T Constitutionalizing Sharia: Identity and Independence of Islamic Politics Among Students

(1)

Vol. 21 No. 2, 2022: 195-206

ISSN: 1412-6109; E-ISSN: 2580-2763

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.31958/juris.v21i2.6954

Constitutionalizing Sharia: Identity and Independence of Islamic Politics Among Students

Khamami Zadaâ,*, Mundzier Supartaâ, Bambang Ruswadiâ, Harapandi Dahri^b, Mualimin Mochammad Sahid^c

a State Islamic University Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, Indonesia

b Kolej Universiti Perguruan Ugama Seri Begawan (Kupusb), Brunei Darussalam

c Universitas Sains Islam Malaysia, Malaysia

*Corresponding Author: [email protected]

Recieved: 21-09-2022 Revised: 13-11-2022 Accepted: 18-11-2022

Abstract: The emergence of Islamic political aspirations in Indonesia always occurs along with the development of national politics. It is delivered not only by Islamic elites from Islamic parties and Islamic movements but also by university students. This study explores the Islamic political aspirations of Islamic High School (STAI) students with a focus on the basic issues of the state, Islamic law, political system (democracy/Islamic caliphate), and the way to deliver the aspirations.

This is quantitative research in which the data were collected through a representative survey in each province involving 222 university students in the fifth semester in the provincial capital, as the samples were allocated disproportionately to each selected university. This quantitative study was strengthened by qualitative data that were extracted by interviewing the directors of STAI in Padang, Semarang, Jambi, Kupang, Banjarbaru, and Samarinda. The findings of this study showed that Islamic political aspiration among university students was about the aspiration to implement Islamic law as state law in the Islamic caliphate system. The university students did not want democracy as a political system that implements Islamic law. These Islamic political aspirations are not delivered through violence but are expressed constitutionally. This Islamic political aspiration is built by integralistic/conservative religious identity and political independence/autonomy of university students.

Keywords: Aspiration for independence; Islamic Law; Religious Identity; Islamic High School (STAI).

Introduction

he aspirations of Islamic politics in Indonesia might be endless as the state does not totally enforce Islamic law and asserts it as an Islamic state. Robert W. Hefner stated that since the 1940s in Indonesia, many militant Islamist groups have promoted Islamic law (Hefner, 2012: 61-69). It becomes no wonder then if Islamic groups fight for the inclusion of Islamic law and an Islamic state in the constitution intentionally to make Muslims able to practice sharia and establish an Islamic state (Effendy, 1998; Hossein, 2007; Rozi, 2015; Salim, 2008; Syahbandir, 2022).

Throughout the history of drafting the constitution, efforts to fight for sharia and an Islamic state in the constitution have always never been fruitful. In the span of four constitutional debates in 1945, 1949, 1950, and 1999-2002, the drafters of the constitution constantly debated the basis of the state, Islamic law and an Islamic state. Though a country with a Muslim majority population and a large influence of Muslim elites and Islamic organizations, Islamic law has never been successfully fought for to be accommodated in the constitution. Even the strengthening of political Islam with the emergence of Islamic parties in the post-1999 political reform was not able to convince the drafters of the constitution to accommodate Islamic law in it. The strong pressures from Islamic organizations, such as the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), the Indonesian Mujahidin Council, and Hizbut Tahrir to accommodate Islamic law in the constitution has never been on horizon (Hossein, 2007; Kolig, 2005; Sabir & Nazaruddin, 2021; Salim & Azra, 2003). The

T

(2)

significant determination of Western laws that have been adopted by national law for a long period, the existence of customary law; which the community has long practiced, and the political influence and community culture have made it difficult for the aspirations of Islamic law and the establishment of an Islamic caliphate in Indonesia (Norcahyono, 2019: 31).

The aspiration of Islamic law and the establishment of an Islamic state still continue regardless of failure to draft the constitution. The political situation in Indonesia and the aspiration of the Muslim community have provided a space for Islamic law to be officially implemented (Maula, 2014). Several Islamic movements continue to strive for Islamic law as state law (Munabari, 2018). The orientation to enact Islamic law into state law is based on strengthening Islam as a political consciousness supported by religious sentiments. Politics grown with the spirit of religion has made the public enthusiastic about welcoming the Sharia movement as a more comprehensive state legal system. In fact, though Indonesia officially is not a religious state, sharia has been accommodated in the Indonesian legal system. There is no obstacle to absorbing sharia values and norms into positive law as long as they do not conflict with the Constitution (Syarif, 2017). Though the state has adopted marriage law, sharia economic law, halal product guarantees, and Jinayah (Islamic criminal law), the Islamic movement still aspires to Islamic law and wants an Islamic caliphate (Munabari, 2020). However, Islamic law as state law and the Islamic caliphate as a political system must adapt to the democratic political process involving the legislature, executive, and social groups (Ikhwan, 2018). Then, it is not wondering if the orientation of Islamic law in a number of regions must be affiliated with executives from secular parties (Buehler, 2013; Syahnan & Ja’far, 2021).

