Chapter 5 Analyzing Sino-Indian transboundary water sharing of the Yarlung
5.1.4 Assertive Verbal Speech Act of the year 2006, ELM on Transboundary Rivers
China in November 2006 can be described as a direct outcome of the directive verbal speech act of the year 2002 relating to China’s announcement of the SNWDP. Apart from the general nature of discussions on issues related to provision of hydrological data by China, already covered by the existing MoU-based cooperation between India and China, the ELM emphasized on ‘emergency measures’ and ‘exchange of views’ on issues of mutual interests regarding transboundary rivers as agreed jointly between the two countries (MoWR India). The use of the word ‘jointly’ here indicates and opens up a two-way exchange of views between the two countries, which under the existing MoU- based cooperation, was only limited to ‘provision’ of hydrological data by China, and used for flood forecasting by India.
This assertive verbal speech act between India and China, when plotted in the TWINS matrix of coexisting conflict and cooperation intensity, comes forth as a
‘securitized/opportunitized common goal formation’. It is plotted as ‘securitized’ as it was an existential threat and required emergency measures, which justified actions or mechanisms outside the normal bounds of political procedure (Buzan 1998). It is plotted as ‘common goal formation’ as there were shared goals in how to solve a specific water- related problem, but the actions and policies of the two countries were not necessarily be aligned, and there was no joint action indicated between the two countries (Mirumachi 2015). The opportunitization aspect comes from the abilities of the hydrocracies of the
two countries to improve upon a situation related to transboundary waters, which requires emergency actions (Zeitoun 2007).
In this speech act, the setting up of the ELM in 2006 was outside the bounds of normal political procedure between India and China, and involved issues related to the SNWDP announced by China in 2002 and its perceived impact and implications on downstream India. The ELM indicated shared goals between India and China towards solving a common water-related problem, but the alignment of the actions and policies were contingent upon mutual agreement by the two countries, and there was no indication of joint action (MoWR India). The cooperation under the ELM was limited to an exchange of views between India and China, which were not binding on each other, and it was left open for which issues could be discussed in the future rounds of the ELM (ibid). The opportunity was how the ELM could be used as a vehicle to further deepen Sino-Indian cooperation on shared transboundary waters.
The first meeting of the ELM was held in September 2007 in Beijing, after both India and China constituted their respective expert groups (Lok Sabha 2008:1012). Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao emphasized in January 2008, that their joint efforts at cooperation on transboundary rivers since 2002 has set a good example, and it has contributed positively to building mutual understanding and trust between the two countries, and the ELM is poised to take this cooperation further (ibid). The ELM has been cited on many occasions by the Indian hydrocracy as a robust mechanism through which issues related to transboundary river water flows can be taken up with China on a bilateral basis, more particularly so when
there have been aspersions of water diversion and dam building activities by China (Lok Sabha 2009:1008, 2010:4199, 2011:2909, 2013:766).
Figure 3: TWINS four-by-five matrix analysis using water-related events in the Sino- Indian case study.
In the above four-by-five TWINS matrix analysis of water related events in the Sino- Indian case study on the Yarlung Tsangpo-Brahmaputra, the points plotted are as below:
• 1 denotes the directive nonverbal speech act between India and China, relating to the incidents of flash floods, on 11 June 2000 in Arunachal Pradesh on the Yarlung Tsangpo-Brahmaputra river and on 1 August 2000 in Himachal Pradesh on the Sutlej
India China Case Study
Confront ation of Issue
Ad-Hoc Joint Action
Common Goal Formation
Common Norm Formation
Collective Identity Formation Non-
Politicized
Politicized
Securitized/
Opportuniti zed
1
3
2
4
Violized
Low---Cooperation Intensity---High
High---Conflict Intensity---Low
• 2 denotes the assertive verbal speech act, relating to the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between India and China, during Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji’s official visit to India in January 2002, for the provision of hydrological information/data by China on the Yarlung Tsangpo-Brahmaputra river during the flood season to India; plotted as a ‘securitized/opportunitized common goal formation’.
• 3 denotes the directive verbal speech act between India and China, relating to the approval and announcement of the South North Water Diversion Project (SNDWP) by the State Council of China in August 2002, perceived by the Indian hydrocracy as potentially impacting the flow of the Yarlung Tsangpo-Brahmaputra river; plotted as a ‘securitized/opportunitized confrontation of the issue’.
• 4 denotes the assertive verbal speech act, relating to the setting up of the Expert Level Mechanism (ELM) on shared transboundary rivers by India and China in November 2006, to discuss interaction and cooperation on provision of flood season hydrological data, emergency management and other issues regarding transboundary rivers as agreed between the two countries; and is plotted as a
‘securitized/opportunitized common goal formation’.
The pattern that is seen in the above TWINS matrix relating to the Sino-Indian case study on the Yarlung Tsangpo-Brahmaputra river, is of an iterated securitized and opportunitized common goal formation, from particular cases of water-related events that have been confronted by the hydrocracies of the two countries, most particularly that
of India. The overall water interaction dynamics and relationship between India and China is characterized by this iterated back and forth of securitized and opportunitized moves. A high level of conflict intensity throughout and a back and forth of low level to medium level of cooperation intensity characterizes the transboundary water interaction between India and China, as is evident from the plotting of the speech acts in the TWINS matrix above. The larger bilateral political ties between India and China influence their interaction on the rivers.
The above TWINS matrix demonstrates the coexisting conflict and cooperation intensities in the Sino-Indian transboundary water interactions, which forms the core argument of Mirumachi (2015) in developing the TWINS framework of analysis. As an example, a speech act which has high-level conflict intensity and low-level cooperation intensity, such as the directive verbal speech act of 2002 related to China’s announcement of the SNWDP, denoted as 3 in the TWINS matrix above. This coexists simultaneously with a speech act, which has high-level conflict intensity and medium- level cooperation intensity, such as the assertive verbal speech act of 2002 related to the MoU on provision of hydrological data on the Yarlung Tsangpo-Brahmaputra, denoted as 2 in the TWINS matrix above. This validates use of the TWINS matrix for the case