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Is There A Reliable Way of Knowing?
I. U. Gwunireama,Victor Chizi Ihunda
Department of Philosophy,
University of Port Harcourt, Port Harcourt, Rivers State, Nigeria.
Email: [email protected]
ABSTRACT
The human quest for knowledge is not a mere quest for information that may probably be true, but an anxious quest for certainty. What then, does it mean to know? Is knowledge possible? What are the sources of our knowledge? This paper deals with some of these recurring epistemological questions and, more precisely, the question: Is there a reliable way of knowing? To claim to know requires that the object of our knowledge is not only true but also that the source from which such a knowledge claim originates is at least reasonably reliable. Therefore, in our response to the question of the possibility of a reliable way to knowledge, we argued that it would be reasonable to think of the reliability of our sources of knowledge not in absolute terms, but comparatively and depending on the context of a given claim to knowledge, because certain sources or kinds of knowledge, if subjected to critical analysis, may simply be more reliable than others. Thus, in light of the numerous challenges associated with certain sources or kinds of knowledge, the virtue of epistemic humility demands that we acknowledge that no single source or kind of knowledge is devoid of challenges that come in the way of its reliability. This work concludes that there is no reliable way to know. Outside of that context, each of our sources of knowledge falls short of being reliable and is capable of misleading us in our quest for knowledge.
Keywords : Quest for knowledge, Certainty, Knowledge, epistemology.
INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE
In everyday expression, when the verb “to know” is used, it is done so loosely. This is because some people barely understand what it clearly entails when they make the assertion. However, in some contexts, when the speaker says
“I know,” “know” here is often intended to be used as a synonym for a hunch, opinion, belief, or even a wish. In some cases, when we claim to know, we usually mean that we are sure that something is true. We may also use the word “know” to express personal conviction. In these cases, our claim may be groundless. In an epistemological sense, neither our hunches, opinions, beliefs, nor wishes can be substituted as appropriate synonyms for the verb to know.
The idea that human beings can in fact know or possess knowledge of the external world, other beings, and ourselves has been a very contentious issue in epistemology. With the increasing number of perspectives and schools of thought in epistemology that attempt to solve or perhaps dissolve some of these old perennial questions about the possibility of knowledge, we have continuously observed shifts or circular movement in the emphasis of what the problem of knowledge is and what we ought to pay attention to. Some of these epistemological problems can be best expressed as questions: what is human
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knowledge, and what are its inextricable components? What are the origins (sources) of our knowledge? Does all of our knowledge have its origin in sensation, or does some of our knowledge originate independently of our sensory experience? How do we know? What is the extent of our knowledge? Is there actually a limit to what we can know? (Moser & Nat 2003).
Moreover, philosophers often make statements that are actually intended to be true, and they rely on arguments in order to argue for or against a theory. In the end, the goal is to arrive at some form of knowledge about the subject matter, and this attempt at seeking knowledge is a quest for certainty (Ayer 1957). What then do epistemologists mean when they use the words “I know?” What does it mean to know? What is knowledge? Nnamdi and Ariche observed that “the analysis of the concept of knowledge has commonly been taken to be one of the central tasks of epistemology” (2017, p. 64). It has been a recurring question in the history of epistemology from the works of Plato, such as Meno and Theaetetus, wherein we could see an attempt to define what knowledge is, or at least conditions that ought to be met before we could epistemically grant that an individual’s claim to know is justified (Duran 1991). Plato recognized three basic components: justification, truth, and belief as inextricable from the definition of knowledge. For him, knowledge is a justification for true belief. Therefore, to know entails the possession of these definitive components of knowledge. Other attempts to define what it entails to have knowledge of a proposition have been made by Roderick Chisholm (1957) and A. J. Ayer (1956). In reaction to this traditional platonic conception of knowledge as justified true belief and its subtle manifestation in the conception of Chisholm and Ayer, Edmund L. Gettier, in his 1963 classic essay entitled “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” challenged the traditional definition of knowledge or what it means to know with his hypothetical scenarios. However, for the sake of this work, we shall stick to the traditional definition of knowledge as a justified true belief in order to proceed to reflect upon the question: is there any reliable way to knowledge?