Similarly, at the national level, the formalization of Islamic law requires the democratic process involvement.

Many studies on the aspirations of the Sharia and Islamic state among the academic community have been conducted. Commonly, these studies are categorized into religious beliefs, focused on state ideology, Islamic law, and the form of the state. The aim is to measure radicalism among university students, lecturers, and university leaders. Say, Mark Woodward et al. (Woodward, 2010) found a correlation between radicalism and Islamic education in Indonesia. The students on secular campuses are seen as vulnerable to being indoctrinated by the discourse of extremism through the process of re- Islamization and rational Islamic teachings. This is in line with the study of Dina Afrianty (2012), and Wahid Khozin (2013) stated that Islamic higher education institutions in Indonesia have become appropriate for religious extremists, carried out by educated people with higher education by taking science and informatics studies (Gambetta & Hertog, 2016).

Nevertheless, private higher institutions such as STAI (Islamic High School) have never been a concern among researchers. The characteristics of higher institutions that are relatively independent of the state policies become important since STAI is bound to the foundation managed by the community. This study explored university students' aspiration towards enforcing Islamic law and the state establishment (Islamic caliphate).

Literature Review

Clifford Geertz (1973) included religion as a cultural system as a symbol in designing power and moving individuals. The perspective of Geertz's about the symbol then has made the interpretation of religion be placed in the religious symbols. In the case of Islam, the terminology of Islamic law and Islamic state/Islamic caliphate refers to religious symbols, which are then crystallized in an integralistic- conservative, radical, and secular religious ideology.

Integralistic-conservative religious ideology emphasizes the unification of religion and state in which the state is obliged to enforce Islamic law entirely and asserts itself as a religious state. This integralistic paradigm then emerges the state-religious ideology (Piscatory, 1986) in which state or political affairs are believed to be the manifestations of God's words. Peter Clarke (Clarke, 2009) included this integralistic ideology in the conservative religion category faced with liberalism. This ideology simultaneously seeks to preserve religious teachings and promotes to return to traditional values (Muller,

(3)

2006). The main issue being fought for is Islamic law as state law and the Islamic/caliphate state as a political system. This integralistic-conservative ideology is vulnerable to change into radical religious ideology (Farmer, 2005; Rossides, 1998), which is not only based on religious roots but also oriented to violence (P. McLaughlin, 2012; Zada, 2002).

In contrast to integralistic-conservative religious ideology, the secular-liberal paradigm emphasizes the separation between religion and the state (Binder, 1998). This paradigm refutes the unification of religion and state. State and religion should be separated and should not interfere with each other. Based on this ideology, applied law refers to the law agreed by the community as part of a social contract without being correlated to religious (Thohir, 2009).

The conflict of integralistic-conservative-radical and secular-liberal religious ideology then creates a third group, i.e. those arguing that religion regulates any state affairs, though only in the form of general principles (Abdillah, 2004). This group is often referred to as having a substantialism ideology. In it, state law and state form principally have been regulated by religion. Still, regulation and implementation techniques are left to humans based on the historical context and challenges of the times.

In this case, Islamic political aspirations in the form of a state basis, sharia and the Islamic caliphate are determined by one's religious background in relation to religion and state (Zada & Irfan, 2021).

Finnemore and Jurkovich (Finnemore & Jurkovich, 2020) explained that aspiration refers to an essential component of political life, which shapes political action; articulates goals, hopes and aspirations, affirms identities and values, generates motivation and facilitates agreement on many issues. Aspiration certainly is the highest goal that is dynamic, flexible, and involves imagination (Roosevelt, 2012).

In the conception of Caroline S. Hart (2016), aspiration is oriented to the future, driven by conscious and unconscious motivation, and indicates individual or group commitment towards a certain track or endpoint. Hart (2012) found that aspiration is done simultaneously, is relational, dynamic, and often associated with other aspirations owned by individuals or other people. It is multi-dimensional, varying in importance and timescale. Aspiration might be latent (unarticulated, evolving, abstract and uncertain) and might emerge immediately or gradually. It can be institutional, political, legal, and shared by family members.

