GLOBAL STATELESSNESS STATISTICS
II. AFRICA
The causes of statelessness in Africa include: the legacy of colonialism and the impact of restrictive post-colonial nationality policies; more recent cases of state succession; and mounted pressure on citizenship policy with the spread of multiparty democracy.94 Discrimination against minority and (perceived) immigrant groups, whereby the laws of some African countries explicitly restrict citizenship rights on a racial or ethnic basis,95 increase the risk of statelessness – particularly against a backdrop of significant migration and displacement.
Discrimination against women also features in the nationality laws of some African states and may be further compounding or perpetuating situations of statelessness, with eight countries in sub-Saharan Africa denying women equal rights to men with respect to the nationality of their children.96 Other legal, political and sociological complexities, including cross-border populations and nomads, the lack of adequate protection for foundlings and other undocumented or vulnerable children, mismanagement of civil status and nationality documentation all also contribute to a difficult environment with respect to the avoidance of statelessness.
Côte d’Ivoire
UNHCR reported figure (end 2013): 700,000
The explanatory note on Côte d’Ivoire in the statistical table in which UNHCR reports a stateless population of 700,000 persons provides a good indication of the context in which statelessness arises in the country. It indicates that this figure is arrived at on the basis of government estimates for ‘descendants of immigrants’ (400,000) and ‘children abandoned at birth’ (300,000). In Côte d’Ivoire then, statelessness stems primarily from the restrictive nationality rules that were adopted at independence, tightened in 1972, and implemented in an even more limited manner over the last two decades with respect to historical migrants and their descendants born in the country. Since before independence in 1960, Côte d’Ivoire has drawn migrants from neighbouring countries; indeed, for a period the French colonial authorities had a policy of forcibly importing labour from
94 See, in particular, B. Manby, Struggles for Citizenship in Africa, Zed Books, 2009;
see further the resources posted by the Citizenship Rights in Africa Initiative at: http://citizenshiprightsinafrica.org/.
95 This problem is found, for instance, in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Malawi and to some extent Mali.
96 See above, note 22; and B. Manby, Citizenship Laws in Africa, 2010.
the territory of what is now Burkina Faso. The new nationality law adopted at independence provided for ‘foreigners’ to be able to opt for Ivorian nationality within one year, and also provided for children of foreign parents born on the territory after independence to have the right to opt for nationality at majority. But it was unclear who exactly needed to take these steps, and in the context of widespread illiteracy almost none did so. The right to opt was removed in 1973, creating a nationality law founded purely on descent. Nevertheless, the long-lived regime of President Félix Houphouët Boigny continued to encourage immigration and integrated historical migrants and their descendants, distributing to them national identity documents and granting them full rights of citizenship, including employment in public services and the right to vote. In the mid-1990s, after the death of Houphouët Boigny, Ivorian political leaders adopted a series of measures to deny identification documents to all those who were perceived to be of foreign origin; this deprivation of citizenship rights was at the heart of the rebellion that broke out in 2002. With the installation of a new government, following an election accompanied by significant violence in 2010, some reform measures have been undertaken. In September 2013, legislation restored, as an exceptional and temporary measure, the right suppressed in 1973 for foreign-born residents living in Côte d’Ivoire since before independence and persons of foreign descent born in Côte d’Ivoire between 1961 and 1973, as well as some descendants of these groups, to acquire nationality through a declaration procedure.97 Another law removed gender discrimination in the right of a person to transmit nationality to his or her spouse.98 However, these exceptional measures leave untouched the highly restrictive general provisions of the nationality code.99 It also seems that many of those affected by statelessness have not applied for nationality under the temporary provisions.100
97 Loi n. 2013-653 Portant dispositions particulaires en matiere d’acquisition de la nationalite par declaration, 13 September 2013.
98 Loi No.2013-654 du 13 Sep 2013 portant modification du Code de la nationalite ivorienne.
99 Although with the country’s recent accession to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness – and given the country’s monist system – it may be possible to directly invoke provisions of this instrument to address relevant issues.
100 Mirna Adjami, Statelessness and Nationality in Côte d’Ivoire, UNHCR, forthcoming.
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
Marked by an asterisk in UNHCR statistical data. Estimated size of stateless population unknown
There are no available estimates for the number of stateless people in DRC. Since 2005, UNHCR statistics have flagged the country as one where statelessness is a problem (though the problem is much older), but a mapping of the situation in the country has not been possible due to the decades of civil conflict and the political sensitivity of the issue. There has, in fact, not been a national census in DRC since 1984.
Statelessness is understood to affect members of the Banyarwanda population.101 DRC’s nationality law was amended several times in response to political concerns around the status of the Banyarwanda.
