Chapter 2: Contextual Overview
1.10 Modern History of Somalia
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Harrar, and the Turks were hesitant to play an active role in Tajura and Zeila (Lewis, 2002, p.
44). This paved the way for Italy to occupy Eretria with the support of Britain.
The influence of British colonists in Somaliland increased day by day, especially their political relationship with Ethiopia when both countries signed a boundary agreement in 1897. Upon completing the Anglo-Ethiopian agreement, the latter completely controlled the Ogaden territory. Somalian people were deliberately ignored, neither consulted nor informed.
This was the seed of the disputes and stress of the Somali-Ethiopian relationship until the present time (Lewis, 2002).
The purpose of the Berlin Conference, also known as the Congo Conference, was to regulate European trade policy in west Africa and, most importantly, to regulate the colonists’ race to the black continent (Abrahm, 2007; Adebajo, 2010; Andreasson, 2005; Bain, 2012). In 1897, colonists advocated the partitioning of Great Somalia as the only way to secure imperial interests on the Somalian coast; consequently, Somalia was partitioned into five regions from north to south: French Somaliland, British Somaliland Protectorate, and the Italian colony of Somalia, British Northern Kenya, and Ethiopian Ogaden (Lewis, 2002; Lewis, 2004; William
& Cummings, 2015).
That partition agreement caused multiple disputes between the indigenous of Somaliland and Italian Somaliland territory. European forces could not resolve clan issues. The stress caused by the partitioning of great Somalia was the root of violence in Somalia (Lewis, 2002; Linke
& Raleigh, 2011).
This historical period profoundly shaped Somalia's present and future in terms of political and social aspects until today (Drake-Brockman, 1912; Jardine, 1923; Lewis, 2002). There is general agreement that it is difficult to control or govern Somali people due to their complex
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nature as Jardine described in Irish Man of Africa. This can be attributed to their aggressive nature and clan vanity (Jardine, 1923; Lewis, 2002).
In the context of Somalia, Sayyid Muhammed Abdillahi Hassan’s nationalist movement (1900-1920) was the first political movement against colonization powers in Somalia. Lewis (2002) described it as a national movement that was “culturally specific,” as when leader and followers “swim within” a social culture of myth, memories, traditions, and symbols
(English, 2008, p.40). Given this, cultural components are at the core of nationalism, notably, to demonstrate power and solidarity (Smith, 1999, 2010).
Smith also emphasized the nationalist role in history and the importance of constantly
reflecting on their lives by “modern nationalist intelligentsias” (Smith, 1999, p. 9). In spite of this, literature reviews have indicated that little or no attention has been given to the history of the Dervish movement as the most powerful national movement in Somaliland. Further discussion follows.
Sayyid Muhammad Abdille Hassan and the Dervish movement (1900-1920) The colonists in fragmented Somaliland strictly controlled nomad movements and,
subsequently, deprived Somalians of freedom in their own land and left them with limited resources of water used primarily for sheep and camels in the harsh environment. Most importantly, the Ethiopian (Abyssinia) power dominated the Ogaden region; furthermore, the missionary schools in Somaliland caused a real threat to the Somali religion.
Lewis (2002), Jardine (1923), and Dawson (1964) affirm that these factors strongly fired Somali patriotism. Shortly, in 1900, Sayyid Muhammad Abdille Hassan declared war against colonists in Somaliland, and Dervishism arose as the longest anti-colonial national
movement.
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In 1920, airplanes landed in Berbera and from there struck Dervish forts in Taleh. Sayyid Mohammed Abdillahi Hassan and the Dervishes were surprised by the new technology (Irons, 2013; Jardine, 1923; Lewis, 2002). Many Dervishes were killed, but Sayyid
Mohammed Abdillahi Hassan survived and went back to Ogaden where he shortly died of a disease. Some said it was influenza; others said malaria. This was the end of the longest anti- colonial movement in Africa. It was the first time in Africa that Britain had used air forces to bomb an anti-colonial movement.
Jardine (1923) asserts that the British administration deprived Somaliland of acquiring Gordon College as was planned, declining to give £20,000 to establish Gordon College in Somaliland. However, the HM government endorsed financial aid of £80,000 first and then
£20,000 to found Gordon and Kitchenent College in Sudan that significantly enhanced higher education in Sudan.
