4. Analysis
4.2 The Metaphorical Structure of Moral Concepts
4.2.2 The Foundations of CMT
Although prima facie CMT seems intuitively appealing, previous challenges, along with the oppositions to be presented here, I contend, should be taken seriously. Logical analysis of the main theoretical claims of CMT uncovers flaws which should lead theorists to seriously reconsider the ways in which they approach the study of the human conceptual system henceforth. In order to demonstrate this, I will proceed by initially introducing the foundational claims of CMT in preparation for the criticisms to follow.
In the decades since it was first proposed, CMT has seen much development and elaboration by various scholars (Gibbs, 2017; Kövecses, 2020; Lakoff, 1996), but the foundational assumptions of the framework remain the same. It will, therefore, be instructive to start this study by first outlining and examining the theory as it was originally put by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson more than four decades ago. In Lakoff and Johnson’s Metaphors We Live By (1980), they begin by emphasizing the importance of understanding the machinations of human conceptualization and, vitally, claim that the human conceptual system is ‘metaphorical’ in nature. In doing so, they start to lay the foundations of Conceptual Metaphor Theory. Lakoff and Johnson state that:
“Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature. The concepts that govern our thought are not just matters of the intellect. They also govern our
everyday functioning, down to the most mundane details. Our concepts structure what we perceive, how we get around in the world, and how we relate to other people. Our conceptual system thus plays a central role in defining our everyday realities. If we are right in suggesting that our conceptual system is largely metaphorical, then the way we think, what we experience, and what we do every day is very much a matter of metaphor.” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p3)
Lakoff and Johnson state the foundations of the theory more concisely by explaining that ‘The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another’ (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). This cornerstone of CMT is still espoused in the contemporary literature. As Zoltan Kövecses puts it: ‘In the cognitive linguistic view, metaphor is defined as understanding one conceptual domain in terms of another conceptual domain’ (Kövecses 2010, p4). To elaborate, CMT states that the human conceptual system uses a ‘metaphorical’ structuring process in order to aid the understanding of abstract concepts. This means that relatively abstract conceptual domains (target domains) are understood in terms of more concrete conceptual domains (source domains); that in order for humans to grasp the target concepts, our minds must structure them by making use of simpler source concepts. The mental constructs born from this cognitive process are dubbed ‘conceptual metaphors’.
To give an example, a now classic and well-documented case of a conceptual metaphor originally proposed by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) is called ARGUMENT
IS WAR. Hence, it is claimed that the way in which we understand arguments is necessarily underpinned by our conceptual knowledge of war – we understand arguments in terms of war. CMT, therefore, makes a claim about the way in which the human conceptual system functions. It states that the mental representations of abstract concepts are determined by the form of the underlying concrete concepts to which they are mapped and that these mappings are the necessary cause of linguistic metaphor.
Lakoff and Johnson make this psychological hypothesis based on linguistic evidence gathered intuitively from everyday utterances that appear to make manifest widespread and systematic metaphors in certain areas of discourse. It seems, at first glance, apparent from analysis of figurative and metaphorical utterances that many natural language expressions make visible, or express, the underlying conceptual structures (conceptual metaphors) hypothesized. To offer an example, Lakoff and Johnson’s original evidence of the proposed conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR consists of the following collection of English language phrases:
ARGUMENT IS WAR Your claims are indefensible.
He attacked every weak point in my argument.
His criticisms were right on target.
I demolished his argument.
I've never won an argument with him.
You disagree? Okay, shoot!
If you use that strategy, he'll wipe you out.
He shot down all of my arguments.
(Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p4)
It is posited that the above utterances tell us something about the way in which we understand the concept ARGUMENT: that there is an underlying conceptual process which allows us to grasp the concept ARGUMENT by mapping it onto our concept of WAR. It is
held that the conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR is made explicit by linguistic metaphors and figurative language, such as those listed above, and that analysis of language, therefore, gives us a way of examining the constitution of abstract concepts; that conceptual structure can be ‘read off’ from our figurative utterances. Lakoff and Johnson explain this link between conceptual structure and language as follows: ‘The concept is metaphorically structured, the activity is metaphorically structured, and, consequently, the language is metaphorically structured’ (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p5). It is argued that there is a systematic relationship between conceptual structure and linguistic structure, such that figurative utterances provide a window to the mind. Such utterances are deemed to be the products of conceptual metaphors, this is made clear by Lakoff and Johnson:
Our conventional ways of talking about arguments [in terms of war] pre-suppose a [conceptual] metaphor we are hardly ever conscious of. (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980: p5)
Conceptual metaphor theorists have subsequently devoted much time to the analysis of metaphorical and figurative language in order to discover the underlying conceptual structures of the mind. This has led to the putative discovery of a multitude of conceptual metaphors at varying levels of generality, or schematicity, which include such examples as ARGUMENT IS WAR; RELATIONSHIPS ARE JOURNEYS and SEEING IS UNDERSTANDING – to mention just a few prominent examples.5 CMT does indeed have much intuitive appeal, but, beyond this, how solid are its foundational claims?