The Political Economy of Fulfilling the Minimum Essential Force: Contextual investigations of Idea Improvement in the

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The Political Economy of Fulfilling the Minimum Essential Force: Contextual investigations of Idea Improvement in the

Guard Business

Guntur Eko Saputro^a, Junindra Duha ^a,1*

an Indonesia Defense University, Indonesia

* corresponding author

I. Introduction

Article 1 section 1 of Regulation Number 3 of 2002 on Defense State pronounces public guard support to maintain state sway, regional respectability, the Unitary Condition of the Republic of Indonesia, and the country's security from dangers and aggravation to the uprightness of the country.

One of the Government's targets for Indonesia in the field of protection is through the freedom of the guard business or the capacity to deliver its tactical hardware without help to different nations. One of the difficulties You need to accomplish is the Base objective Fundamental Power (MEF), where the program Least Fundamental Power (MEF) means to create and modernize the agar guard to become more successful in carrying out military obligations and missions harmony. Least Fundamental Power (MEF) is an advanced system primary part strength towards ideal, and MEF isn't outfitted towards the idea weapons contest or weapons contest as a strength building methodology to win the all-out war, will however as a type of essential strength that satisfy specific guidelines and has an obstacle impact. Least Fundamental Power (MEF) Improvement lined up with accessible assets restricted by rejuvenating the safeguard business. Yet, ideally, proficient location real dangers as scale need without disregarding risks potential inside the structure of the Indonesian Public Military equipped for doing War Military Activity and Military Tasks Other Than War.

Besides that, to realize strategic deterrence[1].

Each new generation of products is more complex and therefore tends to be more expensive[2].

These cost implications are well in the defense sector[3], making formidable defenses out of reach for many countries [4] and creating reasons within capabilities. Similarly, technological equipment is the driving force behind rising healthcare costs (Sorenson et al., 2013) as society considers how many medical services we can manage (Goyen & Debatin, 2009). Several studies have shown that the cost of new age frigates, fundamental fight tanks, warrior airplanes, and other guard gear with more intricate attributes far surpasses buyer costs yearly (Davies et al., 2011). For instance, a synopsis of seven investigations shows yearly intergenerational cost increments of 6-11% for

ARTICLE INFO A B S T R A C T

Article history:

Received 04 Apr 2022 Revised 25 May 2022 Accepted 06 June 2022

This article investigates the effectiveness of policies in Fulfilling the Minimum Essential Force in Indonesia through Defense Budget Allocations based on Law Number 3 of 2002 concerning National Defense. One of the targets of the Indonesian Government in the defense sector is the independence of the defense industry to produce defense equipment without relying on other countries through the Minimum Essential Force (MEF). The fulfillment of the Minimum Essential Force (MEF) target is to reach 100 percent by the end of Minimum Essential Force (MEF) III by the end of 2024. But, Indonesia's defense budget for the 2009-2018 period is still below 1 percent of GDP, or below the average defense budget. ASEAN's countries. Our findings suggest that budgetary support is required from the Government to meet the Minimum Essential Force (MEF) by increasing the defense budget by at least 1.5 percent on the target

Keywords:

Fulfilling,

Minimum Essential Force, Defense Industry, Defense Budget

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Guntur Eko Saputro et.al (The Political Economy of Fulfilling the Minimum Essential Force: Contextual investigations

contender airplanes. One more rundown of six examinations shows yearly intergenerational cost increments for submarines of 3-9%, all in simple terms (Hove & Lillekvelland, 2016). This cost increment depends on the drawn-out cost increment over ages of this sort of gear and isn't adapted to likely changes in qualities between ages. As indicated by a few investigations (Arena et al., 2008;

Kirkpatrick, 1997; Pugh, 2007), the primary driver of the increment in the expense of intricate safeguard hardware is the military extension between countries, which is an increase in costs (Arena et al., 2008). Logically in battle, only the number of wins and the performance of the equipment are essential because they have an advantage over their opponents.

