Introduction
- Research Objectives and About the Survey
- Cohort Analysis
- Overview of the Survey
- Summary of Survey Results
70% of supporters of the People's Power Party (hereafter PPP) approve of the Olympic declaration on the end of the war. 72.6% of respondents expected inter-Korean relations to be the same in the next five years. Opinion in favor of the US nuclear redeployment declined in 2019 amid calls for increased defense spending, but has since rebounded.
Given a choice between a ROK-US alliance and ROK nuclear weapons, 50% of respondents chose the ROK-US alliance. About 61% of respondents said the presence of US forces is necessary even after unification, which is relatively low. 59.6% of respondents, well over half for the first time since the start of the 2018 survey, perceived China as a country that does not want the union.
More than 50% of respondents said the US's importance as a global leader is declining compared to the past decade. In particular, it should be noted that one of the main causes of weakening the basis for a positive perception of China may be the controversy over particulate matter from China.
Public Opinion on Current Issues and Inter-Korean
- End-of-war Declaration and Inter-Korean Exchanges
- Prospects on Inter-Korean Relations
- Succession of Agreement Between Two Koreas
- South Korea’s Nuclear Development and the Redeployment of US Nuclear
- US Forces in Korea vs. Nuclear Weapons
Ÿ Considering that the PPP's presidential mandate ended at the time of the poll, supporters of the opposition parties also support the End of War Declaration, despite the possibility of this issue influencing the presidential election. Ÿ Contrary to the majority agreement of opposition party supporters of the End of War Declaration, opinions are divided on the Inter-Korean Summit and support for the COVID-19 vaccine. 81.1% of Democratic Party supporters approve of resuming the Inter-Korean Summit, while 50.2% of opposition party supporters approve.
54.6%, more than half of opposition party supporters, oppose the COVID-19 aid to North Korea. Ÿ 70.2% of all respondents in the October 2021 survey agreed with the order of an agreement between the two Koreas, regardless of the change of government. Ÿ The Asan Research Institute, investigating the same topics, identified that 69.3% of respondents in 2020 agreed to independent nuclear development.1).
In the 2020 Asan Research Institute survey, 61.3% of respondents agreed with the redistribution of US nuclear weapons2). Ÿ 49.6% of all respondents chose US Forces in Korea, but about 35% said they would rather have "nuclear weapons", indicating that more than a third of people were positive about having weapons nuclear. Ÿ This shows that the South Korean public is unaware of the costs and risks associated with nuclear development or the redeployment of US nuclear weapons.
Ÿ In the comparison by supporting party, the odds that Democratic Party supporters and independent voters chose to own nuclear weapons were relatively high.
ROK-US Relations and Perception of US
Assessment of ROK-US Relations
Necessity of ROK-US Alliance
Necessity of US Forces in Korea: Now and After Unification
Thus, the perception of the necessity of American forces in Korea increased from the point of view of regional security. This suggests that the presence of US forces is seen as a matter of pragmatism rather than a matter of nationalism or independent defence.
Improvement of ROK-US Alliance and Inter-Korean Relations
Resumption of North Korea-US Summit
Specifically, 72%, an increase of about 20%P, showed a positive attitude towards the implementation of the North Korea-US summit. This is a significant change considering that 95% of PPP supporters in the survey said that North Korea will not give up on developing nuclear weapons. So, even if there is no chance of North Korea giving up its nuclear weapons, there are a number of PPP supporters who believe that a North Korea-US summit makes sense if North Korea is making progress on denuclearization.
US Economic Sanctions against North Korea
Positive Feelings on Neighboring Countries
Ÿ The low positive attitude towards North Korea appears to reflect the failure of North Korea-US negotiations and the situation in which South North Korea and North Korea-US relations have made little progress since the start of the Biden administration. In the case of Japan, this seems to reflect a situation where traditional national sentiment against Japan and Japan's trade retaliation against Korea have not improved.
Country that Does Not Want Unification
The Most Threatening Neighboring Country
Direction of Diplomatic Policy towards US and China
Ÿ The percentage in favor of strengthening the alliance with China remains low at less than 10%, and both polls this year showed lower at 4.0%. In the October 2021 survey, the percentage of preference for strengthening alliances with the US was eight times higher than that of preference for alliances with China. Ÿ Koreans mostly prefer balanced US-China diplomacy, however, more preference for the ROK-US Alliance over the ROK-China alliance can be regarded as an appropriate distribution of preferences considering the inevitable influence of the two powers and the reality of international politics.
