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Hurricane in the House: The Jos Special Emergency Convention and the First Purge in the NCNC Party
Udida A. Undiyaundeye
Department of History & International Studies, University of Calabar, Cross River State, Nigeria.
*Penulis Koresponden: [email protected]
Abstract
The NCNC party since late 1951 had been engrossed in an intraparty crisis over the fortunes of the Macpherson Constitution. As a means of settling this crisis once and for all, a special emergency convention of the party was summoned by the national leadership of the party in Jos between 8 and 12 December 1952. The Eastern Regional Leadership demurred the choice of Jos for the convention. The convention was heavily attended but by 31 out of 128 branch unions of the party nationwide. After four days of intensive deliberations some of which sessions were secret, the party came up with several decisions the most important of which was the purge of its three Central ministers who, incidentally, were not at the convention to plead their case.
Keywords: Nigeria, Eastern Regional Leadership, Macpherson Constitution, Jos Peace Conference.
1. INTRODUCTION
Nigeria is a very highly complex, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, multi-cultural and multi-religious polity, with a diversity of cultural groups, having more than 395 ethnic groups. However, three-quarters of these groups are from the Middle-Belt of Nigeria, thus making it a polyglot region, exhibiting almost unparallel diversities in culture and social organisations. Fifty-four of these are from Plateau State, where Bantu and Kwa subfamilies of the Benue- Congo and the Chadic-sub group of the Nilo-Saharan or Afroasiatic family (to which Hausa belongs) meet.
Rather than nurture harmony and unity, these complex diversities tend to give birth to crises, such that conflicts have become commonplace in Nigeria’s fledgling civil rule that it borders on the miraculous that the country has not plunged into civil war or returned to military rule.
The vicious cycle of violence continues to oscillate between various ethnic groups involving minority and dominant groups. At other times, the religious card is flashed, as is characteristic of Muslim/Christian conflicts throughout most of the north, which is usually about anything (politics, economic control and competition after scarce resources, ethnicity) aside from religion. In fact, in a
recent survey, Ellsworth discovered that ethnicity and religious affiliation are the two highest-ranked identity makers for a vast majority of Nigerians than other indices such as state, national, ECOWAS and African identity. Though the research results revealed that northerners (people in the defunct northern region) are more tenaciously inclined towards religious identification, and southerners (people in the defunct Western, Mid-Western, and Eastern regions) were more likely to rank ethnicity first, ethnicity was discovered to be the second-highest ranked identity country-wide after religion, with state and national identity coming third and fourth, respectively.
It must be stated that this is currently exhibited in Nigeria, in the growing tendency for the crisis to emerge between those who are perceived as so-called
“indigenes” and those who are regarded as “settlers”
and are therefore considered “outsiders”. Because of the above, this workshop discussed the Jos Peace Conference and the controversies surrounding it.
2. SETTING OF THE CONFERENCE
The 1951 constitution (popularly called the Macpherson Constitution) was hated with a passion by the NCNC party leadership headed by Nnamdi Azikiwe because, according to it, the constitution
would retard the country’s advance to self- government status in 1956 (Idemili 1980). To kill the constitution, the party leadership summoned the National Executive Council meeting and the Eastern Regional Conference at Port Harcourt and Enugu on 3 and 26 - 27 October 1952, respectively but failed on the two occasions largely because of the determined opposition of the parliamentary party (faction) of the NCNC led by A.C. Nwapa (Wolpe 2020). The only avenue left to be explored for the attainment of its objective was the Special Emergency Convention of the party.
The world was informed of the summoning of the Emergency Special NCNC National Convention for between 8 and 12 December 1952 at Jos through the pages of the West African Pilot - a daily newspaper owned by Nnamdi Azikiwe which was, to all intents and purposes, the mouthpiece of the NCNC party (Fajana 1971). However, ever before the announcement of the emergency special convention, the NCNC Eastern Regional Conference had announced that its own annual convention was billed to take place in November at Aba. According to the NCNC party constitution, such a special convention shall be held
within 28 days from the date of application and at such time and place as shall be determined by the Executive Committee or the President where the interests of the National Council or its members are not thereby endangered all matters to be considered by a special convention shall be submitted to the member unions to enable them to give instructions to their representatives (Flint 1981, p. 126).
Likely, those who summoned this special convention fell afoul of this requirement. Hence, In the Eastern region, the news of the special convention was received with great astonishment and embarrassment.
To some of the Eastern legislators, Azikiwe had declared war against the ministers, and there “was a general protest against the holding of such a convention in the Northern Region” (Udoma 1994, p.
