6.3 The Dialogical Self: Between Polyphony
at the forefront of psychological inquiry for as long as psychology has been operating as a science, it was approached as naturally given or devel- oping within the circumscribed world of an individual’s family—either as a result of early childhood emotional experiences (psychoanalysis) or as a result of the formation of maladaptive beliefs in the immediate social environment (cognitive-behaviour approach). Hermans’s understanding of anxiety as uncertainty, conceptualized within a broad social and politi- cal landscape, is radically diff erent and falls in line with the recent schol- arly interest in the cultural history of emotion evident in sociology and anthropology. 1
Addressing uncertainty as a phenomenon of the twenty-fi rst cen- tury globalized world, Hermans diff erentiates four aspects within this experience:
(a) complexity , referring to a great number of parts that have a large variety of relations; (b) ambiguity , referring to a suspension of clarity, as the meaning of one part is determined by the fl ux and variation of the other parts; (c) defi cit knowledge , referring to the absence of a superordinate knowledge structure that can resolve the contradictions between the parts;
and (d) unpredictability , implying a lack of control of future develop- ments. […] the experience of uncertainty characterizes a global situation of multivoicedness (complexity) that does not allow a fi xation of meaning (ambiguity), that has no superordinate voice for resolving contradictions and confl icting information (defi cit knowledge), and that is to a large extent unpredictable. (Hermans and Dimaggio 2007 : 40)
Hermans and his colleagues outline three reasons why global–local connections require a dialogical conception of self and identity, namely
‘Th e increasing multiplicity of self and identity, the need for developing a dialogical capacity and the necessity of acknowledging the alterity of the other person with whom one enters into a dialogical contact’ (Hermans and Dimaggio 2007 : 40). Th ey further suggest that, with increased glo- balization, individuals and groups cannot be located within one particular culture, internally homogeneous and distinctly diff erentiated from other cultures. Instead, people are living in the context of cultural interface.
1 See, for example, J. Bourke’s study Fear : A Cultural History , Cambridge UP, New York, 2006.
Th e increasing interrelatedness of nations and cultures not only involves inter-individual relationships but is also refl ected and paralleled on the intra-individual level. Th e self of an individual person provides a locus for diff erent cultures to come together and meet. Th us, the global–local nexus has become incorporated within the individual as a constituent of a dialogical self in action.
In contrast to earlier closed and homogeneous societies, Hermans and Hermans-Konopka note, cultural diff erences, contrasts and oppositions are prominent in the globalized society of today. Various cultural prac- tices, worldviews and ideologies reveal their fundamental diff erences and enter into seemingly irreconcilable struggles. Hermans and Hermans- Konopka thus suggest that ‘when the world becomes more heterogeneous and multiple, the self, as part of this world, also becomes heterogeneous and multiple’ (Hermans and Hermans-Konopka 2010 : 30). Th is argu- ment resonates closely with Hermans and Dimaggio’s conviction that,
‘fundamental diff erences in an intensely interconnected world society not only require dialogical relationships between people to create a live- able world but also a self that has developed the capacity to deal with its own diff erences, contracts, tensions, and uncertainties’ (Hermans and Dimaggio 2007 : 10).
It is of critical importance, Hermans emphasizes, that such dialogical relationships be able to recognize and respond to the diff erence of the position of groups or other persons—that is, to recognize the perspective of the other party in order to re-examine its initial standpoints in light of the interaction with the other. Such diff erences, however, are not absolute and can be resolved and overcome with time.
While anchoring his dialogical model of self in Bakhtin’s work, Hermans and his colleagues nevertheless take a decisive turn from the Bakhtinian position in developing an ‘operationalized’ model of dialogue, power and dominance, as has been discussed in the previous chapters. Th is move has particularly far-reaching implications for ethics. Hermans argues that the understanding of dialogue as an interaction among perfectly equal part- ners can be regarded as no more than a ‘romantic ideal’ (Hermans and Hermans-Konopka 2010 : 38).
Defi ning dialogue as ‘a well organized turn-taking process’, Hermans and Hermans-Konopka insist that ‘[r]elative dominance is not extrinsic but
rather intrinsic to the dialogical process’ (Hermans and Hermans- Konopka 2010 : 38). For Hermans, the participants in dialogical interactions have to continually alternate the roles of ‘power holder’ and ‘power subject’.
