Marina Kayumova1 (2015)
International migration displays two interesting tendencies: the increasing migration of the highly skilled workforce and the growing feminization of migration flows.2 This type of human capital flight mostly affects developing and low-income coun- tries.3 It is also an important challenge faced by Central Asian states. The World Bank estimates that the total number of emigrants from Uzbekistan since 1991 is 2 million people.4 However, exact statistics are not available, and there is speculation that the real number of migrants is closer to 6 million. Data for the level of education of emigrants is similarly unreliable. The World Bank has estimated that one in three Uzbeks living abroad has a tertiary educa- tion degree. This would mean that around 1 million Uzbeks with higher education live outside the coun- try.5 That said, Docquier and Rapoport6 report that between 1990 and 2000 the highly skilled emigration rate more than doubled in eight post-Soviet coun- tries, with Uzbekistan displaying one of the highest
rates (59.5%), of highly skilled emigrants of the total emigration stock.7
The gender aspect of highly skilled emigration has only recently started to receive attention.8 Since the 1990s, experts have witnessed a steady increase of women emigrating. The literature explains this in terms of the transformation of labor, changing gen- der roles, including increased gender equality.9 That said, the study of highly skilled female migration is complicated because of the lack of reliable statistics and harmonized gender-disaggregated data on emi- grants’ educational background.10
This paper examines the consequences of the em- igration of the “crème de la crème” from Uzbekistan.
I use the “brain drain/brain gain” debate as my analyti- cal framework. The first section of this paper describes the methodology of my study. The second section ex- plains why it is important to examine highly skilled female emigration in Uzbekistan. Drawing on the empirical data, I collected through a series of in-depth interviews, I examine both negative and positive con- sequences of the emigration of highly skilled profes- sionals. The final section concludes with recommen- dations on how to turn “brain drain” into “brain gain.”
1 Marina Kayumova (Uzbekistan) has considerable international work experience, during which she was exposed to a variety of projects within public and private sectors. Her previous assignments include work in GSM Association, European Parliament and Patent Office. She has also worked as a strategy consultant for SMEs. Marina holds MPhil degree in Innovation, Strategy and Organization from the University of Cambridge and BA from the University of Westminster. She also received Masters in International Relations from the European Institute, where she explored EU-Russia and Central Asia relations in the domain of energy cooperation.
2 J. Dumont, J. Martin, and G. Spielvogel, “Women on the Move: The Neglected Gender Dimension of the Brain Drain,” IZA Discussion Paper No. 2920. Institute for the Study of Labour (IZA), Bonn, 2007.
3 Y. Kuznetsov and C. Sabel, “International Migration of Talent, Diaspora Networks, and Development: Overview of Main Issues,” in Y. Kuznetsov, ed., Diaspora Networks and the International Migration of Skills, How Countries can Draw on Their Talent Abroad (Washington, D.C.: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2006), 3–19; F. Docquier and H. Rapoport, “Quantifying the Impact of Highly Skilled Emigration on Developing Countries,” in T. Boeri, H. Brucker, F. Docquier, and H. Rapoport, eds., Brain Drain and Brain Gain: The Global Competition to Attract High-Skilled Migrants (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 209–302.
4 “Country Partnership Strategy for the Republic of Uzbekistan,” Report No. 65028-UZ. World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2011.
5 “Uzbekistan. Modernizing Tertiary Education,” Report No. 88606-UZ. World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2014.
6 Docquier and Rapoport, “Quantifying the Impact of Highly Skilled Emigration on Developing Countries.”
7 F. Docquier and A. Marfouk, “International Migration by Educational Attainment, 1990-2000,” in Ç. Özden and M. Schiff, eds., International Migration, Remittances and the Brain Drain (Washington, D.C.: World Bank and Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 151–99.
8 N. M. Nejad and A. T. Young, “Female Brain Drains and Women’s Rights Gaps: A Gravity Model Analysis of Bilateral Migration Flows,” IZA Discussion Paper No. 8067. Institute for the Study of Labour (IZA), Bonn, March 2014, http://ftp.iza.org/dp8067.pdf.
9 L. Beneria, C. Deere and N. Kabeer, “Gender and International Migration: Globalization, Development and Governance,” in L. Oso and N. Ribas- Mateos, eds., The International Handbook on Gender, Migration and Transnationalism: Global and Development Perspectives (Cheltenham, UK;
Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2013), 45–66.
10 J. Dumont, J. Martin, and G. Spielvogel, “Women on the Move: The Neglected Gender Dimension of the Brain Drain,” IZA Discussion Paper No.
2920. Institute for the Study of Labour (IZA), Bonn, 2007; Beneria, Deere, and Kabeer, “Gender and International Migration”; Docquier and Marfouk, “International Migration by Educational Attainment.”