229). For strategic reasons it was in Azikiwe’s and the party leadership’s interests to keep the Eastern section of the party In the dark over the date and venue of the special convention as long as it was felt necessary.
On the part of the Eastern NCNC leadership, picking the venue for the special convention in Jos,
Northern Nigeria, was unsuitable because only last year the party’s Annual Convention was held in Kano. Hence it was thought that this year’s convention would take place in the East possibly in Aba (Biereenu-Nnabugwu 2015). However, Azikiwe and his top aides were loath to hold the convention in the Eastern region for strategic reasons. He would have a free hand at Jos than in the Eastern region
“where a hostile government was then entrenched”
(Biereenu-Nnabugwu 2015). The Eastern NCNC held its convention as planned in Aba with Eyo Ita presiding. Nothing went wrong. The NCNC Eastern region protested the choice of Jos as the venue of the special convention. The Aba conference also protested. But the national leadership of the party went ahead with its plans in defiance of the protests.
Perhaps what might have irked Nnamdi Azikiwe equally badly was the fact that Eyo Ita speared no efforts in convincing members of the Eastern Regional House of Assembly that the NCNC party thus formed was to undergo a complete change end re- organization and reconstruction based, as it was, in the Eastern Region of Nigeria as a distinction from the NCNC Party based at Lagos (Lynch 2012).
Was this resolve of Eyo Ita an act of open rebellion against the National Party and president?
Hardly, if anything, was aimed at a reinvigorated and efficient party for Nnamdi Azikiwe himself had rejected any suggestions that he shifts base from the city of his voluntary exile, Lagos, to his region of origin. One of his newspapers, the Eastern Nigerian Guardian argued that: The suggestion of his quitting Western politics for Eastern politics is irregular and will break the unity he has been trying to preserve (Udoma 1994, p. 247).
In any case, if it were an act of rebellion against the national leadership, it would not have been led by a politician from a minority area of the region who would not command the support of the majority ethnic group of the region of which the national president was a member. Each branch union of the party was to send “one delegate” to the special convention and such delegates would have a credential card signed by the branch chairman or secretary or “the General Secretary of a country-wide member union without which no admission into the convention was allowed. It was likely that the convention would be boycotted and it was boycotted by members of the Eastern Region Working Committee because, apart from changing the venue for the convention earlier agreed upon and the
defiance that was shown in response to their protest over the change of venue, the Eastern leaders of the NCNC were “disturbed at a decision taken at a meeting of the Western Region Conference at Ibadan reversing the East’s decision on the future of the constitution” (Nixon 1972, p. 475). There were bound to be sharp differences at the Jos special convention should the Eastern NCNC leadership decide to attend the convention after all.
3. THE JOS CONVENTION
The convention opened on schedule and by 3 pm the deliberations of the convention started
“behind closely guarded doors and in an atmosphere of great secrecy. Indeed never before in the previous history of NCNC convention have the “sessions been so closely & guarded” (Lynch 2012, p. 54). In his welcome address, Nnamdi Azikiwe told members that the Special Emergency Convention was summoned to deliberate on (1) the repercussion to give the MacPherson Constitution a fair trial, (2) the need to ratify certain decisions taken at the Port Harcourt Conference, and (3) to give effect to the NCNC programme without any further decay. He then criticized the
divisionists who are felting a prey &
Macpherson constitution and were demanding regional autonomy contrary to the declared of the party ...our Ministers and Assemblymen had enough time to experiment with the constitution (Bah 2003, p. 64).
He then as it were, read the riot act to the effect that
“from now forward the ministers and legislators to the party line. They either toe the party line or are disciplined. They must either be party politicians carrying out party policies or they are independent politicians. On this score there was to be no compromise” (Ashiagbor 2008, p. 103). He ended his presidential address with a donation of £5,000 in cash and another £5,000 in revenue-earning securities” to the party to the wild applause of delegates(Ashiagbor 2008). The address was accepted and adopted for debate and that it be kept “top secret” till after the convention.
A total of 15 branches attended from the North, 7 and 9 branches from the West and East respectively were also in attendance (Lynch 2012a).