Truth, belief, and justification have been regarded as the conditions for knowledge. Belief is a condition that is necessary for knowledge. “Knowledge requires belief, but belief does not require knowledge... knowledge is belief of a special kind, satisfying certain conditions” (Moser & Nat 2003, p. 2). Secondly, in the truth condition, truth is involved in knowing. We naturally seek to know the truth. “A true proposition describes a state-of-affairs that has occurred or, in the case of the future, that will occur” (Aja 1993, p. 70). This position takes cognizance of the three theories of truth: correspondence, coherence, and pragmatics. Although the truth condition has been criticized, the denial of the truth condition is a weak one, and this means that knowledge neither entails nor fails to entail truth. Lastly, is justification a necessary condition for knowledge?
Does one need to be justified before he can claim to know something?
Justification establishes the link between one’s belief and the fact of the situation.
Justification also demonstrates that a true belief is more than just a coincidence.
During the era of ancient Greek philosophers, the problem of knowledge manifested itself in the form of relativism and a strong form of skepticism about
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the possibility of objective knowledge. The Sophists (Protagoras, Sextus Empiricus, Carneades, etc.), who travelled about as private tutors, did observe the absence of uniformity in moral judgement and claimed knowledge in the various societies they visited. Truth or knowledge is no longer seen as an objective reality but a contingent phenomenon based on the judgement of humans (Cappelen &
Hawthorne 2009). Some of these skeptics were dubbed dogmatic because they believed that nothing could be known with certainty.Hence, relativism, or this form of dogmatic skepticism, became a problem of knowledge and has incessantly manifested itself in diverse forms since the era of ancient Greek philosophers to the contemporary time.
During the medieval period, the problem of knowledge took on a different dimension. The truth and knowledge of the world, self, and ultimate reality become inextricably grounded in God. Therefore, since possessing knowledge of reality demands a relationship with God, faith becomes a prerequisite for knowledge. For instance, Saint Augustine challenged the prevalence of skepticism, which he believed led to despair. He asserts that our knowledge would be impossible if not for God, who illuminates our minds and thus enables us to grasp the truth about reality. Thus, truth, knowledge, and wisdom are possible and attainable, as against the claim of the skeptics (Fuhrer 2013). Saint Anslem also believes that all of our knowledge is related to a belief in God, including the problem of knowledge. His philosophy is described as faith seeking reason (Logan 2009). The idea that our quest for truth or knowledge is inextricably linked to a belief in God seems very problematic today, hence the rejection of such a view by the enlightenment philosophers.
The problem of knowledge during the modern period has predominantly become a problem of the source of our knowledge. On the one hand, rationalists like Descartes and Leibniz maintain that reason is the primary source of our ideas or knowledge of things. Central to this insistence on reason as the primary source of knowledge is the notion of innatism, the belief that some of our ideas and mental constructs are inborn and not acquired through sense experience. For these rationalist philosophers, specifically Descartes and Leibniz, the idea of innatism is necessary in explaining how we come to possess certain kinds of ideas like mathematical concepts and numbers that are not derived from sense experience.
John Locke and David Hume, who represent the empiricist tradition, reject the idea of innatism. In fact, they assert that our knowledge or ideas are primarily derived from our senses and not inborn. Hume maintains that all of the perceptions of the human mind come from sensory experience, whether they are impressions or ideas (Hume 2003). This debate between rationalists and empiricists is a major cause of controversy in epistemology, and even the problem of justification of our knowledge is often based on the rationalist-empiricist divide.
