subsequent take-up in the policy arena and the ‘real world’ in the 2000s, as the following account shows.
The emergence of diaspora and the associated notion of transnationalism as key concepts in migration and refugee studies may be tracked through a number of streams of scholarship that gathered pace from the 1990s and to some extent fed into one another. The current wave of interest in diaspora can perhaps be traced to a number of political scientists who from the 1980s saw the implications of increasing migration for politics and international relations. The political significance of diasporas was taken up in the contributions to a path-breaking volume edited by Sheffer (1986).
For the most part, the political scientists were concerned with the political role of diasporas already in existence rather than their formation
A seminal article by Safran (1991), much drawn upon because of its helpful definition of diaspora, brought or
reintroduced the concept to the anthropological and cultural studies milieu; at about the same time transnationalism was set out as ‘a new analytical framework for understanding migration,’ again starting from an anthropological perspective (Glick Schiller, Basch, and Blanc-Szanton 1992). The associated notions of diaspora and transnationalism were extensively interrogated subsequently. From the second half of the 1990s, the formation, consolidation, and unmaking of diasporas was taken up by those whose perspective on migration drew on political economy approaches, tempered by emphasis on human agency (Cohen 1997, 2008; Van Hear 1998). Since then the literature on diaspora and transnationalism has proliferated from different disciplinary perspectives, and the notions of diaspora and transnationalism have been subjected to meticulous and often well-founded critique, targeted mainly on the ‘inflation’ of the use of the terms—now ubiquitous in migration and refugee studies—and therefore their diminishing specificity and utility (Portes, Guarnizo, and Landholt 1999; Brubaker 2005).
Initially most of the scholarly attention was on migration, diaspora, and transnational engagement in relatively stable settings (Smith and Guarnizo 1998). To the extent that diaspora were considered in the context of conflict, it was largely as a negative force, fomenting or sustaining violence and insurgency. However in the 2000s there was a general shift in perception from ascribing diasporas a negative role in fomenting and supporting conflict as ‘war mongers’ or ‘peace- wreckers’ (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Kapur 2007) to a more nuanced view that diasporas could assist with relief, peace- building, and post-conflict recovery as ‘peace-makers’ or ‘peace-builders’, or that their influence was ambivalent—
sometimes negative and sometimes positive (Van Hear 2006a, 2006b; Smith and Stares 2007). Crucially, it was realized that while conflict undermined (p. 178) development by destroying assets and resources and by killing and displacing people, displacement itself contributed to the formation of diasporas which could themselves in time constitute a resource for conflict-ridden societies.
The notion of diaspora was rarely used in the policy world, nor in public discourse, until about 2000. Now it is ubiquitous in development and policy discourse, with agencies such as the World Bank, USAID, the European Commission, the IOM, the UK’s Department for International Development, and German, Scandinavian, and other development agencies extolling the virtues of diaspora for development, looking to mobilize or galvanize the diaspora, and exploring the possibilities for diaspora engagement in development and in recovery in conflict settings (Van Hear and Sørensen 2003).
The term is also increasingly used by states as they reach out to galvanize citizens abroad (Gamlen 2008). Moreover people in diasporas themselves increasingly use the label, partly because of its strong prevalence in the policy world, but also because of the realization of their growing influence on the world (Sökefeld 2006; Jeyaraj 2009).
The Making of Refugee Diasporas
The increased numbers of asylum seekers moving from the global South to the global North from the 1980s and the spate of major forced migration crises from the 1990s onwards increased attention on conflict as a source of diaspora formation. The crises included the break-up of the Soviet Union and the communist bloc after the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989; subsequent wars and ‘un-mixing’ of formerly ethnically diverse populations in parts of the former Soviet Union and the Balkans; the ‘Gulf crisis’ of 1990–1 and its associated mass exodus of refugees, of Asian and Arab migrant workers, and of Palestinians from Kuwait, Iraq, and elsewhere; the genocide, wars, and mass refugee movements in Central Africa from 1994; protracted conflict and massive displacement in Palestine, Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, Sri Lanka,
Colombia, and elsewhere; and the conflicts and refugee movements associated with the post-September 11 ‘war on terror’ in Afghanistan (from 2001) and in Iraq (from 2003). Major new diasporas have formed from or been augmented by these and other conflict induced population movements over the last two decades (Van Hear 2012).
