The Emerging Migration State'

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52 The Emerging Migration State'

James F. Hollifield

I response to a plea from high-tech businesses that German industry was ⁿ

at

a competitive disadvantage because of its lack of access to foreign computer

and software engineers,

the German government in May 2000 launched a new

"green card"

program, designed to recruit up to 20,000 highly skilled workers, from outside the European Union. To garner support for the initiative and to head off criticism from those who cling to the myth that Germany is not a country of immigration

(Deutschland ist kein Einwan-derungsland),

Chancellor

Gerhard Schroder asserted that "We [Germans] must make sure that in these times of globalization we don't suffer from a lack of cosmopolitanism....

There's

a huge amount of international competition for the best people,

and Germany would be making a big mistake if it didn't take part." This statement reflects a sea-

change in Germany's foreigner policy(Auslanderpolitik),

which is on the

verge of becoming a legal immigration policy (Einwanderungspolitik).

Together with

the

change in German nationality law

-

adopted by the Red-Green government

in 1999 and which for the

first time injected an element of birthplace citizenship

(jus soli)

into German law - the new green card program is pushing Germany in

a decidedlyliberal direction.

Yet,at the same time that the green

card policy was announced,

the Schroder government declared

that foreign high-tech workers would

not be allowed to bring their families with them. After criticism from

human rights groups and gentle reminders from experts about the

difficulty of

preventing"guest workers" from settling,

the government quickly revised

its policyto allow for

the possibility of

settlement and family reunification.

This recent episode

in German immigration history illustrates well the

dilemma that modem states must

face in dealing with

"globalization'? and

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98 International Migration

d "

. . .. n Statesare trapped in a"liberal para o~

rising levels of mternanonal rnigrano . World War II, international economIC (Hollifield, 19?2a). Smce the en~ of. n have been pushing states towar.ds forces (trade, mvestment, and migrano ) t m and powerful (domestIc)

. . tional state sys e

greater openness, while the mterna 1 1 ure This is a liberal paradox

ards greater c os . .hi

Political forces push states tow .. ·nherent inliberalism,whic IS

. . h of the contradlCtlons1 d fini

because it hIghhg ts some .. d economic philosophy and a e mg the quintessentially modem pohtlcal an

feature of globalization. Ad Smith laid down the precepts Since the eighteenth ce~tury,

v:

^hen ^Tham^Wealth^Of^Nations, the ideology

. lib li in hIS treatIse on e ~ . ., .

of economIC 1 era sm . 1relations With Bntam s rise d . ate internatlona .

of free trade has come to .omm. . th V"ctorian era of the late nineteenth to power - which reached ItSz~mthin fth 1 t-World War II international century - and America:s dom~nanc~~cu~ ~~:efute Smith's argument that system, it has become mcreasmgly d the best ways to enhance the

. d free tra e are I

laissez-faire economICS an . t The debacle of World War

d . f the natlon-sta e. d

wealth power, an secunty o. n·onall·sm protectionism, an

, f· 1 . .sm mtense na ,

and its aftermath 0 ISOatlom,. Aft 1945 the victorious

d einforce this lesson. er, . d

depression only serve to r .. d th United States were deterrmne

. led by Bntam an e '

Western democraCIes, d 30 and they set about construct-

. k fthe 1920s an s, d

not to repeat the rmsta es0 d rberal principles of free trade an ing a new international order, base

0(:

^lance ^1986· Jacobson, 1996).

1h rights n.osecr " . .

respect for fundamenta uman f power and authority in inter-

h is that the source 0 . th

The problem, owever,lid the nation-state. Smce e

. ti es to revo ve aroun b d

national relauons con nu . . allegal system has been ase

ali . 1648 the mternauon .

Peace of Westph ia in '. I th Grotian tradition of mterna-

. . 1 bili f the nauon-state. n e 1 .

upon the mvio a iry0 . . st have a territory, a popu anon,

d f tate to exist It mu . . .

tionallaw in or er or as' has fulfilled these cntena, It

, If ce Once a state f

and the capacity for se -~overnan. d i takes on the legal attribute 0

may be recogni~ed as mdepend::; ~~99~) wryly describes as "orga~ized sovereignty, which ~tephen ~a ithas alegal personality and the capaCity to hypocrisy."If a state ISsovereIgn, I

enter into relations wi~ other rates. f trade cross-border investment, and Transnationalism, m the orm ~ 'd thority of the nation-state.

h 11 the sovereignty an au

migration, can c a enge hall e in the sense that the (unau- Migration in particular represents a c eng t'ional boundaries can violate

Ii di iduals across na I

thorized) movement 0 m IVl. . degree of territorial closure

f . ty which reqUires a . f the

the principle 0 sovereign , k 1998a) In every region 0

(Hollifield, 1994b; Sassen, 1?96; Jopp e,n Euro e_borders aresacrosanct globewith the partial exceptlon of Wester. al feature of the international and they represent afundamental org~.~tlO:ade in goods or international system (Andreas ~nd ~nyder, 2000). h le~nic composition of societies an.d financial flows, mlgratlon can change t e .tl described as the"demographiC disrupt what ReyKoslowski(2000) ha~ap Y id the national territory,

. irne" If toomany foreigners rest eon mamtenance reg .

Hollifield • The Emerging Migration State 99

then it may become difficult for a state to identify its population vis-a-vis other states. Thenational community mayfeel threatened, and there maybe asocial or political backlash against immigration. Finally - and this ismost important from the standpoint of political liberalism - the citizenry or the demosmay be transformed in such a way as to violate the social contract and undermine the legitimacy of the government and the sovereignty ofthe state itself (Walzer, 1983). Thus, migration can be seen as a threat to national security,and it can lead to conflicts within and between states (Weiner,1993, 1995; Huntington, 1996). Hence the liberal paradox: the economic logic of liberalism is one of openness: but the political and legal logic is one of closure (Hollifield, 1998). How can states escape from this paradox?