RELATIVISM
One of the major and arguably the oldest problems of knowledge is the problem of relativism (Cappelen & Hawthorne 2009). Since the era of the ancient
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Greek philosophers, relativism has provided a persistent source of challenge to the possibility of knowledge. It is an essential feature of knowledge that it ought to be objective, but certain skeptics have argued against the possibility of objective knowledge. On a more general note, relativism is a view that rejects the possibility of a single standard of moral principles, procedures of justification, and truth. In fact, relativism is often considered antithetical to such philosophical perspectives as absolutism, objectivism, monism, and realism (Rorty, 1979). Therefore, be it truth, procedures of justification or moral principles, they are all considered intertwined with social conventions or specific frameworks within a given context. Relativists often insist that if something is only relatively so, then we have no framework-independent vantage point from which the matter of whether the thing in question is so can be established. Thus, whatever we say or claim to know cannot be objective but must necessarily be relative to some internal and external determining factors. The idea of relativism cuts across the realm of epistemology, or cognition, to the issues of moral and aesthetic values. Here we are concerned with usage within the confines of epistemology as it bears on the human quest for knowledge in terms of cognition, perception, thoughts, and truth etc.
This view was commonly held by the sophists. Among the Sophists was Protagoras of Abdera, whose views on truth and reality led to his famous statement that man is the measure of all things, of what is that it is and of what is not that it is not. This statement has an obvious implication that implies a rejection of the possibility of objective truth or knowledge. Despite the fact that this view of Protagoras may have been influenced by his observation of the lack of uniformity in moral judgement of different societies, which he is said to have visited, knowledge was inevitably seen as relative too, if man was indeed the measure of all things. Scholars such as Richard Rorty and Jacques Derrida, for example, were well known for their doubts about the possibility of objective knowledge and their insistence on the role of socio-historical, psychological, and textual contexts in our claim to know the truth or knowledge (Barnes & Bloor 1982).
The pertinent question at this juncture is: how or why does the philosophical perspective of relativism constitute a problem for human knowledge or the possibility of our knowing? The human quest for knowledge is not a quest for probable opinions, which may or may not be true. Moreover, since the time of Descartes, there has been an awakening and an incessant yearning for certainty, and knowledge has come to demand objectivity and truth as an ideal feature of what should qualify as knowledge. Relativism as an admission of the absence of a singular, uniformed, independent framework comes in the way of the possibility of objective knowledge, if not in practice, at least in principle, because of its emphasis on the relative nature of everything we know.
In the task of addressing the question, is there any reliable way of knowing? This paper is divided into three sections. The first section, which is the introduction historically, highlights the problem of knowledge. The second section examines the sources or kinds of knowledge in order to show the unique nature of
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each source of knowledge and their limitations. While the third section answers the question, is there any reliable way to know?
SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE AND THEIR LIMITATIONS
Historically, it has been the task of epistemologists to seek answers pertinent to fundamental questions about knowledge. Amongst such a panoply of questions is: what are the sources or origins of our knowledge? Is all of our knowledge derived from sensation, or does some of it come from sources other than our sensory experience? It is commonly stated that data exists all around us and that when we become interested in it or it impinges on us, it becomes information. When we organize information into meaningful shapes, it becomes knowledge “(Hannabuss 1991, p. 27). The task of specifying a source of knowledge demands a clear indication of where it comes from. Hence, knowledge can be reasonably explicated in relation to its origin. In epistemological discourses, when references are made to knowledge, it is often considered in the light of its source or its nature. This is recognition of the fact that knowledge often manifests itself through diverse sources and could be of different kinds.
It should be noted that when we speak of sources/kinds of knowledge, there is a distinction between basic and non-basic sources of human knowledge.
From an epistemological standpoint, there are four standard basic sources from which we acquire knowledge. These sources of knowledge yield knowledge without necessarily relying on other sources. The basic sources of knowledge are perception, memory, consciousness (introspection and intuition) and reason (Audi 2009). On the other hand, the other class of non-basic sources of knowledge includes testimony, authority, revelation, etc.
