Post-Truth and Islamophobia Narration in the Contemporary Indonesian Political Constellation
Zainuddin Syarif
IAIN Madura
Syafiq A. Mughni
UIN Sunan Ampel
Abd Hannan
IAIN Madura
[email protected] Abstract
This article discusses the phenomenon of post-truth politics, role, and its influence on the return of Islamophobic narratives in the dynamics of Indonesian political constellation. There are three main issues discussed in this study: post-truth, Islamophobia in Indonesia, and contemporary Indonesian political constellation. Using qualitative research and analysis of critical theory perspectives, this study found that the development of post-truth political practices indirectly evokes the narrative of Islamophobia in contemporary Indonesian political constellation. The return of the Islamophobia can be seen in three ways. First, the practice of post-truth politics which is rooted in the politicization of religion and ethnicity, it gives negative impact not only because of unhealthy process of leadership circulation in Indonesia, but has also faltered the reality of Indonesia's plurality as a pluralist state, both in terms of ethnicity and religion. Second, post-truth political practices in which contain propaganda, intimidation, lies and hate speech have stimulated the rise of sentiment towards religious social groups, as happened in the “212 Movement”. Third, the return of Islamophobic narratives due to political Post-truth appears to be increasing clashes and practices of religious intolerance in Indonesia, where intolerance is practiced by the majority against minority groups.
Artikel ini mengkaji fenomena politik post-truth, peran dan pengaruhnya terhadap kembalinya narasi Islamophobia dalam dinamika konstelasi politik Indonesia kontemporer. Terdapat tiga permasalahan pokok yang dibahas dalam kajian ini: post-truth, Islamophobia, dan konstelasi politik Indonesia kontemporer. Dengan menggunakan jenis penelitian kualitatif dan analisis perspektif teori kritis, studi ini mendapati temuan bahwa berkembangnya praktik politik post-truth, secara tidak langsung telah membangkitkan kembali narasi Islamophobia dalam konstelasi politik
Indonesia kontemporer. Kembalinya narasi Islamophobia tersebut terlihat dalam tiga hal. Pertama, praktik politik post-truth yang berakar pada politisasi agama dan etnisitas, telah menimbulkan dampak negatif bukan saja pada tidak sehatnya proses sirkulasi kepemimpinan di Indonesia, namun juga telah membuat goyah realitas kemajemukan Indonesia sebagai negara pluralis, baik dari segi etnisitas maupun agama. Kedua, praktik politik post-truth yang di dalamnya berisikan propaganda, intimidasi, dan kebohongan, telah menstimulus bangkitnya sentimen terhadap kelompok-kelompok sosial keagamaan, seperti yang terjadi dalam gerakan Aksi Bela Islam 212. Ketiga, kembalinya narasi Islamophobia akibat politik post-truth nampak pada semakin meningkatnya benturan dan praktik intoleransi keagamaan di Indonesia, di mana intoleransi dilakukan oleh kelompok mayoritas terhadap kelompok minoritas.
Keywords: Post-truth, Islamophobia, Political constellation, Indonesia
Introduction
As a democratic country with the largest Muslim population, conversations around religious and political relations in Indonesia's political constellation have always been an interesting theme to be discussed1. Whether it is conversation happen in the theoretical or practical areas. In the theoretical realm, discussions around Indonesian religion and politics find their space when national political narratives are confronted with issues of politics of identity rooted in ethnicity, race, class, and religion. The use of primordial identity issues, especially those which are entrenched in the sacredness of religion and all its symbolic forms, has not only made the level of quality of Indonesian democracy down, but also has made the national order unsteady and threatened2.
Whereas in the area of practice, political discourse finds space as a consequence of the increasing battle of politic at the elite level, both at national and local electoral levels. At the local electoral level, the turbulence occurred as the effect of simultaneous local elections in the 2016, 2017 and 2018.3 Although the battle arena was at the regional level, the effects were almost equal to the national level.
Whereas at the national electoral level, political discourse has gained momentum as a grand general election, the 2019 presidential election.
As predicted earlier, the political battle in the 2019 presidential
1Masdar Hilmy, Islamisme and Democrazy in Indonesia, Singapore: Institute of Southest Asian Studies, 2010: 1-5.
2Petrus Reinhard Golose, "Strategi Penanganan Firehose of Falsehood pada Era Post-Truth", Jurnal Ilmu Kepolisian, Volume 13, Number 1 (April 2019): 7.