In order to answer this question, we need 1) to review the causes and consequences of international migration inhistorical perspective, and 2) to look at the ways in which states have tried to regulate it in an era of globalization,but3)with an eye to understanding the evolution of what I shall call the migration state. In international relations theory, states are defined primarily by their security or military function. The Westphalian state is above allelse a garrison state. Realists like Hans Morgenthau (1978) and neo-realisrs like Kenneth Waltz (1979) view the state as a unitary rational actor,with the over- weening responsibility to maximize power, protect its territory and people, and pursue its national interest. However, at least since the beginning of the industrial revolution in Europe, the state has increasingly taken on an economic function. Ensuring material wealth and power has required states torisk greater economic openness and to pursue policies of free trade, giving rise to what Richard Rosecrance (1986) has called the trading state. As a result, states have been partially liberated from their dependence on territory and the militaryas sources of power.International relations theoryhas moved away from the narrow realist view of the state, recognizing that in an increas- inglyinterdependent world, power is more diffuse (Keohane and Nye, 1977).

Inthisneoliberal view,states are increasingly linked together by international trade and finance, forcing them to alter their grand strategies and seek new ways to cooperate. Here I shall argue that migration and trade are inextri- cablylinked - two sides of the same coin. Hence the rise of the trading state necessarily entails the rise of the migration state, where considerations of powerand interest are driven as much bymigration (the movement of people) asthey are by commerce and finance.

Causes and Consequences of International Migration

Togo back to the German example, we can see clearly how migration has become a driving feature of the international political economy. In the teenth and nineteenth centuries, Germany, which only loosely could be ed as a state until itwas unified byBismarck in 1870, was primarily a

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country of emigration, with millions of Germans migrating to East Central Europe and to the Americas (Bade, 1992). Not until relatively late in the nineteenth century did the German economy begin to grow at a sufficient rate to absorb its surplus population and excess labor supply Strong supply- push factors were at work, compelling Germans to go abroad. At the same time there were powerful demand-pull forces, leading German farmers and workers to emigrate to neighboring countries, such as France, switzerland,

and the Low Countries, in search of employment, while many went to Russia or the United States, lured bythe promise of cheap land and a new start. In eighteenth century Russia, this migration was organized by the German-born empress, Catherine the Great, who sought to upgrade Russian agriculture and tame the eastern frontier by bringing in skilled German farmers as pioneers who could teach Russian peasants new farming tech- niques. For centuries, states have been in the business of organizing mass migrations for the purposes of colonization, economic development, and to gain a competitive edge ina globalizing economy. In this respect, Chancellor schroder's quest for Indian software engineers isbut the latest chapter in the long history of globalization and migration.

Once an international market for labor has been created, however, it may be difficult to manage or regulate it.Migration can quicklybecome self- perpetuating because of chain migration and socialnetworks (Massey,1987, 1998). Word begins to spread from one family and one village to another about the possibilities for gainful employment - or even striking it rich.At the same time, the individual risks and costs associated with migration are reduced bythese kinship networks, which can grow into transnational com- munities and constitute a form of social capital (Morawska, 1990; Portes, 1996, 1997). As international migration accelerates, states are forced to respond by developing new policies to cope with newcomers and their families (in the host country) or to deal with an exodus and potential return migration (in the sending country). Again, looking at the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries _ a period of relatively free migration - many states with open frontiers, like the United States and Russia, were happy to receive immigrants, whereas overpopulated societies, with a growing rural exoduS and burgeoning cities,were happy to be rid of masses of unskilled and often illiterate peasants andworkers (Thomas, 1973; Bade, 1992; Nugent, 1992).

Bythe end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, however, the sending societies in Europe were wellinto the industrial revolu-

tion andentering ademographic transition, with fallingbirth rates andmore

stable populations. Nationalism was on the rise (Hobsbawm, 1990), and

it was increasingly important, in terms of military security, forstatest~ be able to identify their citizens and to construct new demographic, regtmes

(Koslowski, 2000). The need to regulate national populations, for purpose'

of taxation and conscription, led to passport and visa systems and. ' concomitant development of immigration and naturalization polt

Hollifield • The Emerg'm9M'.grat.on State, 101

(Torpey, 1998). Every individual was ex

nationality, and nationality as aIe I' ?ec~ed to have one and only one ual with ameasure of pro~ection i;a I~St1t~t10n,would provide the individ- states (Shaw, 1997). Countries ofem; raO~t1e~nd anarchic world of nation- nationality laws based upon j g t~o~,likeGermany,tended to opt for

h nJUS sangwms (blo d ki hi

w ereas countries of im' .. 0, ns p or ethnicity)

, migration like the U ' d '

d~veloped a more expansive politic;1 citizenshi rute States and France, birthplace), The German nationality la f19 P based uponJUS soli (soil or nent, and it was designed specifi allw 0 13had a strong ethnic cornpo-

h birth ' c Yto accommodate .'

w ereas I nght citizenship in th U' return rrugration, Fourteenth Amendment to th C ,e. nited States, as codified in the

e onstitution ,.

1989, 1992' Schuck 1998) It' . ' was more inclusive (Brubaker

, , . IS important ^t ^'

Fourteenth Amendment was adopt d i h 0 remember, however, that the

, ' e in t e aftermath f h C· .

Its pnmary purpose was to grant I'm di 0 t e ivil War,and

C I me late and auto . "

rormer s aves (Kettner:. ,.1978) Moreover Ame . . .mane citizenship to, ' late runeteenth and early tw 'h' ,ncan imrrugranon polir.:vin the

. ennet centuries e I d I ';If

culmmating in the Chinese E I ' vo ve a ong racial lines xcusion Act of 1882 d he Nati ' Quotasystem, enacted in 1924 (S .h 19 .' an t e National Origins Until1914 international mi mt~t, 97, King,2000; Hollifield, 2000c)

, Igra Ionwasdri '. '

of colonization and the push a d II f ven, primarily bythe dynamics

(H ' , n pu 0 economic and d hi

attonI. and Williamson"1998) even toughh many emograp, , ICforces struggmg to put inplacenational re I receiving states were international market for labor III glu atoryschemes to manage the growing

. ' ega or unauthorized ' , ,

rec?~zed as a major policyissue a d th ,Immigration was not political migration, i.e.,refugees a~d:s lu%.es:ere VIrtually no provisions for

~oregulate international migration wo~ld be ekers. To a large extent, efforts

ill1914 of war in Europe, which sto ed rende:ed ~oot.by ~e outbreak However,war and decolonization fo~~ de:no~lc ml~atlon m its tracks.

forms of nationalism _ ofte . h re e nse of intense and virulent irredentism and the redra ~ Wltf a s?,ong ethnic dimension. War sparked