RATIONALISM VS. EMPIRICISM
A greater part of the debate in epistemology is a concern about our sources of knowledge and its justification. From where does our knowledge originate and how are our knowledge claims or beliefs justified? This problem of knowledge has been expressed within the philosophical views of rationalism and empiricism.
The matter of contention between the rationalist and the empiricist is often seen as a problem of knowledge that pertains to the extent to which we rely upon our sensory experience in our attempt to acquire knowledge of the world we inhabit, self-knowledge, and knowledge of moral and aesthetical values.
The issue of contention between rationalists and empiricists is mainly the problem: how to gain knowledge? Thus, the response to this question further determines the response to other problems of knowledge, such as the nature of justification or the limits of knowledge or thoughts. However, while classifying the thoughts and methods of some philosophers as exhibiting some form of rationalist or empiricist principle may be easier, determining which of the divisions some of these philosophers fall under may be more difficult. According to Clarke (1982), some people think that Descartes, who is often thought of as a rationalist, had empiricist leanings when we look at his natural philosophy, where he used a lot of sensory experience.
101 RATIONAL KNOWLEDGE
Is there a possibility of knowing that something is true or false a priori without recourse to experience? Plato and the Platonians subscribed to what is commonly referred to as platonic rationalism in philosophy. This view holds that the possibility of our arriving at knowledge through reasoning without the aid of sense experience is strong. Fundamentally, these are some of the ontological assumptions of rational knowledge, or rationalism:
Reality in itself consists of Forms, that is eternal, universal, unchanging entities accessible to reason. Reality exhibits… a rational structure arising from the logical relations among the Forms. This rational structures like the Forms themselves, is accessible to reason. The Forms exist independently of the sensory world of material objects, the latter world being only a shadowy reflection of the real world of the Forms. Through the use of reason, we apprehend directly the rational structure of reality. Inasmuch as the forms exist independently of the sensory world of material objects, this apprehension of reality is independent of sensory experience (Moser & Nat 2003, p.
17).
Some truths are demonstrable only through abstract reasoning. Take, for example, the principle that two contradictory statements cannot both be true at once. For example,Dede is a man and Dede is not a man. Rational knowledge is therefore that which is obtained by the exercise of reason alone, unaccompanied by observation of the actual state of affairs.
The principles of rational knowledge may be applied to sense experience, but they are not deduced from it. Unlike the truths of intuitive knowledge, the truths of rational knowledge are valid regardless of our feelings about them, and they are valid universally. The principles of formal logic and pure mathematics are paradigms of rational knowledge. Such knowledge of general propositions is arrived at through a process of inference called induction, while the knowledge of a particular proposition is arrived at through a process of inference known as deduction. Both induction and deduction are methods and, as such, can be said to be a way of knowing (Nelson 2005).
Rational knowledge as a form of knowledge manifests itself in slightly different forms in the history of human thought in spite of its basic commonality.
We can see forms of rational knowledge expressed in the works and thoughts of scholars like Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Leibniz, etc., and these scholars belong to the philosophical school of thought known as rationalism. To a reasonable extent, the idea of rational knowledge is anchored on two assumptions that rationalists consider foundational to their view. First, it is the idea of the indispensability of reason in the human quest for knowledge. This is often expressed in the claim that the knowledge of a subject matter we acquire either by intuition, deduction, or even through the innate nature of some ideas, could not possibly be acquired through our sensory experience. Second, it is the supposedly
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superior status of reason. It is commonly held by rationalists that rational knowledge is superior in epistemic status to that acquired through sensory experience (Moser & Nat 2003).
At the heart of the rationalists’ perspective on the problem of our source of knowledge is their belief in and insistence on the distinction between appearance and reality. They see reality as revealed to our rational thought. That is, what we refer to as reason or intellect. Therefore, they consider appearance as a way reality appears to us, and we ought to employ rational thought if indeed we seek the truth about the real. Appearances could be explained in terms of the real (Nelson 2005).