Methodology
This study is based on 18 in-depth interviews with emigrants from Uzbekistan holding PhD degrees in natural (physics, chemistry, biology), social (eco- nomics, education, law, political science) and ap- plied sciences (medicine, engineering, computer sci- ence).11 The pool of respondents have the following characteristics:
t They have resided outside of Uzbekistan for 4 to 19 years.
t The majority of them left Uzbekistan, on their own, without their family members.
t All of them still have family members in Uzbekistan.
t Most of the respondents got their under- graduate education in Uzbekistan and their Master and PhD degrees abroad.
t Most of the respondents’ current occupation is directly relevant to the areas of expertise obtained in the course of their studies.
The respondents were selected through the use of strat- ified snowball sampling and through the online net- work of Uzbek professionals abroad. First contacts were made through personal networks within immigrant communities in the UK, Belgium, Germany, France, Switzerland, the United States, Canada, and Japan.
To control for gender differences, the sample was composed of an equal number of female and male respondents. The interviews lasted on aver- age for about one hour. Although interviews fol- lowed a semi-structured guide with predetermined themes that uncovered the behavior and intentions of the emigrants, we also allowed for a free-flowing discussion. In order to minimize gender biases, we initially did not tell the respondents that we focused
on the question of highly skilled female migration in Uzbekistan. Respondents were informed only at the very end of the interview. In the interviews we asked female respondents to reflect on their gender roles.
Our male respondents were also asked to reflect on their gender roles. In addition, we asked whether if they had been a woman their situation and motiva- tions would have been different. This study is to be seen as a probe that offers some promising avenues for more in-depth research.
Feminization of Highly Skilled Migration
The increasing number of women emigrating, includ- ing highly skilled women, has generated a growing in- terest by scholars and policymakers in the gender di- mension of migration flows. According to the United Nations, between 1960 and 2005, the share of women in international migration increased from 46.8% to 49.6% and outnumbered the number of male emi- grants from developing countries.12 This trend is par- ticularly noticeable for highly skilled women from de- veloping countries.13 Dumont14 found that the average emigration rate of tertiary-educated women from non- OECD countries exceeded that of men by 4.5%, where- as there was no gender gap in emigration rates of men and women with primary and secondary education.15
Those worldwide tendencies also hold true for the post-Soviet space. The proportion of women emigrants from the former Soviet Union increased dramatically over the past 25 years.16 Docquier et al.17 found that in 2000 the share of skilled female emigrants from Central Asia stood at 50.2% as opposed to 46.5% for their male counterparts. In Central Asia, the increase of the rate of skilled women emigrating as compared to the number of skilled men emigrating or the total number of women emigrating is particulary high.18
11 Because of the lack of reliable and comprehensive statistics on the share of female and male emigrants with tertiary degrees, the present study is based on in-depth interviews.
12 See: Nejad and Young, “Female Brain Drains and Women’s Rights Gaps”; C. Spadavecchia, “Migration of Women from Sub-Saharan Africa to Europe: The Role of Highly Skilled Women,” Sociología y tecnociencia/Sociology and Technoscience 3, no. 3 (2013): 96–116; J. Bang and A. Mitra,
“Gender bias and the female brain drain,” Applied Economics Letters 18, no. 9 (2011): 829–33; Ç. Özden and I. Neagu, “Immigrant Women’s Participation and Performance in the US Labor Market,” in A. Morrison, M. Schiff, and M. Sjoblom, eds., The International Migration of Women (Washington, D.C.: World Bank and Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 153–83; F. Docquier, A. Marfouk, S. Salomone and K. Sekkat, “Are skilled women more migratory than skilled men?!,” World Development 40, no. 2 (2010): 251–265.
13 Docquier, Marfouk, Salomone, and Sekkat, “Are skilled women more migratory than skilled men?!”.
14 Dumont, Martin, and Spielvogel, “Women on the Move: The Neglected Gender Dimension of the Brain Drain.”
15 Beneria, Deere, and Kabeer, “Gender and International Migration: Globalization, Development and Governance.”
16 A. Morrison, M. Schiff, and M. Sjoblom, “Overview,” in A. Morrison, M. Schiff, and M. Sjoblom, eds., The International Migration of Women (Washington, D.C.: World Bank and Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 1–10.
17 Docquier, Marfouk, Salomone, and Sekkat, “Are skilled women more migratory than skilled men?!”.
18 F. Docquier, L. Lowell, and A. Marfouk, “A Gendered Assessment of the Brain Drain,” IZA Discussion Paper No. 3235. Institute for the Study of Labour (IZA), Bonn, 2007.