3 Fakhruddin, Yuslim, and Syamsu Rizaldi, "Evaluasi Pilkada sebagai Wujud Demokratisasi", Jurnal Wacana Politik, Volume 4, Number 1 (March 2019): 2.
election took place in a contestation space that was not only tight but also hot. The smell of politics of identity practices that had heated up in the gubernatorial election in Jakarta in 2017, also penetrated to the national level4.
If observed more deeply, both in political events at the regional and national level such as in the constellation of the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election and the 2019 presidential election, the stage of political constellation in Indonesia is actually more dominated by post- truth political performances.5 The political maneuvers of the elite whom often thrown up racist political narratives, playing emotions and rationality so as to make objectivity obscure,6 all of them are the elements of post-truth political practice. On this occasion, it can be seen how the practice of post-truth politics in Indonesia takes place in a systematic, structured, and neatly designed space, both of which is launched through online and offline media. In the online world, post- truth politics is carried out through massive hoaxes.7 Whereas in the offline world, the emergence of post-truth politics is marked by stretching the behavior of political elites who tend to carry out political intimidation and propaganda, and giving negative stigma to minority groups in the name of religion.8
In a wider perspective, the introduction of post-truth political terms in Indonesia which in practice focuses on discriminatory attitudes and behavior in the name of symbols and religions, to certain limits can be read as a metamorphosis of Islamophobic political views and practices. 9 As part of the global political discourse, the term Islamophobia had known since the 1980s, but it became more popular and grab the attention of the world community when the tragedy of September 11, 2001, namely the attack on two twin towers, World
4 Arya Fernandes, "Politik Identitas dalam Pemilu 2019: Proyeksi dan Efektivitas", Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Number 1 (2018): 3.
5 Budi Kurniawan, "Politisasi Agama di Tahun Politik: Politik Pasca-Kebenaran di Indonesia dan Ancaman bagi Demokrasi", Jurnal Sosiologi Agama, Volume 12, Number 1 (December 2018): 133.
6 Oscar Barrera et al., "Facts, Alternative Facts, and Fact Checking in Times of Post-Truth Politics", SSRN Electronic Journal, (January 2017): 76.
7 Genevieve Gorrell et al., Partisanship, Propaganda and Post-Truth Politics:
Quantifying Impact in Online, UK: University of Sheffield: 2019.
8 M Himawan Sutanto, "Propaganda Politik Calon Presiden Republik Indonesia 2014 -2019; Analisis Isi Berita Kampanye Pemilihan Presiden Tahun 2014 pada Harian Kompas Edisi 4 Juni sampai 5 Juli 2014", Jurnal Himanity, Volume 9 (March 2014): 39.
9 Muhammad Qobidl ’Ainun Arif, Politik Islamophobia Eropa, Yogyakarta:
Deepublish, 2000; Ihsan Yilmaz, "Two Major Challenges to Muslims and the World in the Age of Post-Truth: Islamist Extremism and Islamophobia", SSRN Electronic Journal, Volume 1 (January 2016): 6.
Trade Center (WTC) in New York, United States.10 Whereas in the context of contemporary global politics, Islamophobia politics can be found in the post-truth political style popularized by the president of the United States, Donald Trump. 11
In this condition, Trump's racist political statement that raise the issue of primordial identity and religion, anti-muslim political campaigns and hatred of muslim immigrant groups, in fact not only has triggered the raise of negative stigma and stereotypes towards Islam, but also foster fear. In this situation, Islam is seen as more dangerous than religious teachings as it should be. Islam is more synonymous with terrorism, oppression of women, and the suppression of human rights.12 Based on a PEW Research Center survey (2017), due to Trump's racist politics it is known that 69% of Italians, 66% of Greeks and Poles, 72% of Hungarians, and 50% of Spaniars, have negative views towards Muslims.13 In Europe, concerns and fears have arisen which tend to view Islam as a transcultural force that can threaten the heritage of European Judeo-Christian civilization.14
In Indonesia, the politics of Islamophobia is not a new thing. Its existence has been known and discussed by many groups, especially when Indonesia experienced socio-economic and political turmoil due to the reformation in 1998. At this time, the term of Islamophobia in Indonesia was understood as two things; First, Islamophobia emerged as a response from certain groups to the rampant practices of religious radicalism and terrorism carried out by extreme right Islamic groups.15
10 Ratna Istriyani, "Media: Causes and Strategies to Overcome Islamophobia;
Psychological and Sociological Study", QIJIS; Qudus International Journal of Islamic Studies, Volume 4, Number 2 (November 2016): 201; Ahmed Saad Aziz, "Tracing a Narrative of Muslim Self-Aftermath of 9/11 in Monica Ali’s Brick Lane: Islamophobia in the West", Insaniyat: Journal of Islam and Humanities, Volume 3, Number 1 (December 2018): 81–93.