Also, shortly the British administration established a railway and telegraph of 900 miles to improve the economic condition in Sudan. The protectorate of Somaliland was far behind in social, educational, and medical services. As Jardine describes, "It is Somaliland's misfortune that her 21-year war left her with nothing but a few ramshackle Ford cars that have seen better days" (Jardine, 1923, p. 316).
Colonial Period in Somaliland 1920-1959
The British government lost millions of pounds in the war against the Dervish. The British administration, therefore, adopted an indirect policy to address territory internal affairs (Lewis, 2002) to prevent further confrontation with Somalis that might provoke violence as happened with Mohammed Abdillahi Hassan (Geshekter, 1985). Somalis described the British administration in Somaliland as a “deaf government that is not interested and does not want to spend money” (Geshekter, 1985, p.18). Subsequently, no serious attempt was made
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to improve Somali welfare (Lewis, 2002, Sheik-Abdi, 1977) in spite of the Berlin Act statement to improve social services in all African territories. Somalis criticised the passive approach and confirmed that British colonists failed to build even one railroad in Somaliland despite 75 years of colonization (Geshekter, 1985).
After forty years, Sayyied Muhammed Abdillahi Hassan’s national movement certainly influenced Somalis and inspired a new generation of nationalists such as Haji Farah Omar and his Islamic Association. The Haji Farah movement adopted a peaceful approach to attain protectorate social development (Lewis, 2002). Haji Farah Omar frequently approached the British administration to convey Somali desires and complaints (Lewis, 2002, Sheik-Abdi, 1977).
Somali educators were frustrated because of the discrimination policy that the Colonial administration imposed in the workplace (Lewis, 2002). Somali were deprived and jobs were offered to Indians and Arabs. Somali nationalists felt their “national aspiration” was widely ignored (Sheik-Abdi, 1977). This encouraged Haji Farah Omar and other nationalists to form a structured political configuration.
At the end of the Fascist regime, nationalists were active in all organizations and formed clubs and semi-clubs (Lewis, 2002). On 13 May 1943, the Somali Youth Club (SYC) was established in Mogadishu in the south. The SYC consisted of prominent religious men. The SYC significantly increased its membership to around 25,000 members in Somalia, British Northern Somaliland, Haud, Ogaden, and Kenya (Lewis, 2002). The SYC embraced the national aspiration of “Greater Somalia” and shared a national agenda consisting of: unity of Somalia; fighting clannism, tribal prejudice, and consolidating solidarity; providing education for youth; securing Somali interests; and adopting “Osmania” for writing the Somali
language. The SYC became significant and one of strongest clubs in Somalia (Lewis, 2002).
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In 1947, the SYC changed its name to the Somali Youth League (SYL). Members of the league took roles in the unification of Somalia and British Somaliland (Egal, 1968; Lewis, 2002; Sheik-Abdi, 1977).
Colonial powers became concerned about the growing SYL influence that might encourage opposition in the rest of the country. Consequently, authorities immediately banned the SYL from Ogaden, the Northern Frontier in Kenya. In spite of British actions in Somaliland, patriotic spirit led Somalis to form the Somali National League (SNL) (Lewis, 2002).
At the end of the Second World War in 1945, it was the Somalia misfortune to have a "new scramble" (Lewis, 2002, p.117). Upon Britain’s triumph in the Second World War, the British took back all the Italian colonies in Africa. Given this, the British controlled Italian Somaliland from February 1941 until March 1950 (Lewis, 2002; Reyner, 1960; Sheik-Abdi, 1977). British colonists signed a land demarcation agreement with Ethiopia which enabled Ethiopia to control Ogaden (Lewis, 2002; Reyner, 1960; Sheik-Abdi, 1977). Kenya also kept the Northern Frontier based upon a boundaries agreement with the colonist administration.
Abdi (1981), Egal (1968), Laitin (1976), Lewis (2002), Reyner (1960), and Sheik-Abdi (1977) agreed that Somalia's partitioned and colonial boundaries profoundly harmed Somalia's future and stability. Most importantly it "poisoned” Somalia's relationship with neighbours Ethiopia and Kenya.
When the Second World War ended in 1945 and Britain gained control over all Somali territories, the SYL found it a good time to approach the colonial administration for unifying Italian Somaliland with the rest of Somalia which would pave the way for the unity of Somalia into “Greater Somalia” (Lewis, 2002).
