TWO MECHANISM BASED DATA SECURITY PROTECTION FOR CLOUD STORAGE SYSTEM
Jayant Singh
M.Tech (Computer Science & Engineering), RKDF College of Engineering, Bhopal Sanjay Kumar Brahman
Dept. of Computer Science, RKDF College of Engineering, Bhopal 1 INTRODUCTION
CLOUD storage is a model of networked storage system where data is stored in pools of storage which are generally hosted by third parties. There are many benefits to use cloud storage. The most notable is data accessibility. Data stored in the cloud can be accessed at any time from any place as long as there is network access. Storage maintenance tasks, such as purchasing additional storage capacity, can be offloaded to the responsibility of a service provider. Another advantage of cloud storage is data sharing between users. If Alice wants to share a piece of data (e.g., a video) to Bob, it may be difficult for her to send it by email due to the size of data. Instead, Alice uploads the file to a cloud storage system so that Bob can download it at anytime.[2-5]
1.1 Limitation & Scope
There exists cryptographic primitive called
―leakage-resilient encryption‖.The security of the scheme is still guaranteed if the leakage of the secret key is up to certain bits such that the knowledge of these bits does not help to recover the whole secret key. However, though using leakage resilient primitive can safeguard the leakage of certain bits, there exists another practical limitation.
2 LITERATURE SURVEY
2.1 Public Key Replacement and Universal Forgery of SCLS Scheme [11]
Mingwu Zhang (2013)‖ Certificate less cryptography eliminates the need of certificates in the PKI and solves the inherent key escrow problem in the ID- based cryptography. Recently, Du and Wen proposed a short certificate less signature scheme (SCLS) without Map to Point hash function, and the signature size is short enough with only half of the DSA signature. In this paper, after the detailing the formal of certificate less signature scheme, we show that the Du- Wen’s short certificate less signature
scheme is insecure that is broken by a type-I adversary who has the ability in replacing users’ public keys and accessing to the signing oracles, and also cannot resist on the universal forgery attack for any third user.
Short certificate less signature is a useful cryptographic tool in the systems or devices with low bandwidth channel and/or low computation power, where it can prevent the malicious behaviour from malicious-but-passive KGC. Recently, Du and Wen proposed an efficient CLS scheme with shorter signature size and higher computation efficiency without Map to Point map function. In this paper we showed that the Du-Wen’s CLS scheme is universally forgeable for any third party and cannot resist on the type-I adversary under replacing public keys attacks. This result shows that it is possible insecure if it combines a standard deterministic signature scheme into a certificate less ones.
3 INTRODUCTION
The Systems Development Life Cycle (SDLC), or Software Development Life Cycle in systems engineering, information systems and software engineering, is the process of creating or altering systems, and the models and methodologies that people use to develop these systems. In software engineering the SDLC concept underpins many kinds of software development methodologies. These methodologies form the framework for planning and controlling the creation of an information system the software development process.
3.1 Existing Work
There exists cryptographic primitive called
―leakage-resilient encryption‖. The
security of the scheme is still guaranteed
if the leakage of the secret key is up to
certain bits such that the knowledge of
these bits does not help to recover the
whole secret key. However, though using
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1 leakage resilient primitive can safeguard
the leakage of certain bits, there exists another practical limitation. Suppose we put part of the secret key into the security device. Unfortunately the device is stolen.
The user needs to obtain a replacement device so that he can continue to decrypt his corresponding secret key. The trivial way is to copy the same bits (as in the stolen device) to the new device by the private key generator (PKG). This approach can be easily achieved. Nevertheless, there exists security risk. If the adversary (who has stolen the security device) can also break into the computer where the other part of secret key is stored, then it can decrypt all cipher text corresponding to the victim user. The most secure way is to cease the validity of the stolen security device.
3.2 Proposed System
In this paper, we propose a novel two- factor security protection mechanism for data stored in the cloud. Our mechanism provides the following nice features: 1) Our system is an IBE (Identity-based encryption)- based mechanism. That is, the sender only needs to know the identity of the receiver in order to send an encrypted data (cipher text) to him/her.
No other information of the receiver (e.g., public key, certificate etc.) is required.
