First, we demonstrate that scholars may have underestimated the complexity of White House involvement. At the same time, respondents reported that the White House often advances national policy interests.
THE PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL MODEL
The presidential control model has had more power, in part because of its bipartisan appeal. In Section A, we show that the presidential control model suffers from oversimplifications similar to those that have undermined earlier models of agency decision making.
The Theoretical Debate
Presidential control can thus respond to a particular (often conservative) concern about agency decision-making: agencies, driven by health and safety interests, will regulate overzealously and ineffectively.30 At the same time, presidential control can address the opposite (often liberal control). ) concern: agencies, naturally prone to inertia, will regulate sluggishly and ineffectively. Yet critics of the presidential control model essentially argue that it also rests on an oversimplification of the way government works.
The White House Experience
- OIRA Review
- General White House Involvement
- Lim itations
- THE AGENCY EXPERIENCE: SURVEY METHODOLOGY
Third, Croley found little evidence that the White House used the review process to provide regulatory benefits to favored interests. He noted that OIRA review is the easiest, if not the exclusive, mechanism for private groups to gain access to the White House.
The Survey Instrument
THE AGENCY EXPERIENCE: SURVEY RESULTS
This section organizes the findings and conclusions of the EPA study in a manner that is consistent with the debate over agency legitimacy. Part A addresses a question often sidestepped in the debate: between OIRA and other White House offices, what exactly is the source of presidential control. Part B focuses on the extent to which OIRA research and broader White House involvement improve regulatory effectiveness.
We note at the outset that we found very few differences in the responses of Bush I and Clinton respondents—a finding that is meaningful in itself."° When we found significant differences, they were of degree rather than direction: respondents from a administrations felt more or less strongly about a proposal or thought that a certain activity occurred more or less often, but respondents did not occupy opposite ends of the spectrum." in our review of our findings below.
Sources of Presidential Control
These data support a conclusion that OIRA and the White House are evenly matched in terms of involvement in EPA rulemaking, even when the two. EPA respondents also revealed that White House offices contributed to a climate of infighting and coalition building in the development of EPA regulations. EPA used other White House offices to fight OIRA, and other offices and agencies used OIRA to fight EPA.
Second, White House offices had at least as much, and perhaps more, influence on EPA rulemaking because they often had more influence on more important issues. Finally, it was White House offices (including OIRA) rather than the President himself who were most often involved in agency decision-making. White House offices other than OIRA play an important role in EPA rulemaking and have particular influence on high-profile or high-stakes issues.
EPA respondents reported that OIRA and White House officials took more interest in certain regulations than others.
Regulatory Efficacy
Beyond the broad standards of executive orders, EPA respondents cited only the professional or political interest of particular OIRA staff or White House policy advisers as influencing the existence or intensity of OIRA or House involvement. White in decision making. As an initial matter, EPA respondents stated that, more often than not, OIRA's staff workload was sufficiently limited and OIRA staff had sufficient knowledge to provide meaningful review of EPA's regulations. (see Table A). Question 12.c asked respondents to rate the accuracy of the statement "Inclusion of OIRA helped eliminate unintended consequences of EPA regulations."
The weighted mean of the twenty-eight respondents was 2.3, with 3.6% answering Never true, 64.3% Rarely true, 17.9% Sometimes October 2006]. often helped coordinate EPA's regulations with those of other agencies.". 34;OIRA sought changes that would make a regulation less burdensome for regulated entities." The weighted mean of the twenty-eight respondents was 4.4, with 0.0% responding Never true, 0.0%. Question 27.d asked respondents to rate the accuracy of the statement "OIRA requested changes that would make a regulation more burdensome for regulated entities." The weighted mean of the twenty-eight respondents was 1.4, with 67.9% responding Never true, 21.4% Rarely true, 7.1% Sometimes true, 0.0% Often true, 0.0% Always true, and 3.6% Both others.
EPA respondents tended to affirm that the OIRA career staff exercise judgment beyond that of the OIRA Administrator and the President.
Other White House Involvement
These results suggest that White House involvement has often energized the agency and led it to be active, though not in the way scholars envision. Second, the White House involvement did not prompt the EPA to undertake new regulatory activities. As one respondent noted, the EPA staff "tended to gain energy to explain their position or gain support." the value arguments.' ''6 Finally, White House involvement has rarely brought the agency to change its regulatory policies.
