Although we argue that the primary reason for affording refugees protection is humanitarian, Hathaway has written that modern refugee law was envisaged as a pragmatic response to the reality of forced migration: ‘[r]efugee law was designed to effect a compromise between the reality of [the] largely unstoppable flow of involuntary migrants across European borders and the broader policy commitment to restric- tionism in immigration.’65
European states are in a much better position to police their borders than they were at the end of the Second World War and have now erected a formidable array of non-entrée measures, including carrier sanctions and the like. However, in late 2015, enormous migration flows posed significant challenges to border control. It is also highly doubtful that any system could completely prevent unauthorised arrivals. As Edward Alden explains,
The most secure border in modern history was probably the Cold War border between East and West Germany. To keep their people from leaving – logistically much easier than keeping others from entering – the East Germans built more than 700 watchtowers, sprinkled more than a million antipersonnel mines, created a deep no-man’s zone of barbed wire and electric fencing, and deployed nearly 50 guards per square mile with shoot-to-kill orders. Even so about 1,000 people each year somehow managed to find a way across.66 A contrary example, Australia’s Operation Sovereign Borders, which might be viewed as a success in terms of preventing unauthorized boat arrivals,67 carries an unknown but undoubtedly significant economic
65 James C Hathaway,The Law of Refugee Status(Butterworths, 1991) 2.
66 Edward Alden, ‘The Meaningless Mantra of “Border Security”’ Wall Street Journal(New York), 2 June 2010.
67 Scott Morrison, Australia’s Minister for Immigration from 2013 to December 2014, cited the fact that only one boat arrived in Australia during Operation Sovereign Borders as proof that the policy of maritime interception was the ‘critical blow’ to people smuggling operations between Indonesia and Australia (see Jared Owens, ‘Scott Morrison ends secrecy surrounding Operation
cost.68 The number of arrivals was also not significant in comparison with other countries to begin with,69 which may help to explain the relative ‘success’.
Of course, it is possible that it is not actual containment, but theimage of containment and control to which governmental efforts at deterrence aspire. Perhaps Australia’s focus (obsession?) with unauthorized boat arrivals illustrates this point. Unauthorized plane arrivals and visa over- stayers already living in the Australian community are simply not as visible as those coming on rickety fishing boats. However, the statistical evidence may suggest that deterrence efforts are having a real impact on
Sovereign Borders’,The Australian (online), 18 September 2014 <http://www.
theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/immigration/scott-morrison-ends-secrecy- surrounding-operation-sovereign-borders/story-fn9hm1gu-1227062425371>.
68 A paper concerning budget measures regarding border protection and people-smuggling counter-measures indicates that over 2015 and 2016, AU$186.5 million will be put to counter people-smuggling and to maritime surveillance (Cat Barker, ‘Border Protection and Counter-People Smuggling Measures’ Budget Review 2015–16 <http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/
Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/BudgetReview20151 6/Border>). Meanwhile, the cost of offshore detention is estimated to be AU$811 million (Kaldor Centre, 2015–2016 Budget (13 May 2015) <http://www.kaldor centre.unsw.edu.au/news/2015-2016-budget>).
69 While Australia has a relatively generous resettlement programme, the total number of refugees, including refugees resettled from overseas and those applying for visas onshore, has been set in recent years at 13 750 places, although in 2012–13 this number increased to around 20 000. Unauthorized boat arrivals have been the main concern for Australian governments during this time.
Numbers for this group of asylum seekers peaked in 2013 at 20 587 (Janet Phillips,Boat Arrivals in Australia: A Quick Guide to the Statistics(Parliament of Australia, 23 January 2014) <http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/
Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1314/QG/
BoatArrivals>). This number is still very small when compared with the total refugee population for 2013, which was 16.7 million people (UNHCR, Global Trends 2013: War’s Human Cost(UNHCR, 2014) 2). As the Refugee Council has noted, ‘[w]hile our resettlement program remains the second-highest in the world and the highest per capita, Australia received just 0.34 per cent of the world’s asylum claims. When the protection of refugees through asylum pro- cesses and the further protection of refugees through resettlement are considered together, Australia ranked 17th overall, 22nd on a per capita basis and 36th relative to national gross domestic product (GDP)’ (Refugee Council of Aus- tralia, 2015–2016 Refugee and Humanitarian Program: Discussion Paper and Consultation Questions<http://www.refugeecouncil.org.au/r/isub/2015-16_RHP_
discussion_paper.pdf>).
refugees’ ability to move. Over the last decade, the number of refugees sheltered in the developing world has risen from 70 per cent to 86 per cent.70
The containment of refugees in the Global South in situations where they are not adequately protected leads to or exacerbates a multitude of problems that may adversely affect states’ interests. Containment may contribute to humanitarian tragedies as people are prevented from leav- ing.71 The many deaths at sea or at the border of Northern states are another effect.72
The tendency to treat migration as a threat to security and resulting efforts at containment may also backfire.73 The outcome of the North’s refusal to share responsibility for refugees in a way that includes meaningful protection and durable solutions for them is that refugees are maintained in a compromised emergency situation in camps in the developing world. Securitization discourse tends to encourage a race to the bottom,74 and developing states generally have fewer resources to devote to policing their borders than developed states. Faced with true mass influxes, they are quite likely to resort to encampment as a strategy.
Refugees can and do play a role in insurgencies in their countries of origin,75 and their containment in refugee camps may assist the insurgents.
The literature regarding the causes of militarization of refugees in camps is still in its infancy and subject to ongoing debates. Guglielmo
70 UNHCR,Global Trends 2013, above n 69, 2. Jeff Crisp has argued that the increase is due to thenon-entréemeasures adopted by the Global North (Jeff Crisp, ‘Get Back to Where You Once Belonged! A Global Perspective on Migration, Asylum and the Challenges of Refugee Protection’ (Keynote address at the National Asylum Summit 2013, University of South Australia, 26 June 2013) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yI5d7eFoblM>).
71 See Katy Long, ‘In Search of Sanctuary: Border Closures, “Safe” Zones and Refugee Protection’ (2012) 26Journal of Refugee Studies458, 463.
72 For analysis of deaths at the border, see Leanne Weber and Sharon Pickering,Globalization and Borders: Deaths and the Global Frontier(Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
73 For a history of the turn to security, including by UNHCR, see Anne Hammerstad, ‘UNHCR and the Securitization of Forced Migration’ in Alexander Betts and Gil Loescher (eds), Refugees in International Relations (Oxford University Press, 2011) 237.
74 Ibid 253. See also Troeller, above n 7, 43.
75 See, for example, Aristide R Zolberg, Astri Suhrke and Sergio Aguayo, Escape from Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World (Oxford University Press, 1989) 275–9.
Verdirame and Jason Pobjoy write that camps ‘create an ideal space for political and ethnic radicalization’.76 On the other hand, Lischer warns that socio-economic factors are less important than the political context and that political context explains why some refugee populations are involved in conflict.77 Whatever the causes, militarization of refugees may well have consequences beyond the region, if only because it may prolong and deepen conflicts, creating more refugees and putting ever- greater pressure on the containment walls erected by the Global North.
It is vital that the militarization that has occurred does not become a reason to reject refugees and that the role of encampment in militariz- ation is better understood. The answers to problematic refugee camps may include better security within camps, local integration instead of encampment,78 and durable solutions, including political solutions for root causes that feed refugee warrior movements. Containment, by contrast, is premised on an overwhelmingly negative perception of refugees, as a burden and a possible security threat. The next section presents a more nuanced picture of refugees and acknowledges that they contribute to their host societies.