11 Avissa Suseno, "Islamofobia dalam Kampanye Donald Trump ; Analisis Wacana Berita Pernyataan Donald Trump terhadap Islam pada Media Online Merdeka.Com", Jakarta: Uin Syarif Hidayatullah, 2016: 5.
12 Gabriel Greenberg and Peter Gottschalk, Islamophobia : Making Muslims The Enemy, USA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007: 142–44.
13 Bruce Stokes, "How Europeans See Their Place in the World", Pew Research Center, 13 June 2017, accessed 18 June 2020,
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/06/13/key-findings-europe/.
14 Muhammad Aiman Awaluddin and Anisa Safiah Maznorbalia, "A Suggestion That Europe Also a Muslim: A Study from Historical and Contemporary Perspectives", IJIMS; Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies, Volume 9, Number 1 (May 2019): 101; Syamsul Arifin et al., "Minority Muslims and Freedom of Religion: Learning from Australian Muslims’ Experiences", IJIMS;
Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies, Volume 9, Number 2 (December 2019).
15 Sri Herwindya Baskara Wijaya, "Media dan Terorisme; Stereotype Pemberitaan Media Barat dalam Propaganda Anti-Terorisme oleh Pemerintah Amerika Serikat di Indonesia Tahun 2002", Jurnal The Messenger, Volume 2,
Secondly, The splitting of Indonesian political groups into the nationalist, socialist, secularist, and Islamist poles after the implementation of a multiparty totality presidential system, must be admitted to some extent influenced the development of Islamophobic views and practices in Indonesia.16 In this sense, the term Islamophobia is intended to describe the political movements of Islamist groups that are suspected of keeping transnational political agendas to restore the legitimacy of Islamic politics to the Indonesian and world governance system in general (read: Khilafah Islamiyah). 17
At the moment when the emergence of post-truth politics and the expanding political space of identity, the narrative of Islamophobia comes to the surface in increasingly varied forms, intrigues and modes.
Islamophobia is positioned no longer merely as a political subject, but also as a political object.18 As a political object, Islamophobia could trigger negative impact to Islam and Muslim community as a whole.19 Whereas as a political subject, the term Islamophobia is brought to the public sphere as an instrument of power. In the current Indonesian political context, the use of Islamophobic narratives as instruments of politics is clearly reflected in the behavior of the elite, who in recent years have often thrown sentiment-based issues of identity into the public sphere as political instruments gaining seats of power.20
Begins with that mindset, this article examines deeply in two contemporary political discourses, namely post-truth politics and the narrative of Islamophobia, role and its influence on the dynamics of contemporary Indonesian political constellation. In this context, several national political issues that are directly related to political terms post truth and Islamophobia, such as identity, religion, and hate narratives, which occurred during the recent Indonesian political events, especially in the simultaneous elections of 2016, 2017 and 2018, and 2019 presidential election, are the two main issues that will be described in this article.
Number 1 (March 2016): 32.
16 Kunawi Basyir, "Ideologi Gerakan Politik Islam di Indonesia", Al-Tahrir: Jurnal Pemikiran Islam, Volume 16, Number 2 (December 2016): 34.
17 Masdar Hilmy, Teologi Perlawanan,: Islamisme dan Diskursus Demokrasi di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru, Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 2009: 185.
18 Mualimul Huda, "The Project of Islamophobia", QIJIS: Qudus International Journal of Islamic Studies, Volume 3, Number 2 (2015): 198.
19 See Imtiyaz Yusuf, "Three Faces of the Rohingya Crisis: Religious Nationalism, Asian Islamophobia, and Delegitimizing Citizenship", Studia Islamika, Volume 25, Number 3 (1 December 2018): 503–42.
20 Mohammad Supriyadi, "Politisasi Agama di Ruang Publik: Komunikasi SARA dalam Perdebatan", Jurnal Keamanan Nasional, Volume 1, Number 3 (September 2015): 396.
