The Development of Waqf Bank Organizational Structure Model in Malaysia
Mohd Asyraf Yusof1*, Muhammad Ridhwan Ab.Aziz2, Fuadah Johari2, Yusof Ramli3, Mohamad Sahizam Musa4
1 Academy of Contemporary Islamic Studies, Universiti Teknologi Mara Cawangan Pahang, Kampus Raub, 27600 Raub, Pahang, Malaysia
2 Faculty of Economics and Muamalat, Universiti Sains Islam Malaysia, Bandar Baru Nilai, 71800, Negeri Sembilan, Malaysia
3 Academy of Contemporary Islamic Studies, Universiti Teknologi Mara, 40450 Shah Alam, Selangor, Malaysia
4 Faculty of Administrative Science and Policy Studies,Universiti Teknologi Mara Cawangan Pahang, Kampus Raub, 27600 Raub, Pahang, Malaysia
*Corresponding Author: [email protected]
Accepted: 15 May 2021 | Published: 1 June 2021
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Abstract: This paper aims to develop the new Waqf Bank (WB) organizational structure model in Malaysia. This paper has employed qualitative methods and exploratory research design on the study overall. This research has a conceptual lens (its research framework) that overlays the semi-structured interviews (data collection method). Semi-structured interviews were conducted with waqf institutions employees, Islamic bank employees, and Muslim scholars to develop the WB structure. This study result reveals the newly developed WB organization structure model applied in Malaysia. When the structure is applied adequately in Malaysia, it allows substantial monetary improvement in the current economic system. This study has profound implications for the Malaysian government and policymakers who look for a solution in empowering Muslim economic development. Therefore, poor Muslims' impact will enhance life quality through the WB financing scheme. The research regarding WB covers a wide range of academic disciplines and a new research area in the academic world. This research area gives significant new findings and developed numerous new theories regarding WB; thus, gives new contribution of knowledge to the academic world.
Keywords: Islamic finance, Waqf Bank Organizational Structure, Muslims economic development, Islamic economics
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1. Introduction
Today we live in an age where financial institutions have emerged and become the backbone for economic development where such an institution has witnessed a tremendous economic cycle (Zarrouk et al., 2017). That entails the continuous acquisition of new branch of knowledge. There is a growing demand for almost every living standard level in acquiring financial stability (Huda et al., 2018). Malaysia today faces the challenge of the cost of living rising pattern and Islamic financial institutions role in solving this matter (Tan et al., 2018).
On the other hand, the study shows that waqf institutions can empower Muslims' economic development (Darus et al., 2017; Mahat et al., 2015). Economic development can be defined as efforts to improve society's economic welfare and superiority for an organization by constructing and preserving employments and supporting or growing incomes and the tax base.
Development of economics is a division of economics that focuses on developing countries' economies (Daron Acemoglu, 2006).
Economic development can expand economic growth by improving education, health, domestic and international policies, working conditions, and market conditions in developing nations. It reviews both macroeconomic and microeconomic factors involving the structure of a nation's growing economy and how it can produce adequate domestic and international economic progress (Philippe Aghion, Philippe Bacchetta, Romain Ranciere, 2009).
Apart from that, the combination between Islamic financial institution and Waqf institution, which is a philanthropy based institution said to be the best solution for acquiring financial stability due to the nature of these two financial institutions (Hachicha & Ben Amar, 2015;
Rawashdeh et al., 2017; Wajdi Dusuki, 2008). This study, however, will focus on how to develop the new WB structural model, which has to be in line with shariah law.
WB is not being established yet in Malaysia. However, previous literature regarding WB found that most of the scholars in the waqf area agreed with the establishment of WB (Muhammad Ridhwan Ab Aziz, Fuadah Johari, 2013; Mohammad, 2015; Ridhwan et al., 2017; Sarea, 2019). WB can be defined as an Islamic banking institution that applied waqf practice in its whole banking operation. WB uses cash waqf as their capital, and this bank's profit was channeled to waqf beneficiaries (Muhammad Ridhwan Ab. Aziz & Yusof, 2014). Establishing WB is for Muslim economic development (Mohammad, 2015).