Wing 0 national b dari ,

turn fostered newkinds of mi oun anes in Europe, which in igranon Milli f di I

andasylum seekers would crossnati. I bour 0 lSP aced persons, refugees

" lona oundaries' h . '

escape from violence" (Zolberg S h k m t e twentieth century I marked a crucial turnin g p .' ~ rhe a~d Aguayo, 1989), Thus, World

al oint m t ehistory fmi .

relations. States would 0 migration and interna-

. never return to th I' I

es of the eighteenth and ninet e re anve yopen migration pply-push and demand-pull) e~nth ce~turies when market forces

migration (Thomas 197~er~~ e doml~ant forces driving interna- easinglyclosed, and tra~el would re e, twentieth-century world became I alsomarked the beginni f h quire elaborate documentation. World

ing 0 t e end of i . li '

ndence and decolonization in Asiaand Africa.: Ism,With struggles for ally result in the displa f rica, movements that would the interwar y th cement 0 more millions of people,

ears, e Westphal'

arne further instirutionali di I~n system of nation-states hardened ize int ecorecountries of the Euro-Atlantic

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IL•••••• -------

region, and it continued tospread around the globewith thecreation of new states (or the reemergence of old ones) in Asia,Africa and the Middle East.

Old and new states guarded their sovereignty jealously, and peoples inevery region gained a stronger sense of citizenship and national identity. Because of these developments, international migration took on more of a political character, with diaspora and exile politics coming to the fore (Shain, 1989).

Henceforth, crossing borders had the potential ofbeing a political as well as an economic act, and states reasserted their authority with a vengeance. The rise of anti-state revolutionary movements, such as anarchism and commu- nism, provoked harsh crackdowns on immigration and the roll-back of civil rights and liberties, in the name of national security and national identity

(Reimers, 1998; Smith, 1997; King,2000).

The interwar period was marked byintense protectionism and nativism (EichengreeJ;l, 1989; King,2000). States enacted draconian laws to protect their markets and their populations. The international community was not prepared to deal with new forms ofpolitical migration. Under international law,states are notrequired to admit aliens, but iftheydo,they are obligedto treat them in a humane and civilized manner. This concern for the rights of aliens was clearly enunciated in Articles 22 and 23 ofthe Covenant of the League of Nations, which created a kind of rudimentary human rights law, aimed at protecting those in former colonies (Shaw, 1997).

The events of the 1930s and 40s in Europe radically changed legal norms governing international migration. The Holocaust and World War II led to the creation of the United Nations and a new body of refugee and human rights law.Although states retained sovereign control over their territory,and the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of others still holds, the postwar international order created new legal spaces (i.e., rights) for individuals and groups. The 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees established the principle of asylum, whereby an individual with a"well-founded fear of persecution," once admitted to the territory of a safe state, cannot be arbitrarily expelled or sent back to the state of his orher nationality. Under international law, the individual is entitled to a legal hearing, but it is important to remember that no state is compelled to admit an asylum seeker (Goodwin-Gill, 1996). If,however, the state is a signatory of the Convention, it cannot legally send an individual back to his orher country of origin if he or she is threatened with persecution and violence, This is the principle ofnonrefoulement.

The United Nations Charter aswellasthe Universal Declaration ofHumaD Rights, whichwas adopted bytheU.N. General Assembly in December 1948.

reinforced the principle of the rights of individuals "across borders- (Jacobson, 1996). Likewise, asa direct response tothe Holocaust and othel' crimes against humanity, the international community in1948 adopted ~ signed the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime Genocide. Alongside these developments in international law, wecansee

Hollifield • The Emergln9M'Igrat on StateI 103

growing "rights-based liberalism" in th . . ..

most powerful liberal states inE depolitics and jurisprudence of the

d H 11' . urope an NorthArne' (C .

a.n 0 ifield, 1994; Joppke, 2001) These' nca ornelius, Martin, tional and municipal law feedoff f liberal developments ininterna- spaces) for aliens at both the i 0 ~ne another, creating new rights (legal

e international and do . I Why are these legal develo . mesne evels.

.states escape from the lib Lnaradt so Important, and how can theyhelp

lu h era para ox? Unlike trad d fi

w IC can be promoted and regulated fur . e.an .na~cial flows, the WTO and the IMP.the .ou~h international institutions like

. . ,movement of individual b

a qualitatively different-set of I . s across orders requires

th . regu atory regimes b

e nonon of civil and huma . hts.Tt i -ones ased squarely on

· di td n ng ts. It IS almost at' .

in IVl uals, unlike goods servi . nnsrn to point out that b ' "vices or capital have a '11 f h .

ecome subjects of thelaw and b ' . w.1 0 t eir own and can (Hollifield, 1992a; Weiner,1995~e~e er! of the societies i~ ~hich they reside (Koslowski, 2000). Thequest' f Y .lso.can become citizens of the polity

· b ron,0 cours IShow fa t

III esta lishing an international . £" r sates are willing to go people (Ghosh 2000) and t rheglme or the orderly (legal) movement of

. . ' ,ow at extent would such .

municipal as opposed to international law (H 11'f'o I ield,2000a)7a regime rely upon

Regulating Migration in an Era of Globalization

The last half of the twentieth century· thIII ehistory of globalization W'th dhas mar ed ank. Important new. chapter

h . I avances m travel d .

tee nology, migration has accelerated lu an communications endof the nineteenth century At th b r~ac. mg levels not seen since the

hl . e egmnmg of th tw fi

roug y 175 million people are I' . . .e enty- rst century, citizenship."Even though tho fi rvmg outside of their countries of birth or world's population, the perc:;tio~~se t~on~titutes ~ mere

?5

~ercent of the

an

exponential rate and that it. at international rrugranon isrising at It~eemsthat economic forcesI;o:;e;~anent feature of the global economy.