Aspiring for the truth is the identity and values being fought for. In contrast, an individual's identity cannot be separated from religion (Zada & Irfan, 2021). Thus, aspiration is correlated to the identity of an individual's religious ideology, either the integralistic-conservative-radical ideology or the secular-liberal ideology. The values presented in an individual's aspiration is determined by the commitment of the religious ideology that has been formed in his/herself, though it is dynamic or unfixed.

Method

This is field research using the quantitative method at a national scale, and the data were collected in each province by taking a number of samples in the capital of each province. The data collection was held simultaneously from 17 November 2018 to 10 December 2019 in all research sites. The research population refers to the active university students in the fifth semester in STAIN who have two or more study programs. Based upon the Directorate of Islamic High Education data of 2018-2019, there were 24 capitals of a province with STAI with two or more study programs. Of 24 provinces as the population target, 12 provinces were selected randomly. In each province, one city was selected, i.e. the capital of the province. The selection of the province's capital was based upon the consideration of the university students' heterogeneity, similar to the urban people's heterogeneity. Based on the official website of the Ministry of Religion (http://emispendis.kemenag.go.id), accessed on 3-10 October 2018, there are 644 PTKIS with 312,208 university students in Indonesia. The total number of samples used in this study was 222 students of 5^th semester who were disproportionately allocated to each selected university. Sampling in this survey was conducted using Stratified Multistage Sampling with a confidence level of 95%. This quantitative research was strengthened by qualitative data, which were gained by interviewing the directors of STAI and lecturers in Padang, Semarang, Jambi, Kupang, Banjarbaru, and Samarinda.

(4)

Results and Discussion Aspiration of State Ideology

The basis of the state refers to a political ideology agreed upon by a state. Indonesia has agreed that Pancasila becomes its ideology as the basis for state administration. This ideology has always experienced a serious debate in every change of the constitution. Islamic groups often voice the replacement of Pancasila as the basis of the state with Islamic ideology (Ahyar, 2015). Pancasila has also started to be questioned by a number of Islamic groups, which are carried out in an undisclosed manner. University students are one of the important components in addressing the basis of the Indonesian state.

Table 1. Pancasila as the state ideology in accordance to the Islamic values No Category Frequency Percentage

1 Strongly Disagree 30 13.51%

2 Disagree 13 5.86%

3 Undecided 6 2.70%

4 Agree 27 12.16%

5 Strongly Agree 146 65.77%

Total 222 100%

As shown in the table above, 65.77% of all respondents or 146 respondents answered strongly agree that Pancasila as the state ideology has been suitable with Islamic values and 27 respondents or 12.16%

answered agreed. Thirty respondents (13.51%) and 13 respondents (5.86%) respectively answered strongly disagree and disagree with the statement. In contrast, 6 respondents or 2.70% answered undecided. This data showed that many students still believe Pancasila is not in accordance with Islam.

The general tendency of students to declare Pancasila as the basis of the state in accordance with Islam is their inclusive and moderate political aspiration. Pancasila is placed as a political ideology that unites the diversity of Indonesia. It is not only seen as the result of the consensus of the founders of the Indonesian nation and is capable of accommodating the existing various identities in Indonesia, but also is given religious legitimacy that Pancasila is not conflicting with Islamic teachings (Saifullah, 2018; Arman, 2018) and is accepted as the state ideology since its precepts have been based on Islamic religious arguments. Given the strong and authoritative religious arguments such as the Holy Qur'an and Hadiths, the belief of Muslims to accept Pancasila becomes stronger. Islam can be in harmony with the Indonesian state, which is based on Pancasila as what is contained in Pancasila is also contained in the Islamic teachings (Rauf, 2020; Falak, 2019). Hence, Pancasila does not need to be contradicted by Islam as it is a state ideology in line with Islamic teachings (Rahma, 2018; Limbong, 2018; Sapa, 2018). In Pancasila, there are no precepts leading to the system of shirk or thawut. Pancasila is messages in accordance with the universal values of Islam (Arman, 2018). The mention of the word "God" in the formulation of the first precepts of Pancasila reflects the tolerance of the Pancasila formulators from the Islamic group to accommodate all religions and beliefs in Indonesia (Waliman, 2018).

Table 2. Pancasila should be maintained as the ideology of the state No Category Frequency Percentage

2 Disagree 14 6.31%

3 Undecided 8 3.60%

4 Agree 28 12.61%

(5)

Total 222 100%

As shown in the table above, 140 respondents or 63.06% of all respondents answered strongly agree that Pancasila as the state ideology should be maintained and 28 respondents or 12.61% answered agree.

