In many ways, the regulation of nonbank financial intermediaries paral- lels that of banks. Each of these institutions must learn to deal effectively with similar sources of financial risk.
Also, there is a tendency for lines of business to become increasingly blurred. Commercial banks have moved into trading securities and pro- vide some underwriting and insurance functions. The trading portfolios of banks contain assets, liabilities, and derivatives that are no different from those of securities houses. Therefore, trading portfolios are meas- ured at market values, while traditional banking items are still reported at book value. With the trend toward securitization, however, more and more assets (such as bank loans) have become liquid and tradable.
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2.12.1 Pension Funds
Although pension funds are not subject to capital adequacy requirements, a number of similar restrictions govern defined-benefit plans. The current U.S. regulatory framework was defined by the Employee Retirement In- come Security Act (ERISA) promulgated in 1974. Under ERISA, companies are required to make contributions that are sufficient to provide coverage for pension payments. In effect, the minimum capital is the present value of future pension liabilities. The obligation to make up for unfunded liabil- ities parallels the obligation to maintain some minimal capital ratio. Also, asterisk weights are replaced by a looser provision of diversification and of not taking excessive risks, as defined under the “prudent man” rule.
As in the case of banking regulation, federal guarantees are provided to pensioners. In the United States, the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corpo- ration (PBGC), like the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), charges an insurance premium and promises to cover defaults by corpo- rations. Other countries have similar systems, although most other coun- tries rely much more heavily on public pay-as-you-go schemes, in which contributions from current employees directly fund current retirees. The United States, Britain, and the Netherlands are far more advanced in their reliance on private pension funds. Public systems in countries afflicted by large government deficits can ill afford generous benefits to an increas- ingly aging population. As a result, private pension funds are likely to take on increasing importance all over the world. With those will come the need for prudential regulation.
2.12.2 Insurance Companies
Regulation of insurance companies is globally less centralized than that of other financial institutions, whose insurance is regulated at the national level. In the United States, the insurance industry is regulated at the state level. As in the case of FDIC protection, insurance contracts are ultimately covered by a state guaranty association. State insurance regulators set na- tionwide standards through the National Association of Insurance Com- missioners (NAIC).
In December 1992, the NAIC announced new capital adequacy re- quirements for insurers. As in the case of the early 1988 Basel accord, the new rules emphasized credit risk. For instance, no capital would be needed to cover holdings of government bonds and just 0.5 percent for mortgages, but 30 percent of the value of equities would have to be cov- ered. This ratio was much higher than the 8 percent ratio required for banks, which some insurers claimed put them at a competitive disadvan- tage vis-à-vis other financial institutions that were increasingly branching out into insurance products.
In the European Union, insurance regulation parallels that of banks, with capital requirements, portfolio restrictions, and regulatory interven- tion in cases of violation. For life insurance companies, capital must ex- ceed 4 percent of mathematical reserves, computed as the present values of future premiums minus future death liabilities. For non-life insurance companies, capital must exceed the highest of about 17 percent of premi- ums charged for the current year and about 24 percent of annual settle- ments over the past three years.
2.12.3 Securities Firms
The regulation of securities firms is still evolving. Securities firms hold se- curities on the asset and liability sides (usually called longand short posi- tions) of their balance sheets. Regulators generally agree that some prudent reserve should be available to cover financial risks. There is no agreement, however, as to whether securities firms should hold capital to cover their net positions, consisting of assets minus liabilities, or their gross positions, consisting of the sum of all long plus short positions.
The United States and Japan use the gross position approach, the United Kingdom uses the net position, and the Basel Committee and the European Union consider a variant of both approaches. The European Union, for instance, required firms to have equity equal to 2 percent of their gross positions plus 8 percent of their net positions as of 1996.
Dimson and Marsh compare the effectiveness of these approaches for a sample of detailed holdings of British market makers.101Comparing the riskiness of the portfolio to various capital requirements, they show that the net position approach, as required by the United Kingdom, dom- inates the E.U. and U.S. approaches, as it best approximates the actual portfolio risk. The net position approach comes closest to what portfolio theory would suggest.
