Human Rights
B. North Korea’s Reaction
I. Human Rights and the Characteristics of the North Korean System
Indeed, they should go beyond these steps and take concrete improvement measures. In short, the perception is growing that unless concrete measures are taken quickly to improve the worsening human rights situation, it will never be possible to provide the necessary protective measures to the North Korean people.
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politically motivated to bring undue pressures on the North Korean regime. North Korea also refutes such actions as the UNHRC resolutions on North Korea and the appointment of a UN Special Rapporteur as evidence of a Western strategy to utilize human rights as a means of exerting undue political pressures on another member state, which it says is detrimental to the overall fairness of the UN organization. North Korea, for regime security reasons, has been rejecting all North Korean human rights resolutions adopted by the UNHRC and UN General Assembly.
In addition, North Korea denounced as “the enemy forces’
typical and annual political conspiracy” the three Resolutions on North Korean Human Rights adopted by the UNHRC for three consecutive years between 2003 and 2005, as well as the Resolutions on North Korean Human Rights adopted every year since 2005 by the UNHRC and the UN General Assembly. Pointing out South Korea’s co-sponsorship of the resolution on North Korean human rights in 2008 and the omission of any references (in the resolutions) to the “Inter-Korean Joint Summit Statement”
of October 4, 2007, North Korea argued that they represented South Korea’s genuine policy positions and declared that South Korea would end up paying “a high price” for them. In addition, North Korea denounced them as a “direct challenge to the dignity of the North Korean system.” When South Korea participated in the resolution as a co-sponsor in 2009, North Korea, through a Rodong Shinmun commentary (Nov. 23, 2009), insisted that the
“resolution was another unforgivable challenge” and a “stumbling block designed to hamper improved relations and to raise tensions in inter-Korean relations,” adding, “Human rights issues can never be raised in North Korea as a matter of principle.”
Furthermore, North Korea continues to refuse recognition of
I. Human Rights and the Characteristics of the North Korean System
the UN special rapporteur who was appointed in accordance with the North Korean Human Rights Resolution adopted in 2004 at the UNCHR, and it repeatedly denies the special rapporteur’s requests to visit North Korea. This is a typical item North Korea has refused to accept from among the list of recommendations contained in the UNHRC Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of December of 2009 on North Korean human rights. Furthermore, North Korea even refuses any dialogue or “technical cooperation” with the UN high commissioner for human rights simply because the “UPR” report is contained in the UNHRC resolutions. North Korea criticized the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, which was maintained until 2005, as having been “politicized,” and claimed that it had lost “objectivity” because the Western member states used it “selectively” and applied “double standards” based on their national interests.
North Korea has leveled the same sort of denouncement against the UNHRC, which replaced the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in 2006. North Korea insists that since human rights resolutions on individual member states and the special rapporteur system contain hidden political motives, the Council should operate strictly based on the principle of
“fairness,” rejecting the application of “double standards” and the
“politicization” of human rights, if the UNHRC were to carry out its roles and functions as an international human rights organization.20 In the process of developing standard operating procedures for the new UNHRC, North Korea has strenuously insisted that the system of adopting resolutions regarding individual member states and the special rapporteur system should be abolished. As for the annual reports the UN Special Rapporteur on North Korean Human
20_ The Rodong Shinmun, “The Failed ‘Human Rights Diplomacy’,” May 24, 2006.
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Rights submitted to the UN General Assembly and UNHRC, North Korea insisted that those reports were “full of distortions and falsehoods.” In addition, North Korea has never responded to the special rapporteur’s repeated requests to visit North Korea for the purpose of observing firsthand various aspects of freedom of expression (2002), freedom of religion and thought (1999; 2002), the right to food (2003), and other issues.21
Secondly, North Korea rejected out of hand the Bush Administration’s “North Korean Human Rights Act” and other human rights issues and denounced them as part of US attempts to overturn its regime. Despite North Korea’s complaints, the United States is maintaining the “North Korean Human Rights Act” under the Obama administration. In fact, the new US administration has upgraded the position of special envoy on North Korean human rights to a permanent position. North Korea has reactioned strongly to these steps, arguing that they are “part of the imperialists’
design for global domination” and “a guileful tactic to justify intervention and aggression.” As a result, there has been absolutely no cooperation between North Korea and the United States in the field of human rights.