WIth more than half the world' ~ ng people to move are intensifying

. s migrant pop 1 t' . .

tmtnes (LDCs) especially thos .h . u a Ion in the less-developed

d ' e nc in natural r I"

on s,the biggest regulatory chall esources, ike 011 or dia- lea or the United States which e~ge c~nfronts states like Nigeria, South underdeveloped states~ SUPPlY~~:~ :;d borders. with overpopulated ofcommunication and travel ha p . c ces remam strong, while the

. ve reinforced mi

ier than ever for potential mi igrant networks, making

mak . igrants to gathe th . f .

edecisions about wheth rem ormation they need

Tosom er ornot tomove. '

e extent supply- hf

many decades.What is ~:~ab~rc~s are constant or rising and have been OECDworld and in the I.hiowever, aredemand-pull forces both in

wea tier LDCs f whi '

eof skilledand unskilled labor: Th :ma~y 0 which suffer from a haps thebest examples but' . ~ oilsheikdoms of the Persian Gulf , increasingly wehave seenlabor s ortagesh

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1 04 International Migration

in the newly industrialized countries (NICs) of East and Southeast Asia as well(Fields,1994). Singapore, Malaysia,Hong Kong and Taiwan, for example, have become major importers of cheap labor from other LDCs in southeast Asia,particularly the Philippines and Thailand. Taiwan also has experienced risinglevels ofillegalmigration from mainland China, whichposes a security threat forthe island country.

Withvery few exceptions, however, these LDCshave not evolvedelaborate laws or policies for governing migration. Wealthier Third Worldstates have put in place contract or guest worker schemes, negotiated with the sending countries andwith noprovisions for settlement or family reunification. These types of pure manpower policiesleavemigrants with fewifanyrights,making them vulnerable to human rights abuses and arbitrary expulsion. The only protections they have are those afforded by the negotiating power of their home countries, which maychoose toprotest the treatment of their nationals.

But, more often than not, the sending countries are unwilling to provoke a conflictwith areceiving state over individual cases of abuse for fear of losing accessto remittances, whichare oneof thelargest sources of foreignexchange formanyLDCs (Russell,1986). Hence, economics anddemographY (forcesof supply-push and demand-pull) continue to govern much of international migration in the developing world, and the liberal paradox is less acute because there are fewer legal or institutional constraints on the behavior of

states vis-a-visforeign nationals. Summary deportations and massexpulsions are viable options for controlling immigration in nonliberal states.

In the advanced industrial democracies, immigration has been trending upward for most of thepost-WorldWarII period, to the point that well over 40 percent ofthe world's migrant population resides in Europe andAmerica, where roughly 10 percent of the population is foreign born (laM, 2000;

OECD,1998). postwar migration tothe core industrial states of Europe and North America has gone through several distinct phases, which make these population movements quite different from the transatlantic migration of the nineteenth century or economic migrations in the Third World today.

Aspointed out above, the firstwave of migration in the aftermath of World War IIwas intensely political, especially inEurope, where largepopulations were displaced as a result ofthe redrawing of national boundaries, irreden-

tism, and ethnic cleansing. Much of the remaining Jewish population in Europe fledto the United States orIsrael, whereas the large ethnic German populations in East Central Europe flooded into the newly created Federal Republic of Germany. The partitioning of Germany, the ColdWar,andthe division of Europe contributed to the exodus of large ethnic population~, seeking refuge in the democratic West. Until the construction of theBerlin Wall in 1961, 12 million German refugees arrived in West Germa~y. ~

Once this initial wave of refugee migration had exhausted Itself Europe began to settle into an uneasy peace that split the continent betweeD the superpowers _ thus cutting (West) Germany and other industrial states

Hollifield • The Emerging M"Igratlon" State 105

Western Europe off from their traditional su li

Europe _ new economic forms fmi . pp es ofsurplus labor in Central

ff 0 migration began to

e ort to reconstruct the emerge. The massive

war-ravaged economi f W

~950s exhausted indigenous s li ies 0 estern Europe in the France. Like the United StatesUPPhl~sholflabor, especially in Germany and

, w IC aunched a

program (1942-1964) during World W II ~uest worker (bracero) .workers (Calavita 1992) th . d .ar to recruit Mexican agricultural

1d d. ' ,e In ustnal states of N h

cue bilateral agreements with labor-ric .ort west Europe con- andTurkey,that allowed them t . h countnes In Southern Europe

o recruit million f

1950s and 60s (Miller and Martin, 1982). s0 guest workers during the . However, from the beginning of the uest

Important distinction between th E g worker phase, we could see an

I I. . ose uropean states lik F .

a ega Immigration policy that allowed for ,e ranee,

:-v

hlch had workers and their families and th the settlement of Immigrant

h. ,ose states like G .

w ich attempted to maintain strict rotatior . .erma~y or SWitzerland, settlementand familyreunification R on policies Wltl}.a minimum of Martin and Hollifield 1994) B it ~ ogers,1985;Hollifield, 1992a;Cornelius

. ,. n aInwas somethin fa sneci '

Itseconomy was growing at I g0 a special case in that

. a s ower pace and it h d .

Inshlabor to fillany gaps in the British labor m I a continuous access to to regulate post-colonial migrations b

u

a:ket'.M?reover, the struggle imperialpowers on the continent ( egaFnear ier In Britain than in theformer

b. d e.g., rance and Holland) th .. .

ias towar s restriction into British olic ' usmjecnng a 1998c;Hansen, 2000). p Y (Layton-Henry, 1992; Joppke,

Theguestworker phase ended in theUnited .

of thebraceroprogram in the 1950 h . States w:th the winding down

fir . s,w ereas In Europe t .

s~SIgnSofeconomic slowdown in 1966 H I.cont.Inueduntil the policyin Western Europe came in 1973-7

4.

^owev~r,^thebl? shift in migration andrecession whichrapidly sp d 'following thefirst major oilshock

b' rea around the gl b E

a ruptlysuspended allforeign/g k 0 e. uropean governments uest wor er rec it

encourage foreigners toreturn horn P li . rui ment and took steps to or, wherever possible prevent settle. 0ICIeswere .put inplaceto discourage vailing sentiment wa; that guest e~ent ~nd~amlly reunification. The pre- nature and that these wo kwor er ~IgratiOns were primarily economic

b r ers constituted a ki d f

sor er (Konjunkturpul+er) The b n 0 economic shock

" d ^~J" ywere rought i t th I b

o s of high growth and I n0 e a or market during

d . ow unemployment d h

me urmg periods of recession (MI'11 d' a~ t ey should be sent

also C tl er an Martin 1982' R

as es and Kosack, 1973) Moreov .' ,ogers, 1985;

70s, thehardest hit sectors in thi W er, dunng the recessions of the ustryand manufacturing both bis est European economies were heavy these circumstances of re~ession Ig ~s~r~ of cheap, unskilled foreign labor.

that guestworkers should beha~~ li~SIn~ unemplo~ent, itseemed log- of supply and demand. ,e a commodities, according to the

governments of Western Euro h .