Although there are differences in the regulations of banks and secu- rities firms, capital requirements are likely to converge as banks and secu- rities firms increasingly compete in the same markets. Currently, the same accounting rules apply to the trading-book activities of banks and the trading activities of securities firms. In the United States, the 1933 Glass- Steagall Act, which separates the commercial and investment bank func- tions, is slowly being chipped away. The 1933 act is widely viewed as obsolete and overly restrictive, especially in comparison with the univer- sal banking system prevalent in Europe. Cracks in the Glass-Steagall wall started to appear in 1989, when commercial banks were allowed to under- write stocks and bonds on a limited basis (although no more than 10 per- cent of their revenues could come from underwriting). Banks have also been expanding into insurance products, such as annuities, although fur- ther expansion is being fiercely resisted by U.S. insurance companies.
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More recently, VaR has been gaining prominence in the regulation of securities firms. The Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commod- ity Futures Trading Commission, and six major Wall Street securities houses have entered an agreement to base capital requirements on VaR methodology. An authoritative resource for counterparty risk manage- ment, published by the Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group (CRMPG) in June 1999, is improving counterparty risk management prac- tices. CRMPG was formed by a group of 12 parties in the aftermath of the 1998 market turmoil to promote better industrywide counterparty market and credit risk practices. As for the commercial banking system, VaR is bound to become a universally accepted benchmark.102
2.12.4 The Trend Toward Risk-Based Disclosures
In addition to deriving strategic benefits from risk measurement and man- agement, institutions can use their risk management systems to generate the kinds of reports that regulators are seeking. Disclosure guidelines re- leased by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1997 allow companies to use VaR-type measures to communicate information about market risk. While many companies may be interested in measur- ing the aggregate market risk of their underlying exposures and hedge in- struments for internal purposes, current regulations require only the disclosure of market risk–sensitive instruments (e.g., derivative con- tracts). Disclosure of underlying exposures and other positions is encour- aged, but not required. Whether companies decide to report only the required disclosures or to also include the encouraged disclosures, the systems being used for internal risk measurement can be leveraged to meet regulatory disclosure requirements.
2.12.5 Disclosure Requirements
SEC market risk disclosure requirements affect all companies reporting their financial results in the United States.103These regulations apply to de- rivative commodity instruments, derivative financial instruments, and other financial instruments (investments, loans, structured notes, mort- gage-backed securities, indexed debt instruments, interest-only and princi- pal-only obligations, deposits, and other debt obligations) that are sensitive to market risk, all of which are collectively called market risk–sensitive instruments.
The SEC requires that companies provide both quantitative and qualitative information about the market risk–sensitive instruments they are using.104Currently, the allowed alternatives for the reporting of quan-
titative information include tabular summaries of contract fair values;
measures of sensitivity to market rate changes; and VaR measures ex- pressing potential loss of earnings, cash flows, or fair values.
The New Basel Capital Accord has integrated disclosure require- ments as an integral part of the entire accord, across all risk factors:
The third pillar, market discipline, will encourage high disclosure standards and enhance the role of market participants in encouraging banks to hold adequate capital. The Committee proposes to issue later this year [2001]
guidance on public disclosure that will strengthen the capital framework.105
2.12.6 Encouraged Disclosures
Apart from setting requirements on market risk–sensitive instruments, the SEC encourages, but does not require, risk disclosures on instruments, positions, and transactions not covered by Item 305 of Regulation S-K and Item 9A of Form 20-F. Such instruments can include physically settled commodity derivatives, commodity positions, cash flows from antici- pated transactions, and other financial instruments, such as insurance contracts. The BIS emphasizes disclosure practices and requires that regu- lations on the disclosure of specific, relevant information regarding mar- ket, credit, and operational risk be enforced; thus, the banks become more transparent.
In general, the reporting of the combined market risk of underlying business exposures and market risk–sensitive instruments should provide a more accurate portrayal of a firm’s total risk profile than reporting for market risk–sensitive instruments alone.
2.13 MARKET INSTRUMENTS