Disclosures by members of the organization about immoral and illegal practices to persons or institutions that can influence the action are called whistleblowing (Miceli, 2004). Research is stuck in the whistleblower focus rather than the process of dealing with the problem. Fair interaction results from the supervisor's treatment of the whistleblower by not making threats of retaliation (Miceli & Near, 1992; Miceli et al., 2008).
The supervisor is highly valued by the organization and plays a role in realizing the character of the organization (Roadhes & Eisenberger, 2002). Employees' perception of the status given to superiors by the organization gives confidence that the support of the superiors is also the support of the organization. The actions taken by the employee are considered as feedback for the actions of the organization.
Therefore, employees generalize their exchange relationships with superiors as an exchange for the organization, seeing the supervisor as a representative of the organization. 2010) state that employees form a perception of the similarity between the supervisor and the organization as the embodiment of the supervisory organization (SOE / Supervisor Organizational Embodiment) (Eisenberger et al., 2010). This research predicts that the higher the security level of the whistleblower hotline, the higher the likelihood that a whistleblower will report an error. In organizational support theory, there is a possibility that employees have a different view than employers as representatives of the organization.
Variation in supervisor alignment with the organization may help explain how much variation affects organizational commitment (Eisenberger et al., 2010).
Research Methods
H3: Under conditions of supervisor support being low, and high protection will have a positive effect on fraud disclosure decisions. H4: Under circumstances of supervisor's support is low; high protection will have a greater positive effect on fraudulent disclosure decisions by non-auditors than auditors. The participants were given by manipulation of high and low supervisor's support, and high and low protection.
The experimental instrument was tested six times on the students until the participants passed the manipulation check. The participant who answered correctly was less than the mean of the participants' answers and was therefore excluded from the analysis. The independent variables consist of supervisor support, protection, and job types: auditor and non-auditor.
Supervisor support is when the supervisor treats others with respect, courtesy, and respect and trusts correct information and interpretation. Therefore, supervisor support is operationalized by the supervisor's behavior toward subordinates with attention, support, trust, and respect for potential whistleblowers (Eisenberg et al., 2002). To measure this variable, the mean of participant ratings is: (1) participants; and (2) others will report cheating through a secret hotline in each scenario.
Meanwhile, to test the social desirability bias, the difference between the participants' answers in the decision about the disclosure of fraud is compared with the response if the sketch is answered from a third person's perspective (Lowe et al., 2015). The manipulation check is conducted to test the participants' understanding of the concepts of deception, supervisor support, and protection categorized under high or low conditions. The participants are asked to answer a check manipulation question with a response scale of 1 to 10 (1 = very low to 10 = very high).
The answer to the cheat sheet is considered correct if the participants answer above the average. While controlling the manipulation for the variables of supervisor support and protection, each also consists of 2 questions. While outlines of supervisor support and protection are low, the correct response is below the mean of 3.98 and 3.86.
Results of Analysis and Discussion
The results of the analysis showed that participants who passed the manipulation amounted to 48 students. Higher supervisor support results in a higher average fraud reporting probability (M = 6.708) than low support (M = 5.208). For Hypothesis 3, the ANOVA model analysis results show the interaction between supervisor support and protection against the fraud disclosure decision, indicating F p <0.086.
The interaction results indicate that the interaction of supervisor support and protection is significant at α = 0.10. The results of testing the interaction of support, protection, and supervisor job type are significant at the p value. Figures 2 and 3 show a comparison of decisions for the low and high support supervisor support conditions.
Auditors will be higher in whistleblowing decisions when there is a high supervisor's support and high protection (M = 8.800) than non-auditors (M = 8.42). However, the test results show that non-auditors disclose higher fraud information when supervisor support is low but high protection (M = 7.00) than auditors (M = 5.50). As a prosocial behavior, this study shows that high support results in high decisions when given high protection, not because of the reward.
This research extends the findings of previous studies which suggest that a supervisor's support influences disclosure decisions (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005) and explains interactional justice (Seifert, 2010). The results show that even if supervisor support is low, if protection is high, then the possibility of a whistleblower revealing fraud is high. This research results in opposite results from previous studies on the weakness of the anti-retaliation model (Moberly, 2006).
The results of the organization's responses in the previous period will be used as factors that drive fraud detection in the next period (Taylor and Curtis, 2009). The results suggest that under high supervisor support and high protection, auditors make a higher disclosure decision than non-auditors. This is because of the high support of the supervisor, then the existing employees in the organization have a greater responsibility due to the social exchanges with the supervisors.
This study has a contribution that explains that organizational factors can encourage fraud disclosure. Based on social exchange theory, this study provides evidence that a supervisor's support and protection can encourage disclosure decisions.
