C HAPTER 7
7.2 Options Available For Re-modeling the Indian DITB The approaches that were adopted in the defence industrialisation process of
the four countries studied earlier, reveal three plausible options that can be adopted for re-modeling the Indian DITB. These are discussed next.
7.2.1 The De-Novo Approach
De-novo in Latin means ‘starting from the beginning’ or ‘anew’ or ‘afresh’.
This approach is suggested in the backdrop of the developments in information and communication technologies that are being exploited by all nations to bring in changes in warfare and new concepts of Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), Information-Based Warfare (IBW) and Network- Centric Operations (NCO). This in turn has led to transforming the demand from traditional defence industry sectors producing weapon platforms to sectors producing a range of technologies and systems required for advanced C4ISR capabilities and towards those companies to integrate inter-connected and inter-communicative systems. Further, there is a shift in technological innovation and technological lead from the military to the civilian sector resulting in exploiting Commercially Off The Shelf (COTS) developed technology for ruggedised Military Off The Shelf (MOTS) applications (often referred to as ‘spin-ins’ or ‘spin-ons’) than the erstwhile ‘spin-offs process of exploiting military technology for commercial applications.
In fact, the very same factors led to the post-Cold War restructuring of the US DIB, in 2006, the ROK implementing a DRP - 2020’, in mid-2000 China introducing two major ongoing reforms programmes of ‘restructuring through share-holding reforms’ and ‘capability building of DIB through CMI strategy where, defence enterprises manufacture commercial products’ and lastly, Israel too, focusing on high technology systems and subsystems, and, their integration and upgrades to existing platforms besides the development and manufacture of unmanned systems.
These approaches hope to achieve a significant reduction in the size of the armed forces, intend equipping them with the state-of-the-art weapon systems that would provide qualitative improvements and enhance operational capabilities for the conduct of future network-centric and joint warfare operations. Accordingly, under the DRP - 2020, South Korea is to acquire new destroyers, submarines, fighter aircrafts and missile defence systems, to be sourced preferably through indigenous development and production. “The ROK military thus expects to deploy its first units of next-generation MBTs, fighter
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aircraft, multiple-rocket launchers, surface-to-air missile systems, submarines and naval surface combatants within the set time frame of the defence reform plan”1. In the RMA debate, the Indian defence analysts too have reiterated this requirement. One of the publications paper in 2008 had stated that
“Organisational structures for conventional wars/limited conflicts under nuclear over hang already exist but they need to be remodeled, reequipped & reoriented to conduct joint/integrated battles in digitised battle space and to have the necessary flexibility to undertake other types of operations which lie at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict, at short notice”2.
In the Indian context adopting this approach in its entirety (downsizing and simultaneously equipping the armed forces with all new RMA weapon platforms and systems) may be cost prohibitive today. Its implementation would affect the budget process, requirements process, acquisition process, and the organisations and management processes throughout the MOD.
Although the Indian Armed Forces since the late 1990’s have been advocating RMA, IBW and NCO, the conversion process towards these concepts have moved at a slow pace and in a piece meal manner. Thus, at this stage, the De-novo approach as a comprehensive option can only be a long term strategy.
7.2.2 The Optimisation Approach
Since, the Indian Government ever since Independence has conscientiously built up capabilities in defence R&D, OF’s and DPSU’s to provide the armed forces the equipment, armament, ammunition, weapons platforms and systems and similarly, constantly equipped the in-house MRO facilities of the Base Workshops of the Army, the Base Repair Depots of Air Force and the Dockyards of the Navy, it would only be prudent that these are not wasted out but re-oriented to optimise their efficiency and productivity levels. Such organisations, by all militarily developed nations are considered to be strategic military assets and thus nurtured and preserved. There is no reason as to why India should not consider them to be so. This is because such establishments over a period of time, due to the continuous government support tend to develop distinct capabilities in niche areas and become domain experts and centres of excellence in their respective arenas. They also become the repositories of knowledge and develop assets that need to be sustained and preserved.
The requirement then is that all such resources be suitably re-oriented and re-structured, through a well-directed strategy to address the numerous
127 Re-modeling Indian Defence Industry Apparatus for Accelerating Indigenisation current problems of the indigenous defence industry. This calls for a far-sighted vision, a coherent strategy, streamlining organisational structures, the policy framework and guidelines. Thereafter, undertaking detailed planning, precise programming, accurate forecasting, budgeting and, working out the mechanics and modalities of execution. Implementation would involve making available the necessary resources in terms of the financial investments, incentives to raise loans, developing/acquiring the required technologies and facilitating the technical assistance, where required. A host of other issues would involve ease of doing business and, above all an integrated approach to achieve this.
Notwithstanding, in case this option is to be adopted in a stand-alone mode, it could best be a short term approach or strategy as it will be unable meet the long term requirements of the Armed Forces.
7.2.3 The Simultaneous Two Pronged Combination Approach
As the name suggests, the approach will adopt a combination of the long- term de-novo plan and the short-term optimisation plan for India’s DITB.
This is the preferred option because if India’s military-industrial acumen is to match the size of the US along with China by 2045, we need to take giant strides to bridge the gap. Further, the likely “changes in the requirements of future warfare will need defence planners to (be dynamic and) focus on a broad range of research, development and acquisition activities, including force planning and re-structuring, articulation of requirements, integration of advanced technologies and systems, and changes in the defence budgets that in turn may change acquisition processes”3. Conceptually, this approach would be analogous to parts of both, ROK’s plan of DRP-2020 and China’s long term and short term innovation development strategies.
The ROK’s DRP-2020 envisages a reduction in force levels; mandates the acquisition of indigenously developed RMA-related military assets; shifts the administrative control over the force improvement budget and acquisition process to civil servants at the DAPA; reduces ADD’s dominance in defence R&D sector by DAPA delegating defence R&D activities to contractors; the government designates defence contracts and contractors then by law are entitled benefits and subsidies ; once a contract is awarded the government provides guarantees that it will procure the products once manufactured and assembled4. Thus, defence industry enjoys major incentives to maintain production, as the supply and demand process is institutionally guaranteed by the Korean Government. For joint operation assets as C4IRS, the software
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is mostly acquired through domestic R&D, while the hardware as AWACS and high altitude UAVs were purchased from abroad.
China’s strategic objective for its DIB since 1995, has been benchmarked in its defence White Paper(s). These have been released bi-annually since 1998, less the latest paper of 2015. These papers bring out China’s defence planners intent to achieve the capability to develop and produce advanced military systems on par with those of major industrialised nations by 2020. The defence White Paper published in 2013 states the expectations out of its indigenous DIB. It states China’s armed forces are looking for military preparedness for winning local wars under conditions of informationisation meaning, high intensity, information centric, regional military conflict of short duration, for which the PLA would work to strengthen the development of new and high-tech weaponry and equipment to build a modern military force structure with Chinese characteristics5.
China’s short term “good enough” approach is to produce large quantities of military systems that are the low-end cheaper version(s) of foreign products, whose quality and performance are inferior but meet the needs of the PLA.
The long-term ‘gold-plated’ approach is to develop high-end, high-cost, sophisticated weapons that match those of the advanced nations. This is a long-term strategy, as Chinese defence industry is building scientific and technological capabilities to execute higher-end innovation.