Common patterns of diaspora formation may be observed in these conflict settings over the last two decades or more
Refugees, Diasporas, and Transnationalism
(Van Hear 2006a, 2006b). Many people fleeing conflict make for safer parts of their country if they can, and are cast as internally displaced people. Others may look for refuge in a neighbouring country or countries if they are able to reach and cross a border. Together the internally displaced and those seeking asylum in neighbouring countries commonly account for most people seeking to escape conflict. Smaller numbers seek asylum in countries further afield, sometimes in other continents—usually those with which they have connections through previous migration of relatives or
acquaintances. Some who initially seek refuge in neighbouring countries may later be resettled further afield, or migrate to new destinations as part of onward movements; they sometimes join those who have gone there directly. Dispersal (p.
179) that is enduring and consolidates in these different territories leads to the formation of what we may call refugee diasporas: those in neighbouring territories we might call the near diaspora, and those spread further afield we might term the wider diaspora. As time goes on, transnational connections often develop among these different locations:
transnational social fields may be said to link those remaining at home, those in the near diaspora, and those in the wider diaspora.
Access to these different destinations is unequally distributed among those seeking safety. The increasingly stringent international migration and refugee ‘regime’ has limited access to more desirable affluent destinations—usually in the wider diaspora. Access to networks and money to pay smugglers or agents increasingly shape the capacity to migrate and determine the ability to reach such locations. Access to more prosperous and desirable destinations has therefore been increasingly limited to better resourced refugees: there tends to be a hierarchy of destinations that can be reached by those fleeing conflict, according to the resources—financial and network based—that they can call upon (Van Hear 2006b). Moreover diaspora formation also often features a number of waves or cohorts of migration over time—
frequently professionals, elites, or political exiles, followed variously by students, labour migrants, refugees, and then those coming for family reunion or marriage to the ‘primary’ migrants. Furthermore, as time passes and diasporas consolidate, successive generations will unfold in the diaspora, each of which may have different orientations both to host- and homeland (Mannheim 1952; Loizos 2007). The net result of these processes is likely to be a variegated diasporic formation, with socio-economic position and politico-cultural outlooks shaped by age, gender, cohort of arrival, and generation.
Conflict induced movement in and from Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and Somalia illustrate these patterns.
Afghans experienced large scale displacement from the late 1970s as the conflict in Afghanistan ebbed and flowed (Monsutti 2005). Large numbers of people were displaced within Afghanistan—around two million, depending on the state, phase, and nature of the conflict. Large numbers of refugees moved to Pakistan and Iran—three million and two million respectively at the peak of outflows. Sometimes the refugees followed former labour migration pathways: for example labour migration to Iran has been an important migration stream, and refugees followed these earlier labour migration and betterment pathways. At the same time substantial numbers of asylum seekers made for Europe, North America, and other affluent countries of the ‘global North’, these being usually better off than refugees in Pakistan and Iran. There have been return movements at various points, when conflict has abated, involving substantial movements of refugees and exiles back to Afghanistan (see Monsutti and Balci, this volume).
Tamils from Sri Lanka have been driven to flee by civil war since 1983, intensifying in the 1990s, resuming after an uneasy cease fire agreed in 2002 broke down in 2005, and culminating in a deadly military end-game in 2009 (Fuglerud 1999; Vimalarajah and Cheran 2010). Those displaced included poorer people and households moving to safety within Sri Lanka—between half a million and a million at any one time, according to the intensity of the conflict. Those who could muster some resources fled by boat to south (p. 180) India—around 120,000 at peak in camps and cities of Tamil Nadu by the early 2000s. Some left conflict zones as labour migrants to the Middle East, both as a livelihood strategy and to escape the conflict. Others, with substantial resources to pay migrant smugglers and brokers, and often helped by earlier migrants, were able to make it as asylum seekers to affluent countries—notably the UK, Scandinavia, Switzerland, Canada, and Australia—contributing to the 800,000 or so Sri Lankan Tamils in wider diaspora. In addition to these movements, there has been movement back, between and among these various locations, varying over time with the conditions of conflict and with possibilities for migration (see Banerjee, this volume).
