IV. March 2001 – August 2002: Fragile Consensus and Signs of Divergence
8. Signs of Divergence
approach based on implementation of the Agreed Framework and engagement with North Korea was maintained, but the TCOG began to stray from its original function as a coordinative mechanism for consolidating minor differences within a trilateral
217 Paik, Kim, and Lee, “Towards Establishing Peace on the Korean Peninsula,” p. 11. The authors argue: if the U.S. adopted an uncompromising approach to North Korea, Japan would also pursue a policy with a hard-line base. If the U.S. chose to pursue dialogue and normalization, Japan would resume its own diplomatic talks with North Korea.
218 Rozman, “Japan’s North Korea Initiative and U.S.-Japan Relations,” p. 537. See also Funabashi, The Peninsula Question, p. 7.
comprehensive approach to North Korea.219 The leadership change explanation – particularly in regards to the transition from a moderate Clinton to a hard-line Bush administration – does help to explain the emerging signs of divergence in policy approaches and rifts within the trilateral coordinative framework. Despite joint statements by the TCOG delegates that reaffirmed their commitment to close trilateral coordination and their support of engaging the DPRK, the Bush administration’s words often did not match up with its actions. This discrepancy between U.S. statements and actual behavior created rifts within the trilateral consultative framework – especially between the U.S. and South Korea. At the May 2001 TCOG meeting in Hawaii, the TCOG delegates reconfirmed their commitment to the Agreed Framework, expressed continued support for close coordination and inter-Korean reconciliation, and the “U.S.
invited the ROK and Japan to provide comments and suggestions” for its policy review.220 Yet the Bush administration’s preference for hard-line approaches and pressure on the North revealed that – despite overall support for engagement with the North – the Bush administration desired to “change the basis on which [it] interact[s]
with North Korea” in a manner that “will not be driven into dialogue…through threats and provocations.”221
Aside from leadership change, after the terrorist attacks on September 11, threat perceptions on proliferation and terrorism briefly converged for the three partners and a
219 Hajime, “ROK-U.S.-Japan Trilateral Cooperation towards North Korean Policy: Present Situation and Problems – Centering On the TCOG,” p.65.
220 U.S. Department of State, Joint Statement by the U.S., the Republic of Korea, and Japan, Honolulu, Hawaii, May 26, 2001, http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2001/3115.htm. Accessed January 8, 2013.
221 National Security Council, “Press Backgrounder Points,” June, 6, 2001 as referenced in Pritchard, Failed Diplomacy, p. 6.
TCOG meeting in November 2001 ended with the U.S. stating that it would hold talks with North Korea “any time, any place.”222 Yet while South Korea was actively pursuing North-South dialogue and engagement with the North, the U.S. was heavily involved in its War on Terror and held little interest in actually holding talks with North Korea.223 This pattern continued into 2002 and, amidst conflicts in the Middle East and fears of proliferation and nuclear weapons, the HEU issue propelled U.S. threat perceptions of North Korea to new heights. Even though TCOG meetings were maintained throughout this period, by August 2002, differing perceptions of North Korea shaped divergent policy preferences toward dealing with the DPRK. The TCOG largely lost its function of coordinating policy and, instead, acted as a symbol for U.S.- ROK-Japan trilateral cooperation to display to North Korea that trilateral unity still persisted.224
Different Interpretations of HEU and Koizumi’s Planned Trip to Pyongyang Fragmentation in the trilateral consensus toward North Korea was largely revealed in August 2002 when Washington informed its allies of a suspected DPRK HEU program and Prime Minister Koizumi announced his plan to visit Pyongyang.
Although the Kim and Koizumi governments were actively engaging North Korea, the Bush administration raised the HEU issue which led the ROK and Japan to question U.S.
222 Hajime, “ROK-U.S.-Japan Trilateral Cooperation towards North Korean Policy: Present Situation and Problems – Centering On the TCOG,” pp. 59-60.