Results and Discussion
Narrative of Islamophobia in Post-Truth Politics
Genealogically, the term post-truth was first introduced by Steve Tesich in his essay entitled, The Government of Lies, which was published in The Nation magazine in 1992.21 In general, this essay contains Tesich's criticism of the policies of the United States government such as the policy towards Iran in President Ronald Reagan's administration.
According to Tesich, the success of the United States conditioned its citizens on the aggression they committed against the Persian Gulf countries, not apart from their expertise in playing opinions, especially in terms of arousing emotions, instilling fear, and arousing religious sentiments of citizens.22
By definition, post-truth is understood as a state in which objectivity and truth are narrowed and obscured because they are influenced by personal beliefs and emotional feelings. 23 To be able to influence this area of belief and emotion, post-truth tends to use sensitive issues. The sensitive issues in question can take the form of economics, politics, even to the most primordial realm such as issues (sects) of religion, race, even though racial issues. The negative effect of the use of post-truth racist politics is the division of reason and belief. Between mind and heart no longer exists in a dialectical- productive relationships, but rather negates each other and leads to destructive relationships.24 The highlight of all is the emergence of attitudes and behavioral sentiments towards others. This condition actually contains similarities with the behavior of Islamophobia, which both contain the absence of rationality, so that they tend to see reality clearly and not objectively, and experience excessive fear.25 In today's global politics, the real picture of the use of sensitive issues here is Donald Trump's political narrative which at that time campaigned for racist politics and hatred.26
As part of the global political discourse, post-truth politics operates through multiple instruments, namely politics of lies and
21 Adam Chmielewski, "Post-Truth and Alethic Populism", Public History Weekly (November 2018).
22 Kharisma Dhimas Syuhada, "Etika Media di Era Post-Truth", Jurnal Komunikasi Indonesia, Volume 6, Number 1 (January 2018): 77.
23 Balázs Böcskei, “Post-Truth Politics as the Normal State of Politics", Tamara;
Journal for Critical Organization Inquiry, Volume 15, Number 3–4 (2017): 259.
24 Paul Valadier, "“Post-Truth”: A Danger to Democracy", Cairn on Behalf of S.E.R. 5 (2017): 2.
25 Ibnu Zulian, "Analisis Pengaruh Islamophobia terhadap Kebijakan Luar Negeri Amerika Serikat di Pemerintahan Donald Trump", Jurnal PIR, Volume 3, Number 2 (February 2019): 144.
26 Mohsin Khan et al., "Muslims Representation in Donald Trump’s Anti-Muslim- Islam Statement: A Critical Discourse Analysis", Religions, Volume 10, Number 2 (February 2019): 1–16.
politics of scare, or commonly known as Firehouse of Falsehood politics (hereinafter referred to as FoF).27 In practice, the threat of FoF as modern political propaganda is one level above the hoaxes. FoF not only utilizes technological sophistication, but is also based on neuroscience capabilities.28 Through neuroscience, FoF works systematically to be able to influence the individual's emotional and awareness system. Therefore, post-truth political practices operate more within the realm of religion, because religion is the easiest medium to process and arouse the emotions of individuals or groups, which includes living sentiment and hatred in the form of Islamophobia.
This fact is directly proportional to the data. In the United States, when Donald Trump narrated racism in his political campaign, the trend of Islamophobia among US citizens increased 20 percent from the previous condition, even reportedly having a greater effect than the tragedy of September 11 2001.29 In Europe, more than 40 percent of Muslims in France claims to have felt discrimination, especially after the introduction of identity political propaganda about the threat of immigrant (Muslim) presence by Marine Le Pen.30
Post-Truth in Indonesian Political Dynamics
In general, the phenomenon of the emergence of post-truth politics is marked by the shifting of political narratives at the elite level to the use of primordial identity issues such as issues of religion, minority groups, and certain ethnic groups. To be able to provide an in-depth explanation of the phenomenon of the emergence of post-truth politics in the dynamics of contemporary Indonesian politics constellation, the following will explain three phenomena of post-truth politics that occurred during the 2016-2019 period.
Politicization of Identity
In the context of Indonesian political constellation, politic of identity is clearly illustrated in the gubernatorial election in Jakarta in 2017.
Political contestation involving Ahok-Djarot, Anis-Sandi, and Agus-Selfi, is considered to be a political battle full of politics of identity. The two
27 See Christopher Paul and Miriam Matthews, The Russian, Firehose of Falsehood’ Propaganda Model: Why It Might Work and Options to Counter It, RAND Corporation, 2016.