Despite these disruptions several decades earlier (Augustine, 2015), they continued to occur and reduced purchases to the armed forces. Therefore, the quantity of complicated guard hardware troops over the long haul has diminished because the old framework was by and large not supplanted by barges. Besides, the period between these substitutions has expanded (Kirkpatrick, 1995). This raises the issue of whether people in the future military gear can be provided, for instance, contender airplanes (Pugh, 2007). That would be especially tricky for little countries previously having low quantities of hardware for protecting huge regions, and it could prompt military capacity holes in the end. To stay away from such advancement, it has been recommended that the performers in the watchman region need to ponder more outrageous changes (Hartley, 2011;

Pugh, 2007). Unarguably, there is a need to change how to empower the advancement of reasonable hardware later. In any case, this isn't just a straightforward matter of cost, which is explained in the idea of moderateness. Reasonableness is characterized by the framework designing the local area as '... the equilibrium of frameworks execution, cost and timetable requirements over the framework life while fulfilling mission needs working together with the essential venture and authoritative necessities' (Walden et al., 2015). A proper perspective on reasonableness in a protection setting is that all parts add to an outstanding ability. For example, hardware, workforce, foundation, and precept (Yue & Henshaw, 2009) can't be adjusted; they should be held inside a dispensed financial plan. This thinking is an unambiguous definition by the U.S. Under Secretary of Safeguard for Obtaining in 2010, Ashton Carter (2010) said that moderateness is tied in with leading a program at an expense obliged by the most significant assets the office can assign for that ability. This suggests that for a particular part adding to a capacity, its commitment to the all-out cost should be sensible and subsequently empower meeting the assigned spending plan for the whole ability. This drives us to characterize reasonableness as follows: moderateness suggests that a thing of gear is reasonable, assuming its commitment to an all-out wanted capacity is in a sensible connection to its expenses over its lifetime and subsequently adds to meeting the ideal ability at an assigned financial plan.

After that, reasonableness is, by our definition, comparable to both execution and an allotted financial plan. By exchanging and adjusting the parts comprising the all-out ability, an ideal capacity ought to, in the end, be met at a designated financial plan. What is reasonable is different for various entertainers, contingent upon the size of financial strategies and the ramifications of the capacities wanted. Should a gear idea be costly, it flags the thesis to be reevaluated to meet expense imperatives and the mentioned necessities. There may be a few purposes behind protecting this the norm; however, as brought up by Hartley (2011), the significant explanation doesn't seem, by all accounts, to be absurdly high overall revenues in non-serious agreements. Instances of other potential reasons could rather be center rigidities (Leonard-Barton, 1992) and an inclination for upgrades along standard execution ascribes (Bower and Christensen, 1995). Regardless of an expanded center around moderateness in the present protection procurement (Carter, 2010), there has been restricted consideration paid to how the guard business considers reasonableness in the earliest periods of their improvement of new safeguard hardware, stages frequently going before formal obtaining processes. For item improvement, by and large, it has been proposed that it is by performing better in these beginning stages that the main advantages in the advancement of profound items can be accomplished (Khurana and Rosenthal, 1998), and expenses can be decreased (Cooper & Slagmulder, 1999). Likewise, reasonableness should be tended to in the underlying stages when new ideas are created.

Based on Global Fire Power data (2021), Indonesia's military strength is ranked 16th out of 140 countries with a Power Index of 0.2684 (with a perfect score of 0.0000). The world's top five power rankings militaries in a row are the United States, Russia, China, India, and Japan. Compared to ASEAN countries, the Power Index ranking Indonesia is still better than other ASEAN countries.

However, of all defense equipment owned by Indonesia, on average, it has a world ranking ranging from 35-50, and only one piece of defense equipment ranked in the top 5, Corvette. Table 1 presents

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good military strength comparison data. That's Indonesia's land, sea, and air dimensions compared to other ASEAN countries.