Based on the data of Brücker, Capuano, and Marfouk I constructed a graph depicting the emigra- tion of highly skilled labour as a percentage of total emigrants of Uzbekistan.20
The graph clearly depicts the growing number of women emigrating and the widening gap be- tween highly skilled female and male emigrants from Uzbekistan. These statistics suggest the need for an in-depth analysis of the gendered aspects of highly skilled emigration in Uzbekistan.
The literature points to two major motivations for highly skilled women to emigrate:
t Traditional and conservative gender roles, t The lack of professional opportunities result-
ing from gender inequalities.
Gender differences in migration patterns are most likely to emerge from gender discrimination in the
country of origin.21 Uzbekistan is a country and soci- ety with very traditional gender roles. Such tradition- al gender roles are also part of a new “nationalistic”
narrative and a response to “westernization” be it in a Russian or global variant.22 Independent female migration is not encouraged and is not in tune with the image of a “traditional woman.”23 Most female respondents who took part in this study, while be- ing supported by their families in their decision to independently move away from Uzbekistan, were also subject to many negative reactions from distant relatives, friends and acquaintances. To quote one female participant of the study: “They were trying to convince me that for a girl from Uzbekistan it is very important to get married and give birth to a child. If I left the country, the chances of me getting married would decrease.” Similarly, another woman explained:
“Some of my relatives were telling my parents: “How come? You went crazy... How can you allow your un-
19 Ibid., p.15.
20 In 2013, Brücker, Capuano, and Marfouk constructed a dataset of international emigration by origin, gender and education level for the years 1980–2010. The data was compiled through harmonizing national censuses and population registers statistics from 20 OECD receiving countries.
Pre-1991 data for Uzbekistan was derived from the estimation of the immigrant stock from each origin by multiplying the total migration stock of the Soviet Republic by the gender and skill-specific share of the independent country population over the total Soviet country migration stock.
The database covers only adults over 25 to exclude students.
21 Nejad and Young, “Female Brain Drains and Women’s Rights Gaps.”
22 E. Fayzullaeva, “Labor Migration in Central Asia: Gender Challenges,” in L. Racioppi and K. O. See, Gender Politics in Post-communist Eurasia (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2009), 237–61; M. Tlostanova, Gender Epistemologies and Eurasian Borderlands (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
23 A. Cieslik, “Transnational Mobility and Family-Building Decisions: A Case Study of Skilled Polish Migrant Women in the UK,” in Oso and Ribas- Mateos, eds., The International Handbook on Gender, Migration and Transnationalism, 453–68.
Figure 1. Annual Average Growth Rate of Total/Skilled Stock of Emigrants. Data by Region (1990-2000)
Central Asia Western Africa Souther Asia Souther Africa Central America Middle Africa Eastern Europe South America Northern Africa South-East. Asia Eastern Asia Eastern Africa Austr + New Zela. Western Asia Carribean Others Oceania Southern Europe Northern Europe North America Western Europa 20%
18%
16%
14%
12%
10%
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%
Women total emig.
Women skilled emig.
Men skilled emig.
Source: Adapted from Docquier et al.19
married daughter to go somewhere abroad to study?”
“If she goes abroad’ she may fall in love, she may nev- er return, when she comes back to Uzbekistan, it will be difficult to arrange her marriage because a groom’s family would not want a bride who is much more edu- cated than their son.” Even married women were sub- ject to such opprobrium: “There were too many ac- cusing remarks when I was leaving... According to our traditional cultural belief system, a daughter does not abandon her mother and a wife does not abandon her husband; it was against the flow. My mother in law is very traditional they simply do not understand...And I know what people are saying about me in Uzbekistan.”
In sum, there are strong cultural pressures on women in Uzbek society to stay put. For many highly educated women the decision to emigrate is moti- vated by a desire to escape those conservative social norms. These norms dictate that women have chil- dren soon after marriage and that the dominance of husbands in a household is a given.25
In addition, in Uzbekistan, like in many oth- er post-Soviet Central Asian states, we also see a return to very traditional, and conservative views with regard to the roles of men and women in so- ciety. One female participant of the study explained:
“Life in Uzbekistan is satisfactory for men, because the whole society is created for men... For many men, here I should say traditional Uzbek men, it is difficult to accept knowledgeable women or independent wom-
en. Such a woman can be an intimidating factor for a man. The space for women is restrictive and that’s why women leave the country.”
Another woman told us: “In life there are always gender dynamics. Even in more liberal thinking groups life is constrained; a woman can’t do this and that because people will think this and that...people were asking how my husband was reacting to my career de- velopment...So my husband became a frame of refer- ence, they were nurturing a sense of guilt: But it is not a choice of either career or family−my children never suffered. I think they win when they see both parents working. I do not see that they suffer.”