31 respondents (14.41%) and 14 respondents (6.31%) respectively answered strongly disagree and disagree with the statement. While, 8 respondents or 3.60% answered undecided.

The data showed that most university students not only agreed with Pancasila as the basis of the state but also wanted to defend it. As the basis of the state, Pancasila is final and irreplaceable with other ideologies (Rauf, 2020). Anyone and any group who want to replace Pancasila will face the nation's consensus and be seen as opposing the state as an "unconstitutional act", though it is replaced with Islam (Limbong, 2018; Pratama et al., 2019). However, there were still many university students refuting Pancasila as an ideology, and even they did not want to defend it. In other words, they agreed to replace it with another ideology. The table below shows many students who wanted, and were even involved in the efforts to replace Pancasila as the basis of the state with Islam.

Table 3. Pancasila, as the basis of the state, is replaced with Islam No Category Frequency Percentage

2 Disagree 74 33.33%

3 Undecided 41 18.47%

4 Agree 54 24.32%

Total 222 100%

As shown in the table above, 35 respondents, or 15.77%, answered strongly agree that Pancasila as the basis of the state is replaced with Islam and 54 respondents or 24.32% answered agree. Eighteen respondents (8.11%) and 74 respondents (33.33%) respectively answered strongly disagree and disagree with the statement. While, 41 respondents or 18.47% answered undecided. This data showed a quite high number of students that were required to replace Pancasila with Islam.

Though the university students generally agreed with Pancasila as the basis of the state, many still wanted Pancasila to be replaced with Islam. Their exclusive and conservative view caused this tendency to understand the integralistic relationship between Islam and the state (Khatab & Bouma, 2007). As a consequence, Islam as a religion must be made as the state's ideology. In fact, the Ulama used to formulate Pancasila by considering the pluralistic conditions of Indonesia to prevent any separation and even conflict (Musyafak, 2019).

Table 4. Being involved in the attempt to replace the basis of the state of Pancasila with Islam No Category Frequency Percentage

4 Agree 52 23.42%

Total 222 100%

(6)

As presented in the table above, 28 respondents or 12.61% answered strongly agree to be involved in the attempt to replace the Pancasila as the basis of the state with Islam and 52 respondents or 23.42%

answered agree. 24 respondents (10.81%) and 69 respondents (31.08%) respectively answered strongly disagree and disagree. While, 49 respondents or 22.07% answered undecided. The data showed the high number of university students that required to be involved in the attempt to replace Pancasila with Islam, i.e. 28 respondents or 12.61% of total respondents answering strongly agree to be involved in the attempt to replace Pancasila as the basis of the state with Islam and 52 respondents or 23.42% answering agree.

The data above showed university students' tendency not to want to be involved in the attempt to replace Pancasila as the basis of the state. Some university students wanted to do so. These views showed the support of the university students for Pancasila as a state ideology that can unite the diversity of the Indonesian nation. There are no values in all the precepts in Pancasila contradict Islam; thus, there is no need to replace Pancasila with Islam. In fact, they refuted that Pancasila is contradicting with Islam.

The conception above showed that Islam and Pancasila, in their view, are not two contradicting ideologies. Islam is a complete teaching that puts forward the values of God, humanity, and society. The treasures of Islam have been put as the foundation of the ideology of Pancasila. Islam is not Pancasila, but its values have been included in Pancasila, which until now has been used as the ideology of the Indonesian nation (Fuad, 2012). This assertion is based on the idea that the values of Pancasila are in line with Islam without a need to make Indonesia an Islamic state formally. This thinking suggests that Islamic values can grow and develop in a country that does not declare itself as a country affiliated with Islam (Ruslan, 2013).

Aspiration of Islamic Law

Conflicts between Islamic law and state law in Indonesia still continue. Some community groups see that Islamic law must be the legal basis for the Indonesian state. Another group argued that Indonesian law has been in accordance with its context by considering that Indonesia is not an Islamic state (Fuad, 2012). This debate is still ongoing among Indonesian Muslims. The students of STAI have various perspectives in aspiring the implementation of Islamic law as the state law.

Table 5. Islamic law must be totally implemented though it is contradicting to the state law

No Category Frequency Percentage 1 Strongly Disagree 29 13.06%

4 Agree 54 24.32%

Total 222 100%

As seen in the table above, 64 students (28.83% of all students) answered strongly agree that Islamic law must be totally practised though it is contradicting to state law and 54 respondents or 24.32% answered agreed. 29 students (13.06%) and 41 students (18.47%) respectively answered strongly disagree and disagree with the statement. While, 34 university students or 15.32% answered undecided. This data showed the balance of the number of university students aspiring and refuting the total implementation of Islamic law.