Table 1. Data on the Comparison of Indonesia's Military Strength Compared to other ASEAN Countries

Country Indonesia Vietnam Thailand Myanmar Singapore Malaysia Philippines Power Index 0,2684

(ranked 16/140)

0,4189 (ranked 24/140)

0,4427 (ranked 26/140)

0,6521 (ranked 38/140)

0,6931 (ranked 40/140)

0,7451 (ranked 44/140)

0,8219 (ranked 48/140 Human resources

Total Population

267,026,36 6

98,721,275 68,977,400 56,590,071 6,209,660 32,652,083 109,180,815

Active Personnel

400,000 482,500 361,000 405,000 72,500 110,000 125,000

Reserve Personnel

400,000 0 200,000 0 1,385,000 52,000 130,000

Financial Defense Budget

(million USD)

$9,200,00 $6,390,00 $7,200,00 $2,000,00 $10,700,00 $3,850,00 $4,250,00

Airpower Total Aircraft

Strength

458 247 587 287 237 147 179

Fighters/

Interceptors

41 75 75 60 100 26 -

Dedicated Attack

38 - 18 21 - 13 25

Transport 64 39 50 27 9 18 21

Trainers 109 30 163 88 36 40 24

Special- Mission

17 4 20 5 9 4 9

Helicopters 188 99 261 86 73 42 100

Attack Helicopters

15 25 7 9 18 - -

Land Forces

Tank 332 2,155 840 595 170 48 4

Armored Vehicles

1,430 5,500 2,500 1,700 3,100 1,380 600

Self-Propelled Artillery

153 100 53 40 48 - 12

towed Artillery 366 1,120 583 1,869 77 196 285

Rocket Projectors

63 810 17 496 24 55 -

Naval Forces

Total Assets 282 65 292 187 40 61 103

Aircraft Carries

- - - - - - -

Submarines 5 6 - 1 - 2 -

Destroyers - - - - - - -

Frigates 7 9 7 5 6 10 2

Corvettes 24 14 7 3 6 6 4

Patrol Vessels 179 26 49 79 10 32 55

Mine Warfare 10 8 5 2 4 4 -

Therefore, this paper aims to analyze The Political Economy of Fulfilling the Minimum Essential Force (MEF) by allocating a budget to the defense industry. The idea of satisfaction, as applied in this review, manages issues connected with item advancement from a daily existence cycle point of view (Walden et al., 2015). Using a miniature viewpoint, concentrating on the arrangement interaction, we supplement past investigations (Hartley, 2011) that talked about these expense increments more according to a large-scale view. All the more explicitly, the motivation behind this study is to investigate how moderateness of meeting the Base Fundamental Power (MEF) is overseen through guard spending plan portions for the mind-boggling safeguard industry. This is done to comprehend the idea advancement process, and to recognize potential components, to deliver reasonable guard hardware later on. Moreover, this investigation will be the reason for future

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exploration in fostering the guard business. Therefore, two ongoing instances of things to come age of battle air framework ideas have been examined. Information were gathered by concentrating on the writing of past examinations and investigated for each case

II. RESEARCH SETTING AND METHOD

An investigation contextual analysis approach was picked, contended to be proper for catching the concentrated on peculiarity in its true setting (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007), and especially in new point regions (Eisenhardt, 1989). To expand power and generalizability, numerous cases were contemplated (Yin, 1994). Since the pertinence of this study is grounded in a genuine issue, with conversations and ends firmly connected with experimental proof, the requirements for legitimacy are high (Eisenhardt, 1989). These essentials are additionally fortified via painstakingly chosen proper cases and techniques. To satisfy the necessities of dependability, the information assortment and examination have been completed as completely as conceivable to accomplish excellent translations. Moreover, the outcomes and interaction are represented in an as point by point way as could really be expected.

a) Research Setting

Indonesian Government's political and economic policies have expressed standards for the stockpile of military gear which infers that the necessities and errands of the battle units, the conflict time association, ought to be represented; the functional prerequisites for the protection powers ought to be satisfied. To accomplish that, the inventory of gear ought to be gotten under the accompanying request of needs: (1) upkeep and redesigns of the hardware in help, (2) acquisition of existing and field-tried hardware, (3) new advancement when required in any case can't be met.

Nonetheless, these needs are not really important for two regions recognized as Indonesia's public fundamental security interests: battle airplane abilities and submerged capacities (Olsson &

Nordlund, 2017). Officially, in the Indonesian safeguard securing process, the military are liable for creating and picking reasonable arrangements while the protection obtainment organization is answerable for the acquirement, including creating specialized necessities and picking the provider.