2. Literature Review
A systematic search of WB organizational structure has been performed based on the keyword
*waqf*, *waqf bank* and *waqf bank organizational structure*. The searching process done by using six databases: Sage Journals, Wiley Online Library, EBSCOhost, Science Direct, Scopus, and Emerald Premium. As a result of the search, 53 hits (articles) are found and only 13 articles were selected due to the related field of study.
Waqf Bank Organization Structure from Current Literature
The studies of organization structure being reported by literature since the 1970s. For instant, there was a study regarding roles and set on organization structure (Bassett & Carr, 1996).
Also, there was a study on an examination on strategic planning on organization structure (Drago, 1997), the innovation paradigm on organization structure (Abouzeedan & Hedner, 2012), and among the most contemporary literature regarding organization structure was transformational leadership style in relation with organization structure (Ridhwan, Aziz, &
Yusof, 2014; Ridhwan, Aziz, Yusof, et al., 2014; Yusof et al., 2013).
As reported in the literature, the organization structure should be formal (Sills, 1973). WB structure should also be a formal structure that depicts the well-managed organization organized by those responsible for managing the organization. While in the study context, the researcher should create the WB structure that supports WB organization to meet its specified objective (Ab. Aziz & Yusof, 2019; M R Ab Aziz & Yusof, 2014; Muhammad Ridhwan Ab Aziz, 2014; Yusof & Ab. Aziz, 2015).
As the researcher come across the literature regarding the Islamic banking structure, the researcher found that the Islamic banking structure can be divided into two main sections. The first section is the management team, and the second is the operation team. The top
management team consists of the shareholder of the bank, the board of directors (BODs), the shariah advisory board (SAB), and the chief executive officer (CEO) (Alam, 2013; Bukair &
Abdul Rahman, 2015; Hakimi et al., 2018). Under the management team come the second section of the Islamic banking structure: the operation team. Under the operation team, the Islamic banking structure has a consumer banking department, corporate banking department, and bancassurance department (Mohsin, 2005).
3. Methodology
This paper endeavors to have a primary purpose: escalating knowledge and understanding WB organizational structure in Malaysia. This paper has employed qualitative methods and exploratory research design on the study overall. This research has a conceptual lens (its research framework) that overlays the semi-structured interviews (data collection method).
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with waqf institutions employees, Islamic bank employees, and Muslim scholars to develop the WB structure. The semi-structured interview will continue until this study meets the data saturation point. Emails and messages via online social media such as Facebook, Twitter, and Gmail were sent to the interviewee before the interview session started. This matter will give the interviewee a general idea regarding the interview context and prepare some relevant answers. Interviewees are only selected if they are waqf institutions, Islamic bank institution employees, and Muslim scholars.
4. Discussion and Findings
The Management Team
This paper will explain the Islamic bank management team section underneath this subsection.
This paper will briefly explain the management team's component, which was a shareholder of the bank, BODs, SAB and CEOs to understand this subject matter.
Shareholders
In WB organizational structure, the shareholder could be a person or an institution, including a corporation, SIRC, Government Link Companies (GLC), and any other shariah compliance companies. Shareholders of WB were legitimately detached from the bank itself (Uchechukwu Nwoke, Collins Chikodi Ajibo, 2017). Therefore, the WB shareholders were not liable for any debt that the bank made (Gillman & Hogan, 1999). Subjected to the applicable company act, shareholders of WB may have the right to sell their shares, to vote for director nominations, to vote for mergers of the bank, the right to access certain information of the bank, and to purchase a new share (Hüpkes, 2009).