At its most restrictive, from 1981 to 2004, the law gave nationality only to “any person one of whose ancestors was a member of one of those tribes established in the territory of the Republic of Zaire as defined by its frontiers of 1 August 1885”,102 the date on which the borders of the Congo Free State were officially recognised. In November 2004, a new nationality law was adopted, which returned the foundation date for nationality to 1960, as it had been in 1971. This change was confirmed in the 2006 constitution. Although naturalisation was also made slightly easier, the law still bases Congolese nationality of origin on membership of “the ethnic groups and nationalities of which the individuals and territory formed what became Congo at independence”.103 The continued disputed status of the Banyarwanda population — some of them entitled to Congolese nationality under the 2006 constitution, some of them more recent immigrants — is a significant contributor to conflict in the eastern region.104 The total
101 The Banyarwanda are those speaking the language of Rwanda, descended from various groups: those whose ancestors have always lived on the territory, ethnic Tutsis who migrated to the territory of present day DRC centuries ago, Hutus and Tutsis who were brought by the Belgian colonial powers from Rwanda to work on plantations, and refugees from conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi.
102 See above, note 94, chapter 3.
103 Article 6, Loi n°.04/024 du 12 novembre 2004 relative a la nationalité congolaise.
104 See above, note 94. See also, “Who belongs where? Conflict, displacement, land and identity in North Kivu, Democratic Republic of Congo”, Citizenship and Displacement in the Great Lakes Region, Working Paper No. 3, March 2010;
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): Procedure and conditions for Congolese nationals of Rwandan origin to reinstate their nationality, 24 January 2006, COD100961.FE; Célestin Nguya-
Banyarwanda population is not known, but is likely in the hundreds of thousands, possibly substantially over a million. For example, the government reportedly estimated it to be approx. 1.9 million in the 1990s.105 There are no recent statistics, nor any information about how many within this population are affected by statelessness; indeed, state institutions are mostly not effective in the zones affected by conflict.
Kenya
UNHCR reported figure (end 2013): 20,000
As reported in UNHCR’s statistics, statelessness is estimated to affect some 20,000 persons in Kenya – mainly members of minority groups.106 A footnote in UNHCR’s statelessness statistical table for Kenya indicates that this figure is based on “currently available information on several communities in Kenya” and is “under review pending further research and mapping activities” – it is, as yet, unclear whether the estimate will be revised up or down as a result of further study of the situation in Kenya. A new constitution was adopted by referendum in 2010 and removed gender discrimination in nationality law, while permitting dual nationality for the first time. A new citizenship act in 2011 also created a temporary procedure for stateless persons who could trace their ancestry in the country since independence to apply for Kenyan nationality. However no regulations were adopted to implement the law, and no cases of recognition of Kenyan citizenship have been reported based on these provisions. Among the groups currently under threat of non-recognition of Kenyan nationality are those of Somali descent and Muslims in the coastal region, whose applications for nationality documentation are subject to additional and highly onerous screening measures, in the context of concerns about threats from terrorist attack.107
Ndila Malengana, Nationalité et citoyenneté au Congo/Kinshasa: Le cas du Kivu, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2001.
105 See A. Makombo, “Civil conflict in the Great Lakes region: The issue of nationality of the Banyarwanda in the Democratic Republic of Congo”, in A.
Yusuf (ed.), African Yearbook of International Law, 5 Afr. Y.B. Int’l L., 49, 1997.
106 See, for instance, A. Hussain Adam, Making of Stateless People – The Kenyan Style, 2013; Open Society Justice Initiative, Citizenship Discrimination and the Right to Nationality in Kenya, 2009.
107 Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, An Identity Crisis? Study on the Issuance of National Identity Cards in Kenya, 2007; Kenya National Commission on Human Rights and UNHCR, Out of the Shadows: Towards Ensuring the Rights of Stateless Persons and Persons at Risk of Statelessness in Kenya, 2010; Muslims
Madagascar
Marked by an asterisk in UNHCR statistical data. Estimates for the size of the stateless population: more than 2,200 – up to 100,000
Madagascar has a sizeable community of Muslims of Indo-Pakistani origin, often referred to as the Karana, who have been in the country for more than four generations – i.e. since long before independence.
Some among this community failed to acquire any citizenship (be it Malagasy, French, Indian, Pakistani, or English) at the time of Madagascar’s independence and have not been able to resolve this since. Madagascar’s 1993 national census reports 0.2% of Madagascar’s 12.3 million population as foreign and 9.3% of these - or 2,200 persons - as stateless.108 This is likely to be an underrepresentation of the number currently affected. Firstly, it is important to keep in mind the limitations inherent in reporting the size of a stateless population based on self-identification in a census alone, for people may not know or be reluctant to indicate their nationality status as stateless. Secondly, Madagascar’s total population has since grown significantly – up to 21.3 million by 2011109 – and a lack of safeguards in the nationality law to prevent statelessness being passed to the next generation means that problem of statelessness is likely to have grown with it.
