The chapter presented the findings of the factors that may have an influence or challenge beneficiary participation in social accountability mechanisms in the local level institutions in the villages. The chapter discussed the findings of the social accountability mechanisms particularly social audit in the selected villages in the district of Barpeta. The first part of the chapter discussed the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the district of
Barpeta. The chapter discussed the findings from in-depth interviews with the key beneficiary respondents in the selected villages of Chaibari, Baghbar Gaon and Bampara.The chapter showed that the influential members of the villages such as the village elites, elected representatives of gaon panchayats are involved in patronage politics. The chapter discussed how patronage politics influenced the decisions to participate or not to participate in the beneficiary participation. These beneficiaries faced the challenges not only in terms of receiving the benefits of rural development schemes such as Indira Awas Yojana (housing facilities) and Mahatma Gandhi National Employment Guarantee Scheme (employment opportunities), but also in using their participatory rights in the social audit forums. Our preliminary surveys also added insights to our understanding of the scope and challenges of beneficiary participation in the selected villages in the district of Barpeta. Our field research in the district of Barpeta shows that the first phase of social audit that was conducted in the district of Barpeta in the month of November, 2014 experienced challenges of participation.
The results show the challenges of participatory governance in Assam. The interviews and preliminary surveys revealed that social audit process failed to engage a large number of beneficiaries and those beneficiaries who participated in that round of social audit could hardly contribute to effective participatory governance.
Findings, mainly drawn from in-depth interviews in the selected villages in the district of Barpeta, indicate that patronage politics influenced participatory governance and the functioning of gaon panchayats.We find that politicization of local self-governing institutions and social accountability mechanisms was a calculated move of the local political elites. In a democratic set up like in India where local democracy is well recognized and accepted, politicization of gaon panchayat is calculatedalong the lines of electoral outcomes. Political parties and politicians are more likely to interfere in the functioning of local self-governing institutions to gain and consolidate the electorate support. Distribution of benefits (such as Indira Awas Yojana housing facilities and Mahatma Gandhi National Employment Guarantee Scheme‘s employment opportunities) based on clientele networks is a part and parcel of the political calculations in the local self-governing institutions. Patronage politics also involved diverting development-related state resources and funds to certain selected sections of the society. Selective incentive played an important role in selective beneficiary participation especially those who attended extended electoral support to the political patrons in the villages. Political affiliation of the beneficiaries was important for the local politicians to distribute benefits such as the housing facilities. However, we find that local politicians in the
district of Barpeta care not only about their political party members, but also the villagers who could show political affiliation by extending their electoral support when elections were held. Political parties and politicians consider electoral support of the beneficiaries as a criterion of political affiliation in the villages because of the fact that most of the villagers do not possess formal political membership to the political parties. Their political affiliation is, therefore, counted not by formal party membership but by the support they extended to the political parties when elections were held.Geographical proximity of the local political elites and the villagers makes this identification easier for them.
The study finds that like the other villagers, beneficiaries constituted a numerically significant electoral strength for the political parties and politicians. Targeting the beneficiaries for electoral gains is guided by two considerations: first, rural development schemes entitled selective incentives and personal benefits (such as housing facilities and employment opportunities) to the beneficiaries. Use of scheme-based benefits for the selective beneficiaries is not a difficult exercise for the local political elites in power who belonged to the ruling political party because they enjoyed the institutional capacities to implement the development schemes. Second, political parties and politicians traded off votes with the constituents. Constituents with socio-economic challenges, tended to accept the politically-mediated benefits such as the housing facilities and employment opportunities.
Beneficiaries of the two identified schemes in the district of Barpeta displayed the benefit- seeking behaviour as our field research in the selected villages and gaon panchayat reveals.
Local politicians are aware of the necessities of the rural households because they live in same village or neighbouring villages. By framing a politically viable benefit distribution strategy, where affiliated beneficiaries (by membership and support) are prioritized to receive scheme-based benefits such as the Indira Awas Yojana‘s housing and Mahatma Gandhi National Employment Guarantee Scheme‘s employment opportunities, the political parties and local politicians especially in power can exercise tremendous influence over beneficiary participation in social accountability mechanisms. Therefore, distribution of benefit on the basis of clientele relations is advantageous to the political party and politicians in power. This is a major challenge to beneficiary participation in social accountability.
Exercise of political patronage is viable for the local elites including the politicians in power also because of the social conditions and the cultural norms of the society. The social conditions of the rural areas in Assam including the selected villages in the district of Barpeta
have been discussed in this chapter. Prevailing socio-cultural norms have also been discussed in detail in an earlier section of this chapter. The study finds that the marginalized social conditions of the beneficiaries and the available socio-cultural norms reinforce the lack of effective participation of the beneficiaries. We discussed how female beneficiaries faced constraints and challenges to raise issues in social audit forums. The physical attendance of the female beneficiaries in the selected villages was relatively higher in the social audit forums. However, our analysis shows that they were not effective in the decision making process. The female respondents often failed to raise pertinent issues in the social audit forums because the male members especially with those with political power and social prestige were the key decision makers in these meetings.
Our study also found that social auditors who conducted social audits in the gaon panchayatsere indifferent to listen to the voices of the female beneficiaries and other marginalized groups in the meetings. Likewise, marginalization of other socially weaker sections such as the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes posed challenges to participation.
These groups were accumstomed to the decision making process by the politically dominant and failed to overcome the traditionally practised socio-cultural norms to speak in public spaces such as the social audit forums.
Thus, social conditions and cultural norms, such as gender-based discrimination, poverty, caste-alienation and illiteracy, were important determining factors. The study argues that politicization of the local self-governing institutions in the district of Barpeta under these conditions was much easier. In order to hide the discrepancies of scheme implementation (such as multiple use of below poverty line ID for more than one beneficiary), the village level politicians, in-charge of implementation of the scheme (i.e., the representatives elected to gaon panchayats), engaged in influencing the social audit process. Manipulation of social audit findings is a politically-mediated exercise. This was done to protect and shield the local elites (the elected representatives of gaon panchayat) and other implementing authorities (such as bloc development officers and panchayat secretaries of a gaon panchayat) from public scrutiny. In sum, patronage politics, social conditions and cultural norms reinforced the marginalized conditions of the beneficiaries, leaving them in the periphery of social development and local governing institutions and social accountability.