Telegrams of good wishes poured in: 20 from the North, 21 from the West, and 26 from the East. Of these branches that sent telegrams, 90% of those from
the West, 25% of those from the North, and 50% of those from the East recommended the annulment of the Port Harcourt, NEC decision on giving the new constitution a fair trial (Lynch 2012a). This would mean that even here in Jos where the party national leadership had a free hand, it was tough to get all the mandates to annul the Port Harcourt NEC decision on the new constitution because from the percentages of the telegrams that favoured the annulment, that is to say, 18 branches from the West, 5 branches from the North and 13 branches from the East all totaling 36 called for the annulment. Those who were not in favour of the telegram messages were 2 branches from the West, 15 branches from the North and 13 branches from the East totaling 30(Lynch 2012b). It was a very slim victory.
On a country-wide basis, the party was comprised of 128 member unions or branches, yet only 31 member unions were in attendance which translates to a very tiny minority (Lynch 2012b). The implication here is that were this question put on a country-wide basis, it would have had no chance of success. Seen against this background, therefore, the measures are taken by the party national leadership to annul the earlier decision to give the 1951 constitution a fair trial were a successful attempt by a tiny but very powerful minority in imposing its own will on the vast majority of the NCNC Party faithful in particular and the country in general. Equally, to argue that the ministers have had enough time to learn from their mistakes as the national president did, was to be very uncharitable to the ministers and economical with the truth. Eleven months on a job cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be said to be enough for one to master a new job for which he has had no previous training or experience. But it was expedient on the part of the national president to make such an accusation if only it would serve his interests.
Secondly, had the convention been held in the East, it would have equally had very slim chances of success in annulling the decision of giving the new constitution a fair trial
Thirdly, and more important, only 2 of the Eastern House of Assembly members attended the Jos convention in a House of 80 of which 74 acknowledged allegiance to the NCNC. So given the poor attendance of the convention when seen on a country-wide basis, the veracity of Azikiwe’s argument that the convention was summoned because after the Port Harcourt Conference many branches sent telegrams and letters of disapproval of
the decision to give the new constitution a fair trial, rested on very shaky grounds. It was also decided that the Daily Times newspaper be boycotted because of its studied antagonism against the aims and aspirations of the NCNC(Osaghae 1999). It was also agreed that one had to be a member of the NCNC for at least two years before he could contest an election and that to become a member of the NCNC, one would take an oath of allegiance “in an African fashion” (Lynch 2012b).
By far the most famous decision of the Jos Special Emergency Convention was the expulsion of the three Central ministers: A. C. Nwapa, Eni B.
Nkoju, and Okoi Arikpo. The three ministers were expelled because they had “sent an uncomplimentary letter to Nnamdi Azikiwe as President of the party stating that they would not attend the convention.
What was uncomplimentary in the letter the ministers wrote? In essence, the ministers argued that: since the September 1952 NEC meeting in Port Harcourt, the impression was created that the NCNC wanted to break the 1951 constitution but the ministers and Assemblymen because of the lure of office and hope of gain are stopping the party from carrying out this
“patriotic” act which impression was made open by statements and innuendoes, in speeches and writing of party leaders (Osaghae 1999). Thus, since the Jos convention was to decide whether or not to break the constitution, it would be less embarrassing to those so-bent party leaders to do so in their (ministers) absence, without ministers ‘undue influence’.
As far as what is gleaned from the letter, nothing “uncomplimentary” except of course that it was jointly signed; which raises the question of whether they were letters separately written but embodying the same ideas and treated? It is accepted as the ministers argued, that their letter was a private one to their national president; but that it was wrong for the president to have treated the letter the way he did and stretch the argument too far. The national president was can also be devoid of wrongdoings because although the letter was a private one, yet it dealt with a public and fundamental issue of the moment. But then the national president had two options open to him on how to treat his three Central ministers over the contents of their joint letter. He could have summoned them to discuss whatever objections he had over the contents of their letter since he had at least a week before the opening of the special emergency convention was he interested to do so.
The second option was to refer the issue to the Disciplinary Committee as provided for in the NCNC party rules and regulations to sort out. But again he was not interested in doing so. Hence the question — why? Nnamdi Azikiwe answers as it were, that the three ministers’ letter was like scratching a match on a petrol-soaked wood. The atmosphere was so charged that even though two or three pleaded for Eni Njoku, the uproar rejected any listening because of extenuating circumstances (Akinyele & Adeboye 2013). In other words, the activities and conduct of the three ministers as narrated by the party bosses were so disgusting and choking to the leadership and general membership of the party that their joint letter, instead of pleading for them was a precipitant for their expulsion. Eni Njoku, it would appear, had on his own committed no crime. His sin for which he was being punished was “complicity with the other two gentlemen”.