Th is move requires close attention as much more is at stake here than a change of the rhetorical register from the notions of recognition of absolute alterity to the algorithm of turn-taking, which is dictated by the need to ‘operationalize’ the philosophical notion of dialogue for psycho- logical use. It can be argued that it is in fact the substitution of one ethical position by another: from the ethics of answerability and responsibility inherent in dialogue, as defi ned by Bakhtin, we are moving to the ethics of power and control, power that deeply penetrates social interactions and intra-individual dynamics. Hermans illustrates his model of dialogue by referring to the role social dominance and institutions play in the practices of ‘question and answer’ and relationships of agreement and dis- agreement. Hermans observes that the freedom to ask questions of each other in a conversation depends on the ‘diff erence in dominance between parties’ and that, in a similar way, ‘relationships of agreement or dis- agreement are organized on the basis of institutional positions’ (Hermans and Hermans-Konopka 2010 : 39). While it is hard to dispute such an observation regarding the social context of many interactions, the criti- cal question remains where to go from there. While for such thinkers as MacIntyre and Bauman, as we shall see later on, such an observation becomes a point of departure for critique for a postmodern ethics, for Hermans, even though with some qualifi cations, this point becomes a foundational given, which not only directs social practice but also orga- nizes the internal structure of the self.
As noted earlier, Hermans approaches the self as a fundamentally social phenomenon, where concepts, images and understandings are deeply determined by the relations of power. From this position, Hermans conceptualizes the self as incorporating within its structure the division between internal and external domains, containing such entities as sub- ject, object and abject (that Hermans defi nes, following Julia Kristeva, as an unconscious part of the self representing an ‘enemy’) (Hermans and Hermans-Konopka 2010 : 42). Th e self is characterized by the ‘posi- tion repertoire’ with which individuals, as agentic subjects, do or do not identify themselves at any given moment. Th ese positions within
the self are imbued with various degrees of power refl ecting the power relationships in the social world, and can be regulated by such principles as ‘belonging to myself ’ and ‘not belonging to myself ’ and distinctions between ‘superior’ and ‘inferior’.
With regards to the challenges and dynamics of globalization, Hermans and Hermans-Konopka note that while on the one hand the boundaries between the external and internal domains of self have become increas- ingly permeable, on the other, positions that correspond to one’s own national, religious or ethnic group are often construed as representing purity, order, truth, beauty, good and right, whereas those on the outside are seen as aff ected by pollution, falsity, ugliness, badness and wrong.
For Hermans and Hermans-Konopka such a dynamics represents a logi- cal and unavoidable result of balancing biological needs for stability, safety and security, and the fl uidity in the social world ushered in by globalization:
At the interface of the social and the biological, we witness a paradoxical situation: whereas globalization has the potential to increase the density and heterogeneity of positions of the self in unprecedented ways, it evokes, at the same time, forms of localization that are driven by deeply rooted biological needs that cause a serious reduction and restriction of positions in the repertoire of the self. (Hermans and Hermans-Konopka 2010 : 50)
Clearly, in the current political context, Hermans’s interpretation of certain social processes from a dialogical perspective represents a con- structive step forward:
From a dialogical point of view, religious orthodoxy, the rise of fundamen- tal movements, and the phenomenon of patriotism fi nd their expression in collective voices that encourage a hierarchical organization of the position repertoire of the self and a reduction of the heterogeneity of positions with a simultaneous avoidance of internal disagreement, confl ict, and uncer- tainty. Th e dominance of one voice or a few voices over the others leads to a reduction of the experience of uncertainty, but at the same time, it has the questionable eff ect that other voices, as possible contributors or innovators of the self, are silenced or split off . (Hermans and Dimaggio 2007 : 57)
From this point of view, McAdams’s model can be seen as precisely an attempt to limit and control anxiety in the increasingly unpredictable political landscape post-September 11 through the recourse to patriotism and religious orthodoxy. While not discussing McAdams’s intervention, Hermans does refer to Kinvall ( 2004 ), who noted that global changes intensifi ed ‘ontological insecurity’ and ‘existential uncertainty’, produc- ing institutionalized religion and nationalism as identity markers in times of rapid change and an uncertain future.
Th e critical question, however, is how far Hermans is prepared to take the dialogical position he advocates and how exactly he unpacks its ethi- cal implications. It is here that some tensions appear in Hermans’s theo- rizing, tensions produced by the increasing limitations imposed on the notion of dialogue in the process of developing its ‘applied’ defi nition.
Initially, Hermans acknowledged the potential open-endedness of dia- logue, arguing that, in principle, dialogical relationships are open and move towards an unknown future. However, he later questioned the truth of Bakhtin’s claims by referring to common-sense logic and every- day observations.
