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two arguments for extending legal personhood to nature

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While we may want to copy certain specific aspects of their approach, the model used in Ecuador and Bolivia cannot be directly applied in the US. The application and interpretation of these rights will follow the related principles established in the Constitution. The people of Ecuador voted on this, and almost two-thirds of the population voted in the.

Rather, one of its main motivations was to protect the people affected by its destruction, especially the indigenous population who have dual interests in the form of religious protection and economic security. We have found that this is especially true for indigenous peoples, who have dual interests in the form of religious protection and economic security. In fact, it is telling that studies documenting environmental activism in the United States have shown that they tend to move away from any religious basis.

So I think it is clear that the first component of the Bolivia/Ecuador model should not be used in the United States. Based on the historical examples of Bolivia and Ecuador, what approach should environmentalists take to expand environmental legal personality in the United States. In IV. part of my thesis I will defend a version of this kind of argument that I believe would work well in the United States.

The Current Status of U.S. Legal Personhood

While these citizens sometimes do not possess the necessary qualities to be considered metaphysical persons, the law strengthens their rights as legal persons to protect their rights as citizens and human beings to the fullest extent possible. I will first discuss disabled persons in terms of their ability, or lack thereof, to be defined as metaphysical persons; and then consider how these individuals have been granted legal personality in the form of a guardianship relationship. I will then move on to discuss the United States' granting of legal personhood to corporations and the ways in which corporations are perceived by the law in order to merit such status.

The 2006 United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) provides a particularly useful way to understand why disabled people need the special protection of their legal personality. This move towards guardianship proves to be revolutionary in recognizing disabled people as capable of acting as legal and moral agents through representation. An even more dramatic example of non-traditional entities being considered legal entities in the United States is the expansion of legal entity status to artificial entities such as corporations.

The concession theory views a company as an 'artificial person' that depends on the law to give it legal personality. Under these theories, the company is viewed as a “person” purely in legal terms, as a way of addressing what rights and entitlements exist. Aggregation theory assumes that a corporation is a collection of individuals that gives rise to the rights and obligations of those who make it up.

On this theory, the corporation is regarded as a 'real' person in terms of its ability to act as a moral agent and utilize rational thought via the collective intention and action of its constituents; and since the corporation functions as a real individual, it must be held responsible as a legal person. It is not that the corporation is believed to be a natural person, but rather the theory recognizes that a corporation actually exists, made possible by the collective consciousness that constitutes its being. In this regard, the real entity theory believes that the differentiation between natural and artificial persons is irrelevant because both are granted inherent and inalienable rights that are protected under the Constitution.

We can argue, then, that rather than extending legal entity status entirely to corporations, we have actually created a subcategory of legal personality that includes corporations, in the same way that disabled people have been given a distinctive form of legal entity status. . With a clear concept of legal personality, and with an overview of how this has been applied in the US.

Extending Personhood to Nature: The Argument by Analogy

After all, the underlying similarity between the disabled and the environment is not just that they cannot use language to express their desires, but the fact that they are both alive. Although there are many things that cannot use language, such as shoes or a lamp, what makes it meaningful in the case of the environment is that it is composed of entities that are organic, living beings without the full capacity to express themselves as to express full functionality. people can. The question then becomes: how and to what do we give such guardianship in the case of the environment - each animal, each plant or ecosystems as a single unit.

It justifies granting legal personality to companies by extending the rights of the individuals within the company to the company itself, thereby viewing the company as an extension of the individual. In fact, I think it's useful to think about the environment along the lines of an umbrella: a collection of people makes a company, a collection of people and. At each stage we use aggregation theory to grant rights to these larger entities as a way to support the rights of the individuals within them; we could extend such status to the environment in the same aggregate manner as we do to the corporations and governments within it.

Although the environment as a whole would necessarily be given legal personality, aggregation theory can only protect such people as those who extend their rights to the environment. I believe that the environment not only meets this demand but also expands it, as its collective consciousness includes that of living flora and fauna. I argue that the environment not only does this, but could actually exist and flourish without the existence of humans, demonstrating its fiercely independent nature.

Taking this concept further under real entity theory, I believe we can argue that the environment not only functions as a collective consciousness of the life that constitutes it, but that it is actually a real entity. Indeed, the environment surpasses a corporation or a government in illustrating the concept of a real entity, because it is not only real but alive. In anticipating objections against this perception of the environment as a real and living entity, it could be argued that the environment differs from a government because plants and animals may not have a common will to express themselves, whereas government does for it. .

So I claim that the collective will expressed by the environment is the survival and insurance of life on Earth, which is real. Using this approach, one could argue that the environment is undoubtedly a natural, intelligent machine, operating in a systematic way with or without human intervention. In fact, at this point you could even argue that the environment would probably function better without our existence.

As for the aggregate theory, I find it to be a subpar approach for the environmental movement compared to the real entity and intelligent machine metaphor theories because of the inherent inequities of the approach.

Extending Personhood to Nature: The Autonomy Argument

When referring to the historical examples of Rights of Nature in Bolivia and Ecuador, remember that these nations also placed a focus on citizen protection from government by granting Nature legal personality and promoting ethno-development. But there is a striking difference in Latin America's conception of autonomy and that found in the United States. This is the kind of premise that will be best received and accepted in the United States.

The first steps toward extending the rights of nature to the United States as a way to protect individual autonomy have already been taken by five U.S. Following the founding of the Global Alliance for the Rights of Nature (GARN) in 2010, Pittsburgh, PA became the pari A year later, Grant Township followed suit by imposing a Community Bill of Rights ordinance in response to Pennsylvania Gas and Electric's application for a permit to inject wastewater into one of its unused wells.

Thus, they established their own Community Bill of Rights ordinance that prohibited the dumping of oil and gas waste materials in the township. He found that most of these cases were retroactive approaches to immediate threats, but showed how Santa Monica's ordinance works as a precautionary principle to prevent harm in the future. In response, the residents of both townships developed a new legal structure, the Home Rule Charter, hoping to enforce the rights of nature in the United States.

In summary, Kauffman and Martin concluded that in the United States, "Rights of Nature are linked to the concept of social rights and are. The point that I am arguing is not just a theoretical proposition: as Kauffman and Martin show, it is based on actual examples that have already been tried in the U.S. First, I think these examples show that Natural Rights must be implemented at a state and ultimately federal level if they are to be truly enforceable.

If the Rights of Natural Law were to be based on this concept of personal autonomy, it would help ensure that the individual's protection and wishes are taken into account on an equal basis with the economic considerations. 34;Constructing the Rights of Nature: Constitutional Reform, Mobilization, and Environmental Protection in Ecuador." Journal of the American Bar Foundation: Law and Social Inquiry 40, no. Law and Legal Theory in the History of Corporate Responsibility: Corporate Personhood." Seattle University Law Review 35, no.

Comparing natural rights laws in the US, Ecuador, and New Zealand: Evolving strategies in the struggle between environmental protection and

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These papers explore human and legal relations with technology and nature: legal records and decision-making; food and nutrition at the intersection of law, science and culture; rights