In his initial response to his expulsion, Nwapa refuted the charge that he was not following the party line, describing the accusation as
a blatant lie. “since I joined the NCNC in June 1951, has any word of an act of mine been called to question by either the President or any party organ of the NCNC. I have been working in close contact with both the Central Working Committee and the Parliamentary Committee of the Party. If the National President were as accessible as one in his position ought to be, perhaps the contact would have been closer and more harmonious (Apeh 2015, p. 72).
He regretted the impression given to the ordinary man on the street that there was a crisis between him and the NCNC national president. He argued further that he had no problems with Azikiwe or the NCNC party because neither the Central Working Committee of the NCNC nor Azikiwe Called him privately and asked him to explain any utterance that I have made which they judge to be contrary to the policy of the party or against the interests of the nation (Joseph 2014).
Nwapa also argued that he had no problems with Mbonu Ojike. He had after the NEC meeting in Port Harcourt visited Azikiwe in his private residence in Agege, Lagos in the company of “a prominent personality” on a one-man delegation to ascertain whether there was a split within the NCNC and any
misunderstanding between him and Azikiwe (Tignor 1993). Nnamdi Azikiwe besides denying having any hand in the articles written in the Pilot against me expressed the view that there was no misunderstanding between us. Ojike toed the same line (Tignor 1993). Nwapa was summoned by a letter dated 21 November 1952 to appear before the Disciplinary Committee at Jos to defend himself over statements he made in the Daily Times and Daily Success of 29/9/1952 and 15/10/1952 respectively. He denied the comments credited to him in the papers because they differed from the original texts. He ended his argument with the observation that since the said publications, neither Ojike nor Azikiwe had called him or sent anyone to him to complain about such an act which was “prejudicial to party interests and those of the nation(Tignor 1993).
The case of Okoi Arikpo is even more puzzling. There is no evidence at least for now to link him with any personal offenses that he committed to deserve the harsh treatment he got. He did not get as much publicity as Nwapa got and so the chances of him offending the party leadership on sensitive issues were not there. Nwapa was absent from Jos. It will be unfair to equate his absence with that of Kolawale Balogun’s from the opening of the convention. This is because, whereas Kolawale Balogun was outside the country on a private trip, Nwapa was invited to the Commonwealth Economic Conference in London by the Secretary of State for Colonies in his official capacity and he left for the conference on December 2, 1952. He returned on December 16, 1952 (Tignor 1993). He was therefore absent from the Jos convention and nobody really expected him to break away from such a conference to come and face a disciplinary committee at the Jos convention as Kolawale Balogun did.
In any case, the Jos convention was not an ideal or conducive venue for such an event. In normal times the national president would have called the attention of his Central ministers to sort out any objections he had over their joint letter. But the times were not normal in their relationship and so was an opportunity to nail the ministers for their perceived sins against the party. Attention has been drawn to the possibility that Nwapa was expelled because of the rivalry that existed between him and Mbonu Ojike (Apeh 2015). This seems strange. This is so because, first, Ojike was then not a member of the Eastern House of Assembly and so the possibility of their clash was not there.
Second, Ojike was not from the same constituency as Nwapa which fact made it all the more unlikely for them to be rivals. It would have been more reasonable if Ojike and the influential F. N.
Ezerioha defeated him (Ojike) in the 1951 general elections and so became a member of the House from Orlu Division - Ojike’s home division were rivals.
Hence it would appear more credible to hold the view that Nwapa was expelled because of Azikiwe’s displeasure over his activities in spite of his (Azikiwe’s) protestations to the contrary. After all, Nwapa was his vice president in the Igbo State Union.
He had all the characteristics of a rival and possible successor: he was youthful, smart, and articulate.
Therefore, all things considered, Nwapa was the enemy and so had to be cut down by any means. This desire to deal with Nwapa explains why the three ministers were not given the benefit of fair hearing and were tried in absentia, convicted, and sentenced with their accusers as the prosecutors, judges, and jury.
4. CRITICAL REACTION
The question that now begs for an answer is was justice done to the ministers bearing in mind the constitutional and other legal instruments of the NCNC party? According to Rule 10 of the NCNC rules and regulations titled “Discipline”, there are two broad groups of offences that attract different punishments. Offences against the party included:
1. flouting the constitution of the party
2. flouting the rules and regulations of the party 3. Acting in a manner to bring. the name of the
party to ridicule and/or contempt
4. Flouting the constitutional rulings of the organs of the party e.g. Central or Provincial working committees.
5. Plotting against the party
6. Being drunk before attending party meetings 7. Using indecent language and expressions at
party meetings
8. Giving out party confidential information without authorization and not being a competent officer to give out such information
9. Carrying about information or propaganda tending to injure the reputation of the party or any of its officiate,
10. Acting disrespectfully to the party or any of its officials and members at meetings of the party
11. Giving wrong information to any organ of the party and the officials with the intent to deceive or mislead
12. Defrauding the party or any of Its officials 13. Carrying on dishonest and fraudulent practices
or corruption
14. Irregularities of attendance In party meetings 15. Information, publishing the expulsion of any
member should not be made until the expulsion is ratified by the higher body.
