international behaviour
In view of the rapid and sustained growth of its economy, China’s presence is in various ways a desirable one for the international community. Having become the factory to the world, China is now for many countries a vital source of supply of low priced consumer goods. Also, the steady expansion of the middle class over the course of approximately a quarter of a century of economic growth has created an enormous market. The recovery of the Japanese economy—long mired in stagnation after the burst of the bubble at the start of the 1990s—has been heavily reliant on China, both as an investment destination and as an export market.
From a broader perspective, it should be pointed out that as China has realised its economic growth by integrating itself with international institutions such as the World Trade Organization, it has become an actor that is not likely to benefit from disrupting the existing international order. As advocates of the theory of China’s ‘peaceful rise’ point out, irrespective of China’s massive presence in terms of macroeconomic indicators, the nation ranks lower than one hundredth in the world in per capita GDP and, as it requires continuous long term growth, this trend can be expected to continue in the future.
It is undeniable, however, that the various changes accompanying China’s rapid economic growth have aroused major concern in the international community.
Foremost among these, as many commentators have observed, is the fact that China’s rapid economic growth has enabled it to swiftly modernise its military
capability. According to official Chinese statistics, China’s military expenditure has increased by over 10% almost every year since 1989. However, an annual report on Chinese military power issued by the US Department of Defense states that those official figures account for no more than a third to a half of China’s actual military spending. China has been using this huge military expenditure to import advanced weaponry from Russia, improve military training standards, enhance the computerisation of its military, and rapidly modernise its military capability, with particular emphasis on naval and air forces. This rapid modernisation of China’s military capability—coupled with the serious lack of transparency that surrounds it—has come to be a major source of anxiety for many countries.
Second, as has been evident since the later half of the 1990s, demand by China for natural resources (especially for energy resources) is rising rapidly in tandem with its rapid economic growth. The fact that China has to seek supplies of those resources from abroad is exerting a major influence on its conduct towards other nations. In particular, the rapid rise in China’s level of dependence on oil from other nations since it became a net oil importer in 1993 has contributed to the soaring oil prices of recent years. The fact that China has strengthened its relations with
‘problem states’ such as Iran, Venezuela, and the Sudan, with a view to ensuring sources of supply for oil, has also become a major cause of international concern.
Furthermore, there is also major cause for apprehension about the domestic social consequences of China’s rapid economic growth. First, as has often been pointed out, growth has broken down the old ‘equality of poverty’ and brought about various acute disparities. According to a 2005 report by the United Nations Development Programme, disparity in income levels is such that the
ratio of income in urban areas to income in rural areas is 6 to 1, and over the past twenty years the national Gini index has increased by 50% to 0.46.2 Although the latter figure is lower than in several Latin American and African countries, the urban income disparity is seemingly the worst in the world.
Against this background there has been a sharp rise in the number of cases of social unrest. In January 2006 the Public Security Department announced that in 2005 there had been more than 87,000 instances of
‘offenses of disturbing social order,’ such as public disturbances and incidents of group violence—an increase of 6.6% over the previous year.3 Notably, there have been reports of cases in which conflict over issues such as the forceful appropriation of land and irregular charges have led to violent disputes in agricultural communities. As noted by Elizabeth Economy, an expert on China’s environmental problems, there are also frequent protest movements sparked by the ongoing aggravation of environmental problems such as air and water pollution and desertification—the pursuit of economic development having led to a disregard for the burden placed on the environment.4
It appears that these kinds of situation—
especially incidents of violence on a larger scale—are currently confined to the level of regional disputes, and that there is no nationwide coordination. The Hu Jintao–Wen Jiabao regime seems to be fully aware of the gravity of these problems, as demonstrated by slogans such as ‘putting people first,’
‘constructing a harmonious society,’ and
‘the theory of scientific development.’
Furthermore, the advocates of the ‘peaceful rise’ theory assert that, because China will have to respond appropriately to this kind of domestic situation over a long period, China will need a peaceful international environment, and that its continuing development will thus inevitably be peaceful.5
However, there are limits to the ability of the current regime to counter these problems, and it is conceivable that suppression of discontent (coupled with unremitting corruption among officialdom and the inadequacies of the social security system) could jeopardise the very survival of the regime. Notably, the theory of the ‘revolution of rising expectations’ suggests that, in the event of a significant slowdown in economic growth (even if negative growth were avoided), this danger would rapidly loom.