The Paris Peace Treaty was signed in 1947 and Italy was deprived of all colonies. The four main powers could not decide how to handle Italian Somaliland. Hence, the Council of
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Foreign Ministers sought advice from the UN. In 1948, the “Four-Power Commission”
representing the big powers—Britain, France, the USA, and the Soviet Union—who were active in the Horn affairs, visited Somaliland to explore the political situation and social circumstances (Lewis, 2002; Egal, 1968; and Sheik-Abdi, 1977).
In 1950, Italy sought to reclaim "trusteeship administration" control over its former colonies in Africa. The United Nations declined Italy's request, except for the former colony in Somalia (Tripodi, 1999). In February 1950, the UN endorsed Italy to have “trusteeship administration” for ten years in South Somalia. During the trusteeship period, Italy was to prepare Somalia for independence through economic development and social empowerment (Reyner, 1960; Lewis, 2002; Tripodi, 1999). On April 1, 1950, Italy officially took over authority from the United Kingdom. October 1950, (eight months later) Italy began its official ten years of trusteeship (Reyner, 1960; Lewis, 2002; Tripodi, 1999).
In 1954, when the British had authority over Reserving area and Haoud, it officially ceded Ogaden to Ethiopia. Egal (1968) and Lewis (2002) assert that the rich grazing lands in Ogaden were a valuable resource and contained several reservoirs. Abdi (1981), Egal (1968, p. 223), Lewis (2002), Lewis (1960), and Sheik-Abdi (1977) agree that Ogaden’s rich resources would cause troubles and disputes in Somalia's future. Egal describes it as "the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back" (Egal, 1968, p. 223).
The Italian government in order to prepare Somalia for independence launched a seven-year development plan (1954-1960). The Italian government established a "Territorial Council,"
consisting of Somali members and Italians keen to bring Somalia on board on future reform plans in Mogadishu. Most importantly, the council encouraged Arabic and Italian as the official languages of Education (Tripodi, 1999). Higher education was emphasized by the opening of a school of political and administration on 20 September 1950 that offered a
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three-year program. The Institute of Social Science, Economics, and Law opened in 1953.
Tripodi believes this paved the way for the establishment of Somalia's University (p. 368).
Tripodi (1999) asserts that in spite of Italy’s humble efforts, it could not fulfil the UN trusteeship mission, and the seven-year development plan achieved little in Mogadishu.
Tripodi assumes Italian national prejudice underpinned Italy's Trusteeship administration in Somalia in spite of political and economic constraints. In conclusion, Tripodi (1999) says that Somalia was far behind in accomplishing an autonomous economy and needed 15 to 30 years to develop a state economy.
Somalia Republic Independence
Abdi (1981) asserted that the desire of Somali at the time of independence was not to form a new state, but rather to re-continue Somali culture and history in an autonomous state that had political freedom. In December 1959, the United Nations decided to end the trusteeship mission in South Somalia on 2 December 1960. At the time, Somalia's economy remained poor, and there was limited access to education. Italy itself struggled to cope with the
economic challenge in Mogadishu. On November 9, 1959, the UN received Italy’s petition to
"advance" the independence date of South Somalia to July 1, 1960. Upon Italian economic constraints, the UN agreed to Italy’s request (Lewis, 2002; Reyner, 1960; Tripodi, 1999).
However, the UN confirmed that the region was not ready yet for independence. This decision had a tremendous effect on nationalists in Somaliland. On 6 April 1960, the legislative council collectively decided to have independence and unification with Somalia.
They willingly agreed on execution of these political plans to take place on 1 July 1960 (Laitin, 1979; Lewis, 2002, 1960).
In mid-April 1960, delegates from Somaliland met with government representatives in Mogadishu. By this time, the Somali constitution was completed successfully. The
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constitution stated instructions for the selection of president, prime minister, national government, and flag (Lewis, 2002). However, South Somalia and Somaliland would function individually economically and would have different judicial systems because of differences in political and social situations (Lewis, 2002).