Core rationalism is often expressed thus: “we have knowledge of reality through the non-empirical use of reason” (Moser & Nat 2003, p. 13).
Plato’s thought falls under the rationalist framework. In fact, his brand of rationalism is often referred to as Platonic Rationalism. With regards to the question: how is a priori knowledge possible? Platonic rationalism insists on the possibility of an immediate acquaintance with the rational structure of reality itself through reason. Given that Plato sees reality as consisting of forms that are characteristically universal, eternal, unchanging entities accessible to reason, and that these forms are seen as existing independently of the physical world, Plato and adherents of his view see our apprehension of reality as a process independent of our sensory experience (Moser & Nat 2003).
Aristotle and some of his adherents in the medieval era, especially Saint Thomas Aquinas, held some form of rationalist perspective, which is similar to Aristotelian Rationalism. Aristotle rejected the version of Platonic Rationalism that is premised on the distinction between the world of forms and the world of particulars and rather argued that the forms inextricably inhere in the physical world. Thus, he asserts that our apprehension of the forms and their interrelations through reason or rational intuition does not happen in an a priori manner because the forms are intertwined with the objects of the physical world. Hence, our reason or rational intuition about them can only be arrived at on the occasion of our sensory experience. One may wonder why Aristotle should be classified as a rationalist. This is because he does believe that our apprehension of the truth of a proposition flows from our reasoning or rational intuition of the relations of forms (Nelson 2005).
Modern thinkers such as Descartes and Leibniz seem to maintain that in our acquisition of knowledge, we begin with a priori knowledge of some basic propositions. For instance, they assert that we possess knowledge from the beginning of the truth of the causal principle that every event must have a cause.
This knowledge is believed to provide us with an a priori insight into the way reality is structured. The version of rationalism of these thinkers is often referred to as Classical Rationalism, and its thesis is majorly anchored on the concept of innatism. By this, we mean that certain concepts and propositions are considered innate, born in us, and thus, we possess the ability to apprehend a priori how they are related to each other. These rationalists hold that beliefs based on prior apprehensions constitute a priori knowledge (Moser & Nat 2003).
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Rational knowledge has its shortcomings and does not guarantee us a reliable way to knowledge by virtue of its nature as a source of knowledge.
Rational knowledge is fundamentally abstract and formal. It deals with logical relations and impersonal meanings, and disregards emotional needs and the actual state of affairs. Moreover, the truth of certain propositions that we often claim to have arrived at via the process of reasoning may have been known by intuition and the direct apprehension that is individually arrived at while seeking the truth may not necessarily be uniformed with the findings of others. This may be chaotic for the project of epistemology. In its ideal form, rationalism places a high premium on mathematical principles. It seeks to explain the world we inhabit by employing mathematical principles, but mathematics cannot be employed to help us comprehend every single dimension of life. The concept of innatism, which is central to the rationalist’s thesis, is also problematic.If we grant that some of our ideas are innate, then knowledge would simply entail a recollection of ideas that inhere in our minds a priori. This is rarely the case, and even if it is, how can we be certain that our innate ideas on a given subject will be similar to those of others?
EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE
At the heart of empirical knowledge is the assumption that humans cannot possess knowledge of the world around them through non-empirical sources. The paradigm of empirical knowledge is knowledge confirmed by evidence or the senses. By seeing, hearing, smelling, feeling, and tasting, we form our conception of the world around us. Knowledge, therefore, is composed of ideas formed in accordance with observed or sensed facts. For the empiricists like Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, it is look and see. This type of knowledge is also known as knowledge by acquaintance.
If there is any knowledge of reality, according to core Empiricism, it derives from sensory experience and the empirical use of reason -and from this alone. core Empiricism holds that we do indeed have knowledge, and characteristically it holds that we have knowledge of reality as well (Moser &
Nat 2003, p. 19).
Empirical knowledge as a unique sort of knowledge is not only antithetical to rational knowledge but also repudiates the idea of innate knowledge of any sort.