Then the sender sends the cipher text to the cloud where the receiver can download it at anytime. 2) Our system provides two-factor data encryption protection. In order to decrypt the data stored in the cloud, the user needs to possess two things. First, the user needs to have his/her secret key which is stored in the computer. Second, the user needs to have a unique personal security device which will be used to connect to the computer (e.g., USB, Bluetooth and NFC).
It is impossible to decrypt the cipher text without either piece. 3) More importantly, our system, for the first time, provides security device (one of the factors) revocability. Once the security device is stolen or reported as lost, this device is revoked. That is, using this device can no longer decrypt any cipher text (corresponding to the user) in any circumstance. The cloud will immediately execute some algorithms to change the existing cipher text to beun-decryptableby this device. While, the user needs to use
his new/replacement device (together with his secret key) to decrypt his/her cipher text; this process is completely transparent to the sender.
4. IMPLEMENTATION
4.1 Introduction of Technologies Used About Java:
Initially the language was called as ―oak‖
but it was renamed as ―java‖ in 1995.The primary motivation of this language was the need for a platform-independent (i.e.
architecture neutral)language that could be used to create software to be embedded in various consumer electronic devices.
Java is a programmer’s language Java is cohesive and consistent Except for those constraint imposed by the Internet environment. Java gives the programmer, full control
Finally Java is to Internet Programming where c was to System Programming.
4.2 Types of Containers:
Figure 4.1 Types of Containers 5 RESULT & DISCUSSIONS
In this paper, we introduced a novel two-
factor data security protection mechanism
for cloud storage system, in which a data
sender is allowed to encrypt the data with
knowledge of the identity of a receiver
only, while the receiver is required to use
both his/her secret key and a security
device to gain access to the data. Our
solution not only enhances the
confidentiality of the data, but also offers
the revocability of the device so that once
the device is revoked; the corresponding
cipher text will be updated automatically
by the cloud server without any notice of
the data owner. Furthermore, we
presented the security proof and efficiency
analysis for our system. We can have the results for this proposed work.
5.1 Proposed System and Algorithm Implementation is one of the most important tasks in project is the phase in which one has to be cautions because all the efforts undertaken during the project will be very interactive. Implementation is the most crucial stage in achieving successful system and giving the users confidence that the new system is workable and effective. Each program is tested individually at the time of development using the sample data and has verified that these programs link together in the way specified in the program specification. The computer system and its environment are tested to the satisfaction of the user.
5.2 Implementation
The implementation phase is less creative than system design. It is primarily concerned with user training, and file conversion. The system may be requiring extensive user training. The initial parameters of the system should be modifies as a result of a programming. A simple operating procedure is provided so that the user can understand the different functions clearly and quickly. The different reports can be obtained either on the inkjet or dot matrix printer, which is available at the disposal of the user. The proposed system is very easy to implement. In general implementation is used to mean the process of converting a new or revised system design into an operational one.
5.3 Screen Shorts:
Figure 5.1 Keys Application:
(The first factor is his/her secret key stored in the computer)
Figure 5.2 USB Application:
(The second factor is a unique personal security device which connects to the computer)
Figure 5.3 User Application:
Figure 5.4 Click on Register to Register a New User:
Figure 5.5 After Successful
Registration:
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3 Figure 5.6 Similarly Registering 2 More
Users:
Figure 5.7 Login as a Registered User:
Figure 5.8 User Home Screen:
Figure 5.9 Click on Upload File Button, to Upload the Files on to Cloud Server:
Figure 5.10 While Uploading the Data onto Cloud, we can Create the Access
Policy for Users:
Figure 5.11 After Successfully Uploading the File onto Cloud:
Figure 5.12 The Owner Can Download the Data, Click on Download File
Button:
Figure 5.13 Owner/ user can Report the Loss of Device, if they Lost the Device then wont able to Decrypt The
Data:
After reporting the loss of device:
Figure 5.14 Unable to Decrypt the Data:
Figure 5.15 Login as a User and Try Downloading:
Figure 5.16 The Cloud Server, Keys Server & USB Server
Figure 5.17 The Cloud Server, Keys
Server & USB Server
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5 5.4 Test Results
Test Cases:
Test Case
Id Test Case
Name Test Case
Desc. Test Steps Test
Case Status
Test Priori Step Expected Actual ty
Cloud
server 01 Cloud server
started To verify cloud server start or not
If server is
not start It is not store any data of user
