~C'KIPlUKt IN KABUINI( LlltKAI'UKt
ic biblical interpretation, though, occasionally, we have seen examples from Tannaic interpretations of biblical law. This fact hints at the nature of halakhic interpretation and its status within Bible interpretation as a whole. That is, the same methods and techniques are used for both the halakhic and the narrative portions of Scripture. Just as both the peshat and the derash approaches are applied to the non-halakhic sections, so both can be applied to interpret biblical law. Thus, for example, we find both literal and allegorical approaches in halakhic interpretation. The phrase ‘an eye for an eye’ (Exod 21:24) is in- terpreted literally by Rabbi Eliezer ben Hyrcanus (Wnn, ‘actually’; B. T. Bava Kummu 84a);lM The words ‘And they shall spread the garment’ (Deut 22:17) are also taken literally by Rabbi Eliezer ben Hyrcanus (other versions read:
Eliezer ben Yaakov), whereas Rabbi Yishmael explains this verse as a meta- phor, that is ‘the matters shall become as clear as a (white) sheet’.‘@ But it seems that this last example illustrates a fine distinction between halakhic and non- halakhic interpretation. Whereas the latter does not hesitate to interpret many scriptures allegorically, halakhic interpretation uses this type of explanation in a very limited way: even Rabbi Yishmael only makes use of this method three times.
The self-imposed limitations of halakhic interpretation are most clearly expressed in the attempts to fix a restricted number of exegetical rules. Thus, tradition attributes the formulation and fixing of seven rules of interpretation to Hillel the Elder, whereas thirteen rules are ascribed to Rabbi Yishmael. These rules were undoubtedly formulated in order to limit difficult or aberrant expla- nations of biblical law. Furthermore, even the application of those rules is restricted, at least as they are employed by some of the Sages. For example, Rabbi Yishmael employs the gezeru shuwu only in cases where the word in the biblical verse on which the analogy is based is superfluous (mufie, ‘free for interpretation’, ‘unnecessary for the plain sense’, in halakhic terminology).
Furthermore, he says that one may not introduce a gezeru shuwu on one’s own authority. Another restriction of Rabbi Yishmael is that one cannot be pun- ished for violation of a law that is learned by means of a gezeru shuwu, a kul wu-homer (conclusion from a minor to a major case) or a mu mufsinu (deduc- tion of the type ‘just as we found in the case of X so in the case of Y’). We can also say that Rabbi Yishmael’s extremely restricted use of the interpretative rule ribui u-miut (see below) results from the fear that it might be used to attribute aberrant matters to the biblical text.lm
Is halakhic interpretation closer to the peshut or the derash approach? This question may be linked to the fundamental question of the role and status of halakhic interpretation: does it innovate halakha based on biblical study or does
‘(*I On the additional literal interpretation held by the same scholar, see Gilat, R. Eliezer Ben Hyrcanus, 68-82.
IN) Sifrei Deut. 237, p, 269. On Rabbi Eliezer ben Hyreanus’ literal interpretationsin the tradition of Eeir Shammai, see Safrai, ‘Halakha’. 198-99.
I”’ On the whole subject, see Epstein, Infroducrion. 521-36.
578
SCRIPTUKEIN RABBINIC Ll'ltKA'IUKt
the halakhic midrash seek to link the normative halakha to Scripture. This basic question has been discussed often and in great detail. Some view the halakhic midrash as a linking of the already existing halakha to the biblical text,“] while others see the halakhic midrash also as the means for deriving new laws from Scripture. 172 It seems that the midrash fulfilled both functions, that is, it was both confirmatory and innovative,173 and it hardly seems possible to categorize the two functions as belonging to two different periods.174 On the basis of this we may distinguish between confirmatory midrashim, which provide scriptural evidence for existing halakhot, and creative midrashim which seek to deduce new laws from Scripture. While the creative midrash usually derives from the literal peshat meaning of the text, the confirmatory midrash interprets every word and uses all means possible to find some scriptural base for the halakha. 175 In other words: ‘The explanatory and creative midrash remains within the bounds of reason and legal interpretation . . .whereas the midrash written after the halakha was already in existence, seeks only to confirm the halakha and integrate it with a scriptural verse. This type of midrash interprets the letters, jots and tittles of a verse knowing all the while that the halakha does not convey the true meaning of the verse . . .This type of literary-rhetorical device used to serve this purpose, was understood and accepted in the entire cultured world of that period’.176
Another aspect of halakhic interpretation as displayed in some halakhic midrashim is its moral conception. The laws concerning a city led astray (Deut 13:13-17), a stubborn and rebellious son (Deut 21:18-21), or the prohibition against accepting proselytes from among the nations (Deut 23:4-7), could have given rise to questions and doubts about the Jew’s attitude to gentiles and dissenters. Halakhic interpretation attempted to limit the applicability of these laws as far as possible. The Sages did this through blatant and exaggerated use of literal explanations.ln For example, the scripture dealing with a town led astray: ‘If you hear in one of your cities..’ (Deut 13:13) is interpreted in a very restricted way: ‘if you heard - but not if you find out on your own’ (Midrush Tunnuim, p. 66). In other words, you have no duty to inquire; the law applies only if you heard a rumour. The same midrash continues: ‘your city - one but not three’. In other words, we cannot designate three cities as ‘cities gone astray’. The passage ‘and you shall burn the city and all its spoil with fire’ (Deut
‘X E.g. Epstein, ibid., 511.
In E.g. Albeck, Introduction to the Mishna, 42; Albeek, Introduction IO the Talmud, 79.
In Urbach, ‘The Derasha’, 166-82; Urbaeh, Ho-Halokho, 69-78; Lieberman, Hellenirm, 62; Elon, Jew&h Low, 1.243-63.
“’ Elon, Jewish Low, 1, 245-46.
175 Elan, Icwtih Law, 1.260-62.
“’ Guttmann, Clovb Tolmudis, 7.
ITI On the examples given below, see Elan, Jewish Low 1, 302-W.
SCRIPTURE IN RABBINIC LITERATURE
13: 17) leads Rabbi Eliezer to conclude that ‘a city that has even a single mezuza cannot become a city led astray, L78 since the mezuza cannot be set on fire.
We find a similarly restrictive application of the law to the case of a stubborn and rebellious son. Thus, the word ‘son’ (Deut 21:18) is interpreted as ‘a son and not a daughter, a son and not a man, and a minor is innocent since he has not reached the age where he is obliged to keep the commandments’.17g The scriptural passage ‘then his father and mother shall take hold of him and bring him out . . . and say . . . this our son is stubborn and rebellious..’ (Deut 21~19-20) is interpreted very literally:
‘and his father and his mother shall take hold of him’ - this teaches us that he is not guilty unless he has both a father and a mother (living) . . . if one of the parents was missing a hand or lame or mute or blind or deaf, he cannot be considered a stubborn and rebellious son, as it is written ‘and they shall take hold of him’ - this excludes those missing a hand, ‘and they shall bring him out’ - this excludes the lame, ‘and they shall say’ - this excludes the mute, ‘this our son’ - this excludes the blind, ‘he will not hearken unto our voice’ - this excludes the deaf
(Sifrei Deut. 219, p. 252).