For instance, Locke did maintain that the human mind is a clean slate; there are no inborn principles or mental framework devoid of inputs from sensory experience.
The predominant thesis of empirical knowledge is the basic tenet that our knowledge is derived from our experiences, either through sensations or reflection. Even something as abstract as concepts, under this view of knowledge, is believed to originate in sensory experience.
With regards to the question of how we gain knowledge, J. S. Mill maintains that all of our knowledge, ideas, and concepts originate from experience. It is this response to the problem of our source of knowledge, or ideas, as he often refers to it, that marked him as an empiricist who strongly held to “the
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theory which regards experience as the only source of knowledge” (Brown 1996, p. 59). J. S. Mill and David Hume shared similar views on the problem of our source of knowledge. The climax of the thesis of the empiricists is expressed in the views of the logical positivist, who insists on the verification principle. Thus, by employing the verification principle, a nonanalytic proposition becomes meaningful only on the basis that it is verifiable or falsifiable solely on the grounds of sense experience. For these empiricists, meaningful propositions must be reducible to observational propositions that pertain to particulars. “The relevant observational propositions must be directly verifiable or falsifiable solely by reference to phenomenal items of sensation, such as colours, shapes, tastes, sounds, smells, texture, or warmth” (Moser & Nat 2003, p. 20).
Empirical knowledge is faced with a major challenge: the possibility of our senses misleading us. It is often the case that our senses are conditioned by our preconceptions and physiological disposition. We may be misled to perceive things according to our needs and what is within our power to conceive rather than the actual state of things that we seek to understand. It is usually the case that in the course of our daily activities, we tend to assume too many things as true and real, but on closer examination, we find that many of the things we took to be apparently certain were merely products of appearance and not reality. Like Russell himself admits, “the distinction between appearance and reality, between what things seem to be and what they are” (Russell 2009, p. 6). Moreover, even experience does in fact show that some of the “reputed sources of knowledge”
such as memory, perception, or testimony are fallible” (Ayer 1957, p. 36).
REVEALED KNOWLEDGE
This is a way of knowing in which the object of knowledge is given by inspiration of a supernatural or divine being. In the words of Aja (1993):
Revealed knowledge is that type of knowledge that God has disclosed to man. In his all-knowing nature (omniscience) God inspired certain men to write down certain truths He revealed to them. So that these truths might be known thereafter by all mankind (p. 19).
For Christians and Jews, the word of God is revealed in the Bible; for Muslims, in the Koran; for Hindus, in the Bhagavad-Gita and the Upanishads. Apart from the revealed knowledge contained in the various scriptural texts of each of these aforementioned religious sects, among the religious faithful there are reported cases of some divine manifestations occasionally, either through trance, meditation, prayer, or worship. In either of these religious rituals, some of the faithful have claimed to receive a message from the divine pertaining to a solution to a personal problem or the problem of some other individual, family, or society.
The status of revealed knowledge as a source and kind of knowledge is predicated on the nature of God as an omniscient, omnipotent, and benevolent being.
Therefore, for a good number of religious adherents, this form of knowledge is the
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highest and purest form of knowledge because it emanates from an all-perfect and intelligent being—God.
Revealed knowledge does not fare any better than other sources of knowledge. The problem with revealed knowledge is that its content most often contradicts factual events. This has led to skepticism as to the reliability of revelation as a source of knowledge. One might wonder what the knower’s state of mind was, what language the divine communicated in, how well the religious faithful in such a supposedly supernatural trance or vision comprehended the message or knowledge, and is the revealed knowledge only meant for the individual who received it directly, the believers of such faith, or all humanity?
These are problems with revelational knowledge.
INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE
Intuitive knowledge, in the words of Aja, “is knowledge that a person finds within himself in a moment of insight” (Aja 1993, p. 20). It is the knowledge that is proposed and accepted on the strength of the imaginative vision or private experience of the person proposing it. Intuitive knowledge manifests as the immediacy of cognitions. The truth and ingenuity embodied in the works of art are forms of intuitive knowledge. These truths are not to be tested by observations, calculations, or experiments because they are not hypotheses.