28 Rendy Prasetya, "Criticizing Russian Propaganda Firehose of the Falsehood from the Framework of Social Network Analysis", (November 2019).
29 Andrew Buncombe, "Islamophobia Even Worse under Trump than after 9/11 Attacks, Says Top Muslim Activist", The Independent, 27 December 2017,
Accessed 18 June 2020,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/trump-islam- muslim-islamophobia-worse-911-says-leader-a8113686.html.
30 Suci Suci Sekarwati, "Islamofobia di Prancis Naik Jadi 154 Kasus - Dunia Tempo.Co", 28 January 2020, Accessed 18 June 2020, /read/1300634/islamofobia-di-prancis-naik-jadi-154-kasus.
most popular identity issues raised at that time were ethnicity and religion.31 Ahok, who is ethnically from a Chinese background, became an easy target for his political opponents. The reverence of politics of identity in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election, is the beginning of the return of politics of identity in the course of democracy in Indonesia.32 The same pattern is also found in the leadership circulation at the national level, namely the presidential election in 2019. The fight for the first seat of Republic of Indonesia which brought incumbent Jokowi against his political rival in the 2014 presidential election, Prabowo Subianto, also did not escape the use of identity issues.33
Amid the increasingly wild political maneuvering of the political elite and the widespread hegemony of the global capitalist economy, the problem of the use of politics of identity has not only triggered intolerance among politicians, but also targeted people at the grassroots level. The problem is, intolerance that has been synonymous with the existence of extreme right-wing Islamic organizations, has also targeted other Islamic groups, even the most moderate known as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU).34 Statistically, Djayadi Hanan, director of the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI) found findings, that in recent years, the phenomenon of intolerance in Indonesia which has been declining since 2010, now in the last three years has slowly experienced a wave of increase (See Graph 1) especially since the massive mass mobilization explosion of the “212 Movement” in the Jakarta Election in 2017.35
31 See Luthfi Assyaukanie, "Religion as a Political Tool: Secular and Islamist Roles in Indonesian Elections", JISS; Journal of Indonesian Islam, Volume 13, Number 2 (December 2019).
32 Dina Lestari, "Pilkada DKI Jakarta 2017: Dinamika Politik Identitas di Indonesia", Simulacra: Jurnal Sosiologi, Volume 2, Number 1 (June 2019): 32.
33 Agus Saputro, "Agama dan Negara: Politik Identitas Menuju Pilpres 2019", Jurnal Asketik, Volume 2, Number 2 (Desember 2018): 114.
34 Marcus Mietzner and Burhanuddin Muhtadi, "The Myth of Pluralism:
Nahdlatul Ulama and the Politics of Religious Tolerance in Indonesia", Contemporary Southeast Asia:A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, Volume 42, Number 1 (25 April 2020): 58–84.
35 Dedy Darmawan Nasution, "Ini Hasil Survei LSI Terkait Intoleransi Politik", 25
September 2018", accessed 18 June 2020,
https://www.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/politik/18/09/25/pfkwzm409-ini- hasil-survei-lsi-terkait-intoleransi-politik.
Politicization of Religion
Historically, the role and strategic influence of religious issues in Indonesia's political arena has actually been running for a long time, even taking place since Indonesia has not yet found its sovereignty as an independent state. Now, when the Indonesian political system experiences a big jump, from a semi-presidential system to a multiparty presidential system, religion is increasingly finding its political space. The reason is, since the opening of the democratic system of totality, political space and stage have become more open and dynamic, so that all political movements from across ideologies can participate freely. This includes Islamic-based political movements.36
In politics constellation in Indonesia, the real picture of the politicization of religion is clearly reflected in many regional political events. One of the most inviting public attention is the gubernatorial election in Jakarta in 2017. The tangled up of one of the candidates in the 'al-Maidah' case became the initial explosion of religious sentiment.
The case heats up as the issue of blasphemy arises.37 The climax of all of them was the birth of "212 Movement", which contained a display of the superiority of the groups majority towards minority. The mass mobilization ultimately did not only have an effect on the unhealthy political atmosphere of the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election, but also significantly disrupted national economic and political stability.
While at the level of national politics, the phenomenon of religious
36 Ridho Al-Hamdi, "Islam and Politics: Political Attitudes of the Elites in Muhammadiyah 1998-2010", IJIMS; Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies, Volume 3, Number 2 (December 2013): 267-290.