In relation to the prohibition against accepting an Ammonite or Moabite, Rabbi Yehuda says: “‘No Ammonite or Moabite shall enter the assembly of the Lord’ - Scripture refers to males and not females: Ammoni (male) and not Ammonit (female), Moabi (male) and not Moubit (female)‘.im Finally, early halakha permitted even male Ammonites to join the assembly of Israel.1B1
The conflict between the word of the Tora and the prevalent moral views and daily realities of the time of the Sages resulted in an interpretation so narrow as to annul the written biblical law: ‘There has never been a stubborn and rebel- lious son and shall never be one. Why then was it written? To teach us: interpret it and you shall receive your reward’.lp Likewise: There has never been a city led astray and there shall never be one. Why then was it written? To teach us:
interpret it and you shall receive your reward’.ia
HOMILETIC INTERPRETATION. The midrashic interpretations on the Bible are arranged in many different ways. ‘~4 Among these there are two which are already clearly expressed in Tannaic literature. The first, the explanatory midrash, is arranged according to the order of verses in Scripture, and attempts to explain all or some of the verses in order. The other, the homiletic midrash is
B. T. Sanhedrin 7la, 113a.
Sifrei Deuf. 218, pp. 250-51.
Sifrei Deur. 249, p. 277.
M. Yadayim 4:4; T. Yadayim 2:17-18.
T. Sanhedrin 11:6.
T. Sanhedrin 14:l.
See Wright. Midrash, 52-59.
SCRIPTURE IN RABBINIC LITERATURE
not joined to each and every verse, but selects several verses, and discusses a certain topic, using those verses from the Bible. Among the explanatory mid- rashim we can enumerate the midrashim on Exodus (Mekhiltu de-R. Yishmael and Mekhilta de-R. Shimon ben Yohai) , on Leviticus (Sifra), Numbers (Sifrei, Sifrei Zuta) and Deuteronomy (Sifrei, Midrash Tannaim). In these works we find explanations for almost every verse, in the order in which they appear in the Bible.
The homiletic midrash, by contrast, is far less widespread in Tannaic litera- ture. Only occasionally do we find homiletic interpretations embedded in Tannaic midrashim.‘” For example, Heinemann identified several homiletic sermons of the Tannaic period. ln6 Among the earliest, he cites the sermon of Rabbi Elazar ben Azaria (end first century c.E.) in B. T. Hugiga, 3a/b. This sermon, apparently based on Exod 2O:l deals with the question of the relation of the Tora given on Mount Sinai to the words of the Sages. The thrust of his derusha is that the Tora given on Sinai and the Tora of the Sages are one. Thus, this derasha serves as a fitting introduction to the section of the Ten Command- ments. Another derasha attributed to Rabbi Akiva, can be found in Midrash Tunnuim on Deut 21:22. There, Rabbi Akiva develops the idea of ‘one sin leads to another’, while offering a midrashic explanation linking Deut 21:15ff. with Deut 21:lOff. Other ideas that appear in homiletic midrashim are the close connection between sin, prayer and forgiveness,lU or the idea that ‘the measure a man gives will be measured unto him’ which is linked to the granting of rewards in the world to come. ins Rabbi Yehoshua emphasizes Israel’s depend- ante on the Tora in his derasha on Exod 17:8,isg interpreting Amalek’s attack as a punishment for Israel’s abandonment of the Tora. Rabbi Eliezer ben Hyrca- nus speaks out against war in his derasha on Gen 14:1.1w
THE RELATION BETWEEN PESHAT AND DERASH INTERPRETATION
Our investigation of the different methods of interpretation has revealed that often several different explanations for the same text appear alongside each other. While in most cases the interpretations are not presented as reactions to each other, we can safely assume that conflicting interpretations ascribed to two Sages of the same generation do indeed reflect a debate between differing exegetical positions. This view of the facts may lead us to the conclusion that there was a mutual ‘tolerance’ among interpretations and interpreters, since each side presents its own approach without any attempt at depicting the alternative explanation as incorrect. However, we find in our sources some
‘I” These mainly serve as proems.
‘* Heinemann, ‘The Proem’, 100-22; idem, Sermons, 31-39.48-51.
I87 See e.g. Sifrei Deur. 26, pp. 38-40.
lsll Mekhilta de-R. Yishmael, Beshallah, Pedhta, p. 78ff.
‘@ Mekhilta de-R. Yishmael, Amalek 1, p. 176.
Ipo Gen. Rabba 41:1, pp. 397-99, Tanhuma Buber Lekh Lekha 10, p. 34a-b.
SCRIPTURE IN RABBINIC LITERA-TURE
evidence of debates on interpretation in which one side clearly seeks to deny the validity of the other view. Thus, we find in Sifrei Deut. 1, pp. 6-7 that Rabbi Yose ben Durmaskit (Durmasek = Damascus) strongly attacks three of Rabbi Yehuda bar Ilai’s explanations, claiming that Rabbi Yehuda distorts the scrip- tures. For example, Rabbi Yose rejects Rabbi Yehuda’s interpretation of Zech 9: 1 in which the word Hudrukh (llttl) is interpreted as a noturikon, hinting at the Messiah ‘who is sharp (Tn) to the nations but compliant(l Israel’. The wording of Rabbi Yose’s statement, rejecting this explanation, is particularly forceful:
Yehuda be Rabbi, why are you distorting our Scriptures!? I bring heaven and earth as witness that I am from Damascus and there is there a place called Hadrakh . . .191
Rabbi Nehemia employs similar language against Rabbi Yehuda bar Ilai in referring to the latter’s interpretation of Ps 12:9 ‘On every side the wicked prowl, as vileness is exalted @??) among the sons of men’, in which the verse is seen as describing the wicked in Gehenna around whom walk the righteous in Paradise. These righteous men praise the Holy One Blessed-Be-He in the language of Isa 12: 1. The explanation suggests that the Holy One Blessed-Be- He will, in the future, exalt the righteous who suffered in this world as he exalts the despised vineyard (maa) i.e. Israel. Against this midrashic interpretation, Rabbi Nehemia counters:
Be Rabbi, how long will you continue to distort our Scriptures!?
He offers an alternative explanation, whereby the verse describes the wicked who prowl around the righteous who repose tranquilly in Paradise.‘=
This last example shows that the counter-interpretation to a midrashic exege- sis need not be a peshat explanation. Another comment, less far-fetched or closer in meaning to the words of the text, may be offered as an alternative.
