In view of the rise of China, this conference was held in Kanazawa city and invited young researchers and practitioners under the age of 40 from Japan and the United States who will forge the future of the Asia-Pacific region. One of the secondary goals of the Japan-US Kanazawa Conference was for participants to engage in frequent discussions while staying in shared accommodation, thereby promoting joint recognition of common issues and building a policy research network for the entire Asia-Pacific region based in Japan -American alliance. The young researchers presented these sub-themes, followed by an intensive discussion among all participants.
This booklet presents an overview of the above-mentioned conference and has been prepared under the Chatham House rule, whereby the identity of the speakers is in principle not revealed. All views and opinions expressed are those of the individual participants and do not represent the opinions of their affiliated institutions. I would like to take this opportunity to express my sincere appreciation to the Ishikawa Prefectural Office and all the other parties concerned for their generous support in holding this conference in Kanazawa City, Ishikawa Prefecture.
Assessment of the Strategic Environment in the Asia-Pacific Region to 2030
The above two discussions together will enable participants to assess the strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific until 2030. This assessment will then serve as a reference in discussions on the roles (actions) of Japan-US and its partners in Sessions 2 and 3. This session will begin with presentations of approximately 15 minutes each by panelists, followed by 5-10 minutes of commentary by a panelist, and then plenary discussions.
This session will begin with approximately 15-minute presentations by panelists, followed by 5-10 minutes of panelist comments and then a full-length discussion. Executive Director and Secretary-General, Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) TAKAHARA, Akio (JPN). Research Fellow, Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA). Alphabetical order according to surnames).
Xi Jinping perceives a greater potential threat to the regime than it actually is, and China believes the United States seeks to use China's internal instability to undermine it. China's revisionism is on the margins and consists of shaping institutions to favor Chinese objectives. While China's behavior is revisionist, it offers no alternative vision to the current international order.
Although China has no intention of fundamentally changing the international order, it could encourage revisionist behavior in the long run if China were to surpass the power of the United States. To what extent will China's success in shaping the international order feed its further ambitions? China's recent developments in the South China Sea (SCS) or its apparent disregard for international law represent its revisionist behavior more than the AIIB.
China wants to act now to seize strategic opportunities it perceives as fleeting. Even without a clear vision, China's actions are revisionist attempts to change the rules of the international order. China may perceive the costs of its actions in the SCS differently from the international community because China's short-term gains are concrete and visible, whereas the costs will only be realized in the long term.
Does the lack of cost to China's aggression in the SCS relate to the limited nature of US orientation in Asia. China's narrative is that its actions are reactive, but that matters less over time. China's core interest is the issue of sovereignty, but it interprets sovereignty differently from other countries.
Public distrust at the lower levels did not spread to the central leadership because of China's decentralized power structure.
The United States is not only a stabilizing factor, but also a potentially destabilizing factor in the region. Japan would exercise the right of collective self-defense in relation to Taiwan only in the case of heavy US involvement in some kind of major conflict in Taiwan. Will the gradually increasing US appreciation of a strategy of containment result in the accumulation of incremental advantages by adversaries?
There is debate in the United States about whether China should be accommodated and the extent of the accommodation. The United States and China have played an important role in establishing the legacy of the war and the post-war period in the region. Japan's new national security policy requires a system to ensure that it acts in the interests of national security and regional stability.
Would the US ever consider using economic instruments in response to certain security actions. If so, how can Japan leverage its presence and influence in the region in relation to this. ASEAN was created in part to prevent any great power from entering the region after the Cold War.
ASEAN then established various ASEAN-led institutions, with the participation of major powers in the Asia-Pacific region. Towards 2030, ASEAN strives to persistently maintain the central role of ASEAN in regional mechanisms and to strengthen unity and cohesiveness, which will depend on the diplomatic policy of individual countries and the strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific area for success. Many Southeast Asian countries privately consider Japan to be the most reliable country in the wider region.
In the long term, Korean reunification is a real possibility, so strong Japan-ROK ties would be favorable. In the short term, Japan will work with the ROK to resolve North Korean issues. In the medium term, it would be ideal to encourage the ROK, through the US-Japan-ROK trilateral, to consider issues beyond the Korean Peninsula.
The Japan-US Alliance vis-à-vis China to 2030 (Traditional Security)
What would be the implications of the potential militarization of China's man-made islands in the SCS. It is unrealistic to expect regular patrols by the Japan Maritime SDF (JMSDF) in the SCS, but a viable option may be individual multinational freedom of navigation programs. Japan and the United States should convince China to work together on issues of international protocols and trade rules, but if China is not interested, it will stand outside without having any say in the rules being developed.
The JMSDF is already overstretched for permanent contributions to the SCS, but ad-hoc activities may be possible. What role can the alliance play in the development of norms and rules in the cyber field. The Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM) in the new security cooperation guidelines was heralded as a great success.
The issue of the unequal alliance between the US and Japan still seems to be a divisive issue in the eyes of the Japanese public, regardless of the rise of China. U.S. membership in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) would be symbolic of ECS and SCS issues. The strategic goal of Japan and the United States should be to secure command and mutual denial.
It would be preferable to have the JMSDF stationed longer in the ECS or the SCS, rather than deploying them to the Gulf of Aden. The norms of the profession have also changed fundamentally, including the decline in area studies versus disciplinary studies and the importance of teaching versus research, the increase in the importance of being cited frequently, and increasing specialization to the point of obscurity. To date, China's efforts to increase its international discourse power have not been successful, but will likely remain an issue in the future.
Is China's pursuit of international discourse power directed primarily at the United States or the rest of the world.
Japan-US cooperation vis-à-vis China to 2030
What kind of match is being played and expected to be played between China and the US-Japan Alliance. China is looking for Japan to join AIIB, but continues to stubbornly oppose the reform of the UN Security Council (UNSC). Is AIIB already a lost opportunity for Japan and the United States, or can they still participate and shape it.
The United States is also the only country with veto power in the World Bank. The United States and Japan can influence the game they will play with China, and it must be such that it is mutually beneficial. While China may not have contributed enough to the international community at present, the success of the AIIB will depend on its contribution to development in the region, which is a noble goal and should be supported.
The United States has found that decoupling issues in the China relationship is not beneficial to American policy interests. How can we push back on military cooperation without linking it to other issues in the political relationship. Possible criteria for determining whether China should be accommodated include redundancy with existing institutions, consistency with accepted principles and the order vision behind the initiative.
Is it really acceptable for one country to have the sole right of veto in an international institution? The United States and Japan can engage with China, but they must do so proactively and with an agenda. International economic institutions have much in common with security institutions, but the institutionalization of the latter was much weaker.
China's lack of security interdependence with Japan and the United States makes its emergence more of a challenge.
Wrap-up
It is not impossible to temporarily resolve issues of territory and history or reduce the tension they cause. Whether on territorial issues or historical issues, the United States can never be an innocent third party. Internationally, there already exist the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the Permanent Court of Arbitration.
The rationale is not to establish what international law should be, but first to bring together regional actors to share their respective interpretations of international law. China claims that Japan is trying to avoid the issue by denying that there is a territorial dispute between the two countries. There are some vulnerable democracies in the region that could benefit from Japanese and American support.
With a decision in the UNCLOS court next year, Japan and the US should probably consider how to promote international law and its application, especially in the SCS. This is a good way to put pressure on China and create momentum to use international law against them. More needs to be done to reach out to the European community, which has separated from the US and Japan on the AIIB.