This is supported by the fact that favorability of independent diplomacy has remained relatively low since the second survey in 2019, at just over 10%.
Security of ROK and Relative Importance of US-China
Economy of ROK and Relative Importance of US-China
Changes in the US Leadership in the World
Ÿ During the three investigations, negative attitudes (do not agree at all, disagree) and reserved attitudes increased. Ÿ All three surveys found that relatively young cohorts did not agree to participate in a US-led world order. Ÿ These results show that the younger generation, who will become the pillar of Korean society in the future, will no longer take the US-led world order for granted.
US as a Global Leader
China as a Global Leader
Hegemonic Competition between US and the China
Ÿ In summary, respondents consistently overwhelmingly favored the US international order over other neighboring powers, and respondents said the US is more important than China in security and economics. The United States is also positively assessed for playing the role of leader of the international community.
ROK-China Relations and Perception of China
- Perception of China: Democratic Values
- Perception of China: Economic Interest
- Perception of China: History and Culture
- China and the Unification of the Korean Peninsula
- Responsibility of China on the Spread of COVID-19
- Response to China’s Economic Retaliation
- China’s Attempt to Distort History
- Hong Kong’s Democratization Movement and South Korea
- Defending Taiwan from China
Ÿ "South Korea and China help each other in the economy (mutual interest)"; "South Korea and China will compete economically in the future (competition of the future)"; "The large Chinese market offers us opportunities (market opportunity)"; “China will be a threat to sectors in which South Korea currently has an advantage in the global market (semiconductors, shipbuilding, etc.) (economic threat)”; "China does not care about destroying the natural environment of neighboring countries for its own development (Destroying Environment)". Ÿ About half of the respondents believe that South Korea and China can benefit each other economically, and the positive assessment of the large Chinese market reaches 56.1%. Ÿ 65.1% of respondents also believe that China damages the natural environment of neighboring countries for their economic development.
This indicates that one of the main causes of weakening the foundation of China's positive perception may be the fine dust controversy from China. Chinese capital is negatively influencing the content of Korean dramas and films (Negative Capital Influence)”; "Chinese youth are very nationalistic (Youth Nationalism)"; "China represents all Asian countries (representing Asia)"; "South Korea is still influenced by Chinese culture (Chinese Cultural Influence)". Ÿ More than two-thirds of respondents said that China does not respect the history of neighboring countries.
Ÿ However, negative perceptions aside, 38.1% see China as a representative of Asia and 26.5% believe that South Korea is under the influence of Chinese culture. Ÿ From these results, it can be inferred that historical and cultural factors are behind the different attitudes shown in the mixed assessment of China or China-related issues. Ÿ "China does not want North and South Korea to unite for China's own interests (opposite unification)"; "China Will Not Oppose North Korea-led Socialist Unification (Support NK-led Unification)".
This is consistent with 59.6% choosing China as the least preferred country among neighboring countries for the unification of the Korean Peninsula. Ÿ There is a conventional view that conservatives are negative about China, as some conservatives consistently use the word "Wuhan pneumonia" instead of the official name of COVID-19. Ÿ The percentage (57.4%) of liberals who believe they can withstand China's economic retaliation is clearly higher than the proportion of moderates (49.7%) or conservatives (45.8%).
Ÿ This is consistent with the fact that the percentage of people who chose to actively respond to China's economic retaliation earlier was higher in the liberal group than in the conservative group. Ÿ Therefore, it can be deduced that the liberals evaluate Korea's capability more positively than the conservatives, and based on this, liberals show an attitude that South Korea should respond more actively to China's economic retaliation. Ÿ As with the results of the strong response to the aforementioned China's economic retaliation, the percentage of people who agreed to actively confront China's historical distortion was highest for liberals (77.0%).
Ÿ "If China wants to unify with Taiwan by force, South Korea should join the effort to prevent it." Ÿ Rather than the opinion of participating in the Hong Kong democratization movement (35.0%), a larger percentage of respondents agreed to participate in the effort to stop the unification of Taiwan's military by force.