Moreover, a Sage may reject a peshut interpretation as incompatible with his theological views. Rabbi Akiva interprets the expression Dmlm & (Ps 78:25) as meaning ‘the bread of angels’. This daring peshut explanation is rejected by Rabbi Yishmael, in the following words:
Go forth and tell Akiva that he erred! For do the ministering angels eat bread? Was it not said long ago ‘I did neither eat bread nor drink water’
(Deut 9:18) How then do I interpret the word PqQ&? Bread that is absorbed by the two hundred and forty eight parts of the body
@V’K) .
(B. T. Yomu 75b)
The other cases are Gen 41:43 and Deut 1: 1.
“’ Lev. Rabba 32: 1, pp. 734-35.
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SCRIPTURE IN RABBINIC LITERATURE
Another subject that provoked sharp reaction was the Sages’ tendency to greatly magnify the miraculous aspect of the wondrous events in the Bible. For example, the Mekhilta de-R. Yishmael, Wayassa 3, p. 166 on Exod 16:14 says:
Once Rabbi Tarfon and the Elders were sitting together and Rabbi Elazar of Modiim was sitting before them. Said to them Rabbi Elazar of Modiim: Sixty cubits high was the manna that came down for Israel.
Said they to him: How long will you go on making astonishing statements before us? . . .
Similarly, Rabbi Elazar ben Azaria rejects Rabbi Akiva’s explanation of the words ‘and the frogs (m3Y, in the singular) came up’ in Exod 8:2 according to which ‘there was a single frog that filled the whole land of Egypt’. Rabbi Elazar reacts sharply saying:
Akiva, what have you to do with Aggada? Take your words and lead them to the laws of leprous wounds and tents! There was but one frog: it whistled to the others and they came.
(B. T. Sunhedrin 67b)
While Rabbi Elazar’s explanation is also midrashic, it minimizes the miraculous nature of the event. Rabbi Elazar uses similar language in rejecting Rabbi Akiva’s explanation of Dan 7:9 (brought in the name of Rabbi Yose ha-Gelili), according to which the Holy One Blessed-Be-He has two thrones, one for judgement and the other for mercy.lm In response, Rabbi Elazar says:
Akiva, what have you to do with Aggada? Better lead your words to the laws of leprous wounds and tents. Rather explain: one is a throne and the other a footstool . . .
(B. T. Hugigu 14a; cf. B. T. Sunhedrin 38b)
Rabbi Akiva fiercely rejects the anthropomorphic interpretations of Rabbi Pappias with the words: ‘enough, Pappias!‘. He does not accept Pappias’
explanations of Gen 3:22 ‘Behold, the man has become like one of us’ as ‘like one of the ministering angels’ and gives his own interpretation of the word mimmenu, ‘as one of us’:
Said Rabbi Akiva: Mimennu does not mean like one of the ministering angels. It only means that God put before him two ways, the way of life and the way of death, and he chose for himself the way of death.
(Mekhiltu de-R. Yishmuel, Beshulluh 6, p. 112)
Likewise he condemns Pappias’ interpretation of Job 23:13, Cant 1:9, Ps 106:20 (Ibid. pp.112-113).i%
I93 The former explanation of Akvia was that one chair refers to God and the other to David, the Messiah.
Ipl Cf. Mekhilta de-R. Shimon ben Yohai, p. 68.
583
S(‘KlI’TI’KL IN KABBINI~‘ I.l’fl:KA I‘GKL-.
The above-mentioned examples demonstrate that there were different rea- sons for the rejection of one interpretation in favour of another. Sometimes this was done for exegetical reasons, sometimes for theological reasons and some- times for reasons connected with the interpreter’s conception of miracle.
RULES OF INTERPRETATION
Exegetical-methodological rules in rabbinic literature can be identified either based on explicit statements formulated as rules, or by generalizing from specific rabbinic interpretations. Some of the rules deal solely with the halakhic realm, while others are only applicable in a narrative context. There are categories, however, that are applicable to both the halakhic and the non- halakhic realms.
LISTS OF MIDDOT. Of special status are several of the lists of middot,19’ that is, rules of interpretation which form the basis for halakhic interpretation.‘”
(A) The earliest list is attributed to Hillel the Elder (first century B.c.E.) and from the context it seems that Hillel did not invent the rules himself, but only adapted them for his debate with the Bene Beteiru, when he attempted to establish a law that was not explicitly mentioned in the Tora (i.e. that the Paschal lamb may be slaughtered even on the Sabbat).lW This list contains seven middot, although texts differ in identification of one of the seven rules. Accord- ing to the Tosefta (Sanhedrin, end of chapter 7) and Avot de-R. Natan (version A, chapter 37, p. 110) the seven middot are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
On the term midda, see Bather, Exegerirche Terminologie, 1, 100-03.
Many studies are devoted to these methods. On the terminology, see Lieberman, Hellenirm, 52-W; On the interpretative aspects, see now Elan, Jewish Law, 1, 270-310. Cf. also Mielziner, Inlroduclion 11747; Tower. ‘Hermeneutical Systems’ 112ff.
I” Epstein, Inrroduction. 510; Lieberman, Hellenism, 54; Elon, Jewish Low, 1, 268-69.
Ku1 wa-homer - an inference from minor to major.
Gezera Shawa - an inference from analogy of expressions.
Binyan Av from one scripture - a general law may be derived by induction from different cases which, occurring in the same scripture, have yet some feature in common.
Binyan A v from two scriptures - a general law may be derived by induction from different cases which, occurring in different scriptures, have yet some feature in common.
Kelal u-ferut - a general proposition followed by the enumeration of partic- ulars; and Perut u-khelal - an enumeration of particulars followed by a general proposition.
Kayo&e bo mi-mukom uher- deducing a law by comparison with a law of the same class.
Davar hulamed me-inyano - the meaning of a passage may be deduced from its context.
584
According to the Sifra (Petihta to Torat Kohanim, Baraita of Rabbi Yishmael,
end of the Baraita) the third midda should read Binyan Av (as such), whereas the fourth rule should be ‘Two scriptures (that contradict each other)‘.
(B) The most detailed list is the one attributed to Rabbi Yishmael,lg8 who expands the list of his predecessor Hillel. This list in the Sifra (ibid.) fixes the number of middot as thirteen, although upon examination of its details we find sixteen rules.lW They are:
1. Ku1 wa-homer.
2. Gezera Shawa.
3. Binyun Av from one scripture.
4 Binyan Av from two scriptures.
5. Kelul u-ferat.
6. Perat u-khelul.
7. Kelul u-ferat u-khelal - two general propositions, separated from each other by an enumeration of particulars, include only such things as are similar to those specified.
