarian view that individuals are "situated" and "embedded in a story which places me among others and implicates my good in the good of the communities whose stories I share." LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 9 (Michael J. Sandel ed., 1984) (comments on the writings of Alasdair Maclntyre). 47 The authors also assume a static model in which those who have personal characteristics that favor acquisition have relinquished their acquisitive behavioral traits.
48 There is much debate about how much mobility there is in society, but it is undeniable that mobility occurs. In the authors' universe, all privileged persons rely heavily on inherited49 or other random traits, while all less privileged persons cannot overcome the adverse effects of congenital and/or chronic bad luck. This conceit, the very soul of the author's project, may elicit sympathetic responses from some politically or ideologically kindred spirits, but it hardly stands up to logical analysis or empirical evidence.
Defining and Prioritizing Socioeconomic Justice
The authors provide no explanation as to whether social justice means that the least advantaged actually have a "right" to help. The authors also share Rawls' view that social justice is redistributive in nature, but with a subtle difference. For example, it is "bad" for an individual to live a life that is often humiliating.5 The authors differ dramatically from Rawls in another respect.
Contrary to Rawls, the authors argue that the least advantaged must reach an explicit level, a standard of living which is "well beyond what most people would count as the required minimum." This standard is as ill-defined as "socio-economic justice" and its constituents. This response reveals the hidden egalitarian agenda that the authors seek to perpetuate throughout this work. It supports the conclusion that the authors' real concern is not the achievement of a standard of living for all that is "well beyond what most people would count as the required minimum," but rather an "equal standard of living."
Further, if "poverty" is a negative, why do the authors demand a minimum standard of living that "far exceeds what most people would consider the required minimum. The above is an integral part of the author's failure to flesh out his conception of socioeconomic justice and grapple with inevitable issues of implementation. The authors do not explain what they mean by humiliation and how they would measure it.
In this regard, the authors of The Myth of Ownership fail to provide an analytically satisfactory argument that justifies giving priority to socio-economic justice, the condition they are most concerned with. 34;justice" a higher social value than any of the interests reflected in the authors' use of the term "socio-economic justice." Indeed, the authors concede that there are many competing theories of justice.69 The authors fails to convince that (a) justice is the main concern of a.
Rejection of Marxism; Echoes of National
For Marxist and Bolshevik doctrine, property was theft, so it had to be eliminated by 'transferring the means of production to society'. German socialism, the basis of the new constitution, in contrast to Marxist-Bolshevik theory, recognizes property as a necessary component of the community's national structure. However, they do not reveal exactly how their views in favor of the condition of all private property rights stand with "capitalist economic institutions, 8 8 whose hallmark is genuine, stable and enforceable private property rights. The authors claim to subscribe to the social democratic ideal of contemporary Europe and suggests "there is no reason why it should not become part of the daily moral consensus of Western politics."89 Yet the social democratic ideal of these countries starts with the same constitution.
Of course, the power to end private property rights does not exactly equate to not recognizing them. Indeed, the burgeoning social democratic states in Eastern and Central Europe during the post-Soviet era have struggled to establish credible private property regimes and to assure foreign capitalists and nascent domestic enterprises that the state does not have a prior claim on it. all the general wealth within its limits.9' They have exaggerated the space of the individual mainly as a reaction to the conception of the individual and as a defense against the conception of the individual merely as a component of the collectivity.92. Western European wealth production per person is only two-thirds of that of the United States.93 The sustainability of the system in terms of providing quality service and its financial stability are in serious doubt.
90 For an analysis of the meaning of property under the United States Constitution, see e.g. JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1990). The right to private property is enshrined in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789. 92 Reflecting on the deconstruction of the individual under socialism, one commentator emphasized individuals as autonomous beings and owners of property.
The M yth of the Government
C O NCLU SIO N
In previous works they have formulated arguments in favor of beneficence and equality with great sensitivity, elegance and insight. attraction of competing positions. 116 See WISSENBURG, supra note 67, at 13 (using the term 'degrees of reception' to describe morally relevant differences between alleged recipients). To the extent that The Myth of Ownership stimulates discussion about the underlying value tax, it will prove to be a positive contribution, despite the authors' unfortunate inability to stand up for their own principles.
The authors are unreconstructed radical egalitarian utopians, no matter how much they deny this. Yes, they really want to 'do good'. Aware of the enduring self-interest of individuals, they introduce the reader to a secular savior, an altruistic “government.” Critically, they present yet another version of the utopian's fearless belief in achieving the collective good through massive state intervention, social engineering, and ubiquitous surveillance—what can best be described as the myth of government.
A sophisticated examination of the relationship between private property and public goods, constitutional constraints and political goals, and individual authenticity and collective regulation, would have been a more challenging book to write, but it would have been a more valuable and lasting contribution to constituted political philosophy. , the debate on redistribution, and the role that taxes should play.