Rather, they are offered as insights, and we ourselves recognize them as true intuitively. Also, mystical writings, autobiographies, and essays of all kinds are reflections of intuitive knowledge.
There is a difference between the act of intuition and intuitive knowledge.
Illumination or insight is necessary for all great intellectual achievements. Works of art, scientific theories, and philosophic theses all seem to be generated out of some primary intuition. This primary intuition is then elaborated upon and refined.
However, a completed scientific theory is not a form of intuitive knowledge. This is because it is logically consistent and is testable by observation, experiment, or both. Intuitive knowledge has often been referred to as “some power of immediate perception of the human mind... which could be considered a power of immediately perceiving right and wrong which enables us to make some sort of spontaneous mental judgments” (Smythe & Evans 2007, pp. 234-235).
The problem with intuition as a source of knowledge is that it lacks parameters for verification, as in: how do you know? Intuition is not backed by reasons, and therefore, it cannot be tested. Another problem with intuition as a source of knowledge is that it is purely subjective and psychological, and therefore cannot be adequately considered as a reliable source of our claim to knowledge. The subjectivity of intuitive knowledge and the argument that it is essentially psychological and rather logical have been advanced by some epistemologists as a major challenge to establishing justificatory grounds for claims to knowledge acquired through intuition (Aaron 1942, p. 300).
AUTHORITATIVE KNOWLEDGE
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Some of the pieces of knowledge we accept as true are not true because we have checked them out ourselves; rather, we accept them because they are couched by authorities in the field. Moreover, with the incessant rise of the daunting challenges bedeviling humanity and the resultant rise in specialization, there is hardly anyone who possesses an interest and knowledge of all of these specialized areas. Hence, in many areas where we are novices, one inevitably comes to accept the judgement, authority, and testimony of others on the grounds that they are actually more knowledgeable than us in a given area. Often, most things that we claim to know are neither things that we personally experience nor things that we infer from our reason. In the words of Aja, authoritative knowledge
“is established knowledge that I accept on someone’s authority” (I.993, p. 20). For instance, even though one may know that the earth revolves around the sun, one may not experience it physically enough to accept this scientific truth. Yet, one knows this fact, having acquired the knowledge from some authority. A good number of our claims to knowledge are based on this kind of knowledge.
According to Ikpe, “in accepting authority as a source of knowledge, there is a need to distinguish between the right and wrong authorities” (because) for an authority to be correct and acceptable, he (or she) must be a specialist in the field in which he is giving information” (Ikpe 1993, p. 30).
In the case of everyday information where no specialty is involved, our authority must be someone who has first-hand information concerning the event or state of affairs. It would be misleading, if not wrong, to consult a novice as an authority on specialized or esoteric knowledge of technical matters. For instance, a medical doctor would be a bad authority whose testimony or authority should be accepted on matters of engineering unless he is trained in the field of engineering as well.
In addition to the ways of knowing enumerated above, epistemologists have also classified knowledge into two basic types based on the circumstances by which we come to know how. For instance, knowing how to ride a bicycle is a different type of claim to knowledge than someone who claims to know that the sun does not revolve around the earth. Epistemologists further classify knowledge into two types: description and ability.
Authoritative knowledge seems quite interesting, and history has shown cases where experts with several years of experience have been wrong about some of their basic knowledge claims. Furthermore, we have a situation in which there are divergent, if not diverse, claims to knowledge on a given subject. In such cases, a novice is thrown into a dilemma with regard to the reliability of a given source of knowledge.