Kelalshehu tsarikh li-ferut- an inference drawn from a general proposition complemented by a particular term.
Perut shehu tsarikh li-khelal - an inference drawn from a particular term complemented by a general proposition.
Kol duvar shehayu bi-khelal . . . - if anything is included in a general proposition and is then made the subject of a special statement, that which is predicated by it is not to be understood as limited to itself alone, but is to be applied to the whole of the general proposition.
Kol davur shehuyu bi-khelal . . . - if anything is included in a general proposition and is then singled out in order to be made the subject of a special statement, similar to the general proposition, this particularization is intended, so far as its subject is concerned, to lessen and not to add to its restrictions.
Kol duvur shehuya bi-khelul . . . - if anything is included in a general proposition and is then singled out in order to be made the subject of a special statement, not similar to the general proposition, this particular- ization is intended in some respects to lessen and in others to add to its restrictions.
Kol duvur shehuyu bi-khelul . . . - if anything is included in a general proposition and is then made the subject of a fresh statement, the terms of the general proposition will not apply to it, unless the scripture distinctly indicates that they shall apply.
Duvur ha-lamed me-inyano - an interpretation may be deduced from its context.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
i 13*
‘I
1
14.
I98 According to Porton, Legal Traditions, 429-53 Rabbi Yishmael’s exegetical remarks throughout rabbinic literature have little in common with the list.
lpp Porton, ibid. 431.
15. Davur ha-lumed mi-sofo - the meaning of a passage may be deduced from some subsequent passage.
16. Shenei ketuvim ha-makhhishim ze et ze - when two passages are in contra- distinction to each other, the explanation can be determined only when a third text is found, capable of harmonizing the two.
As Elon has shownm these rules can be classified according to their link with two types of halakhic midrash, the explanatory midrash, that clarifies verses in Scripture, which corresponds to the interpretatio grammatica of Roman law;
and the comparative midrash (= analogy) which compares several cases to each other in order to expand halakhic legislation. This corresponds to the Analogia of Roman Law. Middot 5-16 belong to the first category, the explanatory midrash, whereas middot l-4 belong to the latter category, the comparative midrash.
As I have mentioned, these middot served the Sages in explaining the halakhic sections of the Pentateuch. Occasionally, however, one of these may serve in a non-halakhic context. For example, the last rule, that of two conflict- ing scriptures, serves as an exegetical means of resolving the conflict between Exod 19:20, according to which God descended on Mount Sinai, and Deut 4:36, according to which God only spoke from heaven. The contradiction is resolved by adducing the ‘third scripture’, i.e. Exod 20:22 ‘for I have talked with you from heaven’.201 This rule is also employed in resolving other contradictions, such as that between Lev 10: l-2 and Lev 16: 1 (the reason for the death of Nadab and Abihu the sons of Aaron)202 and the one between Exod 40:35 and Num 7:89 (how the Lord spoke to Moses).S03
(C) A third list, the longest of all, is attributed to Rabbi Eliezer,204 the son of Rabbi Yose ha-Gelili, and it includes thirty twoms middot, which are mainly employed for the aggada rather than the halakha. Bardowicz206 has already argued that the Mishna of Rabbi Eliezer which lists these rules, is a late composition. Both Zucker,m who attributes the composition to the Gaon Shmuel ben Hofni,208 and Halkinm (among others) agree with this view. While some of the rules in the list are undoubtedly early, there is ample basis for the view that a significant proportion of these middot reflect late interpretations.
Mo Elan, Jewish Low, 1 , 2 7 1 .
m’ So in Sifra, Wayikra, I, 30. In Mekhilta de R. Yishmael, Bahodesh 9, p. 238, the contradictory verses are Exod 19:20 and 20:22, while the reconciliatory verse is Deut 4%. See above, p. 576.
Sifra. Aharei Mot 1, 79~.
Sifrei Zutta, p. 254.
See the critical edition of Enelow, The Mishna of Rabbi EIiezer (1933).
According to Lieberman, Hellenism, 68 n. 168 there is a tradition of 36 middot.
Bardowicz, A bfassungszeif.
Zucker, ‘Lamed-Bet Middot’, 1-19; Zucker, Rav Saadya Gaon’s Translation, 237-60.
But see Greenbaum, Biblical Commentary. 93-95.
Halkin, ‘Jewish Arabic Exegesis’ 21-22.
SCRIPTUREIN RABBINICLI'TEK,~I‘I!Rt
Thus, I feel justified in omitting the Mishna of Rabbi Eliezer from my survey of biblical interpretation in the Tannaic period.
AKIVA AND YISHMAEL. Were these rules, attributed either to Hillel the Elder or to Rabbi Yishmael, accepted by all the Sages, or did they, perhaps, reflect the views of some particular interpretative-halakhic school? Until very recently, the accepted view was that use of the midda ‘Kelal u-ferat’ in its various forms, was characteristic of the Tanna Rabbi Yishmael, while his major disputant, Rabbi Akiva, generally used the midda ‘Ribbui u-miut’.210 This rule, as used by Rabbi Akiva, expands the meaning of the scripture (ribbui - inclusion), re- stricting its applicability only by the specific things mentioned in the scripture (miut - exclusion). The rule employed by Rabbi Yishmael, on the other hand, expands the meaning of the text (kelal) only in accordance with the specific detail mentioned in scripture (perat). In the words of the seventh midda in the list attributed to Rabbi Yishmael: ‘Two general propositions separated from each other by an enumeration of particulars, include only such things as are similar to those specified.’
For example, Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva disagree on the halakhic meaning of Lev 5:4 ‘Or if any one utters with his lips a rash oath to do evil or to do good, any sort of rash oath that men swear, and it is hidden from him . . .’
According to Rabbi Akiva this verse must be interpreted using the midda of ribbui u-miut:
‘if any one utters an oath’ - inclusion (ribba); ‘to do evil or to do good’ - restriction (mi’et); ‘any sort of oath that men swear’ - repeated inclusion (ribba); inclusion, restriction, inclusion - all is included.
What is included? All words are included. What is excluded? Oaths to fulfil or violate a commandment are excluded.
(B. T. Shevuot 26a)
In other words: Scripture refers to all oaths except oaths having to do with performance of the commandments. Rabbi Yishmael, on the other hand, interprets this verse using the midda of Kelal u-ferat:
‘or if any one utters with his lips an oath’ - general law (kelal); ‘to do evil or to do good’ - specific detail (perat); ‘any sort of oath that men swear’ - repeat of general law (kelal); general law, specific detail, general law - the law is determined according to the specific detail. Just as the specific detail speaks of the future, so every case (of oaths) must speak of the future.
(ibid.)