The shareholder is the owner of an organization (Mygind, 2009), which means the shareholder has ownership right of an organization share of stock (Utama et al., 2017). However, shareholder roles in an organization were minimal (Holbeche, 2018; Ietto-Gillies, 2017;
Ramaswamy, 2018). As the shareholder have neither the right nor responsibility towards the management of the organization, there was specific right of the shareholder towards the organization (Clarke et al., 2018; Duquette & Ohrn, 2018; Ezzamel et al., 2008; Oyewumi et al., 2018; Sikka & Stittle, 2017).
As mention earlier, the shareholders have the right to obtain information and examine the corporate organization report concerning the corporate governance and financial position (Duquette & Ohrn, 2018; Ezzamel et al., 2008; Gao & Ma, 2010; Li & Hwang, 2018; Nguyen
& Phan, 2018; Oyewumi et al., 2018; Prevost et al., 2016). An organization must disclose such
information to the shareholder in systematizing reporting standard (Ghouma et al., 2018;
Haynes, 2018; Nyahas et al., 2018; Saini & Singhania, 2018).
Moreover, all Islamic banks, including WB and other corporations, must share stock known as common stock representing ownership of the bank (Ertimur et al., 2006; Lin & Chang, 2017).
This type of ownership gives the organization's director the right to vote at its annual general meeting (Cullinan et al., 2017; Lin & Chang, 2017). A committee for nominating the director provides a list of recommended names for the director seat (Abdullah & Ismail, 2016; Ali C.
Akyol & Cohen, 2013; Dato et al., 2018; Lassoued, 2018; Qunyong, 2017). In some cases, shareholders may also nominate their contestants to the board, which the shareholders need to justify their nomination (Berezinets et al., 2017).
Apart from that, shareholders also have to approve every fundamental change in an organization before executing. The fundamental changes include mergers, sale of assets, dissolution, chances in governing documents, and amendments to the organization's charter and law (Dahya et al., 2016; Nyombi, 2015). Other than that, majority shareholders have the right to call upon special meetings to vote for fundamental change to the corporation (Lafarre, 2017).
On the other hand, some of the literature reported that shareholder control over corporate governance would result in management efficiency (Liu & Tang, 2011). The shareholder may provide the management team's solution, and the high turnover of senior managers indicates that shareholders play an essential role in the management team's intensive care (Furrer et al., 2007). Studies conducted by Clark, McGill, Saito, & Viehs (2015) indicate that shareholder engagement in an organization's management will result in better performance.
Board of Directors (BODs)
In recent literature, BODs can be defined as a group of people recognized to cooperatively oversee an organization's activities (Beckman, 1998). In the context of WB studies, BODs works and collaborate alongside with shariah advisory board (Bukair & Abdul Rahman, 2015).
BODs were the highest member of the Islamic bank's management team (Ginena, 2014), giving them the right to appoint the Islamic bank's CEOs (Brinkhuis & Scholtens, 2018; Cook &
Glass, 2015).
According to Kamardin & Haron, (2011), BODs role can be classified into four dimensions:
monitoring role, strategic role, service role, and resource dependency role. Nevertheless, some of the literature highly emphasized that BODs should monitor their role (García Lara et al., 2017). Thus, a corporation such as WB needs the practice of sound and effective monitoring and management skills by BODs to evade company assets' exploitation by the majority shareholders without regard for the minority shareholders (Kim et al., 2014).
On the other hand, the role of BODs can be generalized to several scopes: planning and setting- up corporate governance (Mohamad-Yusof et al., 2018). Other than that, BODs also have to appoint and terminating CEOs (Cai & Nguyen, 2018; Hornstein, 2013); managing resources (Adams et al., 2015); analyzing corporate budget, and monitoring corporate performance (Allam, 2018; Assenga et al., 2018; Guizani et al., 2018; Marchini et al., 2018; Mardnly et al., 2018; Rathnayaka Mudiyanselage, 2018; Saini & Singhania, 2018; Ziyae, 2018).