labor market, in response to a J;h ~dsuc~eded m~reating an interna- eman for unskilled or semi-skilled

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foreign labor. Yet just when this labor migration was no longer needed, powerful supply-push forces and networks came into play to sustain it at high levels, even after the official suspension of recruitment programs in 1973-74. Turkish migration to Germany and North African migration to France continued well into the 1980s, taking the form of familyrather than worker migration. What made the family reunification phase of postwar migration possible was the intervention of courts, extending rights of residence to guest workers and their families (Hollifield,1992a, 2000b). Executive and administrative authorities were hampered by legal/constitutional constraints in their quest to reverse the migration flows.States with universalistic, republican traditions (like the United States, France, and to a lesser extent Germany), along withelements of separation ofpowers, including a strong and independent judiciary,had much greater difficultyincutting immigration flows

(Weil,1991; Hollifield, 1994a, 1999b; Joppke, 1998b, 2001). Again,Britain, with its system of parliamentary supremacy,unitarygovernment, and the absence of a universalistic, republican tradition constitutes something of an exception among the industrial democracies - GaryFreeman refers to Britain as the

"deviant case"(Freeman, 1994;see also Messina,1996;and Hansen, 2000).

The difficulty of using guest workers for managing labor markets in Western Europe is a perfect illustration of the liberal paradox. Importing labor to sustain high levels of noninflationary growth during the 1950s and 60swas a logical move for states and employers. This move was in keeping with the growing trend towards internationalization of markets for capital, goods, services and labor; and it was encouraged byinternational economic organizations, particularly the OECD (Hollifield, 1992a). But, as the Swiss novelist MaxFrisch pointed out atthe time, the European governments had

"asked for workers, but human beings came." Unlike goods or capital,

migrants (human beings) can and do acquire rights, particularly under the aegis of the laws and constitutions ofliberal states, which afford migrants a measure of due process and equal protection. When it became clear thatthe guests had "come tostay" (Rogers, 1985), the initial reaction of most governments was to stop further recruitment of foreign workers, try to induce those residing in the country to return, and prevent family reunification. When this proved not to be possible, these liberal stateshad to accept the fact thatlarge numbers of guest workers and their family members would become perma- nent settlers, leading most governments to redouble their efforts to stop any future immigration.

The settlement of large foreign populations transformed the politicsof Western Europe, giving rise to new social movements and political parties demanding ahalt toimmigration (Betz,1994;Kitschelt,1995;Messina,1996)·

Publicopinionwasby and largehostile to immigration, andgovernmentswere at a loss how to manage ethnic diversity (Freeman, 1979; Ireland, 1994;

Fetzer, 2000; Bleich, 2003). Problems of integration began to dominate the public discourse, amid perceptions that Muslim immigrants in particular

Hollifield • The Emerging M'IgratlOn. State 107

a threat to civilsociety and to the secular (re ubli

(and IS) that dispossessed and diISill'usioned youthP can) state.f th The fear was would turn to radical Islamd ' ratherthan ^C1011owmg. the0 e second. generation an republican path to ass' '1' (K conventional, secular

· urn anon epel 1988' K '

European societies looked . . lv Ii ' ,astoryano, 1997).

· increasing y like the U . d

linear conceptions of assirnilati. IOnh da given way t. nite 1States. where older' .increasingly uneven or segme t d . . 0mu ticulturalism and an

n e mcorporanon h b 1

the second generation, particularl amon ' w e~e y arge segments of experienced significant downwarl rnobili g t~e u~skilled and uneducated, Hollifield, 1998' Portes and R b ity Hollifield, 1997b; Santel and

, um aut 1996' Alb d

Inpart because of this (perceived) crisi~ of .a an N~e,2003).

posed, pressures for greater control of im . I~te~atlon and the threat it Western Europe but in the Unit d S migration intensified, not only in

. ' Ie tates and Au t I"

in the face of these political pressud res, It IS irnporta t t... s ra ia as well.th However' an equally powerful rights-d .. . n 0 note e pervasive minorities and foreigners werynedamlclmthe liberal democracies. Rights for

. . eepyembedded inth . .

the political culture of these societires,hi'e ping to blI tthe jurisprudence. and andxenophobic movements Th d . un e Impact of nativist 1995 Pasqua Laws in Fran;e P~ mor.e. racom~n laws, like the 1986 and Illegal Immigration Reform an'd Iopo~ltlon 187 in California, or the 1996

mrrugrant Re ibili

States, were either struck dow b h sponsi I iryAct in the United conform with liberal constitu; y t e.co~rts or substantially modified to 2000b'Schuck 1998:T' h ional principles (Hollifield, 1997a 1999b

, , ,IC enor, 2002) Even th h "

toexpel unauthorized migr denortati oug all states have the right

· ants, eportanon IS n t

instrument, and it is used sparingly and lar el f ~ a very ~ttractive policy effect(Ellermann 2003) MI' g Y or ItSsymbolic and deterrent

. ,. ass expu slons (like 0 .

United States in the 1950s) .. peration Wetback in the In spite of th are not politically orlegally viable.

· . e enormous pressures on th 1

mg in the last two decades of the tw . heasyurn process that were build-

. . ennet centurv E d

maintained a relatively strong' ^"J' uropean emocracies international refugee and hum~~~~ltmen~ to the 1951 Convention and the seekingbecame the principal ave~:etsf~;glme. I~ the 1980s and 90s, asylum bsence of full-fledged leg 1 . . . entry into Western Europe in the

a imrmgranon poli . d . '

rs that large numbers of a 1 teres an in the face of growing regimeand destabilize Europe:~ :melfseekers would undermine the refugee

In this a are states.

tmosphere of crisis control lici h'

tIP external (border) control

a .

^{po cies}^sifted ^{in the} ^1990s ^{to stepped}

.S.-Mexican border and th- :~atlons Gatekeeper and Hold theLineon the es to turnawayasylum se:ke~s ~n~:n ~ystem in Western Europe to allow mal regulation of labor markets (th ad transited a "safethirdcountry' - ). and integrating large, established tf:~~gh emplo~er sanctions and the ar; 1999;Corneliusetal 2004) C. gnll.poPulatlOnS(Brochmann and

ew d·, . ontro ingbord . E

e emphasis on .. ersm urope required

international cooperati .

r states of the Eur C . ranon, especially among the opean ommumty (EC).The EC, soon tobecome

(7)

••

the European Union (EU),was committed to building a border-free Europe, relaxing and eventually eliminating all internal borders in order to complete the internal market. This process of integration was given new impetus by the Single European Act of 1986, which called for the eliminati.on of all ~arriers to the movement of capital, goods, services and people within the territory of the EC by January 1992, and by the Maastricht Treaty on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), ratified in 1993, which established a new kind of European citizenship (Caporaso, 2000). Given the desire of member state~ to stop further immigration, creating a border-free Europe meant reinforcing external borders, building a "ring fence" around the common terntory, and movingtowards common asylum andvisa policies (Hollifield, 1992b; Ucarer, 1997·Guiraudon and Lahav,2000).