Somalis experienced state collapse and civil conflict from the late 1980s (Lindley 2009, 2010). Forms of forced migration have again included internal displacement for poorer households within what are known as the ‘Somali regions’, including southern Somalia, Somaliland, and Puntland in the north. Those who had some resources to move made for neighbouring countries Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, and Yemen. There has also been migration to the Middle East as labour migrants and to set up small businesses both in pursuit of livelihoods and to escape the conflict and its consequences. As in the other
cases there has been movement to western or other affluent countries, usually by those well endowed with resources and network connections, including onward movement of Somali refugees from Kenya to Europe (Kibreab, this volume).
As these cases show, people who move within and from conflict-ridden countries are spread among different kinds of location: some, typically the less endowed, are dispersed within their own countries as internally displaced people; some find their way to neighbouring countries; and still others, with the resources to do so, are able to move to countries further afield. The migrants include not just refugees, but people who move for a variety of reasons, and with varying degrees of force and choice. With their dispersal comes the establishment of transnational relations and networks among the dispersed groups and it is through these networks and relationships that diasporas can exert influence on their countries of origin.
Refugee Diasporas and Transnational Engagement
Diasporas formed as a result of conflict are of course shaped both by the society from which they have come and the new society in which they find themselves, as well as by their experience of conflict and flight: they carry with them some of the values of their homeland, while absorbing to a greater or lesser degree the values of their host society. These values, together with the socio-economic character of the diaspora—which is differentiated on class, ethnic, generational, and gender lines—help shape their disposition, their capacity, and inclination to influence the homeland.
(p. 181) One of the principal resources that diasporas contribute to relief during conflict and recovery afterwards are remittances and other transfers. It has been increasingly recognized that remittances often become key components of livelihood strategies in conflict settings—not for all, but at least for some people (Van Hear 2002, 2006a; Horst 2006;
Lindley 2010). There are at least three settings in which diaspora transfers influence the living conditions of displaced and conflict-affected people. First, during the course of conflicts, such transfers provide a survival lifeline for those who cannot get out of conflict zones, or alternatively means of flight for those who can move out of such areas. Second, in neighbouring countries of first asylum, remittances might supplement other means of refugee survival and coping, such as humanitarian aid. Third, in post-conflict settings diaspora remittances and other transfers might enable households to get beyond survival to coping, and lay the basis for recovery. There has also been potential for diaspora contributions to broader economic and social recovery, beyond the immediate concerns of their kin in conflict areas. These kinds of interventions in conflict settings are considered further below.
The distinction should perhaps be drawn between the capacity and the desire to engage in conflict settings (Al-Ali, Black, and Koser 2001). Capacity to engage is shaped, among other things, by security of status, having an income above subsistence level, having the freedom to speak out, and developing social competence and political literacy—knowing how to lobby, campaign, speak in public, write leaflets, draw up funding proposals, and so on. The desire to engage is shaped by personal or private motivations, such as the imperative to protect one’s family, kin, or friends; by wider humanitarian concerns for the community, society, or nation; and by harder political motivation, driven perhaps by ethno- nationalism.
The hope of humanitarian and development actors has been that, by virtue of gradual incorporation into Western societies, diasporas—or at least some of their members—would be drawn into nurturing ‘liberal peace’ in conflict-ridden societies (Duffield 2001). However, as in more stable environments, diaspora engagement in conflict settings tends to be privately oriented on family and community than concerned with broad societal renewal, as the next section indicates.