On 2 May 1960, in a London conference and in the presence of Somali delegates, Britain happily disassociated Somaliland. Lewis (2002) asserts that Britain had always seen the protectorate as the “least rewarding of its possessions” (Lewis, 2002, p. 163). The colonial secretary shared with Somali representatives that 1 July 1960 was the proposed independence date for Somaliland. Somalis protested and caused serious trouble in protectorate. Britain advanced the proposed date to 26 June 1960 to prevent further confrontation. Five days later, South Somalia declared independence and joined Somaliland to form the Republic of
Somalia. Somali now considers this period as its golden age (Abdi, 1981; Egal, 1968; Farah, Hussein, & Lind, 2002; Dawson, 1964; Laitin, 1979; Lewis, 2002; 1960; Reyner, 1960;
Sheik-Abdi, 1977).
Military Regime of General Mohammed Siyad Baree, 1969-1990
Civilian leadership successfully implemented institutions and parliament. This type of practice impressed Western countries and great powers who assumed Somalia was
democratic and a stable state. Somalia's public was frustrated with the humble performance of Sharmake's civilian government and Muhammad Egal, the Prime Minster Laitin (1976). On 15 October 1969, President Abdul-Rashid was assassinated by one of his bodyguards (Dawson, 1964; Laitin, 1979/76; Lewis, 2002; Sheik-Abdi, 1977).
Internal disturbance paved the way for military officers who had a waited for a long time to step in through military coup in 1969 (Laitin, 1976; Lewis, 2002; Sheik-Abdi, 1981). Military forces controlled strategic points and suspended the constitution. Parliaments were disbanded,
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the supreme court and political parties were cancelled, the national assembly was closed. The SRC “caught and locked up” parliamentarians (Lewis, 2002; Sheik-Abdi, 1981). Officials announced governance by the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC).
On 1 November, the SRC revealed General Muhammad Siad Baree as the new president of the Supreme Council which consisted of two vice-presidents and 22 officers from different ranks (Lewis, 2002; Sheik -Abdi, 1977). Siad began his career in the police force and then he became a police inspector and a senior official in the British military administration who had been exclusively locally-recruited. During the Italian administration in 1950, General Siad had military training in Italy where he studied political philosophy (Lewis, 1982). Siad Baree planned strategically to attain the national agenda. Priority was given to resolve internal issues of the poor economy, development, and the fight against nepotism. Once these were in place, then irredentist issues and border disputes with Ethiopia, Kenya, and French
Somaliland would be addressed (Lewis, 2002).
The coup's name was changed to “Kaan” in the Somali language which means “revolution”
(Lewis, 2002, p. 209). One year later in celebration of the military coup, General Siad Barre declared scientific socialism to be the ideology of the SRC, “Kaan” in the Somali language (Lewis, 2002, p. 209). Siad was remarkably talented and able to make socialism appropriate to the Somali context when socialism is successfully blended with Islam and influenced by nationalism (Laitin, 1979; Lewis, 2002; Sheik -Abdi, 1977).
Siad strongly supported developing close cooperation with the Soviet Union. Accordingly, in 1974, a successful relationship flourished in the "Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation.”
Upon signing the treaty, the Soviets used Somalia ports in Berbera and Kis-mayyo to build military bases (Laitin, 1976, 1977; Lewis, 2002). Somalia alone received generous grants of
$63 million. This was significantly larger than all financial aid to the rest of Africa that
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equalled $67 million (Laitin, 1976, 1977; Lewis, 2002). Consequently, the economy was booming, several development projects were established such as milk factories, new schools, roads, hospitals, radio stations, and canning factories (Laitin, 1976, 1977; Lewis, 2002).
Siad also developed a relationship with the African Unity Organization and the Arab World.
Siad became an active member and was well-known for “ideological support”. Siad's approach upset the SU and caused a conflict of interest; consequently, the SU suspended lubricant and oil supplies to Somalia (Lewis, 2002). Siad did not have any other option than to seek help from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia; subsequently, Siad developed close relationships with Gulf countries (Laitin, 1977).
Although Siad wisely spent international grants on state development, he was not satisfied, thinking that Somali over-relied on financial aid. Siad’s expectation was to reduce Somalia's dependency on the international community as he commented, “A fully independent country never…seek[s] money for the actual running of its machinery from a foreign country”
(Laitin, 1977, p. 50).
Ravenhill’s (1980) study aimed to compare two types of regime—the civilian and military regimes. Ravenhill affirms that the Siad military government’s performance was
exceptionally good at improving the economic status and controlling the increase in food prices. However, military expenses slightly increased. Laitin believed the military regime of General Siad in Somalia was "honest and public” (Laitin, 1976, p. 455).