Security Dynamics in Northeast Asia
II. North Korean Provocations and Enhanced U.S.-ROK-Japan Trilateral Security Cooperation
II. North Korean Provocations and Enhanced
international pressures by conducting its second nuclear test in May 2009. As a result, the United States and its allies have exercised pressure through economic sanctions rather than moving toward negotiations with North Korea.
The author has previously made effort to explain the logic of North Korean aggressive foreign behavior by analyzing the case of the second North Korean nuclear test based on neoclassical realism perspectives.10Neoclassical realism presumes systemic incentives as primary independent variables and emphasizes that such systemic incentives must be transmitted through intervening variables at the unit level. If we apply this perspective to the North Korean second nuclear test, first, the negative system incentives from the international community in the form of the UNSC presidential statement along with external pressures criticizing North Korea’s rocket launches functioned as independent variables. Secondly, such system incentives, which North Korea was perceived as violating its sovereign rights and basic principles of the Six-Party Talks, had been filtered through the North Korean perception that a nuclear test is required as a nuclear power when it feels necessary. Since the first nuclear test in October 2006 was not fully successful, a subsequent nuclear test was indispensable from a military perspective as well. Therefore, the UNSC presidential statement condemning North Korea for conducting the satellite launch along with other external pressures functioned as the trigger for North Korea to conduct the second nuclear test.
10Sachio Nakato, “North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test: Neoclassical Realism Perspectives,” (forthcoming).
If this analysis is correct, North Korea’s nuclear policy depends on how North Korea perceives the changing international environment and how it transmits its domestic factors into its foreign policy formation. In other words, if North Korea perceives changing international situations as threatening to its survival, it is highly likely to conduct a third nuclear test as a result of incorporating its domestic factors together with its perception of international sentiment.
Therefore, it seems logical to assume that North Korea has concluded that it is “legitimate” to keep its status as a “nuclear power” especially in light of Iraq and Libya. That is to say, if North Korea considers those countries like Iraq with no nuclear weapons or Libya which exchanged the declaration of denuclearization for better relations with the west as well as national security (the so-called Libyan Model) actually became targets of attacks from the United States and/or NATO due to their lack of nuclear weapons, it will ascertain that the only way to assure its security is by maintaining its status as a nuclear power.
Next, related to the above discussion, if North Korea perceives itself as a “nuclear power,” North Korea may pursue its policies based on the assumption that nuclear deterrence functions between North Korea and the United States as well as South Korea. When North Korea and South Korea actually exchanged fire during the Yeonpyeong Island incident in November 2010, a second Korean War or massive U.S.
military intervention did not occur. While the Lee Myung-bak government was criticized within South Korea for its weak posture toward North Korea, one could argue that this incident “proved” that it is virtually impossible for both South and North Korea to engage in unlimited military confrontation. If North Korea perceives that the
“impossibility” of total war in the Korean peninsula comes from its nuclear power, small scale military confrontations between the South and the North especially in the disputed areas might continue to occur more often than before, when North Korea did not possess nuclear weapons. Therefore, the possession of nuclear weapons itself might function as a decisive factor when military confrontations between South and North Korea occur.
2. U.S.-ROK-Japan Trilateral Cooperation
While the importance of U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral cooperation in dealing with North Korean issues is often emphasized among concerned policy makers, there are at least two structural impediments to trilateral cooperation. First of all, policy priorities and interests of each country are different with regard to respective North Korean policies. Needless to say, all three countries do not want a nuclear North Korea. However, their approach as well as priorities shows some differences of interest. For South Korea, the issue of denuclearization is imminent and must be resolved through peaceful means. North Korea does not regard South Korea as its negotiating counterpart on this issue, thus South Korea is more in a position to support the denuclearization process along with the United States. The United States is concerned more about the spread of weapons of mass destructions; thus the nonproliferation issue is the highest priority.
Japan prioritizes the abduction issues as more important than denuclearization. It also has no real policy to deal with North Korean nuclear issues.
Secondly, territorial conflicts along with historical legacies between Japan and South Korea remain an obstacle for U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral cooperation. The Dokdo/Takeshima issue has always been a source of antagonism between Japan and South Korea. Recent attempts to visit Ulleungdo Island near this disputed island by conservative politicians in Japan certainly stimulated nationalism in South Korea and may have a negative impact on ROK-Japan cooperation. One American expert on Korea even suggests that Japan should renounce its claim on the disputed island for the sake of better ROK-Japan relations.11Although Japan needs to continue to claim this small island for political and economic reasons, it is unwise to anger South Koreans especially when U.S.-ROK-Japan cooperation is essential in dealing with North Korean issues. It is important for Japan’s national interest to continue as an important player among the three countries, and thus be able to exercise more influence over North Korean issues. As a result, it also becomes easier for Japan to pursue its policy objectives in dealing with North Korea.
While “strategic patience” and “vision 3000 thru denuclearization and openness” have not accelerated denuclearization of the Korean peninsula so far, North Korea’s aggressive external behavior during the past few years has actually promoted U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral cooperation. After the onset of the North’s recent bout of aggressive behavior, both the U.S.-Japan security alliance and the U.S.-ROK security alliance have been enhanced and subsequently, U.S.-ROK- Japan trilateral security cooperation emerged as a result of a series of incidents, i.e. the rocket launches, the second nuclear test, the
11Peter Beck, “Consider a Korea-Japan alliance?” JoongAng Daily, May 27, 2011.
Cheonan incident, and the bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island. Its implications go beyond the North Korean issues. Such enhanced trilateral security cooperation among the U.S., ROK, and Japan is in alignment with the U.S. Northeast Asian strategy dealing with the various effects of the rise of China as well.
First of all, the Cheonan incident led to an enhancement of the strategic alliance between the United States and South Korea. For example, while the United States and South Korea had agreed that South Korea would reclaim wartime operational control of its forces from the United States as of April 17, 2012 during the Roh Mu-hyun administration, they agreed to put off the return of wartime control to South Korea to 2015 after the Cheonan incident. While U.S.-ROK alliance arguably seemed to be weakened during the Roh Mu-hyun government (which had once cited the Northeast Asian balancer theory to distance itself from the U.S.), this incident actually created momentum for the Obama administration and the Lee Myung-bak government to strengthen and transform the damaged U.S.-ROK alliance to a strategic alliance. The North Korean shelling of Yeonpyeong Island reconfirmed the importance of the U.S.-ROK strategic alliance and the need for U.S.-ROK joint military exercises (which in addition is a frustration for China).
Secondly, the United States and Japan also returned toward enhance- ment of its security alliance as a result of the Cheonan incident. From the time Prime Minister Hatoyama took office, the newly established Democratic government had pursued a more equal partnership in its alliance with the United States through the issue of the relocation of the Futenma U.S. military base, as well as a positive attitude for the
East Asian Community. While U.S.-Japan relations were drifting due to such new initiatives, the Cheonan incident functioned as an important opportunity for Japan to recognize the security threat in Northeast Asia including North Korean provocations, as well as other security concerns, such as the Chinese military buildup and military activities over disputed areas. As a result, U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral cooperation was promoted in order to deal with threats from North Korea as well as instability in Northeast Asia. The United States has moved to strengthen its strategic influence on the Korean peninsula through its enhanced alliance with Japan and the ROK as well as U.S. military presence with its allies in Northeast Asia.