223 Ibid.
224 Ibid., p. 65.
intentions.225 During the Kim-Clinton period, President Clinton’s trust in President Kim’s policy toward North Korea fostered deep understanding and mutual trust between the two administrations to the point that the South Korean government shared all information related to the DPRK with the United States.226 Yet from the Kim-Bush summit meeting in March 2001, trust between the two governments became shaky and the Kim administration was hesitant to immediately accept U.S. intelligence.227 While the U.S. was certain that North Korea possessed the HEU program, South Korea claimed there was not enough evidence to invoke confrontation.228
Prime Minister Koizumi’s announcement that he would be meeting Kim Jong-il in September 2002 also showed signs of divergence within U.S.-Japan approaches to North Korea. On August 27, 2002, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Armitage and Prime Minister Koizumi met in Tokyo and exchanged information on Koizumi’s planned visit and the HEU issue. The result was a cleavage in policies. For Japan, it was “hard to grasp that North Korea was so duplicitous; that the United States was so determined to pressure North Korea…and that Japan, as a U.S. ally, had so little leverage to conduct an independent foreign policy.”229 Raising the HEU issue threatened Koizumi’s trip to the DPRK and created conflict for his plans to resolve the abduction issue in his meeting
225 Funabashi, The Peninsula Question, p. 130.
226 Ibid., p. 131.
227 Ibid., pp. 130-131. Funabashi states that South Korea officials had become distrustful of U.S. intelligence since it had been wrong in assessing Kumchang-ri. Other countries, including Japan, shared these suspicions in regards to U.S. explanations about the HEU program.
228 Ahn, Is an Autonomous South Korean Policy toward North Korea Possible, p. 237. Ahn argues that different interpretations of the same intelligence pointed to fundamental problems within the U.S.-ROK relationship, where South Korea was becoming less dependent on U.S. information for its policy to the North and more critical of American judgments. Ibid., pp. 239-240.
229 Rozman, “Japan’s North Korea Initiative and U.S.-Japan Relations,” p. 527.
with Kim Jong-il.230 For the U.S., Koizumi’s diplomatic efforts and large-scale
economic aid to North Korea conflicted with its campaign for “arms inspections in Iraq and, should they fail, a war to topple Saddam Hussein.”231 In the Bush administration’s preparations for war in Iraq, Japanese support was important.232 Diverging perceptions of North Korea were producing different policy options for the three states.
230 For analysis of the link between the HEU program and abduction issue, see Funabashi, The Peninsula Question, p. 39.
231 Ibid.
232 Ahn, Is an Autonomous South Korean Policy toward North Korea Possible, p. 229.
V. September 2002 – June 2003: Divergent Perceptions, Different Approaches, and Dissolution of the TCOG
1. Prime Minister Koizumi’s Visit to Pyongyang and Nuclear Crisis Most scholars cite Kelly’s visit to Pyongyang and confrontation over the HEU program in October 2002 as the decisive point for the eventual dissolution of the TCOG.233 This thesis argues that, even prior to the U.S. confrontation, the sharp change in Japanese perceptions of the North Korean threat following Prime Minister Koizumi’s meeting with Kim Jong-il effectively carved the path for the demise of the TCOG and trilateral coordination process. Although many people view the Koizumi-Kim summit meeting and the resultant Pyongyang Declaration as breakthroughs in Japan-DPRK relations, Kim Jong-il’s confession to the deaths of abducted Japanese citizens turned Koizumi’s diplomatic dream into a domestic political nightmare.234 A brief period of thawed Japan-DPRK relations and Japanese support for engagement following the summit was quickly replaced by rising conservative voices within the Japanese
government and strong negative reactions within the Japanese public. As a result, Japan – the U.S.’ key ally in the region – fell in line with the U.S. policy of confrontation and support waned for an already weakened trilateral coordination mechanism and the ROK
233 Schoff, Tools for Trilateralism, pp. 24-25.
234 See Victor D. Cha, “Japan-Korea Relations: Mr. Koizumi Goes to Pyongyang,” Comparative
Connections, Vol. 4, No. 3 (October 2002). Accessed January 10, 2013; Keiji Nakatsuji, “Prime Minister in Command: Koizumi and the Abduction Question,” Korea Review of International Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2004), pp. 35-46; Funabashi, The Peninsula Question, pp. 36-42; Yumiko Nakagawa, “Koizumi Visits Pyongyang: Beginner’s Luck?” PacNet No. 38 (September 2002).