Under such circumstances, the leadership might succumb to the temptation to inflame tensions with other nations in order to displace domestic discontent and avert a crisis. Even if it did not go to such lengths, it is likely that it would not make any effective efforts to contain demonstrations of mass discontent directed at foreign nations.
It is possible that the rise of nationalism that accompanies rapid economic development will further intensify these trends. As a Chinese researcher told me a few years ago, in the initial stages of reform and opening up, nationalism was a friend of reform and opening up because it was essential to overcome China’s low level of development, but now nationalism turned against any opening up to the outside world, due to a rise in self confidence resulting from economic growth.6
This trend is being spurred on by the recent exceptionally rapid spread of the internet.
According to a survey by the China Internet Information Center, the total number of internet users in China was 620,000 in 1997, 22.5 million in 2000, and 111 million in 2005.
The 2005 figure is nearly five times the 2000 figure, and 179 times the 1997 total.7 Against this backdrop, the anti‑Japanese demonstrations that took place in many Chinese cities in April 2005 were organised over the internet through email and chat rooms, and rapidly assumed major
proportions. Even after the activities on the streets were brought under control in May, criticism of Japan continued unabated on the internet. It is said that on July 1, activists sent UN Secretary‑General Kofi Annan a letter, with 46 million electronic signatures attached, opposing Japan’s accession to permanent membership of the UN Security Council.8
How should we deal with such problematic behaviour on the part of China, stemming from its economic and social development?
As well as devising ways to alleviate and avoid the damage which that behaviour entails (the natural response), we should probably also work towards a pre‑emptive response and wherever possible assist China as much as we can in its efforts to mitigate and dispel the causes of the behaviour.
For example, the rapid rise in Chinese energy demand is not the result of China’s rapid economic growth alone—it is also partly due to China’s inefficient use of energy. According to some assessments, China’s energy
consumption per unit GDP (oil equivalent conversion) is approximately ten times that of Japan and four times that of the US. Although those assessments may be biased by the conversion of GDP into dollars at the market rate, China definitely has significant room for improvement in energy efficiency—and an improvement in efficiency would certainly slow down the increase in demand. Assisting China to improve its energy efficiency would not simply be in China’s interests—it is a task that ought to be performed in the interests of the entire international community.
China’s environmental pollution is also not solely a domestic problem, but is also a huge problem for Japan and South Korea, which are downwind in the jetstream. According to a Japanese study on sulfur dioxide that fell on Japan in January 1999, in all regions but one over 50% of it originated in China, with the proportion reaching 75% in one region.
The same is true (although to a lesser extent) of the spread of yellow dust caused by the advance of desertification. In fact, some of China’s environmental problems now assume a global dimension. According to a study by the International Energy Agency published in November 2006, China is now the second largest emitter of carbon dioxide, accounting for 18% of the global total (after the US, with 22%), and is expected to overtake the US within four years.9
Elizabeth Economy points out regional disparities in China’s response to environmental pollution, and cites the support of leaders for protecting the environment, the existence of the necessary resources to do so, and the strong backing of the international community as the common features in those regions that are succeeding in this regard.10 In this case, the international community includes not only the governments of environmentally advanced nations but also non‑government organisations, which play a key role. It is also possible that China might witness a replay of the pattern seen in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, where demonstrations of discontent by local residents over environmental problems proved to be a vital first step towards government reform and democratisation. Hence, assistance with the environment could transform into low key backing for democratisation.
It is really up to China alone to make efforts to reduce the disparities and eliminate corruption. Although there is little scope for participation by the international community, there may be times when it will need to exercise prudence so as not to become part of the problem. With regard to China’s modernisation of its military capability, the international community must take measures to avoid risks and demand increased transparency, while taking care not to fall into the trap of the security dilemma. China
formerly concealed all information regarding its military capabilities. It was international persuasion at the ASEAN Regional Forum and other venues that led China to publish at least a national defence white paper.
Although it was highly unsatisfactory by international standards, it is a welcome step forward. Finally, the international community must cope with Chinese nationalism calmly, without rising to the bait of its anti‑foreign tendencies, and at the same time seek cooperation with cooler Chinese heads through mutual understanding.