For key, significant expense or explicitly pinpointed gear the public authority has, in any case, the last say (Olsson and Nordlund, 2017). All things considered, despite the fact that the military are answerable for creating calculated arrangements, the business can effectively take part in government-started examinations.

b) Data Analysis

The information examination was performed actually to get new and unexpected relations in this emerging and under-researched point. Without a laid-out system and wording an organized investigation approach, was picked for exploring through the empiric (Gioia et al., 2013). To give research great legitimacy, for example to 'examine what one wished to explore' (Kvale, 1983 : 191), we have painstakingly chosen proper cases and strategies while attempting to address the characterized research questions. To satisfy necessities of unwavering quality the information assortment and examination have been completed as completely as could be expected.

Straightforwardness has been utilized inside the examination bunch, for instance, by talking about various decisions and translations made.

III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Good planning is a success of stages Minimum Essential Force (MEF) development and is the starting point for its implementation embodiment of Minimum Essential Force (MEF). Planning realization can be optimized through thoroughness, accuracy, and selective between Alutsista shopping list and availability limited budget, so consistent in planning, budget support, and the nature of the Minimum Essential Force (MEF). Minimum Essential Force (MEF) arranging in layers The Service of Guard, the Service of Public Improvement Arranging, the Service of Money, and the Indonesian Public Military have agreed collective policy (collegial policy) that the Minimum Essential Force (MEF) is a development of military defense forces consisting of Alutsista, facilities and infrastructure, organization, and human resources. The 2010 Indonesian National Armed Forces, Minimum Essential Force (MEF) budget support is the initial stage of a new paradigm for the implementation of the defense development planning system, which is aligned with the mapping of budget support and adapted to the principles of Minimum Essential Force (MEF) development. The

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Ministry of Defense as a government function in aspects of regulators, administrators, and facilitators in the context of planning towards the Indonesian National Armed Forces, strives to continue to encourage the strengthening of comprehensively so that the policy function can be fully implemented by the operational function of the Indonesian National Armed Forces. Hope it doesn't happen changes to Minimum Essential Force (MEF) budget submissions that do not in accordance with the interests and Minimum Essential Force (MEF) documents which are part of the defense planning document.

Mechanisms for the implementation of the related Minimum Essential Force (MEF) development fulfilment especially with procurement, there needs to be thorough consideration related to the type and product of Alutsista, budget, and duration procurement. On the other hand, for domestic procurement, industrial capabilities defense is still limited in meeting the required technical specifications Indonesian National Armed Forces is needed. Overseas procurement using credit facilities Exports that have long bureaucracy and slow processes from each procurement node. This causes procurement Alutsista takes a long time, while technology growing fast, and budget absorption time is limited. At this stage the implementation of the Minimum Essential Force (MEF) through the procurement system many face problems with several stages interests that ultimately slow down the execution process and lead to non-optimal operations. While defense equipment increasingly unfit for use can even endanger safety humans and the environment. In Minimum Essential Force (MEF) there is development and organizational development that needs to be adapted. Asynchronous between policies and operations in the field when faced with in critical condition of defense equipment, there needs to be consistency in the system replacement of the defense equipment

The Government's commitment to build national defense at scale can be realized as a determinant of budget policy by strengthening togetherness collegial and prioritize the defense budget even though it is still available some political interests at the the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia level are getting longer the resolution process. This can be accelerated through planning and budget allocation at National Development Planning Agency and availability budget at the Ministry of Finance so that the priority of the defense budget improved. This can be seen in the plan indicators and fulfilment of defense needs in accordance with the details planned baseline budget.

Defense management is inseparable from the management system defense that still uses the traditional system with prioritize individual decision-making officials from the pre-determined system considerations. The defense management supervision system has not been effective so that Minimum Essential Force (MEF) projections are expected to be able to make decisions in accordance with applicable procedures and systems. Shopping list Minimum Essential Force (MEF) should have a legal basis with Regulations President.

