KINU
II. Peace Forum on the Korean Peninsula: Problems and Significance
Ⅲ. The Way Forward
Three possible scenarios for North Korea exist at this important juncture. First, the status quo could be maintained. This is perhaps the most dangerous scenario, for the longer the present impasse
continues, the more time that North Korea will have to develop nuclear weapons and become a de facto nuclear state. The longer North Korea continues to suffer economic difficulties arising from the status quo, the greater the temptation will become for the regime to sell nuclear material to terrorists groups. Japan is vigorously seeking to avoid an indefinite extension of the status quo, particularly since it is the country most vulnerable to a nuclear attack from North Korea.
The second scenario is a shift from dialogue in the six-party talks to condemnation and sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council, or in case of the vetoing of sanctions, by like-minded countries. This is also an undesirable scenario for two reasons. First, sanctions, which are imposed in order to modify aberrant behavior, would do little to modify North Korea’s policy as it has managed to survive in near-complete economic isolation for decades. Second, without the complete cooperation of all relevant countries─including China, North Korea’s most important ally─
sanctions to regime could not possibly change North Korea’s behavior. The only plausible situation under which the international community would have to resort to sanctions would be if North Korea were to test a nuclear weapon or sell nuclear material.
The most desirable scenario is a comprehensive solution achieved through dialogue. The scope of a resolution emerging from dialogue would need to go beyond the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework, which lacked a precise roadmap for implementation and verification measures for the resolution of nuclear issues. The Six-Party Joint Statement of September 2005, which outlines clear, comprehensive commitments by all parties, could serve as a starting place. A new
resolution could build upon the statement’s commitments by including specific measures for implementation and follow-up.
Several key elements could make this outcome possible. In order for this to occur, the United States must decide to engage seriously with North Korea under the umbrella of the six-party talks, and the North Korean military leadership must unconditionally endorse its own participation in the talks. For the United States, however, which is currently preoccupied with Iraq and Iran, revitalized talks may not be easy.
The success of the talks clearly rests on the nature of the security guarantee that the United States could provide to North Korea.
Under its “military first”regime, North Korea tends to be deeply suspicious of any promises made by other countries, particularly the United States; an appropriate device needs to be found here.
Under certain circumstances, it may make sense to create a framework where security is collectively guaranteed by the six parties and possibly to utilize the authority of the United Nations Security Council. In return, North Korea would permit precise, independent verification of the abandonment of nuclear programs and settlement of outstanding issues.
We will also need to consider the future role of the six-party talks, since any stable regional architecture requires participation by all vital stakeholders. In this sense, if the six-party process proves successful, steps must be taken to ensure that it is transformed into a semi-permanent regional entity. Under such an arrangement, the talks’supervisory format would be transformed into a political format. It would build confidence and support a dialogue on lasting peace and stability in the region, a shared
commitment that already exists in the Joint Statement. The true resolution of the question of North Korea, however, may entail a longer process in which the North Korean regime transforms its policies thoroughly. The six-party entity could ensure that the process takes place, and it could additionally promote stability by negotiating and facilitating economic cooperation and institutional capacity building in Northeast Asia.
It is vitally important to reflect on the future outcome of the six- party talks when thinking about the negotiation of a permanent peace regime on the Korean peninsula, which was agreed upon by the six parties in September 2005. If done collectively, security guarantees that are backed with the authority of the United Nations and that form part of the resolution of the nuclear issue may pave the way for a permanent peace regime. If the talks succeed in consolidating the transformation of policies in North Korea, we will have a solid basis for the negotiation of such a regime.
주제발표 | 153
KINU
한반도 평화포럼에 관한 러시아의 입장
올레그 바그다미안
러시아 외무부 외교아카데미 국제관계학 교수제2회의 <한반도 평화포럼에 관한 주변국 입장> 발표
www.kinu.or.kr
한반도 평화포럼에 관한 러시아의 입장 Russia’ s Viewpoint toward Peace Forum
on the Korean Peninsula
올레그 바그다미안 러시아 외무부 외교아카데미 국제관계학 교수 Oleg Bagdamyan(The Diplomatic Academy, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Russian Federation)
<요약>
한국전쟁 그리고 현재의 북핵으로 인한 한반도의 위기 상황은 한반도 정 세에 대한 러시아(구 소련 포함) 정부의 적극적인 관여, 그러나 러시아 자체 의 국익의 차원으로 보아서는 별반 득이 될 것이 없었던, 과거 50년 간의 상황을 말해주는 두 극단적인 예라고 말할 수 있다. 과거에 북한에 대한 일 방적인 지원을 보냈던 소련 정부는 중국 정부와의 경쟁적 관계로 인하여 한 반도 정세 변화에 관하여 독자적인 노선을 취하는 데 필요한 영향력을 충분 히 행사하지 못하였다. 1990년대에 들어서서 러시아 정부는 과거의 노선으 로부터 급선회하여 한국 측에 상당히 우호적인 태도를 취하게 되었으며, 그 로 인하여 영향력 행사에 있어서 우위를 누릴 기회를 다시 한 번 상실하게 되었다. 한국에 대한 정책들이 이 지역에 관한 포괄적인 전략과 맞물리는 것이어서 영향력의 상실에 따라 러시아는 동북아의 그 밖의 3개 세력국가 들과의 관계에 있어서도 변화를 느끼게 되었다. 1990년대 말에 러시아 지 도자들은 지역에서의 상황 전개에 대한 영향력을 갖기 위하여 한반도에서 의 상황에 다시 한 번 더 깊이 관여할 방책을 모색하기에 이르렀다.
이 논문은 4부로 구성하여, 제1부에서는 한반도 위기상황 해결을 위한
두 가지 전략의 분석에 초점을 맞추었다. 제2부는 효과적인 개입전략의 분석으로 구성하였고, 제3부는 한반도 평화과정 구축에 대한 외부 세력국 가들의 참여의 방법, 그리고 제4부는 한국에 대한 개입 전략에 초점을 맞 추었다.