Thirdly, the perpetuation of statelessness is further compounded by the fact that Malagasy women experience difficulties transmitting their nationality to their children – even though the law should allow for this if the father is stateless, access to nationality remains a problem in practice. The combination of gender discriminatory law and historical ethno-religious discrimination has perpetuated statelessness in the country. Furthermore, naturalisation processes are inaccessible, including to the Karana community.110 There has yet to be a comprehensive mapping of statelessness in Madagascar to confirm the current number of persons affected. Other sources that touched on this question concur that reliable data remains unavailable. Refugees International has suggested that the Karana population number some
for Human Rights, Persistent Human Rights Violations and Harassment by the State to Muslim Communities in Kenya, Muhuri, Mombasa, 23 July 2014.
108 The national census report is available here: http://www.gripweb.org/
gripweb/sites/default/files/databases_info_systems/Madagascar_RGPH%20 Vol2%20Tome1.pdf .
109 UN Statistics Division, World Statistics Pocketbook, 2011 population figure for Madagascar.
110 C. McInerney, “Accessing Malagasy Citizenship: The Nationality Code and Its Impact on the Karana”, Tilburg Law Review, Vol.19, 2014, pp.182-193.
20,000 and within that group, “only a handful of individuals hold citizenship rights”.111 The US Department of State, in its annual human rights reporting, cited Muslim leaders who estimate that up to 5% of the approximately two million Muslims in the country may be stateless – this would amount to up to 100,000 people.112 Preparations are now underway for the next population census, which will take place in 2016 and may present an opportunity to gather new data on the scale of the problem of statelessness in the country.
Nigeria
Unreported in UNHCR statistics. Estimated number of stateless persons:
unknown
In 1979, constitutional reform in Nigeria introduced an ethnic dimension to the criteria for citizenship, repeated in the 1999 constitution currently in force, which provides for citizenship by birth to be acquired by “every person born in Nigeria before the date of independence, either of whose parents or any of whose grandparents belongs or belonged to a community indigenous to Nigeria”. Although this provision only refers to persons born before independence, the emphasis on belonging to a “community indigenous to Nigeria” ensures that recognition of citizenship at the moment of succession of states is based on ethnicity, and continues in practice in the recognition of nationality of those born since then. These provisions, reinforced by provisions relating to the respect for Nigeria’s ‘federal character’ in state appointments, have created a strong emphasis on ‘indigeneity’
that, despite the lack of laws providing any more detailed framework, pervades identification systems and that impacts both internal migrants and those who have come from other countries. There is no document that serves as definitive proof of Nigerian citizenship, and currently no requirement to hold a national identity card (this is being introduced). Statelessness is likely to be a substantial but currently hidden problem in Africa’s most populous country.113 A 2002 judgement of the International Court of Justice granted sovereignty over the Bakassi peninsula between Nigeria and Cameroon, and other
111 See above, note 43.
112 US Department of State, Country reports on human rights practices for 2013:
Madagascar.
113 B. Manby, Nationality, Migration and Statelessness in West Africa, A study for UNHCR and IOM, forthcoming.
territory, to Cameroon.114 The number of people affected was also disputed between Cameroon and Nigeria, but was alleged by Nigeria to be more than 150,000. Nigeria rejected the judgment. In 2006, a bilateral agreement was reached at Greentree, New York, between the two countries, by which Cameroon promised, among other things, not to force Nigerian nationals living in the Bakassi Peninsula to leave the zone or to change their nationality. The territory was formally handed over to Cameroon on 14 August 2008, though a Nigerian presence remained during a five-year transitional period, ending in 2013. There have been problems in establishing recognition of nationality both for those Bakassi residents who remained in their homes, in what is now Cameroon (whether of Cameroon or Nigeria), and for those who relocated to the Nigerian side of the border. For the time being, all former or current Bakassi residents should be regarded as being at risk of statelessness.115
Zimbabwe
Marked by an asterisk in UNHCR statistical data. Estimates for the size of the stateless population: 80,000 – 600,000
Dual citizenship was permitted on attainment of majority rule in Zimbabwe in 1980, but forbidden from 1984. The 2001 Citizenship of Zimbabwe Amendment Act strengthened this prohibition by requiring proof of renunciation of another citizenship under the relevant foreign law, and not only a declaration under Zimbabwean law that only one citizenship was held. The government applied this amendment to mean that even those people with only a claim to a foreign citizenship (but who had made no attempt to claim another citizenship in fact) had to renounce that potential citizenship. The vast majority of persons affected by the amendment were farm workers and other migrants born in neighbouring countries or one of whose parents or grandparents were born in neighbouring countries, such as Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia.116 Most of these individuals lack identity documents, including birth registration, and were caught in the difficult position of not being considered as Zimbabwean nationals while not being able to prove their origins to obtain citizenship of their countries of origin or proof of renunciation of that citizenship. The number of persons
114 International Court of Justice, Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, Cameroon v. Nigeria, 10 October 2002.