16. Offences (a) to (f) and (m) shall merit the punishment of expulsion and those from (g) and (o) may be punished by suspension, fine or censure.
Section 4 provides that expulsion shall be of two types a. With dishonour, when the expulsion order
shall be published for the world to know.
b. Ordinarily; when the culprit shall be informed by correspondence.
Expulsion with dishonour shall be for life.
Now under which of these sections were the three central ministers prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced? The letter conveying their expulsion provides the answer. It read:
I am directed by the Working Committee to inform you that the Special Convention held in Jos on December 8 to 13, 1952 decided to determine your membership of the party because of the joint letter signed by you and two others. It is clear to the Convention that you did not propose to be bound by decisions. You wit agree with me that no can stand such Challenge as contained your letter under reference.
Faithfully yours, Kola Balogun,
National Secretary (Mathew et al., 2013).
Shockingly, no reference was made to any sections of Rule 10 of the Rules and Regulations of the NCNC party which the three Central ministers breached and for which they were judged and expelled. Rather, reference was made to their joint letter to the national president which was used as the basis for their expulsion. Even at this, no objections were made as to the language or contents of the letter. Instead, the
ministers were being punished for crimes they were thought they will commit in the future! This act was, to say the least, an act of being lawlessness par excellence, committed by an organization that was supposedly very law-abiding.
The letter of expulsion argued that their expulsion was decided by the Central Working Committee. Fair enough, Rule 3 of the Rules and Regulations provided that the Central Working Committee shall have the power to give preliminary consideration to the discipline of any member of the party offending against any national policy of the party and shall make recommendations for action to be taken by the National Executive Committee (Anugwom 2020).
From all available evidence, the Central Working Committee had not heard the case before the Jos Emergency Convention let alone recommending same to the National Executive Committee for further action. In this case, the duties of the National Executive Committee were usurped and the committee sidelined. In fact, the last NEC meeting was in Port Harcourt and at that meeting, nothing was mentioned about any case against the three Central ministers.
5. CONCLUSION
From the perspective of the NCNC party legal instruments, this was jungle justice without parallel.
The expulsion letter was silent on whether the expulsions were for life or not, but since they were published in the West African Pilot for the information of the whole world, means that the ministers were expelled for life and hence with dishonour.
Another reason for the extra-legal expulsions was that there was an urgent need to rid the party of dead woods. This accusation was very surprising indeed very strange. That the party felt the only way open to was to expel the ministers - the dead woods in its “determined march to freedom”(Anugwom 2000).
But the affected ministers were Central ministers and the NCNC party leadership was not competent to pronounce on their capabilities. That was the duty of the Governor of the country. There is no evidence that the Governor had any cause to doubt his ministers’
competence. In fact, he argued;
in a broadcast, on New Year’s Eve, I gave a pledge that the ministers, when appointed would have the
wholehearted co-operation of myself and of the ex-officio members and I said that I was greatly looking forward to working with these men, and to sharing my responsibilities with them. In the past few weeks that pledge has been honoured and my most optimistic hopes have been more than fulfilled. I have said before that it is at the Centre that this new constitution of ours will meet the severest test...In the past few weeks, my Ministers have done that in full measure and all of us on the Council of Ministers have thought first of the unity and overall interests of Nigeria.
It is my earnest hope that Honourable Members of this House will follow the lead given by my Ministers (Guyer 1992, p. 53).
Indeed all of them were very efficient in the execution of their official duties and A.C. Nwapa was the most visible of the three and so could hardly be described as dead woods by any stretch of the imagination by the unbiased.
The expelled ministers regretted the denial of the elementary democratic right of fair hearing in their case and pledged themselves to the task of putting reason in place of hate, co-operation among Nigerians in place of stupid rivalry, and constructive work in place of insane destruction... anybody who differed from us In this respect differs from us fundamentally and Irreconcilably. The ministers had fought a bitter struggle on the basis of, as far as the available evidence is concerned, truth and principles.
Cannons which in normal times and in more developed societies would have ensured their victory in the end. They lost and a bad precedent was thus set.
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