Hermans concludes that in real life, contrary to Bakhtinian theory, dia- logue bears more resemblance to confrontation and defensive interaction:
Th e fact that people exchange opinions in a conversation is no guarantee of an open dialogue. In case of disagreement, they defend their point of view against the opinion of the other, and in case of agreement, they use the opinion of the other party as a means to further corroborate or even expand their initial viewpoint. In a globalizing environment, people are confronted with myriad opinions and ideologies that are diff erent from those that they have learned in their local environments. When these views are experi- enced as threatening or undermining their local point of view, they are motivated to defend their local positions, often in emotional ways. Self- defense restricts the dialogical self. (Hermans and Dimaggio 2007 : 57)
What becomes apparent here is that the logic of dialogue cannot be combined with the logic of power and dominance, the dichotomies of outside and inside, self and enemy. Th e logic of dialogue carries within itself the impetus of another ethical system, a system that insists on
thinking outside these categories. If this potential is not acknowledged then there indeed appears to be a gap in the ethical system, a gap that Hermans strives to fi ll by the incorporation into his system of what he calls ‘emotion work’ and ‘emotion rules’: ‘Emotion work takes place under the guidance of emotion rules. Such rules are standards used in internal and external dialogues to determine what it is right or wrong to feel. Emotion rules serve as standards that tell us what is “due” in a par- ticular social or personal position’ (Hermans and Dimaggio 2007 : 59).
Hermans analyses emotional positions in terms of privileges, restrictions, obligations and entrance requirements:
Th ere is a privilege when, for example, a person in love may engage in sexual behavior that otherwise may be viewed as socially inappropriate.
Restrictions refer to limits on what a person can do when acting under emotion. For example, lovers are expected to be discrete and honorable in their aff airs. Whereas restrictions forbid a person to feel and do particular things, obligations instruct the person what should be felt or done. For example, in all societies those who are bereaved are expected to perform particular mourning practices. An individual who fails to comply with these expectations is often subject to severe sanction. Finally, most social positions have entry requirements, that is, they can be occupied only by persons of a certain age, sex, training, or social status. (Hermans and Dimaggio 2007 : 59)
As this passage amply demonstrates, what Hermans defi nes as ‘emo- tion rules’ correspond to ethical norms and moral prescriptions, and moreover, to a particular system that is itself historically constructed.
Th us, it can be argued that Hermans’s essentialist understanding of emo- tion represents an incorporation of a normative substantive ethical sys- tem in which overtones of Enlightenment discourse, Kantian reasoning and Protestant ethics are clearly discernible.
Th e introduction of ‘emotion rules’ as an ethical foundation doesn’t agree easily with the Bakhtinian paradigm. Bakhtin explicitly opposes the grounding of ethics in empathy. But Hermans’s emphasis on power in this context appears to be even more problematic. It can be argued that dialogue and power make rather incompatible theoretical partners.
While dialogue presupposes diff erences and is organically linked with the notion of multivoiced polyphony, power (at least as it came to be understood in the modern period) is closely associated with a univocal position, which by defi nition excludes all diff erences.
The recourse to power and dominance is predicated on Hermans’s earlier reduction of alterity to difference. The critical distinction here relates to alterity as an irreducible singularity that cannot be appropriated, while difference, with time and effort, can be under- stood, and therefore appropriated. For Hermans, alterity is not an irreducible given, as it is for Bakhtin, but a temporary and unfortu- nate state that can be overcome. But absolute alterity is structurally and philosophically essential for Bakhtin’s system and its implications for ethics: it is only against alterity and unpredictability that choice, decision and freedom can occur; it is only the presence of that irre- ducible other that calls for answerability on my side, and it is only in this context that human actions become truly responsible (Bakhtin 1993 ). The core of Bakhtinian theorizing encapsulated in the prin- ciple of dialogism, of polyphony and multivoicedness understood as clash and constant refraction of consciousness through each other, becomes increasingly limited as Hermans’s model acquires psycho- logical sophistication. From a Bakhtinian perspective, such a loss is a critical one as this is the very core that allows Bakhtin to ground freedom in his model.
It can thus be concluded that in many important ways Hermans departs from Bakhtinian insights and resorts to a less ambitious position.
It seems that such a stand is to some degree a reaction to the pressure to generalize, to come up with rules, norms and principles applicable to large groups of people, to operate on a broader than case-by-case basis—
the pressure of the positivist-orientated model of science that psychology shares. Th e question then arises as to whether the new ethics, based on the principles of dialogue and respecting irreducible singularity and alter- ity, can be implemented in psychology at all. It should thus come as no surprise that the greatest advance in this direction so far has been made by narrative therapy—the mode of psychological practice that, by defi ni- tion, addresses individual subjects.