In other words, Scripture speaks only of oaths about events that have not yet occurred.
lI” Cf. Epstein, Introduction, 527-29
!-X‘Rlf’T‘L’Rlr. IK RABBINIC‘ 1.17‘ERA-I’URE
The view which clearly distinguishes between the methods of interpretation of Rabbi Yishmael and those of Rabbi Akiva is based on evidence in rabbinic literature which contrasts the midrashic methods of these two Sages.*n The text of the Tosefta, according to the Erfurt manuscript,212 combined with an in- vestigation of the interpretations of Rabbi Yishmael dispersed throughout midrashic literature, reveals that Rabbi Yishmael used the tibbui u-m& meth- od as well. It would appear, though, that Rabbi Akiva made unrestricted us of this method, whereas Rabbi Yishmael was not willing to apply this midda in all cases.*13 Furthermore, the midda of kelal u-feral as used by Rabbi Yishmael is not employed by Rabbi Akiva and is never found in the Sifra or the Sifrei on Deuteronomy, two collections identified with the school of Rabbi Akiva.*14
THE TORA SPOKE IN COMMON PARLANCE. Another important halakhic-exegetical rule of the school of Rabbi Yishmael was that of nI1K 912 IV&3 allll nl3-r
‘The Tora spoke in common parlance’. This rule is usually employed when Rabbi Yishmael disagrees with a halakhic explanation of Rabbi Akiva. Accord- ing to the Palestinian Talmud215 this rule reflects a general concept, whereby repetitions of words are considered to be of no significance.*r6 Moreover, no distinction is made between the halakhic and the narrative portions of the Pentateuch.*” For example, according to Rabbi Yishmael, there is no halakhic significance attached to the repetition of words in the expression hnl hXl;l,
‘they shall be circumcised’ (Gen 17:13), since this expression is not different from others that only reflect men’s patterns of speech, as we find in Gen 3130 ll35fi ll%, ‘you have gone away’, nQb33 qPX, ‘you longed greatly’ or in Gen 40:15 ‘IXlU ml, ‘I was indeed stolen (out of the land of the Hebrews)‘. This rule, ascribed to Rabbi Yishmael, and sometimes expressed in other words as
‘they are merely double expressions, the Tora spoke in the usual way..‘*” is employed by the Babylonian and Palestinian Talmuds in explaining debates between Tannaim.Z*9 Nevertheless, it is doubtful that other Sages used this category at all. Moreover, Rabbi Akiva’s student, Rabbi Yose ben Halafta, applies this category to the repetition in the Tora of similar, though not identical expressions, while changing the meaning of the category:
See B. T. Shevuor 26a; T. Shevuor 117.
See Chemick, ‘Ribbuyim and Mi’utim’, 97.
Porton, Legal Traditions.
Chernick, ‘Formal Development’, 393.
P.T. Shabbat 19, lla.
Against Rabbi Yishmael’s view see Akiva’s interpretation of the absolute infinitive combined with finite forms of a verb, as in B. T. Sanhedrin 64b (JllJll IllXf) B. T. Bava Mefsia 31alb (Dhv
rhun, xyn XY).
‘I’ Elan. Jewish Law, 1, 311.
Iln See P.T. Shabbat 19, 17a; P.T. Yevamorfkl, Bd: P.T. Sofa8:l. 22b; P.T. Nedarim l:l, Xc.
I” Bather, Aggada der Tannaifen, 1,237.
SCRIPTIJRE IN RAHRINI(’ I.l7‘LRAI‘L!Rt
‘Say to the people of Israel’ (Lev 20:2), ‘and to the people of lsrael you shall speak’, ‘Tell the people of Israel’ (Exod 14:2), ‘Command the people of Israel’ (Lev 24:2), ‘And you shall command the people of Israel’ (Exod 27:20). Rabbi Yose says: the Tora spoke in the language of men, using many forms of language, and each form must be interpreted.
(Sifra Kedoshim 10, p. 91b).
In other words Rabbi Yose recognizes that the many styles in the Tora reflect the many styles of speech of people, but whereas Rabbi Yishmael concludes from this that the repetitions have no interpretative significance, Rabbi Yose is of the opinion that one must interpret each and every sentence.**O
SCRPMJRE SPEAKS OF THE ORDINARY CUSTOM. Another halakhic category of interpretation is fillif> SUlZYn 137, ‘Scripture speaks of the ordinary cus- tom’. In other words, the custom of ‘the codifier to formulate his words at times using common examples, without intending to limit the law to the explicitly mentioned cases’.**’ The Mekhilta de-R. Yishmael, Kaspa 20, pp. 320-21 on Exod 22:30 provides a string of examples:
‘(you shall not eat) any flesh that is torn by beasts in the field’ - I only learn (that it shall not be eaten) if it is in the field, from where shall I learn (that it shall not be eaten) in the house?
Scripture says: (Lev 22:8) ‘That which dies of itself or is torn by beasts (he shall not eat)‘. We compare an animal tom by beasts to one that died of itself. Just as in the case of an animal that died of itself, the Tora did not distinguish between an animal in the house or in the field, so too, in the case of an animal torn by beasts, we should not distinguish between the house and the field. What then, does the scripture ‘any flesh that is torn by beasts in the field’ come to teach us? Scripture speaks of the ordinary custom.
Similarly in the case of Deut 22:27:
‘because he came upon her in the fields’ - I learn from this only (if he came upon her) in the fields. From where do I learn (of the cases where it occurred) in the house? Scripture speaks only of the ordinary custom.
Similarly, with regard to Deut 20:6.
‘What man is there that has planted a vineyard and has not enjoyed its fruit?‘- I learn from this only (if he planted) a vineyard. From where do I learn about (the case) of all other fruit trees? Scripture only spoke of the ordinary custom.
*M According to Mekhilra de-R. Yishmael, Nezikin 18, p. 313, Rabbi Yishmael does not use this rule in explaining Exod 2222.
*‘I Greenberg, ‘Rabbinic Exegesis’, 6.
588
SCRIPTURE IN RABBINICLITERATL'RE
Similarly, with regard to Exod 23:19:
‘you shall not boil a kid in its mother’s milk’- I learn from this only (in the case of) a kid. From where do I learn about (the case of) other animals?
Scripture speaks of the ordinary custom. So, here too, ‘any flesh that is torn by beasts in the field’ - Scripture speaks of the ordinary custom, it mentions the place where animals are likely to be tom.
To these examples we should add the case of the Mekhilta de-R. Yishmael, Nezikin 18, p. 313 on Exod 22:21:
‘You shall not afflict any widow or orphan’ -1 learn from this only (in the case of) a widow or orphan. From where do I learn about other people?
Scripture says: ‘You shall not afflict’. ‘This is the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: the widow and the orphan are most often afflicted, therefore Scripture mentioned them.
