Japan has not embarked upon a MD relationship with the US without what has been a long preparatory period that has led to the country taking small but definite steps leading towards enlarging the highly restrictive constitutional envelope within which SDF have so far been allowed to act. While these may be considered as practically negligible relative to the strides taken by NATO, it however does point to a significant confidence in Japan and may mark the beginning of a shift not only in thinking but also in action.
This chapter considers the moves taken by Japan in missile defense development.
Japan and MD
Japan first expressed interest in missile defense immediately after President Reagan`s speech of March 1983 when he declared his vision of the Strategic Defense Initiative, the so called “Star Wars “ program. According to those involved at the time96, Prime Minister Nakasone quickly supported this initiative at a summit meeting shortly thereafter, seeing the political significance of the huge program rather than its technological benefits. The US Department of Defense identified some 16 fields in which Japanese expertise would be useful. In January 1983, the Chief Cabinet Secretary announced97 that Japan had decided to “respond positively” to the US request for exchange of defense related technologies – this in view of the advance of technology in Japan as well as “to ensure the effective operation of the Japan – US Security Treaty and its related arrangements”. For this the traditional ban on arms export was laid aside – the whole was justified in Japans fundamental interest in avoiding the escalation of international conflict Some reports note that the Japanese technology assistance in missiles technology dates this period, with Toshiba and Ishikawajima Harima Industries involved in providing parts to air launched and ship launched missile technology 98. In 1987, the two countries signed an “Agreement Concerning Japanese Participation in Research for the Strategic Defense Initiative”. Big names in the Japanese defense
44
industry including Mitsubishi ( one of the largest industrial houses in the world, with revenues topping $75 billion, and closely involved with the SDF programmes like the FS- 2 as well as fast breeder technology) and Kawasaki Heavy Industries were involved from this period. According to the JDA , the 1983 agreement allowed the provision of 13 items of military technology – from portable SAM`s to research weapons technologies related to joint technical research on ballistic missile defense. While initially under the “Star Wars banner” actual search for cooperation continued well after the virtual end of the cold war, when US and Japanese were trying to get Japan involved in what was the follow on the SDI – the newly emerging GPALS.
The second phase
In 1989, a joint study under the chairmanship of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries began its labors (the Western Pacific Missile Defense Architecture Study 99. The study (1989-1993) with around ten of the largest defense groups on both sides participating, concentrated on the feasibility of defending Japan from missile attacks that would evolve in 2000- 2005 period, and its later recommendations ( which called for Japan to adopt a satellite based defense communications network, acquire THAAD as a “first tier” of defense and examine the use of a sea based BMD system100,) reflected the priorities of the new administration in Washington. Whatever the truth of this statement, it was undoubtedly the case that defense industries would have strong interests in continuing work on the mega project that was BMD.
During the Clinton period, the emphasis on trade and improving the economy of the United States inevitably had a spill over into the MD talks. This period saw a proliferation of ‘ joint studies’ and industry efforts to narrow the choices that Japan could make. While this was obviously encouraged by the government, officially Japan remained outside such efforts. Initially, the US offer on the table was that Japan could buy an advanced missile defense system and in exchange the US would access Japan dual use technology ( the so called Perry initiative )with the latter contributing its expertise in opto electronics , composite materials, microelectronic controls and display screens. In the face of Japanese hesitation, repeated visits by Les Aspin however only elicited the response that the Japanese constitution ( Art 9) hindered any participation in what was essentially a multinational program since that would fall under the rubric of
45
collective defense. Yet another problem was the possible space based component which was violative of a Japanese diet resolution against militarization of space. However this was got around by the offer by the US that the space based components would be supplied solely by the US.
In 1993, the first meeting of the US-Japan working level group on TMD met at the PACOM in Hawaii. ( 63) appeared to be pushing the Japanese to at least discuss jointly a possibly TMD system. While this paper was being prepared,
• A paper on the specifics of missile defense was being prepared by a GoJ led US- Japan Bilateral Study on BMD , which was initiated in January 1995. The Study according to analysts relied on extensive simulation and systems analysis to evaluate various MD architectures. This study appears to have identified specific technologies that could be associated with the US Navy theatre wide program.