engagement policy toward North Korea.235 The collapse of the Agreed Framework after North Korea’s admission to having a nuclear program and the subsequent nuclear crisis from the end of 2002 to 2003 solidified the differences in policy approaches among the United States, South Korea and Japan.
Collapse of the Agreed Framework and Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis After U.S. suspicions of a DPRK HEU program were affirmed in October 2002, the situation on the Korean peninsula was one of crisis and conflict. The United States failed to utilize its “bold approach”, instead choosing to confront the North Korean regime over its nuclear program.236 The U.S. trip to Pyongyang ended in disaster with early signs of the Agreed Framework’s imminent collapse appearing.237 The Agreed Framework met its end when North Korea resumed its nuclear activities on December 12, 2002. The North Korean nuclear crisis reached its peak when the DPRK removed surveillance cameras and expelled IAEA inspectors from December 21-31, and announced its withdrawal from the NPT on January 10, 2003. The common threat perceptions that had established the TCOG and held the trilateral consensus together
235 Cha, “Japan-Korea Relations: Mr. Koizumi Goes to Pyongyang.” Cha states, “In some ways, Japan offers a more credible voice on the Korean Peninsula than South Korea these days…when the
Japanese…take such a dramatic step and personally communicate to the U.S. that engagement is worthwhile, then it registers.” Thus, when Japanese support for engagement decreased, the U.S. was not inclined to pursue an engagement policy toward the DPRK and pushed forward its own policy of confrontation.
236 For more on the U.S.’ “bold approach”, see Pritchard, Failed Diplomacy, pp. 25-27; Funabashi, The Peninsula Question, p. 98.
237 Pritchard, Failed Diplomacy, pp. 37-39. The North Korean government was in the position that the Agreed Framework had already been violated by the United States, when it failed to meet its heavy fuel oil shipment deadlines under the KEDO. In addition, DPRK First Vice Minister Kang Sok-ju further justified his claim by stating that the “axis of evil” label and U.S. preemptive strike policy pushed North Korea “to reinforce its “Military First” policy by modernizing the military to the maximum extent possible.” Ibid., p.
37.
began to fall apart as different national priorities toward North Korea and conflicting policy preferences moved the three countries away from a formalized trilateral
coordinative process to an informal multilateral consultative process under the Six Party Talks.
2. U.S. Perceptions of North Korea
Main Security Threats and Foreign Policy Objectives
Despite having information on North Korea’s HEU program before its
admission, the Bush administration did not take immediate action against the DPRK. At the time, Washington’s foreign policy objectives were focused on a potential war with Iraq and “no one wanted the U.S. relations with North Korea to deteriorate, creating a crisis.”238 Essentially, the United States was trying to “buy time” in order to offset a North Korean crisis that could hurt U.S. plans for its invasion of Iraq.239 Unlike the Clinton administration, which had set a clear red line at the reprocessing of plutonium fuel rods, the Bush administration did not establish thresholds for North Korean nuclear and missile activities.240 Nevertheless, North Korea’s resumption of its nuclear program at Yongbyon in December 2002 constituted a major threat to U.S. principles of
disarmament and nonproliferation.
In a testimony before the Senate, Armitage stated that “North
Korea’s…programs to develop weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery
238 Funabashi, Peninsula Question, p. 155.
239 Ibid., pp. 155-157. Some American politicians criticized the Bush administration for “downplaying the North Korean nuclear crisis in order to start a war with Iraq.”