A'series of conventions dealing with migration and security issues were drafted to help construct anew European migration regime, including the Schengen Agreement of 1985, whereby EU governments comm~tted th~m- selves to eliminating border checks in exchange for common visa require- ments to control the movement of third-country nationals (TCNs). In the same vein the Dublin Convention of 1990 requires asylum seekers toapply forasylum in thefirst"safe country" where theyarrive. Schengen andDublin helped to establish buffer states in the formerly communist countries of Central Europe. EU member states could return asylum seekers tothese now safe third countries without violating the principle of nonrefoulement. The Dublinand Schengen Conventions also were designed toeliminate "asylum shopping" byrequiring signatory states to accept the asylum decision of oth~r member states. Thus an asylum seeker is permitted to apply for asylum m only one state, assuming he or she did not transit a safethird country before arriving onthe common territory.

Project 1992 together with the Maastricht process l~u~ched. the.mo.st ambitious program of regional integration and economic liberalization m European history.But just as this process wastaking offin 1989-90, the stra- tegic situation in Europe was turned upside down, with the end ofthe Cold War and the collapse of the USSRandits communist satellites inEast Central Europe. This change in the international system, which began i~ the?980S during the period ofglasnost under Mikhail Gorbachev, made Iteasl~r for individuals wishing to emigrate from theEasttoleave and seekasylum mthe West. The result was adramatic increase in the number of asylum seekers in Western Europe, not just fromEastern Europe, but fromallovertheworld.

International migration had entered a new phase inthe 1980s a.nd 90s, withrefugee migration and asylum seeking reaching levels not seen sinceth.e period just after WorldWar II. The situation in Europe was further c~mph- cared by a resurgence of ethnic nationalism (Brubaker, 1996), by warinthe Balkans and by a dramatic increase in the number of refugees from almost

, . th 16million

everyregion of the globe.By the mid-1990s there were more an

refugees inthe world, with two thirds of them in Africa and the MiddleEast.

Hollifield • TheEmerging Migration State 109

The U.N. system for managing refugee migration, which had been created during the Cold War primarily to accommodate those fleeing persecution under communist rule, suddenly came under enormous pressure (Teitelbaum, 1984). The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) was transformed virtually overnight into one of the most important international

~stitu~i~ns. The UNHCR was thrust into the role of managing the new migra- non CnsIS,as the Western democracies struggled to contain a wave of asylum seeking. The claims of the vast majority of those seeking asylum in Western Europe andthe United States would berejected, leadingWestern governments (and their publics) to the conclusion that most asylum seekers are in fact economic refugees (Fetzer, 2000). Bythe same token, many human rights advocates feared that genuine refugees would be submerged ina tide offalse asylumseeking.

Whatever conclusion onedraws from the high rate of rejection of asylum claims,the factis that refugee migration surged in thelast two decades of the twentieth century,creating anew setof dilemmas forliberalstates (Teitelbaum, 1980, 1984). Alarge percentage of those whose asylum claims were refused would remain in the host countries either legally, pending appeal of their cases, or illegally, simply going underground. With most of the European democracies attempting to slow or stop all forms oflegal immigration, the number of illegal immigrants, many of whom are individuals who entered the country legally and overstayed their visas, has increased steadily. Closing off avenues forlegal immigration in Western Europe led to a surge in illegal migration. Butwith the perception among Western publics that immigration is raging out ofcontrol and with the rise of right-wing andxenophobic politi- calparties and movements, especially inWestern Europe, governments are extremely reluctant to create new programs for legal immigration or to expandexisting quotas.

Instead, the thrust of policy change in Western Europe and the United States has.beenin the direction of further restriction. To give a few examples, GermanyIII1993 amended its constitution inorder to eliminate the blanket

~ghtofasylum that was enshrined in Article 16 of the old BasicLaw. France m 1995-96 enacted a series of laws (the Pasqua and Debre Laws) that were designed toroll back therights of foreign residents and make it more difficult for immigr~nts to naturalize (Brochmann and Hammar, 1999). Alsoin1996, the Repu.blIcan-majority Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform an~ ImI~llgrantResponsibility Act, which curtailed socialorwelfare rights for -!llmml~rants (legal as well as illegal) and severely limited the due process nghts of Illegalimmigrants and asylum seekers.

Yet,.at the same time that the U.S. Congress was acting tolimit immigrant .ts,It took steps to expand legal immigration, especially for certain care- .esof highly skilled immigrants. The H-1B program, which gives American messes .the right to recruit foreigners with skills that are in short supply ng native workers, was expanded in the 1990s. In France in 1997 and in

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d b left-wing governments to liberalize Germany in 1999, laws were passe. Y(H ll'fi ld 1999b 2000b c). Most

.' d" ITh' policy 0 ineiu, ' '

naturalIzation an cinze SIP. at the now preside over multicultural!