North Korea has begun to seek improved relations with the European Union. In the process, North Korea has accommodated the EU’s demands and engaged in a human rights dialogue with the EU. The reason North Korea was able to go along with the human rights dialogue with the EU was because such dialog would have little impact on its regime security, while it satisfied North Korea’s practical need of improving diplomatic relations. On Oct.
12, 2009, Sweden, in its capacity as the chair of the EU, was able to
21_ Amnesty International, “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review,” April 2009.
I. Human Rights and the Characteristics of the North Korean System
conduct an “assistant secretary level” dialogue with North Korea.
In addition, it was reported that in November of 2009 North Korea accepted a French proposal to exchange ideas on human rights during a meeting with Jack Lang, a member of the French National Assembly, who visited Pyongyang as a special envoy of French President Nicolas Sarkozy. However, when the EU took the lead in passing the North Korean human rights resolutions at the UNHRC and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, North Korea refused human rights dialogue with the EU citing concern for its own regime security. Thus, North Korea’s human rights dialogue with the EU has followed an irregular on-again, off- again pattern.
Third, North Korea has been pursuing various policies that were helpful in removing the wall of international isolation so long as they did not have practical impact on its regime security.
For example, North Korea has been duly filing national progress reports in accordance with the terms of International Human Rights Covenants, to which it is a party. It appears that North Korea has found it useful to utilize the occasion of filing the reports as opportunities to promote North Korea’s human rights guarantees and to alleviate the human rights pressures of the international community. In January of 2009, North Korea participated in the deliberations of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, following its participation in the same conference in May of 1998 and June of 2004. North Korea also responded actively by dispatching a delegation to the 6th Regular Conference (Dec. 7, 2009) of the Working Group Meeting of the UNHRC Universal Periodic Review on Human Rights in which North Korean issues were discussed.
Fourth, North Korea has been streamlining its laws so
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long as the changes did not bear directly on its regime security.
As the level of its dependence on international economic assistance increased, North Korea was in no position to persist in its negative attitude toward the demands for human rights improvement under the international human rights regime.
When it amended its Constitution in 1998 North Korea decided to guarantee the “freedom to reside in and travel to any place”
as well as recognize private property rights. In the April 2009 Constitutional Amendment, North Korea included human rights as part of the state’s responsibilities. North Korea also revised its Criminal Procedure Law in 2004 and 2005; it removed a clause on “presumptive interpretation” and tightened the “elements constituting criminality.” It also partially adopted the principle of nullen crimen sine lege and tightened regulations concerning arrest, detention, torture and other inhumane treatment. In 2003, North Korea newly enacted the “Disabled Persons Protection Law.”
Recently, North Korea is in the process of revising its laws on narcotics control and illegal monetary transactions (i.e., the law prohibiting money-laundering and the narcotics control law) and joining the three international anti-narcotics conventions.22 The decisions to revise these laws were made presumably because such revisions would have little or no impact on regime security, while they could significantly contribute to North Korea’s improved international image.
In formal terms, the judicial system has seen some improve-
22_ In addition to the visit of June 2002, North Korea again allowed the visit of members of International Narcotics Control Board in June 2006. During the annual report conference held in Bangkok in March of 2006, the INCB made positive observations on North Korea’s narcotics control effort, pointing out, “North Korea enacted a narcotics control law in February 2005. Thus, the INCB fully expects North Korea to faithfully observe the terms of international narcotics conventions”; Yonhap News, Jun. 27, 2006
I. Human Rights and the Characteristics of the North Korean System
ment when compared to the past, and the people can now expect to manage their lives in a more stable manner, taking personal responsibility for individual actions. This is a positive development.
However, it would still be prudent to continue to monitor whether these legal protections are in fact and effectively implemented.
White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2010
II
1. The Right to Life 2. Individual Liberty 3. The Right to Due Process of the Law 4. The Right to Equality 5. Civil Liberties 6. Freedom of Religion 7. The Right of Political Participation