240 Ibid., pp. 154-155.
are a fundamental obstacle…[to Korean peace and stability]. They are also a threat to the international community, regional security, US interests, and US forces, which remain an integral part of stability in the region.”241 Kelly reemphasized the North Korean nuclear threat – in regards to both plutonium and HEU – and the concern that the North could sell missiles, conventional weapons, and fissile material to rogue and terrorist states.242 In light of the U.S. war against terrorism and nuclear proliferation, the Bush administration focused on the ways in which it could contain the North Korea nuclear threat without further destabilizing the region.
View of the North Korean Regime
The Bush administration continued to be highly suspicious of the North Korean regime and the North’s admission of having a HEU program only helped to solidify this view. Armitage stated, “We cannot change our relationship with the DPRK until the DPRK changes its behavior. North Korea must abandon its nuclear weapons programs in a verifiable and irreversible manner.”243 Although there was a solid consensus in Washington that North Korea’s nuclear program was unacceptable, intense debates between the “engagement school” and the “confrontation school” over the most
241 Richard L. Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State, “Weapons of Mass Destruction Developments on the Korean Peninsula,” testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D.C., February 4, 2003, http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/armitage/remarks/17170.htm. Accessed January 8. 2013.
242 James A. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, “A Peaceful Resolution of the North Korean Nuclear Issue,” remarks to House International Relations Committee, Washington, D.C., February 13, 2003, http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2003/17754.htm. Accessed January 8, 2013.
243 Armitage, “Weapons of Mass Destruction Developments on the Korean Peninsula,” February 4, 2003.
effective policy option to North Korea occurred.244 Eventually, an increasingly powerful Pentagon and the influence of hard-liners in the Bush administration convinced
President Bush that direct U.S.-DPRK dialogue and engagement with North Korea were ineffective in dealing with the nuclear issue.245 This was a significant departure from the Clinton administration’s view that U.S.-DPRK negotiations were key to addressing the North Korean security issue and even a contrast from the Bush administration’s earlier views that dialogue was to be maintained. The Bush administration essentially adopted a policy approach toward North Korea based on the following convictions: North Korea is an ‘evil’ regime, North Korea is fully responsible for the crisis, the North Korean nuclear program is a major threat to the nonproliferation regime and the NPT, and that North Korea does not deserve any rewards for its bad behavior.246 Bilateral talks with North Korea were ultimately viewed as ‘rewarding’ the North, thus, the Bush administration chose to pursue a multilateral policy approach to North Korea that focused on building an international coalition and avoiding U.S.-DPRK bilateral negotiations.247
3. South Korean Perceptions of North Korea Main Security Threats and Foreign Policy Objectives
Although the threat of the North Korean nuclear and missile programs presented a serious threat to South Korea – in terms of potential physical damage and geographical
244 Funabashi, The Peninsula Question, pp. 90-92, 139-144. See also Park, “Toward an Alliance of Moderates,” pp. 30-31.
245 Ibid., p. 161.
246 Rozman, Strategic Thinking about the Korean Nuclear Crisis, p. 30.
247 Pritchard, Failed Diplomacy, pp. 52-56.
proximity – the South Korean government was adamant on continued engagement of the North and inter-Korean conciliation for its goal of peaceful reunification. The 2003 ROK Defense White Paper identified North Korean armed forces, WMD development, biological weapons, and missile programs as the main security threats.248 Yet President Roh Moo-hyun’s inaugural address on February 2003, entitled “An Age of Northeast Asia Begins: A New Takeoff Toward an Age of Peace and Prosperity”, outlined a policy approach that aimed to “build peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia on the basis of a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and the establishment of an inter- Korean economic community.”249 President Roh stressed that, while North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons could never be condoned, resolution should come from peaceful dialogue as opposed to military tensions, and that South Korea should be actively involved in resolving the crisis.250 In this respect, Roh “stressed again that South Korea regarded North Korea as a dialogue partner, not as a threat.”251 The Roh administration also decided to drop the reference to North Korea as its “main enemy” in a government publication and advocated South Korea’s self-reliant defense.252 The dualistic characterization of North Korea as both an ‘enemy’ and a ‘partner’ created dilemmas for ROK policymakers and contributed to gaps in perceptions among the ROK, Japan, and the United States.253 On March 2, 2003, an aerial standoff between
248 Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, “North Korean Military Threat,” Participatory Government Defense Policy 2003 (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, July 2003), pp. 26-28.
