crucial for event‐based prospective memory than for time‐based prospective memory (see Altgassen et al., 2015; Neroni, Gamboz, & Brandimonte, 2014). Thus, even if it turns out that event‐based prospective memory is unimpaired in ASD, this does not show that a limitation of the me‐self does not contribute to diminished time‐based prospective memory in ASD.
The self‐reference and ownership effects in autism
Studies of self‐referential memory provide a direct test of the capacity of individuals with ASD to encode material in relation to their self‐concept, and may provide further evidence regarding whether or not individuals with ASD have intact or impaired me‐
selves. As such, if self‐concept is diminished among individuals with ASD, they should show diminished self‐reference effects, relative to neurotypical individuals.
Several studies have examined the “self‐reference effect” in ASD, each showing a diminished (Lombardo et al., 2007) or absent (Henderson et al., 2009; Toichi et al., 2002) effect in this population. For example, in one study, Lombardo and colleagues employed a typical self‐referential memory paradigm with adults with ASD as well as age‐ and IQ‐matched neurotypical adults. In this study, individuals were presented with psychological trait adjectives and asked to rate the extent to which each word described themselves, a close friend, or Harry Potter. After a delay, participants were given a surprise recognition test, in which they were presented with the adjectives from the previous study phase of the task alongside new lure adjectives. Both groups showed self‐reference effects (Harry Potter < Close Friend < Self), but the effect was stronger in the neurotypical group than the ASD group.
Additional evidence of difficulties with self‐referential processing in ASD comes from a recent study exploring “ownership” in this population (Grisdale et al., 2014).
Previous research with neurotypical individuals indicates that objects people feel they own hold a privileged status in memory and people are more likely to remember objects they “own” compared to objects they do not own (see Cunningham et al., 2008). One explanation for this “ownership effect” is that owned objects are treated almost as an extension of one’s self within memory (see Beggan, 1992). If so, individu- als with ASD might be expected to demonstrate a reduced ownership effect. To test this prediction, Grisdale et al. employed a task where participants were required to sort pictures of objects that people commonly buy in supermarkets into two shopping bas- kets. It was explained that they “owned” the objects in one of the baskets, while the objects in the other basket belonged to the experimenter. It was found that neurotypi- cal adults recalled cards belonging to the self significantly better than cards belonging to the experimenter. However, in keeping with studies of self‐reference effect in ASD, adults with ASD recalled self‐ and other‐owned cards equally well. Thus, while neuro- typical adults showed a clear ownership effect, this effect was absent in the ASD group.
difficulties with self and memory limitations are causally related is somewhat less clear.
Certainly, we are not claiming that limitations of the me‐self are the only possible causes of memory difficulties; memory (like the self) is multifaceted and has multiple underlying bases. Thus, a number of difficulties (other than with self‐awareness/self‐
concept) among people with ASD probably contribute to impairments of memory.
However, there is a relatively large body of evidence that a diminution of the me‐self contributes to memory difficulties in this disorder. The findings of reduced self‐refer- ence and ownership effects in ASD suggest strongly that the self‐concept does not have the same organizational properties/effects in memory.
If our conclusions are correct and people with ASD do have attenuated me‐selves, this may have practical implications, particularly for eyewitness testimony and forensic interviewing. The quality of eyewitness memory depends on both the quantity and quality of the information provided by the witness—in court, one is asked to tell the
“whole truth” (quantity) and “nothing but the truth” (quality) (Koriat et al., 2001;
Maras & Bowler, 2014). In fact, a diminished me‐self could potentially result in less complete and less accurate testimony. In this chapter, we argue that an attenuated me‐self at least contributes to episodic memory difficulties in ASD. Difficulty with episodic memory should, in turn, lead to less complete eyewitness testimony, which by its very nature relies on recollection of a specific event, including details such as what happened, who was there, and where and when it occurred. As well as being less complete, the testimony of people with ASD may potentially also be less accurate than that of neurotypical people. Several studies have shown that even intellectually able individuals with ASD have difficulty judging the accuracy of their own memories—a clear example of diminished self‐awareness. This may mean they have difficulties
“screening out” potentially inaccurate event details when they are providing eyewit- ness accounts. Clearly, then, an attenuated me‐self has potentially far‐reaching conse- quences for individuals. Having said all this, we are reluctant to draw firm conclusions—particularly with respect to the eyewitness testimony of people with ASD—without further, more direct research on the topic.
Take‐Home Points
•
Several theories propose that the self and memory are multifaceted and have a complex and bidirectional relation with one another.•
Such theories have clear applications to the case of autism—a large body of research suggests impairments in aspects of self and aspects of memory in this disorder.•
We conclude that impairments in self‐awareness and self‐representation are likely to contribute to the memory difficulties that many individuals with autism experience.References
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5
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a neurodevelopmental disorder characterized by repetitive patterns of behavior, and impairments in social reciprocal interaction and in verbal and nonverbal communication, all present from early childhood (American Psychiatric Association, 2000; World Health Organization, 1993). Autism is also characterized by atypical functioning within the domain of memory (Boucher, Mayes, & Bigham, 2012). Because of its clear everyday importance for the healthy functioning of individuals (Conway, 2005), autobiographical memory in autism has now been investigated extensively. However, despite clear difficulties to retrieve auto- biographical memories in autism, the factors explaining those difficulties remain a matter of debate. Deficits in autobiographical memory have been explained as the result of many different factors, including deficits in executive function (Goddard, Dritschel, & Howlin, 2014), autonoetic consciousness (Bowler et al., 2000), memory binding (Lind, 2010), and scene construction (Lind et al., 2014). In this chapter, we review how source memory and theory of mind (ToM), two different but interlinked potential causal factors, might explain why individuals with autism exhibit autobio- graphical memory deficits.