• Industry to Industry contact was formalized in April 1995 the Office of Ballistic Missile Defense Research (BMDR) was established to work with the US Pacific Command and the US BMDO to determine the threat from missiles101..
• At the US-Japan WG (1995) US BMDO representatives presented a 40 page document to Japanese officials outlining Japanese choices in TMD. The paper reportedly also noted that TMD “is the last military business opportunity for this century”102, a sentiment much the same as that which motivated allies to join into SDI earlier. The government continued to prefer to keep the whole issue under wraps, and protested upbeat statements from the US government on Japanese commitment, noting that it was nowhere near deciding to field a TMD system 103.
• In August 1995, the JDA issued a report titled “On Research Concerning Ballistic Missile Defense” arguing in favor of BMD and stressed Japans limited ability to counter missiles under the PAC-2 system. This acted as a spur to further studies by the JDA on linked technologies and systems including satellite linked sensor systems, and a highly integrated C3I system.104 The JDA also conducted a study in 1995 A Report concerning the Problems of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction’ which studied a nuclear option, but came to the conclusion that it offered few benefits for Japan . While the actual arguments are unknown, the negative conclusion would have obviously benefited the decision on MD.
46 Third Phase
As noted above, after the launch of a Taepo dong by North Korea, Japan agreed to joint development of a MD ( 20 Sept 1998) at the two plus two ministerial meeting, a decision which was cleared by the National Security Council, and announced by the Chief Cabinet Secretary in December 1998, where he noted not only that Japans interests would be “more efficiently and successfully served” by this arrangement, but also that the would improve trust in the frame work of the Japan – US arrangement105. The actual start up began in August1999, on areas identified by the US as :
• Design, develop and produce an advanced, lightweight, high-strength nose cone using advanced composite materials.
• Design develop and produce an advanced, lightweight, high-strength kinetic kill vehicle using advanced composite materials technologies.
• Design, develop, and produce advanced, lightweight solid rocket motors at reduced cost using weight reduction techniques and materials.
• Design, develop, and produce multicolor focal plane array technology for the interceptor.
At the end of the three-year period either side would be free to leave the project or to continue on to the demonstration and validation phase. Japanese cooperation is focused on the NTW Block –II, which is viewed as more multi – threat capable than the Block – 1. The NTW is seen to be more suitable for Japan since it does not require the highly controversial and difficult land basing, as well as that a developing program would allow Japanese industries a far greater role. Additionally the MSDF has been the one arm that has been more energetic in its cooperation with US forces, making it the more suitable service.
In November, Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiromu Nonaka was quoted as saying that Japan would develop a military reconnaissance satellite. A report noted that Japan planned to launch 4 satellites by 2002, at a cost of some $1.7bn. However this desire for an independent satellite predated the actual test, with reports noting a US-Japanese squabble over the issue as early as January 1998106. The US is reported to have found the need of a military satellite to be unnecessary and an overreaction. This was even thought to be a signal of Japans lack of confidence in the US deterrent.107 On April 14, 1999 a
47
State Department delegation was reported to be lobbying the government for a role in the 4 recce satellites108. The extent of the US role in this is not yet known. At present, Japan is understood to be readying to put two satellites in orbit in March 2003., a year behind schedule. These satellites ( 1mm res) however are understood to have a limited capability for early warning since they would pass over the area only once in two days.
Reports since note that two of the satellites would have photo recce capability of one metre, and two with radio waves to penetrate cloud cover. Ground stations ( Kagoshima, on the southern island of Kyshu and Tomakomai, Hokkaido) and two data control centers which were completed in March 2002109.
The cabinet clearance for joint development was followed by a clear conception of the areas of cooperation, among which was a decision to upgrade Raytheon’s Standard Missile SM3 to a Navy Theatre Wide Block 2 configuration, with a reported ability to discern between warheads and decoys. The R&D effort would focus on analysis and design of an advanced missile sensor, advanced kinetic warhead, second stage propulsion an lightweight nose cone” . Japan was said to have allocated $8 million for 1999110. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries was allocated as the prime contractor for development of these as well as an infrared seeker and a rocket motor. Later six other industries were reported to have been tasked with joint development of the NTW, including Fujitsu, Toshiba Corp, Ishikawajima Harima Heavy Industries , Nissan Motors, and Kawasaki Heavy Industries (January 2000). Alongside the Japanese navy was reported to be readying to operate two more Aegis destroyers in addition to four already in hand.