This passage has been interpreted in many ways, as it seems to indicate that it is specifically Rabbi Akiva who uses the category under discussion. Some have resolved the problem of this passage and its meaning by referring to a fragment from the Cairo Geniza which reads as follows:
‘A widow or an orphan’ - I learn from this, only (in the case of) a widow or orphan. From where do I learn about other people? Scripture says
‘Any (53) . . . you shall not afflict’ -These are the words of Rabbi Akiva.
Rabbi Yishmael says: ‘Any widow or orphan’ - Scripture mentioned those who are most often afflicted.m
In other words, according to this fragment, it is Rabbi Yishmael who employs the category we discussed. We must point out, however, that this category also appears in Sifrei Deut 255, p. 280 on Deut 23:ll in a section of the Sifrei considered to be the writing of the school of Rabbi Akiva. Thus, it seems that the category ‘Scripture speaks of the ordinary custom’ was employed by Sages belonging to several different schools.
THE ORDER OF BIBLICAL BOOKS. There are two categories of interpretation that relate to the significance of the order of biblical books. The first category is
;nlll3 TllKPJl DTpln j-K, ‘there is nothing earlier or later in the Tora’, i.e.
the Scriptures change the chronological order in describing events in certain cases. Sometimes the chronological order is violated within a single verse, and sometimes the violation is in the order of arrangement of several different scriptures.2n Our sources ascribe this category to the school of Rabbi Yish- mae12” and to Rabbi Meir.w
*= Boyarin, ‘Hidden Light’, 9.
2u See above, pp. 558-60.
“’ See Eccl. Rabba on Eccl. 1:12: cf. the use of this rule in the Mekhilla, Shira 7, p. 139.
lzz Cf. P. T. Shekalim 6: 1.49d; a variant reads: Rabbi Yehuda.
SCRIPTURE IN RABBINICL.ITERA'I‘URE
The second category is attributed to Rabbi Akiva, and apparently, reflects a concept different from the previous one. This category is formulated as ‘when any passage adjoins another, we may derive something from it’.226That is, there is a meaning to be found in the proximity of scriptural sections, and the interpreter must find the connection and draw conclusions from it. In this way, we learned that the story of the whoring of the Israelites after the Baa1 of Peor (Num 25:lff .) was placed next to the section of the Blessing of Balaam in order to teach us that it was he who advised the King of Moab to entice the Israelites to commit prostitution. The proximity of Lev 21:lO to the verse preceding it teaches the halakha that not only a priest’s daughter who fornicated is puni- shable by death by burning (verse 9) but even the priest must be punished by burning. The prophecy of Hosea chapter 2 teaches us that the Holy One Blessed-Be-He reconsidered his intention to expel Israel, as was stated at the end of chapter 1. The link between Hos 14:l and 14:2 also shows that the first verse is to be understood as a warning rather than as a final decision.
This rule, formulated by Rabbi Akiva met with opposition:
Rabbi”’ (Yehuda the Patriarch) says: many scriptural sections adjoin one another, yet they are as far from each other as the distance between East and West.
(Sifrei Num. 131, p. 169)
NOT EVERY SCRIPTURE MUST SIGNIFY SOMETHING. Another important rule of exege- sis was formulated by Rabbi Yishmael and concerns his general view that ‘not every verse of the Bible must signify something. In the Sifrei on Num 5:5-6*% we read:
This is a mid& of the Tora: any passage mentioned in one place, but with one thing missing, and repeated somewhere else, was only repeated because of the one thing missing.
That is, we do not need to find interpretations for all of the second passage. It suffices to find a single (halakhically) additional detail. For example, in the Sifrei on Deut 14:6219 the question posed was why the passage on forbidden foods, written in Lev 11, was repeated in Deut 14. The answer is ‘The animals - to mention cloven hoofs, the birds - to mention the kite (or in some versions:
the buzzard).’ Rabbi Akiva, on the other hand, disagrees, and in response, he declares: ‘Wherever we find the word lruS5, it must be interpreted’.uO Perhaps zm Cf. Sijki Num. 131, p. 169. Bather, Aggada der Tannuiten, 1,302 n. 2 is right when the claims that Rabbi Akiva does not invent the method but only formulates the rule used by his predecessors, like Rabbi Eliezer ben Hyrcanus and Rabbi Eliezer ben Azaria.
m Variant: Rabbi Meir.
t21) Sifrei Num. 2, p. 65.
m Sifrei Deut. 101, p. 160-61; see also B. T. Hullin 63b.
u” Sifrei Num. 2, p. 5.
S~‘RII'Tl:RI~ IN RABBINI(‘ LITERATURE
we can understand the words of Rabbi Akiva as a generalization, meaning that even the insignificant word lIJK5 must be interpreted.
A DIFFICULT TEXT CAN BE EXPLAINED BY A MORE EXPL ICIT ONE. An additional category of interpretation is ascribed to Rabbi Nehemia:
‘She is like the ships of the merchant, she brings her food from afar’ (Prov 31:14) - words of Tora may be sparse in one place and plentiful in another.
(P. T. Rosh Hashana 3:5,58d)
The meaning of this category is that we can explain a difficult text using another, more explicit passage. One example of this might be found in the A4ekhilto1231 on Exod 1522 ‘The Moses led Israel onward from the Red Sea’. Did Moses do what he did following God’s command or on his own initiative? According to Rabbi Eliezer Moses led the people according to the word of God: ‘They travelled by word of the Almighty. Just as we found in two or three other places in Scripture that they only travelled by word of the Almighty, so, here too, they travelled by word of the Almighty’.
USE OF A GRAMMATICAL RULE. Another rule ofpeshat interpretation is attributed, in several sources to Rabbi Nehemia. This concerns the dative case: ‘Instead of prefixing a lamed to indicate “to”, a he is appended at the end of the word’.232 There are many examples of this grammatical feature to which the Sages pay attention in their explanation.u3
AUTHORITY OF THE TRADITIONAL READING or THE BIBLE. Another interesting halakhic rule of interpretation is found only twice in the extant Tannaic litera- ture. This principle is formulated as K?pn+ U UP, ‘the traditional reading of the Bible (that is according to its established vocalization) has authority’.w This rule attempts to link the halakha to the traditional reading of the text. Thus, Rabbi Yehuda ben Ro’ets rejects the possibility of reading the word BVaV (Lev 125) as aqy?V, ‘seventy’, as contrary to the tradition of vocalization which reads b?@V, ‘two weeks’.us Similarly, the Sages dismiss the possibility of reading the word $ll in Exod 23:19,34:26 and in Deut 14:21 as a%l, ‘fat’
rather than the accepted reading which is a%, ‘milk’. It may be that in these cases the category was employed to block halakhic interpretations other than the accepted ones. Perhaps this category indicates the tendency, on the part of u1 Mekhilta de-R. Yirhmael, Wayasa 1, p. 152 and Mekhilta de-R. Shimon hen Yohai, Buhaliah
IS, p. 101.