European governments recogmze th y. e settled foreign populations .' d tt mpts to ostraClZ

immigrant socieues, an a e . d . Moreover with stagnant or

fl f ophobla an racism. ,

only feed the a~es 0 xen e of hi hi skilled workers, European declining populatIOnS and.a short~ recrui!e;t programs, seeking to emu- governments are now turm.ng to n~ Canadian immigration policy,and make late some aspects of Amencan ~n. a idly globalizing world. How can their economies more compet.itlvle l;o::a~ictOry trends? Have states found we make sense of these see~mngt d or are they stillcaught between ways of escaping from the lI~e~a p~r~~;d greater openness (to maximize economic forces that prope t em .0) d olitical forces that seek a higher material wealth and economic secunty maintain the integrity of the commu- degree ofclosure (to prot~ct thedemo)s;mTh.is already a daunting task - for

. d e the SOCialcontract. IS I b

mry;an preserv ." uilibrium"between openness andclosure - ut states to find the appropnate eq f ism The attacks of September 11,

f h ry real threat 0 terron . . ..

they also ace t e ve d inder that the first responsibilIty 2001 on the United ~tates sethrve as .atyr~~itsterritory and population.

of the state is to proVIde for e secun

The Emerging "Migration State"

. . . . I increase in coming decades unless there is International m~gr.atlon IS~e y:~ent like war or economic depression. Even some cataclysmic mternatlOnal h

'u

it d States the liberal democracies after the 9/11 terrorist attack on t. e ru t~onal mi~ration Global economic have remained relatively open to mterna I . strong 'while at the same

h t pply push forces remain ,

inequalities mean t a su .- ifyi (Martin and Widgren, 1996). The time demand-pull forc~s are ~l~e~s~o~:ers as we have seen in the German growing demand for highly ~ lie . the i~dustrial democracies create eco- case, and the demographic .ec ne m tional networks have become nomic opportunitie.s. for ~llg:ant~eT;:~~:gl and receiving societies. Th~se more dense and efficient, linking d the risks of migration, making it easier networks help to lower the costs an ver Ion distances. Moreover,when for people to move across b~rders.and 0 have i~creaSinglY turned to profes- legal migration is not an Option,mlgrant~. tsmuggling _often withthe sional smugglers, and a glob~l industry 0 mlgranespecially in the last decade involvement oforganized cnme - has s:rung ~~ithout some newsofa tragic ofthetwentieth centuIY:Har~lya wee passe KIe and Koslowski,2001).

lossoflife associated With migrant smuggh~g ( lYeconomicactivity (such as

. . lik type oftransnatlOna I

Butmigration, I e any d d ot take place inalega Of

.' t) cannot an oesn 1y

trade and foreign mvestmen , h b en and still are deep

id A have seen states ave e . of

institutional VOl. s we , . . . and the extenSlOn

involved in organizing and regulating migration,

Hollifield • TheEmerging Migration State 111

rights to non-nationals has been an extremely important part of the story of international migration in the post-World War II period. For the most part, rights that accrue tomigrants come from the legal and constitutional protections guaranteed to all "members" of society (Hollifield 1992a, 1999a); Thus, ifan individual migrant is able to establish some claim to residence in the territory ofaliberal state, his or her chances of being able to remain and settle will increase. At the same time, developments in international human rights law have helped to solidify the position of individuals vis-a-vis the nation-state, to the point that individuals (and certain groups) have acquired a sort of international legal personality, leading some analysts to speculate that we are entering a post-national era, characterized by

"universal person-hood" (Soysal, 1994), the expansion of "rights across borders" (Jacobson, 1995), and even "transnational citizenship" (Baubock, 1994). Others have argued that migrants have become transnational, because so many no longer reside exclusively within the territory of one state (Glick-Schiller, 1999; Levitt, 2001), opting to shuttle between a place of origin and destination. This line of argument gives priority to agency as a defining feature of contemporary migrations; but it ignores the extent to which state policies have shaped the choices that migrants make (Hollifield, 2000d; Waldinger and Fitzgerald, 2004). The migration state is almost by definition a liberal state inasmuch as it creates a legal and regulatory environ- mentin which migrants can pursue individual strategies of accumulation.

But regulating international migration requires liberal states to be atten- tive to the (human or civil) rights of the individual. If rights are ignored or trampled upon, then the liberal state risks undermining its own legitimacy andraison d'etre (Hollifield, 1999a). As international migration and transnationalism increase, pressures build upon liberal states to find new andcreative waysto cooperate, to manage flows. The definition of the national interest andraison d'Etat have to take this realityinto account, as rights become more and more a central feature of domestic and foreign policy.New international regimes will be necessary if states are to risk more openness, and rights-based (international) politics will be the order of the day (Hollifield, 1992b, 1994b, 2000b;Cornelius etal.,2004; Ghosh, 2000).

Some politicians and policymakers, as well as international organizations,continue to hope for market-based/economic solutions to the problem ofregulating international migration. It is hoped that trade and foreign direct investment - bringing capital and jobs to people, either through . ate investment or official development assistance - will substitute for migration, alleviating both supply-push and demand-pull factors (Bhagwati,

1983; Martin and Widgren, 1996). Even though trade can lead to factor- . equalization in the long term, as we have seen in the case of the anUnion (Stolper and Samuelson, 1941; Mundell, 1957; Straubhaar, ), inthe short and medium term exposing LDCsto market forces often ts inincreased (rather than decreased) migration, as is evident with

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pi

NAFfA and the U.S.-Mexican relationship (Martin, 1993; Massey et aI., 2002). Likewise, trade in services can stimulate more "high end" migration because these types ofproducts often cannot be produced or sold witho~t the movement of the individuals who make and market them (Bhagwati,

1998; Ghosh, 1997). .'

In short, the global integration ofmarkets for goods, se~ces and capital entails higher levels of international migration. Therefore, If states wa.nt to promote freer trade and investment, theymust beprepared tomanag~ ~Ighe.r levels of migration. Many states (like Canada and Germany) are willing, If not eager, to sponsor high-end migration because the numbe~s are m~nage- able and there is likely to be less political resistance to the importation of highly skilled individuals. However, mass migratio.n.of un~killed and le~s educated workers islikelyto meet with greater political resistance, even m situations and insectors like construction orhealth care, where there ishigh demand for thistype oflabor.In these instances, the tendency is forgovernments togo back to the oldguest worker models in hopes of bringi~g in j~st enough temporary workers to fillgaps in the labor market, bu.t with stnct contracts between foreign workers and their employers that limit the length of stay and prohibit settlement or family reunificati~n (Miller and Mar:in, 1982;Honekopp, 1997). The alternative isillegal immigration and agrowing black market for labor - aHobson's choice.

The nineteenth and twentieth centuries saw the rise of what Richard Rosecrance (1986) has labeled the trading state. The latter half of the twentieth century has givenrise tothe migration state. Infact,froma strate- gic,economic and demographic standpoint, trade and mig:ation gohand in hand. Because the wealth, power and stability of the state ISnow more than ever dependent on its willingness to risk both trade and migration (Lusztig, 1996;Hollifield, 1998), as our German example shows.In launching a mo~est

"green card" program, Germany is clearly seeking to. ~mulate the United States and Canada on the premise that global compennveness, power, and economic security are closely related to a willingness to accept immigr~ts.