Defense Budget experiencing a trend increased since 2018 by IDR 106.8 trillion to IDR 127.35 trillion in 2020. Currently, the largest allocation defense budget is for personnel expenses, namely by 41.6 percent, for shopping for goods of 32.9 percent and for shopping capital of 25.4 percent.

During this time, the military budget Indonesian mostly channelled to shopping ground dimension.

In the year of 2019 military budget for Indonesian Army amounting to IDR 44.96 billion, the Navy is IDR 17.44 billion and the Indonesian Air Force amounting to IDR 13.76 billion. In 2020, budget for Indonesian Army amounting to IDR 55.92 billion, the Navy is IDR 22.08 billion and the Indonesian Air Force amounting to IDR. 15.50 billion. Ministry of Defense to allocate budget for the modernization program defense equipment in 2020 which is IDR 10.86 trillion consisting of IDR 4.59 trillion for land mat, IDR 4.16 trillion for the sea dimension and IDR 2.11 trillion for the mattress air.

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Guntur Eko Saputro et.al (The Political Economy of Fulfilling the Minimum Essential Force: Contextual investigations Fig. 1. Development of Defense Budget (in trillion IDR/Rupiah)

Based on SIPRI data (2019), Indonesia's defense budget against GDP in the 2009-2018 period is still below 1 percent of GDP, or still below the average defense budget of ASEAN countries. Based on BPS data, GDP at current prices in 2019 is Rp. 15,833.9 trillion. That is, in 2019 the budget allocation defense is only 0.68 percent of GDP. In Strategic Plan Ministry of Defense and Indonesian National Armed Forces in 2015-2019 it is stated that there is a target to be able to increase the defense budget to 1.5 percent of GDP. But until now still not achieved

Fig. 2. Development of Defense Budget in ASEAN

The Minimum Essential Force (MEF) was initiated the Government since 2007, Furthermore, the Minimum Essential Force (MEF) strategy has been executed beginning around 2009 which is isolated into three phases, to be explicit the primary stage 2010-2014, the second time of 2015-2019, and the third time of 2020-2024. Policy The Minimum Essential Force (MEF) is consistently supported by the defense budget which tends to increase every year. There are four Minimum Essential Force (MEF) development elements, namely Rematerialization, Procurement, Revitalization, and Relocation

Rematerialization emphasizes compliance with organizational tables and equipment or list of work force and gear composition until 100 percent. Rejuvenation is an increase in unit strata/thickening units adapted to the development of threats in placement area. Relocation refers to

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the exchange of units/work force/starting with one region then onto the next that has a high potential for event genuine dangers. Procurement means the development of another unit of faculty and protection hardware in the structure of realizing Minimum Essential Force (MEF) Main Component development.

The four elements are concentrated at a point called as a flash point, which is part of the territory of Indonesia which identified as areas with a high potential for actual threats. Flash point is the priority base advancement of the piece and attitude of The Minimum Essential Force (MEF) slowly and sustainable. Mentioned in the Defense White Paper in 2018, Minimum Essential Force (MEF) policy does not lead to arms race but the fulfilment of Indonesia's minimal defense needs.

These four things really depend on consistency, commitment, and continuity in the Minimum Essential Force (MEF) administration system at Indonesian National Armed Forces Base camp and the three powers (Indonesian Armed force, Indonesian Naval force, and Indonesian Flying corps).

Fig. 3. Achievements in the Physical Aspects of the defense equipment of the MEF weapon system until October 7, 2019

MEF is assigned at 100 percent before the completion of the MEF stage III is around the completion of 2024. MEF achievement is incredible in MEF I MEF II still under target which have been set. In October 2019, MEF achievement just showed up at 63.19 percent of MEF stage II goal is 75.54 percent

Table 2. Information on the Accomplishment of Defense Equipment for Each Dimension Before

MEF

MEF I MEF II

(2015-2019)

*as of Dec 2018

MEF III (2020-2024)