The data above showed that most university students required the Islamic law to be applied in Indonesia – not partially as currently applied in Indonesia. This point of view showed the conservative- fundamentalist religious ideology (Tibi, 2000). This conception has been based upon the rights of Muslims to apply Islamic law, not being entrapped in conflict in the contradiction between state law and religious law (Arman, 2018), not creating issues (Zuliyanti, 2018) and being in line with the contexts and the necessities (Falak, 2019).

(7)

The application of Islamic law no longer targets family and economic law, but is directed at the application of Islamic criminal law at the national level. Regarding the replacement of Indonesian criminal law with Islamic criminal law, the university students' responses were also varied. However, many university students still wanted Indonesian criminal law replaced with Islamic law, as seen from the table below.

Table 6. Indonesian Criminal Law must be replaced with Islamic law through the legislation of the House of Representatives

4 Agree 49 22.07%

Total 222 100%

As presented in Table 6 above, 39 university students, or 17.57% answered strongly agree that the Criminal Law of Indonesia must be replaced with Islamic law through legislation of House of Representatives and 49 university students, or 22.07% answered agree. Twenty-one university students (9.46%) and 52 university students (23.42%), on the other hand, responded strongly disagreed and disagreed to the statement. While, 61 university students or 27.48% answered undecided.

Students' aspirations for the formalization of Islamic law were not carried out through violence. But the students wanted the formalization of Islamic law in a constitutional way by voicing their aspiration to the legislature authorized to formalize Islamic law into national law. This confirms that students still believe in the constitutional political mechanism for delivering their aspirations. The constitutionalization of Islamic law refers to an effort to make Islamic law a state through a democratic mechanism. This constitutionalization can be done through a formalistic and substantive approach. The aspirations of these students seem to lead to a formalistic approach by totally making Islamic Sharia to be state law - not a substantive approach through internalization of Islamic Sharia values into state law (Muhammadun &

Murjazin, 2004).

Aspiration of Islamic Caliphate

Democracy system has been in practice as a political system in Indonesia. Democracy as a political system has been a tendency of the globally modern country instead of another system, i.e. monarchy. In this case, in relation to the religion and state, this system is under a debate by Muslims. Even some Muslims view democracy as a kufr system that contradicts to Islam. This view is reflected in university students' tendency to view democracy as something contradicting Islam.

Table 7. Democracy is a system that contradicts Islam and must be replaced with the Islamic system

4 Agree 58 26.13%

(8)

Total 222 100%

As seen in the table above, 23 respondents, or 10.36% of total respondents answered strongly agree that democracy is a system that is contradicting to Islam and it must be replaced with Islamic system. 58 respondents, or 26.13% answered agree. Twenty-seven respondents (12.16%) and 62 respondents (27.93%) answered strongly disagree and disagree correspondingly. While, those answering undecided were 52 respondents or 23.42%.

The data above indicated that some university students stated that democracy is a political system in accordance with Islam. However, others stated that it contradicts Islam. The university students chose the Islamic state as the ideal form of the Indonesian state. This confirmed that the university students tended to select the Islamic state more than democracy.

Table 8. The ideal form of an Indonesia state is the Islamic state No Category Frequency Percentage

4 Agree 42 18.92%

Total 222 100%

Table 8 above shows that 69 respondents or 31.08% of total respondents answered strongly disagree that the ideal form of Indonesia state is the Islamic state. 42 respondents or 18.92% answered agree. 20 respondents (9.01%) and 55 respondents (24.77%) were with the answer strongly disagree and disagree respectively. While, 36 respondents or 16.22% answered undecided.

The data above showed that, according to university students, the Islamic state is an ideal system for Indonesia. With this data, it becomes clear that, for university students, democracy is not a system expected but an Islamic state. This is in line with the integralistic-religious ideology emphasizing the Islamic state as the political system taught in Islam (Al-Mawdudi & Abu, 1980)

Table 9. The system of the Islamic Caliphate must be enforced to replace democracy No Category Frequency Percentage

4 Agree 57 25.68%

Total 222 100%

Table 9 above shows that 32 or 14.41% of total respondents answered strongly agree that the Islamic caliphate system must be enforced to replace democracy. Fifty-seven respondents or 25.68% answered agreed with this statement. Twenty-five respondents (11.26%) and 69 respondents (31.08%), on the other hand, answered strongly disagreed and disagreed with the statement; 39 respondents or 17.57% were undecided.