These traditional and unequal cultural gender norms also translate into unequal economic gender norms. Indeed, another major reason why highly qualified women decide to emigrate is the lack of professional opportunities. The literature shows that developing countries, including countries with high- er levels of gender inequalities, are more affected by highly skilled female emigration. Such countries have fewer professional opportunities for educated wom- en.26 Studies also show that countries with high fer- tility rates, restricted access to education for women, and strong labor market bias towards women face higher rates of female highly skilled emigration.27 Many Uzbek female participants of the study are convinced that a woman can succeed in Uzbekistan professionally, but they also agree that she faces many
24 H. Brücker, S. Capuano, and A. Marfouk, “Education, Gender and International Migration: Insights from a Panel-Dataset 1980–2010,” mimeo, IAB, Nuremberg, 2013.
25 Ibid.
26 Dumont, Martin, and Spielvogel, “Women on the Move.”
27 Bang and Mitra, “Gender bias and the female brain drain.”
Figure 2. Emigration of Highly-Skilled Labor as a Percentage of Total Emigration Stock for Uzbekistan
0.00%
1.00%
2.00%
3.00%
4.00%
5.00%
6.00%
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Women
Men
Source: Graph constructed based on data developed by Brücker, Capuano, and Marfouk24
obstacles. They acknowledged that “Everything is very difficult for women in Uzbekistan. It is very diffi- cult for women to succeed in Uzbekistan. Women will not be promoted...If you are a woman you will need the support and patronage of a man (husband, father, brother).”
Many men seemed to concur. The male respon- dents who took part in the study all recognized the unequal position of women in Uzbek society. All male respondents were asked what they believed would have happened to them if they had been a woman. They all agreed that their projected life sce- narios would not be the same: “I think I would not be able to achieve what I achieved in life as a man.
This is one of the problems of our society. I know the environment in Tashkent; as a woman she must have a family. After she has a family, it is not her decision:
it is up to the family and husband to decide. I know for sure that if I were born as a girl, I would not be able to do what I did.” In a similar vein, another male re- spondent elaborated: “I never thought I would be an- swering such a question. I don’t know how my career would develop in this case. In our patriarchal, very conservative society, of course it is much more diffi- cult for a woman career-wise. Many husbands do not favor a situation when their wife works. For a wom- an it all depends on her partner and his position. In many cases a woman just cannot decide and does not have the freedom of choice. Family plays a huge role in our society of course, and it influences women’s career choices.” Some of the responses were sharp: “If I were a woman there would be no career plan in Uzbekistan for me.”
Hence, if policymakers want to counter the emigration of highly skilled women they would do well to pay attention to gender discrimination not only in in the domestic labor market,28 but also in society at large. The increase of highly skilled fe- male emigration should be a warning signal for policymakers.
Brain Drain or Brain Gain
There is an ongoing debate in the literature on the consequences of highly skilled emigration on the country of origin. There are two schools of thought.
One highlights the negative consequences also known as “brain drain” The other emphasizes the possible positive outcomes and “brain gain.”29 When exam- ining the consequences of highly skilled emigration five main factors have to be taken into consideration.
These factors include: (1) remittances; (2) diaspora networks; (3) investments; (4) return migration; and (5) occupational shortages.30
Remittances
Many experts argue that the negative effects of em- igration may be offset by remittances sent by mi- grants.31 According to a UNDP report32 in many developing countries remittances exceed the level of direct foreign assistance and positively influence eco- nomic development. Indeed, remittances are a direct source of foreign exchange. They provide investment funds and contribute to GDP growth. They also al- low for increased consumption as they are received directly by households.33 It is generally believed that the more qualified migrants will remit more as they are expected to earn more.
However, my study reveals that the extent of remittances coming from highly skilled migrants from Uzbekistan is quite insignificant. While these findings cannot be generalized due to the small sam- ple size and the qualitative nature of the present re- search, this finding might call into question some of the conventional wisdom and theories with regard to remittances. My respondents, when asked if they send money to support their families or relatives in Uzbekistan, explained: “I have a big family and many siblings who take care of my parents. All of them are in Uzbekistan, so there is no pressure on me to send money to Uzbekistan.”
28 F. Docquier and H. Rapoport, “Documenting the Brain Drain of “La Crème de la Crème”: Three Case-Studies on International Migration at the Upper Tail of the Education,” IRES Discussion Papers No. 2009031. Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales, Université Catholique de Louvain, 2009.
29 Spadavecchia, “Migration of Women from Sub-Saharan Africa to Europe.”
30 During the course of my primary data collection no significant gender differences were displayed with respect to those factors. Hence, the findings presented below are not gender disaggregated.
31 Spadavecchia, “Migration of Women from Sub-Saharan Africa to Europe.”
32 “Human Development Report 2009: Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development,” UNDP, New York, 2009.
33 Beneria, Deere, and Kabeer, “Gender and International Migration.”