*target

Ideal Posture

Land Forces 64,89% 74,62% 100%

Small Arms 92.155 613.043 649.062 723.564 783.462

Cannon/ Rocket/ Missile 962 1.144 1.371 1.354 2.162

Combat Vehicle 1321 1.641 2000 3.738 4.858

Aircraft 67 104 121 224 1.224

Naval Forces 55,55% 68,72% 100%

Republic of Indonesia Warship

144 146 161 182 262

Submarine 2 2 4 8 12

Aircraft 62 72 85 100 160

Marine combat vehicle 413 440 503 978 1.481

Air Force 43,97% 44,40% 100%

Aircraft 211 261 267 344 469

Radar 17 20 20 32 32

Missile 0 0 0 72 96

Air strike repel 20 24 24 64 216

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Indonesia needs more moderate strategies to seek after lingering behind in the dominance of science and innovation guard area to acknowledge freedom Protection Industry. Defense industry independence highly dependent on the three pillars of science and technology actors, namely universities and R&D institutions, industry, and users (Indonesian National Armed Forces as user).

By Therefore, the Government will soon formulate an integrated policy in the areas of science and technology and industry directed at industrial needs defense, which includes: (1) H.R. development, excellent and strategic programs that quality in the field of engineering design and technology as well as priority of technology transfer required, (2) Research and development cooperation in the field of science knowledge and technology, and the defense industry both in country and abroad, (3) Empowerment of national industries that have the potential to become defense industry.

Relevant government agencies need to follow up on this policy with strategic steps, including spectrum diversification products, both commercial and military products, set regulations within the Ministry of Defense/ Indonesian National Armed Forces to use local product, establish cooperation regulations and defense industry development financing, and set regulation of the defense industry, including by involving parties private sector as a form of commitment to efforts to increase independence of the defense industry.

The Government's policies in meeting the needs of defense equipment are prioritize domestic products, if the defense industry domestically cannot afford it, then use foreign products but still involves domestic industry, one of which is through joint production mechanism. The domestic defense industry has not been able to Fulfilment of defense equipment from abroad is endeavoured to continue to provide compensation through other Trade Reward mechanisms by industry non- defense. Policies to build defense industry infrastructure that is part of the national industry, it is necessary to generate strategic technology-based leading industry by working together with other countries. One of the patterns of cooperation in the development of the defense industry is joint production (co-production) which is a part of the offset and counter trade mechanism. Production is carried out based on an agreement between the seller and buyers to obtain technological information to perform production of all or part of the appropriate defense equipment with the original.

Fig. 4. Counter Trade

The defense industry's ability to produce Alutsista will affect the independence of meeting the needs of defense equipment from within the country. The development of the defense industry is directed at achievement of independence the ability to provide tools and equipment defense to support defense capabilities in face threats. The ability to be achieved is in accordance with the projection in 2024 is to have a defense industry capable of providing the need for defense equipment to support strong defense capabilities has the power of deterrence against all the powers of neighbouring countries. Defense industry development is directed at achieving design, production, marketing, after-sales service capabilities, maintenance, and integrated logistics support that meets

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standards national/international gradually, continuously, and consistently according to the field of industry, through the development of science and technology that involving academia, R&D institutions, and industry as well as cooperation with foreign parties in the context of technology transfer. Government policy to use domestic production, need to be followed up by users/

Indonesian National Armed Forces in the form of policies real to use defense industry products in country as a form of development of the defense industry.

One of the policies related to defense equipment policy is development domestic defense industry through Law 16/2012 on the Defense Industry. In the law, it is mandated to State-owned defense industry becomes the lead integrator of defense equipment development. Until 2019, the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia has established 110 defense industries both state owned enterprises and Private Company. Currently, the industry Indonesian defense has been able to make some defensive tools and security, including Anoa from P.T. Pindad, CN-235 and NC212 from PT. DI, Fast Patrol Boat 28 m, Ship KCR 60 m, Missile escort Destroyer, Ship Landing Platform Pie from P.T. SAHABAT. However, there are still obstacles in the industry Indonesia's defense is limited basic infrastructure of the defense industry in country and low investment in development of scientific research to support defense industry. Defense industry has not been able to meet the request of government agencies for not implementing the most advanced technology. It is proven from Indonesia are still importing such as frigates, corvettes and submarines from Dutch, British and German, battle tanks from Germany, and still importing all Its fighter aircraft are F-16 and fighter jets F-5 from the United States, Sukhoi from Russia, maritime patrol aircraft and transport from the United States and Spain, and aircraft train from South Korea.