Though many students stated that democracy is not contradicting Islam, some students stated that democracy should be replaced with an Islamic caliphate. This view emphasized the struggle for discourse

(9)

on the relationship between religion and the state among university students. On the one hand, they asserted that fundamentalist religious ideology with the aspirations of the Islamic caliphate (Mousalli, 19998) replaces the democratic system since democracy in Indonesia factually starts to exceed the maximum limits set by religion and the state (Nurdiana, 2018). On the other hand, they emphasized moderate religious ideology with support for the democratic system. This support is based on the fact that the democratic system practised in Indonesia has accommodated Islamic law in the national legal system, although in limited numbers, such as family law and sharia economic law. Therefore, democracy is considered suitable for Islamic teachings because the Al-Quran and hadiths teach about democracy (Agustina & Ratri, 2018); thus, democracy is not a kufr system (Agustina & Ratri, 2018). For this reason, the aspiration to build a caliphate system is seen as unsuitable in Indonesia (Ramli, 2018). Hence, there is no need to change democracy into a caliphate system (Harahap, 2018).

Aspiration and Identity of Religiosity

Religion is a cultural system as a symbol in designing power and moving individuals (Geertz, 1973) to interpret religion in religious symbols. In the next stage, these religious symbols struggle through the distribution of political aspirations in the power system such as the aspiration for the formalization of Islamic law as state law and preferences for a political system based on religion, such as the Islamic caliphate. In practice, this aspiration cannot be denied by the identity and values in which a person or individual believes. This is because aspirations articulate goals and expectations (Roosevelt, 2012) and affirm dynamic identities and values (Finnemore & Jurkovich, 2020). The aspirations voiced by STAI students are part of the representation of their identity and values in the formation of religious ideology.

The aspiration of STAI students principally expressed the Islamic law (Suma, 2020), particularly Islamic criminal law, totally applied as the state law in the political system of the Islamic caliphate. Even they wanted Indonesian criminal law to be replaced with Islamic criminal law. The religious identity shown by STAI students above showed an integralistic-conservative religious concept to apply Islamic law totally in the Islamic state (Piscatory, 1986). With the categorization formulated by Peter Clarke, this aspiration is a part of the conservative religion (Clarke, 2009). This Islamic political aspiration does not show liberal religious values and identity (Binder, 1998; Rossides, 1998).

Nevertheless, they refuted the implementation of Islamic law through violence. The implementation of Islamic law should be given to the rulers of the state through a constitutional democratic procedural mechanism. They also refuted the political aspirations by means of violence. In essence, the aspirations of university students who wanted sharia law to be implemented in Indonesia through constitutional means through democratic instruments reflect the moderate aspirations. Their aspirations cannot be categorized as radicalism as the conception of P. McLaughlin (P. McLaughlin, 2012) and Astrid Bötticher (Astrid, 2017), stating that radicalism has some elements of violence with certain targets in the form of opposition movements against the establishment. However, the desire to totally implement Islamic law and establish an Islamic caliphate shows an integralistic-conservative character (Clarke, 2009; Piscatory, 1986).

The aspirations of the university students were not relying upon the government bureaucracy but they were autonomous. As stated by Marilyn Friedman, autonomy as self-determination is related to personal identity (Friedman, 2003) so that each individual will make a choice in determining his/her aspirations based upon the personal identity inherent in him/her. Thus, religious ideology and political independence/autonomy have built the characteristics of STAI students' aspirations to Islamic political aspirations in terms of the state's basis, the implementation of Islamic law, and Islamic caliphate.

Conclusion

In Indonesian history, Islamic law and Islamic state have been the most consistent aspirations. The Islamic elites have always fought for Islam as the basis of the state, the formalization of Islamic law and the Islamic state. As one of the important political entities in Indonesia, STAI students commonly tend to make Pancasila the basis of the Indonesian state, enforcing Islamic law constitutionally, not through violence.

They fight for Islamic law in the national political system through the national political mechanism. This

(10)

Islamic political aspiration shows their religious concept, which is integralistic-conservative. The political aspirations they voice are generated from their independence/autonomy because they are not dependent upon the government's political policies refuting the Islamic caliphate.

Acknowledgement

The researchers would like to thank the Sub-Directorate for Research, Scientific Publications and Community Service, the Directorate of Islamic Higher Education, the Directorate General of Islamic Education, the Ministry of Religion of the Republic of Indonesia and the Center for Human Resources Empowerment of State Islamic University of Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta, for supporting the funding and research activities in 2018-2019.

Conflict of Interest

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

References

Abdillah, M. (2004). Demokrasi yang Religius: Membincang Kembali Konsep Demokrasi di Indonesia. Faculty of Sharian and Law.