Analysts pointed out that if budgeting permitted, another two Aegis ships would be added at a later date111.
Yet another field in which Japan appears to have an independent capability is in interceptor technology. In 1995, reports noted that JDA was developing a new missile with side thrusters112, to enable quick orbital correction in an low air density ambience, to enable it to intercept ballistic missiles. This was to be done by combining expertise acquired by Nissan Motor's (responsible for space activities and solid fuel rockets) and Kawasaki Heavy Industries' s flight control technology. This technology is claimed to allow very high maneuverability even in space, a key requirement for successful interception.
48
Japanese public diplomacy which had hinged on the ‘theatre system‘s purely defensive orientation received a blow when President Bush during his NDU speech clearly withdrew any distinctions between TMD and NMD, - a differentiation which at any rate had been hardly accepted. General Nakatani , the Director General of the JDA tried to maintain this distinction, even as the press counseled discretion113. While the Government declared support for the second half of the Bush speech of nuclear reductions, and ‘shared the common view with the US’ on missile proliferation, it simply
‘recognized’ that the US was ‘ studying the missile defense program. This point however saw the first enunciation by the JDA of a new slant. The JDA chief was quoted as saying that ‘ if Japan is to own a missile defense system, it would be designed to protect the nation’s territory” and that “ it would be operated by Japan independently” 114 ( 23 June 2001) . He later noted that national detection systems would be used to track down missiles, with interception being a Japanese decision. This statement was later clarified to say that the General had merely noted that Tokyo would judge decisions on different occasions115. This also appears to tie in with US complaints that the JDA remains discouraging of industry contacts, while at the political level there appears to b a lack of coordination in policy and acquisition. While Japan was due to decide on movement to development only by 2004, recent statements by the JDA chief may indicate that the dates may be shifted forward116. This urgency was later reflected in the US decision on an
`emergency deployment “ of ground based and sea based MD systems. Later, the US was reported to have informed Japan that it planned to begin deploying MD in 2008, a decision which would have put further pressure on Tokyo to come to a decision117. Important questions that remain to be decided is (a) who would the system belong to (b) would it address common strategic requirements (c) Can interoperability be achieved at working levels and missions.
Overall however the shift is apparent in expanding R&D more interaction at subcontractor levels, and opportunities for collaboration, (arising in part from interoperability requirements, and a globalization of industry), and perhaps a greater political push to allow such cooperation.
49 The Navy theatre wide
The NTW has been the subject of increased attention with two events. Firstly the NTW(
now renamed the Sea based mid course) is a critical part of the initial quick deployment envisaged by 2004-2005, and announced by President Bush ( ( Dec 17, 2002). The quick deployment schedule as announced later by MDA head Lt. Col. Ronald Kadish , will build up what was known as the "test-bed facility" in Ft. Greely, Alaska, which will have six ground-based interceptors there and four at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California (2004). In 2005, 10 more ground-based interceptors will be fielded. By the end of 2005, 10-20 sea-based interceptors — the Standard Missile (SM)-3 — will be fielded on three converted Aegis ships, with another 16 Aegis ships dedicated to surveillance.. Radars that will be used by the newly-deployed interceptors are: a sea-based X-Band radar; upgraded Cobra Dane radars on the Aegis cruisers; and, upgraded land-based early warning radars.
The latter include radars located in the U.K. (at Fylingsdale) and Denmark . Thus the NTW is a critical part of the first stage of MD.
Secondly, since the cancellation of the Navy Area system, and the subsequent incorporation of the lower segment interception being incorporated into the NTW, the program itself now has become vital. Though Pentagon reports note that the NTW is not suited for Strategic missile interception, the present upper tier system under development would appear to have a latent capability against missiles with counter measures and reaching an altitude of around 1200KM ( i.e a range of upto 10,000km). The critical input for this capability is a faster interceptor, using technologies which are under development by Japan. A decision to evolve a new interceptor using US companies also appears to be in the pipeline118, though this may take a longer time to emerge, depending on whether development alternatives exist.