Germans in particular and Europeans ingeneral are (reluctantly) followmg the American and Canadian examples in order to enhance their matenal power andwealth. But,in oneimportant respect, Germany and Europehave anadvantage over the United States, and Canada or Australia forthat m~tter.

Germany is part of a regional economic enterprise (the Eur.opea.nUmon), which is not only creating a free trade zone, but also a freemigration area.

Now more than ever,international security andstability aredepende.nt on the capacity of states to manage migration. It is extremely difficult, Ifnot impossible, for states to manage or control migration either unilater~llYor

. I ., . d similarto

bilaterally. Some type ofmulrilateral/regiona regime ISrequire ,

what the EUhas constructed for nationals of the member states. TheE~

model as it has evolved fromRome to Maastricht to Amsterdam andbeyon ,

, .. b d urelyon

points the way to future migration regimes because It ISnot ase P

Hollifield • The Emerging Migration State 113

ho~o economicus,but incorporates rights for individual migrants and even a rudimentary citizenship, which continues to evolve (Caporaso, 2000). The pr.oblen:' of course, in this type of regional migration regime is how to deal Withthird-country nationals (TCNs). As the EU expands and borders are relaxed, the issue of TCNs,immigrants, and ethnic minorities becomes ever morepressing, and new institutions, laws and regulations must be created to deal with them (Geddes, 1994,2003; Guiraudon, 1998). In the end the EU by creating a regional migration regime and a kind of supra-national author:

ity to deal with migration and refugee issues, allows the member states to finesse, ifnot escape, the liberal paradox (Geddes, 2000, 2003). Playing the good cop/bad cop routine and using symbolic politics and policies to maintain the illusion of border control help governments fend off the forces of closure, at least inthe short run (Rudolph, 2003). Inthe end, however, it is the.nat~re of theliberal state itself and the degree to which openness isinsti- tutionalized and (constitutionally) protected from the "majority of the moment" that willdetermine whether states will continue to risk trade and migration (Hollifield, 2000d).

Regional integration reinforces the trading state and acts as amidwife for the ~~gration .state. In the EU, migrants, including TCNs, are gradually acquiring the nghts that theyneed in order toliveand work on the territory ofth.e.member states (Groenendijk, Guildand Barzilay,2000; Geddes, 2003;

H~llifield,2000b). Regional integration blurs the lines of territoriality, less- emng problems of integration and national identity. The fact that there is an increasing disjuncture between people and place - which in the past might have provoked a cr~sisof national identity and undermined the legitimacy of the.natlo~-state - ISless of a problem when the state is tied to a regional regime, like the EU.This does not mean, of course, that there will be no resi.st.anceto freer trade and migration. Protests against globalization and nativist orxenophobic reactions against immigration have been on the rise throu~hout the OEC~ world. ~onetheless, regional integration, especially whenI~has.along history and ISdeeply institutionalized as it isinEurope, makesIteasier forstates torisk trade and migration and forgovernments to construct the kinds of political coalitions that will be necessary to support and institutionalize greater openness.

loo~otsurprisingly, Mexican President Vicente Fox,likehispredecessors, is . ngto Europe as amodel forhow to solveproblems of regional integra-

~on,especially the very delicate political issue of illegal Mexican immigration to the U it d Srue tates. H'IS argument IS. that freer migration and a more

;::n (normalized) border are logical extensions of the North American Free

~_-,~eAgreement (NAFfA).The previous Mexican government under Ernesto

KlJillo bvmnvi ...'

, ymoving to grant dual nationality to Mexicannationals livingnorth :~ border,took a.big step towards consolidating and extending the rights :~ thelargest migrant population in North America. But the U.S.govern- ISreluctant to move so fast with economic and political integration,

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especially after the attack ofSeptember 11,2001, preferring instead tocreate new guest worker programs or to continue with the current system, which tolerates high levels of unauthorized migration from Mexico (Massey,2002).

Clearly,however, North America is the region that is closest to taking steps towards an Elf-style regional migration regime, and the United States is facing the prospect of another legalization. In the long run, it is difficult for liberal states, like the United States, to sustain a large, illegal population. For this reason, amnesties, legalizations, or regularizations have become a common feature of the migration state.

Even though there are large numbers of economic migrants in Asia,this region remains divided into relativelyclosed and often authoritarian societies, with little prospect of granting rights to migrants and guest workers. The more liberal and democratic states, like Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, are the exceptions; but they have only just begun to grapple with the problem of immigration, on a relatively small scale (Corneliuset al.,2004). In Africa and the Middle East,which have high numbers of migrants and refugees, there is a great deal of instability, and states are fluid with little institutional or legal capacity for dealing with international migration.

In conclusion, we can see that migration is both a cause and a consequence of political and economic change. International migration, like trade, is a fun- damental feature of the postwar liberal order. But, as states and societies become more liberal and more open,migration has increased. Will this increase in migration be a virtuous or avicious cycle?Will it be destabilizing, leading the international system into greater anarchy,disorder and war,or will it lead to greater openness, wealth and human development? Much will depend on how migration is managed bythe more powerful liberal states, because they will set the trend for the rest of the globe.To avoid a domestic political backlash against immigration, the rights ofmigrants must be respected and states must cooperate in building an international migration regime. In thisarticle, I have argued that the first, halting steps towards such a regime have been taken in Europe and that North America is likelyto follow.As liberal states come together to manage this extraordinarily complex phenomenon, it maybe possible to construct a truly international regime, under the auspices of the United Nations. But I am not sanguine about this possibilitybecause the asym- metry of interests, particularly between the developed and the developing world, istoo great topermit states to overcome problems ofcoordination and cooperation. Evenas states become more dependent on trade and migration, they arelikely to remain trapped inaliberal paradox fordecades to come.

Notes

1. Iwould like to thank Rainer Baubock, Klaus Bade, Ewald Engelen, Christian Joppke,

Douglas Massey, Rainer Miinz, Christopher Rudolph, and Dietrich Thriinhardt, as~ as the editors ofthis volume, Josh DeWind, Mark Miller, Alejandro Portes, and LydiO Tomasi, for their helpful comments onearlier versions of this article.

Hollifield • The Emerging Migration State 115 2. Here defined simply as . .

3 The tr d i . increasing levels of international exchange

. en In Internanonal migratio h b . .

War II(10M, 1996, 2000). n as een steadily upward since the end of World

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