Afrianty, D. (2012). Islamic Education and Youth Extremism in Indonesia. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, 7(2), 134–146. https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2012.719095

Agustina, P. W., & Ratri, A. K. (2018). Analisis Tindak Kekerasan Seksual Pada Anak Sekolah Dasar. Jurnal Kajian Teori Dan Praktik Kependidikan, 3(2).

Ahyar, M. (2015). Membaca Gerakan Islam Radikal dan Deradikalisasi Gerakan Islam. Walisongo: Journal of Religion-Social Research, 23(1), 1–26. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.21580/ws.23.1.220 Al-Mawdudi, & Abu, A.-A. (1980). al-Hukumah al-Islamiyah. al-Mukhtar al-Islami.

Binder, L. (1998). Islamic Liberalism: a Critique of Development Ideologies. The University of Chicago Press.

Buehler, M. (2013). Comparing Shari’a Politics in Two Indonesian Provinces. Comparative Politics, 1(1).

https://doi.org/. https://doi.org/10.5129/001041513807709347

Clarke, P. (2009). The Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of Religion. Oxford University Press.

Effendy, B. (1998). Islam dan Negara: Transformasi Pemikiran dan Praktik Politik Islam di Indonesia. Paramadina.

Farmer, B. (2005). American Conservatism: History, Theory and Practice. Cambridge Scholar Press.

Finnemore, M., & Jurkovich, M. (2020). The Politics of Aspiration. International Studies Quarterly, 64(4), 759–

769. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaa052 Friedman, M. (2003). Autonomy, Gender, Politics. Oxford University Press.

Fuad, F. (2012). Islam dan Ideologi Pancasila, sebuah Dialektika. Lex Jurnalica, 9(3).

Gambetta, D. D., & Hertog, S. (2016). Engineers of Jihad: The Curious Connection between Violent Extremism and Education. Pricenton University Press.

Geertz, C. (1973). The Interpretation of Cultures. Basic Books.

Hart, C. (2012). Aspirations, Education and Social Justice: Applying Sen and Bourdieu. Bloomsbury.

Hart, C. (2016). How Do Aspirations Matter? Journal of Human Development and Capabilities, 17(3).

https://doi.org/10.1080/19452829.2016.1199540

Hossein, N. (2007). Shari’a and Constitutional Reform in Indonesia. ISEAS.

Ikhwan, H. (2018). Fitted Sharia in Democratizing Indonesia. Journal of Indonesian Islam, 12(1).

https://doi.org/10.15642/JIIS.2018.12.1.17-44

Khatab, S., & Bouma, G. D. (2007). Democracy in Islam. Routledge.

(11)

Kolig, E. (2005). Radical Islam, Islamic Fervor, and Political Sentiments in Central Java, Indonesia. European Journal of East Asian Studies, 4(1). http://www.jstor.org/stable/23615642.

Maula, B. S. (2014). Islamic Law in a Secular State: A Study of the Distinctiveness of Islamic Law in

Indonesia. Journal of Sharia and Law, 48(1).

https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.14421/ajish.2014.48.1.%25p Mousalli, A. S. (19998). Islamic Fundamentalism: Myth and Realities. Ithaca Press.

Munabari. (2020). Islamic Revivalism in Indonesia: The Caliphate, Sharia, NKRI, Democracy, and the Nation-State. Political Journal, 5(2). https://doi.org/doi.org/10.7454/jp.v5i2.263

Munabari, F. (2018). The Quest for Sharia in Indonesia: The Mobilization Strategy of the Forum of Islamic Society. Cont Islam, 12, 229–249. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11562-018-0416-z

P. McLaughlin. (2012). Radicalism: A Philosophical Study. Palgrave Macmillan.

Piscatory, J. P. (1986). Islam in a Word of Nation-States. Cambridge University Press.

Pratama, S., Hidayat, A., & Aisyah, P. (2019). Mendorong Reformasi Parlemen Melalui Kekuatan Civil Society di Indonesia. Journal of Political Issues, 1(1), 50–62. https://doi.org/10.33019/jpi.v1i1.6 Roosevelt, K. I. (2012). Law’s Aspirations. Journal of Law & Interdisciplinary Studies.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1526

Rossides, D. W. (1998). Social Theory: Its Origins, History, and Contemporary Relevance. Generall Hall.

