Aldo Ferrari, Eleonora Tafuro Ambrosetti
Before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, there were high hopes for a more fruitful “green cooperation” between Russia and the EU. Conditions indeed seemed favourable. As more and more states pledged their commitment to carbon neutrality goals, global momentum built: numerous countries demonstrated ambitious targets, especially among the most advanced economies which seemed intent on making the most of the opportunities for growth and innovation linked to carbon-neutral policies. In particular, the EU made the fight against climate change its foreign policy trademark, launching the European Green Deal (EGD) in 2020 and complementing this internal policy with an external action directed primarily at countries such as Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. The EU-Eastern Partnership (EaP) Summit in December 2021 marked an important step forward in this direction, officially making the green transition one of Brussels’ objectives.1 Moreover, many in Russia’s political and business community had warmed to the idea of closer collaboration with the EU in green energy.
However, Moscow’s full-scale attack against Ukraine has changed everything: the possibility of EU-Russian cooperation now looks improbable and global priorities have suddenly shifted, potentially jeopardising the EU’s and post-Soviet countries’ environmental plans.
1 K. Pishikova, Greening the EU Neighbourhood: Climate Policies for the Eastern Partnership in Times of War, ISPI Analysis, ISPI, 18 May 2022.
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For example, Dmitry Trenin, former Director of Moscow Carnegie Centre, eloquently stresses Russia’s need to rethink the green deal in light of the dramatic change in the international scenario.
Now it is necessary to move from retaliatory steps to initiatives that will strengthen Russia’s position in the total economic war declared by the West, allowing it to inflict significant damage on the enemy. In this regard, a closer alignment of efforts of the state and the business community’s activities is required, as well as implementation of a coordinated policy in such sectors as finance, energy, metallurgy, agriculture, modern technology (especially related to information and communications), transport, logistics, military exports and economic integration – both within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Union State of Russia and Belarus and taking into account the new realities in the Donbass and the northern Black Sea region. A separate task is to revise the Russian approach and policy position on climate change issues under the changed conditions.2
These words – written by a scholar traditionally prone to dialogue with the West but who, in today’s situation, seems to shift to a more confrontational attitude – serve as a clear indicator of the radical political change that is taking place before our very eyes. As a matter of fact, the conflict in Ukraine is profoundly transforming the international scenario or accelerating existing political patterns dramatically. This applies in particular to relations between Russia and the West yet also bears important consequences in Asia, where an unfolding domino effect has potentially dramatic – and currently unforeseeable – effects.3
However, the war has devastating consequences not only in humanitarian and political terms, but also for the environment.
Russian shelling and occupation increase the risk of nuclear
2 D. Trenin, “How Russia Must Reinvent Itself to Defeat the West’s ‘Hybrid War’”, Russia in Global Affairs, 24 May 2022.
3 F. Fasulo and G. Sciorati (Eds.), How the Ukraine War Fuels Great Power Competition in Asia, ISPI Dossier, ISPI, 26 May 2022.
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hazards in one of Ukraine’s four operational nuclear power plants and toxic waste emissions from industrial facilities, particularly in heavily industrialised eastern Ukraine.4 Initial estimates (May 2022) by the Ukrainian Ministry of the Environment on the war’s environmental damage stand at $5.8 billion.5 While existing legal protections need to be updated and strengthened, environmental destruction is already recognised as a war crime by the International Criminal Court, with a growing number of people calling for the indictment of the Russian leadership over “environmental war crimes”.
Given the current situation, concepts like environmental policies in the eastern neighbourhood or EU-Russia “green”
cooperation may appear like fiction. However, this very issue could offer an important opportunity for the necessary resumption of political relations with Russia at the end of the conflict. If the Kremlin stops its aggression against Ukraine and some degree of cooperation between Brussels and Moscow resumes, the EU ought to prioritise environmental issues. At the moment, this may be the only possible – and necessary – area for cooperation in light of the shared interests in this field and the transnational nature of the matter.
At the same time, the environmental dimension of EU foreign policy vis-à-vis the ex-Soviet space should also be intensified.
First and foremost, this applies to policies aimed at the Eastern Partnership countries, many of which are deeply integrated in the EU single market, but also in Central Asia.6 This is crucial in order not to make the EU’s Green Deal and environmental foreign policy yet another casualty of this war.
4 Y. Zasiadko, Polluted to Death: The Untold Environmental Consequences of the Ukraine War, ISPI Commentary, ISPI, 29 May 2022.
5 Ibid.
6 See E. Tafuro Ambrosetti, “The ‘Climate Dimension’ of EU Foreign Policy in the Neighbourhood”, Valdai Discussion Club, 17 December 2020; K. Pishikova (2022).