249 Ibid., p. 31.
250 Ibid. See also Funabashi, The Peninsula Question, pp. 215-216.
251 Funabashi, The Peninsula Question, p. 216.
252 Ibid., p. 243. The Ministry of Defense was against the removal of the term ‘enemy.’
253 Choong Nam Kim, “The Roh Moo Hyun Government’s Policy Toward North Korea,” East-West Center Working Papers: Politics, Governance, and Security Series, No. 11 (August 2005), p. 9.
DPRK fighter jets and an American reconnaissance plane further revealed the divergent U.S.-ROK threat perceptions of North Korea as Washington condemned the North’s actions, while Seoul requested that “the United States should not go too far.”254 Although the North Korean nuclear and military threats were evident for the South Korean government, the long-term foreign – and even domestic – policy goal of peaceful reunification prevented the ROK from seeking strong punishment and
military/economic pressure against the DPRK that would threaten efforts at inter-Korean reconciliation.
View of the North Korean Regime
Improvements in North-South relations in mid-2002 followed by the historic Japan-DPRK summit meeting in September 2002 convinced the Kim administration and supporters of engagement that the North Korean regime was still steadily opening up to the international community. Although Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang sparked another South Korean national debate over its policy toward North Korea,
“[m]any South Koreans compared the results of his visit to that of President Kim in 2000 and found the latter lacking.”255 In October 2002, with the revelation of North Korea’s HEU program, progress in inter-Korean relations made earlier in the year once again stalled. Additionally, North Korea’s resumption of nuclear activities and
withdrawal from the NPT threatened stability on the Korean peninsula. Yet President
254 Kim, “Limits and Possibilities of ROK-U.S.-Japan Security Cooperation,” in The Future of U.S.-Korea- Japan Relations, p. 15, reference 10.
255 Levin and Han, Sunshine in Korea, pp. 127-128.
Kim still sought to improve deteriorating U.S.-DPRK relations and engage the North in dialogue before the end of his term – thus he sent Ambassador Lim Dong-won to Pyongyang on January 27, 2003.256
Although hard-liners in South Korea viewed the North Korean regime as acting out of regime survival and that North Korea would be unwilling to give up its nuclear weapons, the Roh administration and moderates believed economic assistance and dialogue would make the North cooperative to international standards if it could gain assurances against U.S. attack.257 The Roh government identified North Korean provocative behavior as “brinksmanship tactics” and that “North Korea has also been focusing on negotiations with the United States, demanding a non-aggression pact as a means to ensure regime survival.”258 The Roh administration’s view of the North Korean regime and its capacity to change was in stark contrast with the Bush
administration which viewed North Korea as “a problem to be solved rather than one to be managed” and even considered policy approaches that advocated regime change.259
256 Funabashi, The Peninsula Question, pp. 197-205.
257 Park, “Toward an Alliance of Moderates,” pp. 32-34. North Korea felt very threatened by the U.S. war in Iraq and wanted assurances that the U.S. would not subsequently take military action against North Korea.
258 Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, Participatory Government Defense Policy 2003, p. 26.
259 Mitchell, “Status Quo: Putting It All Together,” in Strengthening U.S.-ROK-Japan Trilateral Relations, p. 28. Refer also to Funabashi, The Peninsula Question, pp. 138-139, 144-145. Secretary of Defense was a supporter of the regime change approach, but some policymakers saw it as a “straw man” to make the tailored-containment approach more moderate and persuasive.