We conclude that White House involvement may not increase regulatory effectiveness, defined as promoting regulatory change. The involvement of the White House may encourage agencies to solidify the basis for their regulatory proposals, which is not without value. EPA respondents indicated little or no indication that White House involvement prompted the agency to undertake new regulatory activity and only a weak indication that it prompted the agency to change its regulatory priorities.
Perhaps White House involvement would have brought about regulatory change if it had included more formalized actions than it did with respect to EPA regulatory activity.
Political Accountability
In addition, 90% said the mainstream media rarely or sometimes reported White House involvement. First, White House involvement has rarely been transparent to the public, either in absolute terms or relative to EPA actions. Finally, White House involvement in EPA's regulatory activities has not been as responsive to the public as EPA's actions.
We conclude that White House involvement in regulatory activity may not sufficiently increase political accountability. Involvement of the White House brings some regulatory activity under the president's control, and therefore provides some political accountability in a formal sense. Although White House involvement is somewhat reflective of public preferences, EPA actions may be more so.
Even presidential audit advocates acknowledge the need for increased transparency of White House activities.
Faction Resistance
INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
We set out to examine the effect of White House involvement on the part of the agency and revealed a picture that was far less confirmatory than previous empirical analyses. Note that the picture of the White House's involvement on the part of the agency does not provide such a strong reason to reconsider the propriety or legality of the president's control. On this fundamental point, they demonstrated substantial agreement with White House political officials and OIRA.
What EPA respondents mainly disputed was whether the President or the White House offices (including OIRA) did their work in a way that enhanced the agencies' legitimacy—the ostensible purpose of the presidential control model, or any model of administrative law. also. Three apply to both OIRA and other White House offices: transparency, lines of responsibility, and selectivity. Few would dispute that the White House's involvement in agency decision-making should be more visible to the public.
Limiting the White House's ability to comment in the rulemaking process could prevent the president from intervening early in agency policymaking.
Lines of Responsibility
While the White House as a whole can be credited (or blamed), the great advantage of presidential oversight is that it promises more specific lines of accountability. Rather, they should be considered to require concrete knowledge of how the White House controls agency decision-making. If the White House's involvement isn't reasonably methodical, it doesn't really represent a model of oversight at all.
If White House involvement is to be meaningful, the issue must be one of reasonableness. White House engagement must be logical and orderly enough that it reliably achieves matters of public interest as well as political interest. The White House's involvement in EPA rules during the Bush I and Clinton administrations often did not qualify.
Thus, White House involvement can aim to avoid under-regulation as well as over-regulation.
Focus on Costs
EPA respondents mostly blamed the OIRA revision for skewing the administrative process in a deregulatory direction because of its excessive focus on cost, particularly in the short term. In any case, it is entirely reasonable to expect OIRA to fully assess benefits as well as costs.2' Furthermore, it is worth asking what costs and benefits should be calculated. According to EPA respondents, OIRA typically focused more on short-term costs and benefits, while EPA typically focuses on long-term costs and benefits.
A focus on short-term costs and benefits can tend to favor business interests because regulatory costs are often immediate and environmental benefits are often latent. Focusing on long-term costs and benefits can tend to favor environmental interests for exactly the same reason. In addition to broadening its focus on benefits, OIRA should avoid issues that exceed its institutional purview.
While economists may be adept at quantifying costs and benefits, they are ill-equipped to reevaluate agencies' scientific findings—even when those scientific findings inevitably affect cost-benefit analysis.
Entrenchment of Career Staff
For example, we could try to replace cost-benefit analysis with a different or broader standard for evaluating regulatory policies." Or we could try to improve OIRA's structure in ways that strengthen its coherence and coordination functions.233 "We could seek to completely abolish OIRA as a tool of presidential control. Did career OIRA staffers see their role in reducing regulatory burden or ensuring that costs and benefits were accurately estimated. These questions seek to determine whether career OIRA staffers have served to minimize the politicization" of the regulatory review process or has changed that process and the resulting decision-making in a deregulatory direction.
This article is the first to consider the practice of presidential control from within the agency. By looking inside the agency, we are not simply examining the ways in which the White House sets regulatory policy. Unlike previous empirical analyses, our study concludes that the presidential control model may not entirely succeed in enhancing agency legitimacy.
They should take steps to improve the presidential control model so that it better delivers these goods in practice and in theory.