232 Mekhilta de-R. Shimon ben Yohai, Pirha 14, p. 48; cf. B. T. Yevamot 136.
B’ See also Mekhilta de-R. Yishmael, p. 33; P. T. Yevamot 1:6,3b; B. T. Yevamot 13b; Gen. Rabba 50:3. p. 518; 68:s. p. 777; 86:2, p. 1053.
zy See Aminoah, ‘Em la-Mikra’, 43ff.
"' Sift Tazri’a 2, p. 58d; B. T. Sanhedrin 4a.
SCRIPTURE IN RABBINICt~ITFRATlJRE
certain Sages to link the halakhic midrash, or the halakha itself, to the accepted traditional reading of the text.
OTHER RULES. Many rules of interpretation which are midrashic in nature, are scattered throughout rabbinic literature. They mainly relate to specific words or expressions in the Bible. These rules have a standard formulation, such as
‘Wherever we find written X, this is nothing but Y’ or: ‘Wherever it says X, this means Y’. The following are several examples of these rules:
a.
b.
C .
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
1.
Wherever we have found ill%, ‘sending’, this means accompanying.
(Mekhilta de-R. Yishmael, Beshallah, Petihta, p. 75)
Wherever we find i13V, ‘standing’, this refers to the Holy Spirit (Mekhilta de-R. Yishmael, Beshallah 2, p. 94)
Wherever we find EI.ItiK, (Elohim) this refers to a judge.
(Mekhilta de-R. Yishmael, Beshallah 4, p. 101)
Wherever we find nSV, ‘sitting’, this refers to sinning (Sifiei Num. 131, p. 169)
Wherever it says T&, ‘saying’, or D*K lll13K1, ‘and you shall say unto them’, this passage is relevant to future generations. Wherever we do not find 1LlX~ or D;1$7K mnK1, the passage was for that time only.
(Mekhilta de-R. Yishmael, Beshallah 1, p. 83)
Wherever it says UtPl lyD?, ‘and they set out and they encamued’, they set out in dissension and encamped in dissension.
(MeWtilta de-R. Yishmael, Bahodesh 1, p. 206)
Wherever it says *, ‘to me’, it is established for all eternity.
(Sifei Numbers 92, p. 92)
Wherever it says :il, ‘the Lord’, this implies God’s measure of mercy . . . Wherever it says &YK (Elohim) this is the measure of justice.
(Sifiei Deut 26, p. 41)
Wherever it says
Dmnmn,
‘your dwellings’, Scripture speaks of the Land of Israel.(Sifrei Num. 107, p. 106).
CONCLUSION. I will conclude my survey of the rules of interpretation with a colourful and interesting literary rule attributed to Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yose ha-Gelili: ‘First the Holy One Blessed-Be-He places the righteous in doubt and suspense. Only later he explains to them the meaning of the mat- ter’.= That is, the Holy One Blessed-Be-He does something perplexing. He gives a command without any reason. Only later does He explain the reason for the command. Thus, for example, we have the unexplained command given to Abraham ‘Go . . .to the land that I will show you’ (Gen 12:l). Only later on does the reason for this command become clear. Similarly, God commands Abraham to go and sacrifice his son, telling him that He will later reveal him the m Gen. Rabba 39~9, pp. 372-73; 57, p. 592.
SC KlPl URt IN RABBINIC LITERATURE _
mountain that he is to climb - ‘upon one of the mountains of which I shall tell you’ (Gen 22:2). Similarly, too, in Ezek 3:22 ‘Arise, go forth into the valley, and there I will speak to you’ and in Jonah 3:2 ‘. . . to proclaim to it the message that I tell you’. The importance of this rule is that it reveals a general biblical style, not restricted to any particular book or collection (such as the Pentateuch), that is characteristic of God’s way of revelation.
Selected Bibliography
On rabbinic exegesis see the studies of BoNsIRvEN, Ext!gt%e rabbinique, U-259;
DOBSCHUTZ, Einfache Bibelexegese; DOEVE, Jewish Hermeneutics, 52-90; EUIN, Jewish Law, 2, 239-320; FRANKEL, Peshat; GREENBERG, ‘Rabbinic Exegesis’;
HALLEWY, Sharei ha-Aggadah, 1-112; HEINEMANN, Darkhei ha-Aggada; HES-
CHEL, Theology; KADUSHIN, Rabbinic Mind, 98-130; LAUTERBACH, ‘Jewish Alle- gorists’; LONGENECKER, Biblical Exegesis, 19-50; MELAMMED, Bible Commenta- tors 1, 3-128; PATTE, Early Jewish Hermeneutic; SEGAL, Bible Exegesis, 7-21;
STRACK-STEMBERGER, Einleitung, 222-56; VERMES, ‘Bible and Midrash’.
The following works on the rabbinic terms of interpretation should be men- tioned: BACHER, Exegetische Terminologie; BU)CH, ‘Midrash’; GERTNER, ‘Terms of Scriptural Interpretation’; HALLEWY, Erkhei ha-Aggadah; HEINEMANN,
‘Technical Terms’; LE DEAUT, ‘Dkfinition’; LIEBERMANN, Hellenkm, 47-82;
LOEWE, ‘The “Plain” Meaning of Scripture’; MARGALIOTH, ‘The Term “DRS” ‘;
MILLER, ‘Targum, Midrash’, 43-49; PORTON, ‘Midrash’; WRIGHT, The Literary Genre Midrash.
Important studies on the hermeneutical rules are: CHERNIK, Kelal u’ferat; id.,
‘Ribbuyim and Mi’utim’; id., ‘Derashot’; id., ‘Formal Development’; DAUBE,
‘Alexandrian Methods’; id., ‘Rabbinic methods’; DOEVE, Jewish Hermeneutia, 65-71; ELON, Jewish Law, 2,270-302; EPSTEIN, Introduction, 521-36; ~XITLIEB,
‘Formula Comparison’; JACOBS, Talmudic Logic; LIEBERMAN, Hellenbm, 53-68;
MIELZINER, Introduction, 117-87; OSTROWSW, Ha-Middot; SCHWARZ, Analogie;
id., Syllogismus; id., Znduktion; id., Antinomie; id., Quantitiitsrelation; id., Kontext; STRACK-STEMBERGER, Einleitung.