KNOWLEDGE BY DESCRIPTION
Bertrand Russell’s The Problems of Philosophy draws our attention to a different kind of distinction between knowledge and experience based on the immediacy of our cognitive apprehension of sense-data.This corresponds to our knowledge by acquaintance or our knowledge by description. While knowledge by description is akin to ordinary propositional knowledge wherein we know that
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something is or is not the case, knowledge by acquaintance could be understood as a form of familiarity with a person, place, or thing. This is often obtained through sensory experience. Russell maintains that knowledge by acquaintance is a direct causal interaction between a person and some object that the person perceives, while knowledge by description possesses the truth statement of a given object. He points out that our knowledge of things is different than our knowledge of truths. We know a description, and we know that there is just one object to which this description applies, though the object itself is not directly known to us. In such a case, we say that our knowledge of the object is
“knowledge by description” (Russell 2009, p. 34). This kind of knowledge is supposed to “enable us to pass beyond the limits of our private experience.” In spite of the fact that we can only know truths which are wholly composed of terms we have experienced in acquaintance, we can yet have knowledge of things which we have never experienced (Lazerowitz 1937, p. 404). The problem with knowledge description is the assumption that words can adequately create a pictorial representation of whatever it is we intend to describe to our listener.
Even if we grant that a word may adequately enable a speaker to transmit her/her knowledge by description, we have no grounds to assume that the listener must have grasped such knowledge.
KNOWLEDGE BY KNOW-HOW
The word “know-how” draws our attention to the question of process or procedure. Hence, when we talk about knowledge by know-how, we are essentially referring to procedural knowledge. The term “know-how” refers to practical knowledge of how to complete something or a specific task, whether simple or technical in nature.Knowledge by know-how is frequently considered tacit knowledge, which is difficult to transfer to another individual through writing or verbalization (Bach 2012, p. 43).
The challenge with knowledge by know-how involves some misleading assumptions that once the process or procedure involved in the accomplishment of a given task is laid out, one can claim to possess such knowledge by virtue of reading or listening to the procedure. This is rarely the case; in fact, this type of knowledge may be so tacit and intricate that possessing knowledge by know-how may necessitate a lengthy period of practice.
IS THERE ANY RELIABLE WAY TO KNOWLEDGE?
The idea that human beings can in fact know or possess knowledge of the external world, other beings, and ourselves has been a very contentious issue in epistemology with an ever-increasing number of perspectives and schools of thought. On each end of the question of the possibility of knowledge are epistemologists who believe that knowledge is possible, and on the other end are skeptics who doubt the possibility of knowledge. Following our analysis of the different ways of knowing in the previous subsections, we have argued that none of our sources or kinds of knowledge are without their limitations. There is clearly
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no unambiguously reliable and universally accepted way of knowing that is error- free. The challenges of these sources of knowledge make us doubt the possibility of answering the question “is there any reliable way to knowledge?” in the affirmative while upholding the virtue of epistemic humility.
As much as it is the nature of knowledge to manifest itself to humans via a given source, the validity of our knowledge claims is also inextricable from the reliability of such a source. Hence, the question is whether there is any reliable way to knowledge, for if there is any, we suppose it would guarantee our quest for knowledge and, most importantly, provide us with certainty, an important feature which we honestly seek.
This leads us to the recurring problem of skepticism. Given that none of our sources of knowledge is completely devoid of the possibility of misleading us, it is necessary that we think of reliability not in absolute terms but within the context of a given claim to knowledge. Thus, unlike the skeptics who may deny the possibility of knowledge, the reliability of a given knowledge claim should be looked at within the light of a given context.
CONCLUSION
The sources of knowledge and reliability examined show that there is no reliable source or kind of knowledge in absolute terms. It may be necessary for us to admit that, comparatively and depending on the context of a given claim to knowledge, certain sources of knowledge may be more reliable than others.
Therefore, in light of the numerous and daunting challenges of some of our sources of knowledge, it is expected that we uphold the virtue of epistemic humility in acknowledging that we lack a reliable way of knowing. Hence, the reliability of these sources and kinds of knowledge depends, very largely, on the context.
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