Rozi, A. B. (2015). Penerapan Syari’ah di Negara Modern (Analisis Ijtihad Pemikiran Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im). Al-Ihkam: Journal of Law and Social Institutions, 10(2).

https://doi.org/doi.org/10.19105/al-lhkam.v10i2.734

Ruslan, I. (2013). Membangun Harmoni Kehidupan Berbangsa dan Bernegara dengan Nilai Islam dalam Pancasila. Journal of TAPIS, 9(2). https://doi.org/doi.org/10.24042/tps.v9i2.1512

Sabir, M., & Nazaruddin. (2021). Manifestation of Sharia Regional Regulations in Managing Social

Morality. Sharia Scientific Journal, 20(2).

https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.31958/juris.v20i2.3276

Salim, A. (2008). Challenging the Secular State: The Islamization of Law in Modern Indonesia. University of Hawai Press.

Salim, A., & Azra, A. (2003). Shari’a and Politics in Modern Indonesia. ISEAS.

Suma, M. A. (2020). The Implementation of Sharia in Aceh: Between the Ideal and Factual Achievements.

Ahkam: Jurnal Ilmu Syariah, 20(1). https://doi.org/10.15408/ajis.v20i1.14704

Syahbandir, M. (2022). State and Islamic Law: A Study of Legal Politics on Zakat as a Tax Deduction in Aceh. Ahkam: Journal of Sharia, 22(1). https://doi.org/: 10.15408/ajis.v22i1.26200

Syahnan, M., & Ja’far, M. I. (2021). Ulama and Radicalism in Contemporary Indonesia: Response of Al Washliyah’s Ulama on Radicalism. Ahkam: Jurnal Ilmu Syariah, 21(1).

https://doi.org/10.15408/ajis.v21i1.19684

Syarif, N. (2017). Sharia in Secular State the Place and Models for Practicing Islamic Law in Indonesia.

Thohir, A. (2009). Relasi Agama dan Negara. HMI Commissariat of FPBS IKIP PGRI.

Tibi, B. (2000). Ancaman Fundamentalisme: Rajutan Islam Politik dan Kekacauan Dunia Baru. Tiara Wacana.

Wahid, K. (2013). Sikap Keagamaan dan Potensi Radikalisme Agama Mahasiswa Perguruan Tinggi Agama. Journal of Edukasia, 11(3).

Woodward, M. (2010). Muslim Education: Celebrating Islam and Having Fun as Counter-Radicalization Strategies in Indonesia. Perspectives on Terrorism, 4(4).

Zada, K. (2002). Islam Radikal: Pergulatan Ormas-ormas Islam Garis Keras di Indonesia (Teraju (ed.)).

(12)

Zada, K., & Irfan, M. N. (2021). Negotiating Sharia in the Secular State: A Case Study in France and Germany. Samarah: Journal of Family Law and Islamic Law, 5(1).

https://doi.org/10.22373/sjhk.v5i1.9753 Interviews

Interview with Ma’ruf Rauf, Vice Director I of STIT Kupang, 20 December 2018 at STIT Kupang Interview with Linda Suanti, Director II of STAIPIQ Padang, 19 December 2019.

Interview with Falak, a lecturer of STAI Semarang, 14 January 2019.

Interview with Arman, Director of STAI Al-Ma'arif Jambi, 24 December 2018.

Interview with Nurdiana, Vice Director III of STIT Kupang, 19 December 2018.

Interview with Nur Hayati, Vice Director of STAI Samarinda, 27 December 2018.

Interview with Diky Pranata Kusuma, Secretary of Study Program of STAI Al-Ma'arif Jambi, 24 December 2018.

Interview with Emmi Kholilah Harahap, a lecturer of STAI Al-Ma'arif Jambi, 24 December 2018.

Interview with Ramli a lecturer of STAI, Al-Falah Banjarbaru, 20 December 2018.

Interview with Imaniar Elfa Rahma, Director of Study Program of Madrasah Ibtidaiyah Teacher Education (PGMI) STAI Al-Falah Banjarbaru, 20 December 2018.

Interview with Masdar Limbong, a lecturer of STAI Al-Hikmah, Medan 26 December 2018.

Interview with Roni Hidayat Sapa, a student president of STAI Al-Hikmah, 27 December 2018.

Interview with Asep Saifullah, Secretary of BEM STAI Al-Falah Banjarbaru, Banjarmasin, 20 December 2018.

Interview with Ana Zuliyanti, Head of Public Relations, BEM STAI Al-Falah Banjarbaru, Banjarmasin, 20 December 2018.

Interview with Sukri Waliman, STAI Al-Falah Banjarbaru, Banjarmasin 27 December 2018.

Interview with Najahah Musyafak, lecture of STAI Semarang, 14 January 2019.