The health of the NTW was asserted after it successfully conducted an intercept of a dummy missile with the SM-3 kinetic warhead. ( 11 Nov 2002) Its SM-3 intercepted a target Aries ballistic missile ( launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility in Kuai, Hawaii.) It was tracked by a radar on a USS Lake Erie CG, which had 80 seconds to identify the target and launch the SM-3. The interception occurred under two minutes later while the target was during its ascent phase119. Previous tests dealt with the descent phase, since as a mid course system it would need capability to intercept at both phases.
50
The test, Flight Mission (FM)-4, marked the first of six planned flight tests geared toward developing a system that could be used if the administration decided it wanted an emergency deployment. While the earlier Block 1, which has a limited capability to counter only simple separating threats continues in a technical and evaluation mode, though its funding was stopped in the FY 2003 budget submission.
Analyses of the NTW /SMD has to be necessarily limited, since the program is one that appears to be still being built up. However so far as it appears, the evolving Block 2 has a certain capability in ascent and descent phase. It may have a multiple shot capability depending on distances. An increased SM-3 burnout velocity will provide greater stand off capability, and increased operation areas for advanced threats, and greater ascent phase capability. A two color IR sensor in the seeker head ( replacing the Block –1 single color IR sensor) will bolster discrimination against counter measures and debris. This capability will be increased by a signal processor on the warhead, which will increase the number of objects discriminated in the field of view. The Block -2 will also add ship X band radars (which is already in development in the test best facility in Alaska). Essentially the system evolves from the Block –IV booster, adding a third stage rocket motor, a fourth stage kinetic warhead, and a solid fuel DACS guided by the IR sensor. Tests so far appear to have validated the design of the ALI ( Aegis Lightweight Exoatmospheric Intercept), though tests still have a long way to go, with the critical burn out speed proving to be less than the intended 4.5km/s. Higher velocity burn out may mean obstacles in retrofitting it into the VLS of the Aegis ( since it needs very high acceleration, which also may preclude a boost phase intercept system).
- It has a capability against missiles of the range at least upto 3000 km (which includes Nodong and DF-21 type)
- With a capability during ascent and descent it has a ‘shoot look shoot’
capability.
- With a faster interceptor it may have some capability against ICBMs in the ascent phase ( depending on point of launch, launch angle)
- In an emergency deployment, the US will have 4 ships fitted with 10-20 sea based interceptors by 2004-5. The Japanese may have two.
51
- This will add to twenty ground based interceptors (Alaska and California) , with however only the upgraded Cobra Dane radar available in Alaska, Fylingdales and Thule. A similar radar in S. Korea is expected, as well as a floating X-band radar.
Given the secrecy involved, it is not clear whether the NTW would have any capability against ICBMs. But the head of MDO has Lt General Kadish has noted that testing against long range ballistic missiles could begin by 2007/8 . One may assume therefore that in the 2005 –6 segment, the NTW would have no demonstrated capability against ICBMs.
A limited capability
It is apparent that by 2005-6 only a limited capability to defend will be available for deployment. This is based on the following available facts:-
• The layered system that will likely be deployed (perhaps by 2008) will have a mid course capability ( land and sea) where the US input will be around 40 interceptors with 10-20 of these on three Aegis ships. The terminal phase will have the PAC-3 ( which the DOT&E says needs at least 23 more flight tests) . The Japanese component ( in terms of Japanese owned and operated assets) is likely to be limited to begin with ( i.e perhaps two ships out of the present four, and a possible four out of six at a later date) with possibly one remaining at sea in times of tension. US based systems will also not be on continuous alert ( according to DoD officials) and neither will all the required sub systems of the mid course segment ( e.g a sea based x-band radar, and possibly the critical booster) . Thus relative to the planned defense, what will be available by 2007 is a limited capability.
• The mid could in principle be used against a rising ICBM , but by 2007 is unlikely to be tested fully in that mode. Thus in terms of actual tested capability again, the Japanese –US system would essentially be a ‘theatre’ system.
Full capability
A full capability on the other hand would in essence mean a layered system with a tested capability against ICBM’s, in the mid course phase,- i.e with a reasonably proven