More than a few literary works provide evidence on Islamic bank BODs performance, BODs size, and its relation with Islamic bank performance (Belkhir, 2009; Bukair & Abdul Rahman,
2015; Farag et al., 2018). The performance of BODs is crucial to improve the Islamic banking sector (Ajili & Bouri, 2018b; Ghayad, 2008). Otherwise, the poor performance of BODs will result in poor performance of Islamic banks (Chen et al., 2018; Green, C. and Homroy, 2015;
Hauser, 2018; Ii & Patel, 2017; Owen & Temesvary, 2018).
Shariah Advisory Board
Shariah-compliant product is the main reason for the Islamic banking system (Saqib et al., 2016). SAB certifies all Islamic banking products as shariah-compliant (Nomran et al., 2018).
Therefore, all Islamic banks in Malaysia, including WB, must have SAB for advising them on their product and banking activities concerning shariah matters (Lujja et al., 2016). On the other hand, a SAB member consists of specialist Islamic scholars, particularly experts in fiqh al-Muamalat (Grassa, 2013).
One of the roles of SAB was product screening, which involves examining the Islamic banking product thoroughly to ensure the product offered by an Islamic bank is shariah-compliant (Adam & Bakar, 2014). Other than that, SAB also has to ensure that the Islamic banking system operates in line with shariah law and shariah principle (Ayedh & Echchabi, 2015). SAB was part of the internal shariah governance structure, which improves the shariah credibility of Islamic banks (Khalid et al., 2017). SAB is carrying the responsibility of directing, supervising, and reviewing the Islamic banking institutions to ensure adherence to Islamic law (Ajili &
Bouri, 2018a; Amalina Wan Abdullah et al., 2013).
There were several issues regarding SAB reported in the literature. For instant, the issue of fatwa shopping on Islamic financial products. The practice of fatwa shopping involves the issuance of a fatwa, which testifies that the banking product complies with shariah law even though there was no substantial evidence on such fatwa (Oseni, 2017). Other than that, Grassa, (2015) discusses the weak supervision of SAB in the Islamic banking system, which will affect the customer trust toward the Islamic banking system. Moreover, there was trust between stakeholders with SAB and its relation with Islamic banks' performance (Al-Nasser Mohammed & Muhammed, 2017).
CEO of Waqf Bank
CEOs' primary responsibilities include corporate major decision making, handling the whole tasks and assets of a company, leading the communication between the BODs and corporate operations, and being the image of WB (Herman Aguinis, Luis R. Gomez-Mejia, Geoffrey P.
Martin, 2018). A CEO frequently has a position on the BODs; sometimes, they are even the corporation's chair (Chaminda Wijethilake, Athula Ekanayake, 2016).
In general, a CEO's role varies from one corporation to another (Herman Aguinis, Geoffrey P.
Martin, Luis R. Gomez-Mejia, Ernest H. O'Boyle, Jr., 2018). This matter depends on the corporation's overall structure and size (Denis Cormier, Pascale Lapointe-Antunes, 2016). In a relatively small corporation, the CEO habitually has a considerable more hands-on role in the corporation, participating and making most corporate decisions, including simple tasks, such as hiring staff (Teksten et al., 2005). However, in a more giant or more enormous corporation, the CEO naturally deals with the higher-level corporation strategy and coordinating its overall development and progress. Other tasks are passed on to other directors or managers in various departments (Mohammad Jizi, 2018).
Figure1: Waqf Bank Management Team
5. Conclusion and Recommendation
This paper aimed to establish the WB structure model in Malaysia. These have led this paper to study various knowledge fields to fulfil in the academic world. These fields include waqf, WB organizational structure, WB Shareholder, WB BOD, WB SAB and WB CEOs. Further study in the areas of WB is indeed essential to venture. The establishment of WB will need additional post-study research for it to be successful. Other areas requiring further studies are the legal aspects in banking practice and cash waqf funds for the Muslim economic development. Due to cash waqf's potential in developing the Muslim economy, fostering entrepreneurship through cash waqf investment is also an excellent topic to study.
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