115 See above, note 113.
116 See above, note 94.
affected is unclear. In 2005, Refugees International estimated that some 80,000 foreign farm workers and their family members might have lost their nationality.117 The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre released a report in 2008 indicating that in fact up to 600,000 people could be affected (30% of an estimated two million farm workers were reported to be of foreign descent) and Refugees International revised its figure to match this in 2009.118 The US Department of State 2013 human rights country report indicated that ‘independent groups’
estimated as that many as two million may have lost their Zimbabwean nationality,119 but again did not indicate how many were thereby made stateless and this high figure is not reported elsewhere. None of these sources provide a figure for the number of persons actually left stateless by loss of Zimbabwean nationality, nor do they provide insight into the methodology that was used to arrive at the estimates, so further research is clearly needed. Some neighbouring countries reported that they did not recognise as their citizens, those who were rejected by the Zimbabwean government as Zimbabwean citizens.120 Constitutional amendments adopted in 2009 removed gender discrimination in the law but did not resolve the issue of ‘potential’
dual nationality. A new constitution adopted by referendum in 2013 confirmed these changes, and for the first time since 1984 permitted dual nationality for those who are Zimbabwean citizens by birth, while giving parliament the power to prohibit it for citizens by naturalisation or descent (born outside the country).121 In addition, the new constitution contains a section on ‘restoration’ of Zimbabwean citizenship (by birth) for those persons who were born in Zimbabwe if one or both of the individual’s parents was a citizen of a member country of the Southern African Development Community and the individual was ‘ordinarily resident’ in Zimbabwe on the effective date of the Constitution.122 Although those who had been affected by the
117 See above, note 41.
118 See above, note 73. See also, note 43.
119 US Department of State, Country reports on human rights practices for 2013:
Zimbabwe.
120 B. Manby, Statelessness in Southern Africa, 2011.
121 Constitution of Zimbabwe 2013, Chapter 3 (sections 35 to 43). See also, B.
Manby, Draft Zim constitution fails citizenship test, 11 October 2012.
122 The member states of the Southern African Development Community are Angola, Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
previous rules began to re-apply for confirmation of Zimbabwean citizenship, the registrar-general continued to deny passports to those who were believed to be entitled to another citizenship, despite court rulings in favour of specific individuals, pending a change to the Citizenship Act (which still prohibited dual nationality in all cases). An amended Citizenship Act was not yet proposed by mid-2014.
Other countries in Africa
In South Africa, research by Lawyers for Human Rights has identified multiple groups who may be affected by statelessness – as well as other groups at risk.123 These include an estimated 100,000-200,000 Zimbabwean born migrants with foreign parentage who may face statelessness for the reasons described above and who currently live as (largely undocumented) migrants in South Africa.124 There may also be stateless persons among other migrant, asylum seeker and refugee communities in South Africa and problems have been flagged regarding access to citizenship for undocumented persons in border areas as well as potentially for some orphans.125 It remains unclear though what the overall stateless population in South Africa is.
Several situations of state succession have created problems of statelessness in Africa. In Eritrea and Ethiopia, it has been established that statelessness exists as a consequence of Eritrea’s independence from Ethiopia in 1993 and affects persons in both countries – in particular those of mixed Eritrean-Ethiopian origin or parentage and those of Eritrean origin in Ethiopia. But no figures are available for how many persons remain stateless in each country today. In 1998, at the outbreak of the war between the two countries, there were still around half a million people of Eritrean origin living in Ethiopia. An estimated 100,000 Ethiopians were living in Eritrea. During the war, each country expelled 70 – 75,000 persons to the other. Those of Eritrean descent who were not expelled and who remained in Ethiopia (an estimated 150,000) were not considered Ethiopians, but had not acquired another nationality. In 2003, a new Ethiopian nationality law should have significantly improved the situation, but implementation has
123 See J. George, Statelessness and nationality in South Africa, Lawyers for Human Rights, 2013, at page 41,
124 See above, note 120.
125 See above, note 123.