37 Ahmad Najib Burhani and Deasy Simandjuntak, "The Ma’ruf Amin Vice- Presidential Candidacy: Enticing or Splitting Conservative Votes?", ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute, Volume 51, Number 2018 (4 September 2018): 8.
politicization is clearly reflected in the 2019 presidential election political contestation, between camp 01 (Jokowi-Amin) and camp 02 (Parbowo-Sandi). In camp 01, attacks through religious politicization emerged in the form of classical discourse that revolved around types of political beliefs and ideologies such as communism and the like.38 Whereas in candidate pair 02, the politicization of religion was played out in the form of issues of radicalization, fundamentalism and the extreme right-group of Islamic religions which were considered to have transnational political interests, replacing the Indonesian government system with an Islamic system.39
Based on the political reality above, it must be recognized that the escalation of the politicization of religion in Indonesia in recent years has indeed increased. The rolling of the 1998 reformation with all its great narratives to create an emancipatory political system that is far from using primordial and intolerant issues, is it seems difficult to be real.40 The rising trend of religious politicization in recent years has practically had a significant impact on increasing intolerance behavior, both in the political and religious sectors. Referring to the findings of the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI), it was found that the majority of Muslims in Indonesia objected if they were led by people outside of their beliefs, both leadership at the level of president, vice president, governor to regent or mayor (see Tabel 1).41
Table1. Trends of polical intolerance toward non-muslims Indonesian
POLITICAL INTOLERANCE
FORM 2016 2017 2018
Non MuslimPresident 48% 53% 59%
Non Muslim Vice Presiden 41% 50% 52%
Non Muslim Governor 40% 48% 52%
Non Muslim Regen 39% 47% 52%
Politicization of Data
38 Arie Setyaningrum Pamungkas and Gita Octaviani, "Aksi Bela Islam dan Ruang Publik Muslim: Dari Representasi Daring ke Komunitas Luring", Jurnal Pemikiran Sosiologi, Volume 4, Number 2 (November 2017): 65.
39 Alwi Dahlan Ritonga and Fernanda Putra Adela, "Mencermati Populisme Prabowo sebagai Bentuk Gaya Diskursif Saat Kampanye Politik pada Pemilihan Presiden 2019", Politeia: Jurnal Ilmu Politik, Volume 12, Number 1 (2020): 6.
40 Abdul Mu’ti and Ahmad Najib Burhani, "The Limits of Religious Freedom in Indonesia: With Reference to the First Pillar Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa of Pancasila", IJIMS; Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies, Volume 9, Number 1 (May 2019): 113.
41 jpnn.com, "Survei LSI: Mayoritas Muslim Indonesia Intoleran dalam Urusan Politik", www.jpnn.com, 3 November 2019, https://www.jpnn.com/news/survei- lsi-mayoritas-muslim-indonesia-intoleran-dalam-urusan-politik.
In Indonesia, the discourse of politicization of data was widely discussed as news spread that there were around one million Indonesian Facebook users' data leaked.42 But beyond that, the politicization of data in the Indonesian political sphere has actually been going on for a long time, even since the 2014 presidential election. Exactly since the use of political survey institutes. As a political reference, the survey institute does not only have the position as a 'tool' to measure and know electability to the popularity of candidates or candidates, but also has a strategic function in influencing the opinions and emotions of voters.43 The big question is, how does the perspective of the politicization of data influence the formation of post-truth political waves in Indonesia?
What needs to be emphasized here is that post-truth politics works not to display facts, but to form image, not in the sense of searching for truth, but to play emotions and rationality so as to make objectivity obscure. In this regard, the politicization of data, through its advantages in offering statistical data, as well as the use of scientifically based methodological instruments, plays a strategic role and function in conducting opinion gathering and processing public emotions, thereby affecting overall political behavior.44 In practice, the politicization of data is identical to the use of information media, both offline-based media and especially online-based media. In the political constellation of the United States, Trump is known to have succeeded in arousing Islamophobic sentiments, after he made use of political data and social media. In Indonesia itself, the politics of religious-based intolerance has increased dramatically, and occurred after the discovery of issues of religion and identity that is widespread in many media.
Islamophobic Narration and Political constellation in Indonesia In terms of language, Islamophobia consists of two words, Islam and phobia. The word Islam refers to the types of beliefs carried and taught by the Prophet Muhammad.45 While the word phobia, referring to the College Dictionary, has the meaning of fear that has no reference, does
42 Fabian Januarius Kuwado, "1 Juta Data Pengguna Asal Indonesia Bocor, Menkominfo Panggil Facebook", KOMPAS.COM, 5 April 2018, https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2018/04/05/17361101/1-juta-data-
pengguna-asal-indonesia-bocor-menkominfo-panggil-facebook.