In article 43 paragraphs (3) of Law 16/2012 mandates that every purchase defense equipment tools and security from abroad must be involving the participation of the defense industry in the form of Local Content and Offset and technology transfer (ToT), which is an important link for build defense industry capability in order to have adequate capabilities. The mandate of the law is actually implemented so that the defense industry can develop independently and become an important part from global supply chain defense equipment tools and security.

Other problems faced are there is still a lack of private roles in defense industry. Given the many numbers of BUMS engaged in industry defense which amounted to 101 companies, but only half are active because most are constrained by capital. The Government needs to regulate in more detail regarding private authority in running defense industry projects.

Learn from developed countries, in the United States (USA) for example, the role of the U.S.

government in defense industry as a customer, defense industry sponsors and regulators. Private company running the defense industry is in supervision and there is financial support from U.S.

government. The U.S. government determines defense industry demand allocation and defense spending. As a consumer, The US is a loyal user of goods and services defense offered by industry national. This shows a lot of the defense function carried out by the U.S. private and Government focus on carrying out core defense tasks like soldier training. Provisioning task logistics, transportation, clothing to headquarter maintenance is left to private. Here the U.S. government judges that the policy eases the burden government tasks and budget and can build a production chain national defense.

Possible risks if strength requirements are not met the minimum principal Main Components are as follows: (1) Threats and disturbances to sovereignty and integrity The territory of the Republic of Indonesia is getting bigger and has an impact on stability national, (2) The non-achievement of the national development program in the field of National Defense, (3) Bargaining position of the Indonesian Government in international diplomacy is weakened and less taken into account by international community, (4) Non-fulfilment of Minimum Essential Force (MEF) Main Component development resulting in a decrease in defensive deterrence countries in the region, (5) The declining position of the nation's competitiveness (Competitive Index) in international environment, (6) The reduced ability of the Indonesian National Armed Forces in carrying out its duties the main thing is.

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Guntur Eko Saputro et.al (The Political Economy of Fulfilling the Minimum Essential Force: Contextual investigations IV. CONCLUSION

Minimum Essential Force (MEF) alignment is fundamental to realize urgent interest in the development of national defense until year 2024 within the framework of the ideal posture taking into account developments in the strategic environment and actual threats that urge. Phasing out the alignment of the four strategies contained in realizing the Minimum Essential Force (MEF) as a guide in fulfilling the need for defense equipment and in the preparation of program plans development of national defense as stated in the program and annual budget.

Fulfilment of the Minimum Essential Force (MEF) is very important so that Indonesia's defense system and posture will be better. Minimum Essential Force (MEF) has entered phase III, whereby 2024 it is targeted that 100 percent of the Minimum Essential Force (MEF) can be met. Government must accelerate the pace of development of the Minimum Essential Force (MEF) because the achievements of the Minimum Essential Force (MEF) to date have not yet reached targets in each of the previous phases. In addition, the Government is expected to be able to strengthen the marine dimension and in the air, seeing that Minimum Essential Force (MEF) current achievements are still lagging behind the land unit which has a larger budget. The domestic defense industry is also expected to contribute more in improving Indonesian defense force. The Government needs to allocate more budget for research and development of Indonesian defense technology (R&D).

Defense technology development Sophisticated equipment is a must so that the defense industry can produce more sophisticated defense equipment. The Government is also expected to provide opportunities for the private sector to develop domestic defense industry. In addition, it is necessary to increase the capacity of human resources in developing domestic defense equipment production capacity in order to reduce dependence on imported defense equipment and can increase the absorption of domestic products. Therefore, budget support from the Government is needed to fulfil the Minimum Essential Force (MEF) by increasing defense budget is at least 1.5 percent in line with the target. In addition, the Government need to increase support for the sea and air forces in increasing its military power so that the target Minimum Essential Force (MEF) phase III can be achieved.

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