It store user details
High High
Key application 02
Key generation started
To verify key generation start or not
If server is
not start It is not
provide keys It provides keys to user
High High
USB application 03
USB package
server started To verify USB package server started or not
If server is
not start It is not provide request
Request
came High High Register 04 User
Registration To get authorization user must be register in the system
If user will not fill a particular field
Fill the
empty field Registratio n process is
completed
High High
Login 05 User Login To verify login user valid or not
If we enter wrong password or username
Invalid login Login successfull y
High High
Upload 06 Upload file User uploading file into the cloud server
If not
uploaded data
Any file information details are not stored in the cloud server
Uploaded successfull y
High High
Share file
07 Share the
information of file
To check whether you are given access
permission or not
If suppose you are not given access permission
We cannot download the files
We can download the files
High High
Revoke 08 revocation To verify whether you will select and revoke a particular user or not
If you are revoke any user
He is not download any file and to remove the access permission
To give the access permission
Mediu
m Mediu
m
Download
09 downloading
the file Test whether the given file either exist or not in the cloud server
If the file is not in stored in cloud server
File cannot download by the user
Download the selected file and stored D drive in the system
Mediu
m Mediu
m
Table 5.1 Test Result 5.5 Comparison in Existing and
Proposed Research
In this Research, we propose a two-factor data security protection mechanism with factor revocability for cloud storage system. Our system allows a sender to send an encrypted message to a receiver through a cloud storage server. The sender only needs to know the identity of the receiver but no other information (such as its public key or its certificate).
The receiver needs to possess two things in order to decrypt the cipher text. The first thing is his/her secret key stored in the computer. The second thing is a unique personal security device which connects to the computer. It is impossible
to decrypt the cipher text without either
piece. More importantly, once the security
device is stolen or lost, this device is
revoked. It cannot be used to decrypt any
cipher text. This can be done by the cloud
server which will immediately execute
some algorithms to change the existing
cipher text to be un-decrypt able by this
device. This process is completely
transparent to the sender. Furthermore,
the cloud server cannot decrypt any
cipher text a t any time. The security and
efficiency analysis show that our system
is not only secure but also practical.
we propose a new data access control scheme for multi-authority cloud storage systems. The proposed scheme provides two-factor protection mechanism to enhances the confidentiality of outsourced data. If a user wants to recover the outsourced data, this user is required to hold sufficient attribute secret keys with respect to the access policy and authorization key with regard to the outsourced data. In our proposed scheme, both the size of cipher text and the number of pairing operations in decryption are constant, which reduce the communication overhead and computation cost of the system. In addition, the proposed scheme provides the user-level revocation for data owner in attribute-based data access control systems.
5.6 Research Summary
In this research, we will introduced a novel two-factor data security protection mechanism for cloud storage system, in which a data sender is allowed to encrypt the data with knowledge of the identity of a receiver only, while the receiver is required to use both his/her secret key and a security device to gain access to the data. Our solution will not only enhances the confidentiality of the data, but also it will offers the revocability of the device so that once the device is revoked; the corresponding cipher text will be updated automatically by the cloud server without any notice of the data owner.
Furthermore, we will try to improve presented the security proof and efficiency analysis for our system.
5.6.1 Advantages of Proposed System:
1. Our solution not only enhances the confidentiality of the data, but also offers the revocability of the device so that once the device is revoked;
the corresponding cipher text will be updated automatically for security system by the cloud server without any notice of the data owner.
2. The cloud server cannot decrypt any cipher text at any time
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced a novel two- factor data security protection mechanism for cloud storage system, in which a data sender is allowed to encrypt the data with knowledge of the identity of a receiver only, while the receiver is required to use both his/her secret key and a security device to gain access to the data. Our solution not only enhances the confidentiality of the data, but also offers the revocability of the device so that once the device is revoked; the corresponding cipher text will be updated automatically by the cloud server without any notice of the data owner. Furthermore, we presented the security proof and efficiency analysis for our system.
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