43 Henry E. Brady, "Contributions of Survey Research to Political Science", PS:
Political Science and Politics, Volume 33, Number 1 (2000): 47–57.
44 Timothy A Gibson, "The Post-Truth Double Helix: Reflexivity and Mistrust in Local Politics", International Journal of Communication, Volume 12, Number 1 (27 June 2018): 3169.
45 Dalal Alshammari, "Islamophobia", International Journal of Humanities and Sosial Science, Volume 3, Number 15 (2013): 178.
not make sense for an object, behavior, or in certain events, which motivates individuals to avoid or be afraid. As for the terminology, Islamophobia has a number of iterations that carry the meaning of negative prejudice, excessive fear, hatred, and hostility towards Islam and muslims.46
Genealogically, the term Islamophobia has actually emerged since the 1980s, but the discourse on it became more popular and drew a lot of attention after the attack on the WTC building in September 2001.47 At this time Islam was perceived as a threat, both in the world and specifically in the United States. Islam is said to be a substitute for Nazi and communist power which contains a picture of invasion and infiltration. 48 This refers to the negative stigma of Islam which according to them has an exclusive, conservative, rigid paradigm and a very closed view of modernization.49
In Indonesia, the term Islamophobia found its popularity when the political transition of government occurred, from a semi- presidential system to a presidential system of multiparty totality.50 The national political turmoil due to the instability of international geopolitics and the domestic economy, was further compounded by an increase in religious terror carried out by extreme right Islamic groups, both at the national level such as the Bali Bombing I, Bali Bombing II, the terror bombing Hotel J.W. Marriot, or terror on a global level such as the 11 September 2001 tragedy, directly had a significant influence on the rise of Islamophobia discourse. At this time, the discourse of Islamophobia in Indonesia is aimed at responding the emergence of a political ideology-based political movement that is suspected of having a transnational political agenda to create a political system of caliphate theocracy. Included in this group are the Party of Partai Keadilan
46 Yasser Ad-Dab’bagh, "Islamophobia: Prejudice, the Psychological Skin of the Self and Large‐group Dynamics", International Journal of Applied Psychoanalytic Studies, Volume 14, Number 1 (June 2017): 173–82.
47 Hatem Bazian, "National Entry-Exit Registration System: Arabs, Muslims, and Southeast Asians and Post-9/11 “Security Measures”", Islamophobia Studies Journal 2 (1 April 2014): 82–98; Jauharoti Alfin et al., "Wacana Islamophobia dan Persepsi terhadap Islam Indonesia melalui Studi Bahasa di Kalangan Mahasiswa Polandia", Miqot: Jurnal Ilmu-ilmu Keislaman, Volume 42, Number 1 (August 2018): 207.
48 Wajahat Ali et al., The Roots of the Islamophobia Network in America, Washington, D.C: Center for American Progress, 2011: 47.
49 Salman Sayyid, "A Measure of Islamophobia", Islamophobia Studies Journal, Volume 2 (April 2014): 10–25.
50 M. Sauki, "Perkembangan Islam di Indonesia Era Reformasi", Tasamuh: Jurnal Studi Islam, Volume 10, Number 2 (7 November 2018): 52; Andar Nubowo,
"Islam dan Pancasila di Era Reformasi: sebuah Reorientasi Aksi", Jurnal Keamanan Nasional, Number 1 (2015): 18.
Sejahtera (PKS) and the Islamic organization of Hisbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). 51
Theoretically, the narrative of Islamophobia amid the emergence of post-truth politics in contemporary Indonesian politics constellation can be grouped into two big themes, namely Islamophobia based on cultural religious intolerance and Islamophobia based on political intolerance. In cultural religious intolerance, exclusivism behavior tends to target several aspects that are in direct contact with the religious dimension. For example, groups or individuals (Muslim or non-Muslim) object if there are followers of other religions to build houses of worship or conduct religious activities in the surrounding environment. In some survey institutions, the growing trend of Islamophobia due to religious religious intolerance is easier to control and overcome than intolerance in the religious political sector.52
If intolerance in a holy cultural religious bases itselfin the religious realm, this is different from political intolerance. Theoretically, political intolerance can be understood as exclusive behavior in the socio-political sector. Exactly, political intolerance can be measured by how much resistance an individual or group has if another religion holds a certain structural position.53 Whether it's as president, vice president, governor, regent, or mayor. Interestingly, in the context of contemporary Indonesian politics, the trend of political intolerance which in the early days of the reformation era has not shown significant stretching, now after two decades of reformation rolling, the trend of political intolerance actually shows an increase. This condition is directly proportional to the decline in Indonesia's democratic ranking.
