The Dislocations of the Real
1.1 The categorical imperative
of the greatest number’ as the measure of right and wrong. By contrast, Kant attempted to ground his ethics in the adherence to a rational prin- ciple merely for the sake of duty, which is why it is often considered an example of deontological ethics. Zupančič (2000) argues that Lacan started off from Kant’s analysis of the logics of desire in ethics, in order to take an additional step into the realm of the drive as central to ethics.
In this endeavor, however, Kant remained the most important philo- sophical reference point for Lacan, and a large portion of this chapter will therefore be devoted to some of the former’s main ideas.
The opening question to be addressed is the following: how is desire related to ethics? The traditional answer is that human desires are exces- sive: they constitute a dangerous, disruptive force that must be kept in check through the formation of and adherence to a moral code, so that our behavior is kept free of all excess. The unbridled living out of desires is deemed problematic because it interferes with the rights, preferences and happiness of others. Therefore, ethics appears to be involved with a gradual turning away from one’s egotistical inclinations towards more and more sociable goals. Kant will turn this idea upside down: ethics will not keep our conduct free of excess, but it is, in itself, excessive by nature. As I will show, this claim derives from his particular conception of ‘the good’.
Importantly, the categorical imperative is ‘an end in itself’: it is not a means to some other need, desire or purpose. This is a crucial point. Kant holds that it is not enough for an action to be in accord with duty or with the law to qualify as ethical, for what counts is the motivation behind this action: What drives the choice for it? Such a compelling force is called a Triebfeder , a ‘drive’ or an ‘incentive’, a general term that encom- passes everything from the most basic needs to the most elevated ideas (Kant, 1788, p. xlviii). Kant (1797, p. 51) insists, in a move that seems peculiar at first, that our actions are pathological when we are under the sway of such incentives. It follows that in our ordinary lives, our normal, everyday actions are always more or less pathological, propelled as they are by a series of drives or incentives that have nothing to do with the categorical imperative as such. It is worth stressing that the pathological equally encompasses common incentives such as pleasure or happi- ness (of the self and of others), as these exert a robust influence on the human will that differs from the mere ‘duty’ to adhere to the categorical imperative. It is not that the motivational force or appropriateness of such feelings is negated, but rather that when duty is concerned, they should not be allowed to determine the choice of action. For Kant, the only valid ethical incentive for action, the only non-pathological incen- tive, is ‘the Idea of duty arising from the law’ (Kant, 1797, p. 46). So, in this reading, if we are to determine whether an act is ethical or not, we simply have to ask ourselves the question which in fact determines our will: duty or some other, pathological influence (Zupančič, 2000)? In contrast with the utilitarian ethical position, right or wrong is here not decided by the outcome of an action, but by the motives of the person who carries them out. When the personal appraisal of the consequences becomes the driving force of one’s comportment, this constitutes a path- ological motive according to Kant, and hence does not amount to ‘the ethical’ as such.
A brief pop culture illustration can make this clearer. In the American television series of Spartacus , we witness the arrival of the main char- acter as a slave in a ludus , where he will be trained to become a gladi- ator. After he passes the test to determine that he is worthy, he swears the sacramentum of the gladiator brotherhood and becomes part of the group. Due to his racial background as a Thracian and his haughty and cocky attitude, Spartacus quickly develops a feud with the undefeated Gallic champion of the region, Crixus, a fellow resident at the same ludus . The hatred between both men rises as Spartacus becomes so skilled in combat and successful in the games that he is soon crowned the new champion of Capua, during a time when Crixus is out of action,
recovering from his battle wounds. One night, Spartacus is caught by surprise in the seclusion of the ludus as an assassin sneaks up behind him and attempts to strangle him. By pure coincidence, Crixus walks in upon the scene. Within the framework of regulated battle, in training or during the games, Crixus had many times attempted to kill Spartacus himself – wanting nothing more than to be done with the obnoxious Thracian that took over his hard-earned position and status within the ludus , to the point even that Crixus is to be sold to a less prestigious lanista . At this juncture, Crixus has several options and is compelled to make a choice. He can just leave the scene and let Spartacus die, without anybody ever knowing he was there and could have intervened.
For Kant, this would be a pathological option. Contrastingly, there are several scenarios where he could act in accordance with duty by inter- vening and saving Spartacus, without however reaching the level of the ethical because he is driven by selfish motivations. For example, he might believe that by saving Spartacus he might regain some of the lost respect and status he enjoyed before, thus potentially preventing the transaction to offload him to a lesser House; or he might want to save Spartacus from the assassin, only so that he himself can kill him in the arena in due time and get his personal revenge. Although his course of action would then be in accordance with duty, it is in all such cases not
‘ethical’ in the Kantian sense, because duty is not the sole motive. The third possibility is that Crixus simply recognizes his duty and saves his
‘brother’ – for no other reason than because it is his duty to do so. This would, incidentally, not imply that he thereby relinquishes any of his personal feelings towards the person of Spartacus. That Crixus in fact made a Kantian ethical choice in this fictive sequence is suggested by the dialogue that follows his rescuing intervention. The baffled Spartacus’s question as to why Crixus ‘would save a man whom he hates’ is answered as such: ‘I did not save Spartacus. I saved a brother who shares the mark’.
After which Crixus turns away in disgust – once again strengthened in his conviction that Spartacus does not understand what it means to be a gladiator, and is not worthy of being a member of the brotherhood, nor of his popularity with the crowds. However, these personal opinions and motives did not play a part in Crixus’s decision to act, which was exclusively taken through duty (Woods, 2010).
The essential Kantian stipulation that morality is a matter of motiva- tion refers to the distinction between the legality and the morality or ethical character of an action: ‘The mere conformity or nonconformity of an action with law, irrespective of the incentive to it, is called its legality (lawfulness); but that conformity in which the Idea of duty
arising from law is also the incentive of the action is called its morality ’ (Kant, 1797, p. 46). The legality of an action does not concern itself with motivations: all that matters is whether or not the action is conform with law . The ethical dimension of an action thus lies beyond this corre- spondence between action and law: in relation to legality, ‘the ethical always presents a surplus or excess’ (Zupančič, 2000, p. 12). But what is the nature of this excess? As we have seen, it has something to do with the driving force behind an action: the will should be determined solely by ‘the form of the moral law’. Kantian ethics demands not only that action is conform with duty, but also that ‘this conformity be the only
“content” or “motive” of that action’ (Zupančič, 2000, p. 14). To reca- pitulate and schematize this, consider the following theses, put forward by Zupančič (2000, p. 16):
In conformity with duty (the legal)
In conformity with duty and only because of duty (the ethical) These phrases highlight that the ethical for Kant asserts itself as a supple- ment. This supplement appears to be a ‘pure waste’, in that it does not serve any purpose: in the end, the comportment of the subject remains the same, as do the consequences of the actions, despite any possible difference in his or her motivations. The bottom line is that ethics is based on some sort of wasteful excess that isn’t good for anything but, nevertheless, makes all the difference (ethical or not).