Chapter Sixteen
Use, Authority and Exegesis of r;c/likra in the Samaritan Tradition
Ruairidh Bbid (M.N. Saran
General
Scripture for the Samaritans is the Pentateuch. In this they do not differ radically from Jews, who regard the rest of Scripture as having come into existence only because of a general falling away from the teaching of the Tora, only existing for the purpose of leading people back to the knowledge of the Tora, being destined to become largely unnecessary in the ideal future, and being of a decidedly lower level of reve1ation.l
The Samaritans prefer not to call themselves by the name Samaritans,
DWV31V. They consider this to be a modification by outsiders of their real name, Sham&em, mnw, ‘Guardians’, which they explain as meaning those that keep the Tora correctly and guard it.’
Use of the Tora
HOWTHETORAIS KNOWN
The written text of the Tora is not fully informative. The Samaritans agree with rabbi& Judaism, against the Qumran Covenanteers and against the Karaites, that there is much not said by the text that could never be derived by exegesis.
The classic statement of this principle is an untranslated passage in the Kitrib at-TubC1kh’which deserves to be quoted in full, partly because it is so important for the understanding of the Samaritan theory of the relationship between the
’ The distinction between the Pentateuch and the rest of Scripture (or in other words, the absolute difference between the prophecy of Mose-s and all other types or instances of revelation) is a fundamental tenet of Judaism. Copious references to the authoritative sources of all periods on this subject can be found in Kaplan, Handbook, chs. 7-8. On the ending of the need for all or most of the books of the Prophets and Ketuvim in the future, see P. T. Megilla 1:7 (70d, bottom). The opinion is
presented aa being unopposed in essexz.
’ The Samaritans are B&i Yi&r&‘el ash-StimCrem WlnW3 ‘7KlV Xl. The Jews are B&ni Yishd’cl ay_Yt’Jdcm atn;r;l 5~7~ ‘~2.
’ For information on the date and authorship of the Samaritan sources in Arabic referred to throughout this article, as well as the mss. available, see the introduction to my Principles.
I-
text of the Tora and the tradition that accompanies it, partly because it is such acontradiction to scholarly assumptionsJ and partly because it has been summar- / ised or referred to before in a misleading way and needs to be made available for
independent scrutiny.5
Religious practice (madhhab), by which God is served and by which the permanent benefits, which appear free of all dross, are gained, can be learnt in two ways: the knowledge got from the intimation of the text, and the knowledge got from the testimony of tradition. The second of these is more effective as a guide, because if you have the second one then both are all right. It follows that you need to know the tradition and know the rules for telling a genuine tradition from a defective one.
Let us look into this last point. Tradition can be defined as what is available from a number of people who could not possibly have consulted each other or connived with each other. There are four essential marks of its genuineness.
’
The first is that it must have been received from a large number of people, right back in the time of the Emissary of God, people who were his contemporaries and received the regulations from him.
The second is that the bearers should be the next generation from them who would then have been supervised by them and must necessarily have been given the information about it.
The third is that they must all agree unanimously on it.
The fourth is that it must not be invalidated, either by reason or by the intimation of the text.
These, then, are the marks of the correctness of tradition, and any information held by the whole of the bearers of tradition, according to all these stipulations, must necessarily be conclusive evidence and decisive
’ There seems to be what could be called a bit of scholarly folklore to the effect that the Samaritans derive their halakha by Iiteralistic exegesis because they have no tradition. The most recent ex- pression of this idea is by Schiffman, Hu,$rkhrrh, 17.
’ I quote from Rylands Samaritan Ms. 9, IXb-153b; Bibhothtque Nationale, Ms. Arabe 4521, 56b-57b. Gaster, Samaritan Escharology, 59-63, was apparently the first to notice this passage.
Internal evidence shows that he was working with the Hebrew translation, the text now classified as Rylands Samaritan Ms. 174. His exposition of the passage is useful, but is marred by his failure to register the inter-connection of the ideas in the passage. Halkin, ‘Relation’, 315-16, has mis- understood the text just as seriously, though less obviously. Briefly, Halkin’s attempt at finding an equivalent to the Moslem concept of sun&r in this text, which looks convincing in his exposition, is vitiated by the facts of the text, which does not use. the term sunnu& and which does not make tradition the continuation of the observed practice of Moses. The most serious misunderstanding is in regard to the reason for the introduction of the list of criteria for an adequate tradition. The list is of course modelled on the Moslem requirements for a valid sunnah, but the point that the author is making is that by generally accepted criteria the whole nation of Israel have a trustworthy tradition of the whole of the Tora: in other words, both the author and his readers have to use the terminology and categories provided by the environment. (Most attempts at finding Moslem influence on the Samaritans depend on the same fallacy of confusing the vehicle of expression with the message expressed.)
MIKRA IN THE SAMARITAN TRADITION
proof. There is no need to scrutinise any information when the essential conditions of tradition are in order and the tradition is sound: scrutiny is only necessary in a case of doubt.
The actual number of the bearers of tradition is irrelevant provided the basic conditions are in order, and the tradition is sound. A fallacy never became the truth through numbers and the truth never became a fallacy through lack of numbers. The nation, and all the experts (‘uqaW), will accept a person’s declaration, on the strenth of the consensus of the inhabitants of a single village, that Zayd is the son of Khblid, and on that basis will sort out the details of the inheritance of an estate, making Zayd eligible and disqualifying ‘Amr; and they will give a ruling on quite serious questions, by giving permission for a man to marry certain women deemed permissible and disqualifying certain other women. Now if these and other cases can be settled on the basis of the consensus of a single village, then it must be even more right and correct to take the word of the whole nation.
There are some actions that you would never have any knowledge about, and would never know to be all right, without tradition. For instance, take the actions of midwives on Shabbat and festivals, when they perform a delivery: the point here is that the midwives, when they perform a delivery, perform activity that is work, and would not be permissible for anyone else. Then there is the killing of fish, by leaving them in air, so that the life leaves them; or the killing of locusts in hot water.6 Then there is the question of how to tell the boundaries separat- ing the Qiblah from the profane ground surrounding it on all sides. Then there is the accuracy of the text of the Tora, written down with twenty- two letters, which they witnessed on the Day of Descent.’ There are plenty of other examples, but there is no room for them in this brief account.
The reason that we know all these details and know they must be right is the tradition received from the nation, who trace it right back to the time of the six hundred thousand that heard the Speech of God, and were alive at the same time as his Prophet, Moses the son of Amram, and received from him. The emissary gives the testimony for tradition and the intimation of the text in the General Speech,8 where the tradition is given precedence over the intimation of the text. The verse in question is ‘My doctrine will pour like rain, my utterance will run down like dew’ [Deut 32:2]. He intended these two expressions as a metaphor to teach the
6 Fish and locusts must be killed by an Israelite, and this is done by putting them in an element opposite to their natural one. In this respect the Samaritans partly agree with the Karaites and the Qumran sect against rabbinic Judaism.
’ The day of the giving of the Tora.
* Deut 32.