According to a report by The Economist Intelligence Unit experiencing degradation, from 48 to 68.54
The fact that the increasing practice of political intolerance in Indonesia occurred in recent years, especially since the outbreak of the
51 Asep Muhammad Iqbal and Zulkifli Zulkifli, "Islamic Fundamentalism, Nation- State and Global Citizenship: The Case of Hizb Ut-Tahrir", Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies, Volume 6, Number 1 (June 2016): 26; Aksa,
"Gerakan Islam Transnasional: sebuah Nomenklatur, Sejarah dan Pengaruhnya di Indonesia", Yupa: Historical Studies Journal, Number1 (August 2017): 1.
52 M. Iqbal Ahnaf, "Membaca Survei LSI: Antara Korupsi, Religiositas, dan Intoleransi", Https://Crcs.Ugm.Ac.Id (blog), Oktober 2018, https://crcs.ugm.ac.id/membaca-survei-lsi-antara-korupsi-religiositas-dan- intoleransi/.
53 See Ananda Zhafira, "Efek Moderasi Kepercayaan Politik terhadap Hubungan antara Religiusitas Islam dan Intoleransi Politik", Jurnal Psikologi Sosial, Volume 15 (August 2017): 122–35.
54 Dian Erika Nugraheny, "Indeks Demokrasi Indonesia Turun dalam Tiga Tahun
Terakhir", Kompas.com, 24 January 2020,
https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2020/01/24/20340031/indeks-demokrasi- indonesia-turun-dalam-tiga-tahun-terakhir-ini-respons?page=all.
“212 Movement”, directly provides answers to hypotheses raised by many circles. The hypothesis to be tested for truth revolves around one important question, does the presence of post-truth politics have major implications for the return of the narrative of Islamophobia in parts of the world, including in Indonesia? In related with this importent question, findings from many survey institutions show that there is a causal relationships between the post-truth political phenomenon and the increasing wave of global Islamophobia.55 The data shows that of
“212 Movement” have left a long and widespread footprint or legacy.
This is not only seen from the trend of political expansion, but can also expand into other domains such as the practice of intolerance in the religious religious sector. The survey shows, in the last two years, precisely since 2019 there has been an increase in cases of intolerance at the religious cultural level. The most frightening thing of all is the socio-religious and socio-political implications that are far more serious and bigger. The implication is that there has been a re-emergence of a wave of fear and anxiety in the name of religion (Islamophobia) among the community, which grew as a result of the use of post-truht racist politics,
Conclusion
In Indonesia, post-truth politics has taken part in many political events in the past decade, it happens both in political events at the local and national levels. At the simultaneous elections of 2017-2018, 2014, and 2019 presidential elections, post-truth politics showed its identity through the rise of political propaganda rooted in two major issues. It was religion and ethnicity. In practice, the use of religious and ethnicity issues in post-truth politics has indirectly revived the narrative of Islamophobia in the Indonesian political stage. The return of Islamophobia in Indonesia can be seen from three things; first, the use of post-truth politics that is rooted in the politicization of religion and ethnicity, has soil Indonesian democracy, but has also made Indonesia's nationality as a plural and pluralist state become fragile.
Secondly, post-truth political narratives that contain racism, discrimination, intimidation and hate speech give negative effect on the synthesis of behavioral syntax. Especially the raising sentiments in the name of religion and ethnicity as happened in the “212 Movement”. Third, the revival of the narrative of Islamophobia due to the use of post-truth politics in Indonesian politics constellation, is clearly illustrated by the increasing number of intolerance behavior.
The majority feels more entitled to the future, and at the same time
55 Paul Valadier, “Post-Truth: A Danger to Democracy", Cairn on Behalf of S.E.R.
Volume 5 (2017): 55-64.
the minority group must participate in them. Both intolerance that occurs in religious cultural areas such as the burning of church, persecution of religious activities, and intolerance that occurs in political areas such as restraints and restrictions on individual or group political participation.
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