Chapter 4 A Contribution to a Semiotic Approach of Risk
4.5 Risks in a Multi-Viewpoints Semiotics
Relating a semiotic approach to the concept of risk is based upon the hypothesis that the perception of a risk involves a human subject who grasps or produces signification; and in this case the elucidation of the
2
Morineau, 2001)
These cases correspond to psychological tests inspired by Piaget (see
conditions of this process can take the form of a semiotic theory. When expressed without preparation this hypothesis is a little surprising since the notion of risk is usually attached to what is unfamiliar to us, to what we do not control and which because of that seems to partly escape the domain of our subjectivity.
In several chapters (for presentation and references, see for instance Galarreta 2004), we have proposed a semiotics approach of technical sys- tems which tries to conciliate the impersonal subjectivity – we called viewpoint – of an agent with the objectivity of collective designing and manufacturing in the form of space systems. We have proposed arguments in favour of a semiotic view of a risk: it is inseparable of an action that it characterises as a semiotic doing. Therefore risks are a priori good candi- dates to be apprehended by multi-viewpoint semiotics.
Description of a space system in a multi-viewpoints approach
In designing a technical system such as a space system, an issue is to find a common framework where the designers can efficiently share their knowl- edge of the same problem (see Galarreta 2004).
In a complex approach a technical system can be defined as the set of the views which comply with the set of (explicit) requirements which define the system on a functional plane and which also satisfy all the (explicit and implicit) physical constraints in order to assure a stable physical existence.
We can extend this list to other requirements or constraints according to the viewpoints which are convoked in the production of these views.
We can give a more precise statement of this complex approach, by de- fining a viewpoint as the competency to produce or grasp the meaning of discourse and representations (contained in documents, schemas, images, etc.) in association to a trade. For instance we can distinguish viewpoints such as electrical viewpoint, mechanical viewpoint, thermal viewpoint, etc.
Instead of considering the space system designed by a team of designers from a single point of view (e.g. from a functional point of view or from an economical one) we proposed to consider the system just as a signifying ob- ject, the significance of which is to be a “space system” whichever the view- point we choose to observe it.3 This means that the system is only virtual when it is observed from a single point of view (cf. Fig. 2). It is virtual and Only with all dimensions can it give an actual character to the system.
3 During the design process this “observation” is either an interpretation or a production of a view.
not actual, because it lacks all its other dimensions (=the other viewpoints).
Fig. 2. A view of an object produced by a viewpoint
In the absence of interaction with other viewpoints the object is virtual and a view of it is a piece of data.
Within this theoretical framework, it is possible to give a precise defini- tion to the concepts of data, information, and knowledge.
− A piece of data is a view with respect to a viewpoint of a (virtual) object.
− A piece of information is a view with respect to a viewpoint of an actualised object when a confrontation with other viewpoints occurs.
− A piece of knowledge is a view with respect to a viewpoint of a real- ised object as a result of a negotiation process with other view- points, assuming that a confrontation took place before.
The producing of a piece of knowledge therefore takes place during a negotiation process. This process is interpretable as the repairing of the identity (see Galarreta 2004), the identity of the object: (a) being designed or (b) manifesting an anomaly the cause of which is looked for, or (c) being the target of a risk analysis process. This negotiation process is based upon a value system (see Galarreta 2004).
Let us consider now the production of knowledge for its own sake in the three corresponding processes.
During a designing activity views of the object are virtual before the confrontation of viewpoints then they are actualised through confrontation and last realised when the negotiation process ends: they become a piece of knowledge.
In an analysis of the cause of an anomaly views are directly actualised through the confrontation of viewpoints involved in the description of the anomaly; they will evolve to become realised views as the repairing (negotiation) process is progressing. At the end they turn into a piece of knowledge.
Table 1 sums up these arguments:
Table 1. Table of comparison of the three negotiation processes The set of views and
viewpoints involved is bound
The views and viewpoints involved are a priori known
Repairing of the identity
Designing Yes Yes Occurs on the
virtual views of the system Analysis of cause
of anomaly
Yes No Occurs on the
actualised views of the system
Risk analysis No No Occurs on the
realised or actualised views of the system In risk analysis, the views from which the analysis starts from, could correspond to realised views of the object (e.g. the system) before a possi- ble confrontation is proposed through potential anomalies, their causes, and their effects.4 When the risk analysis, preventing and protecting action have been proposed, the repairing of the object can be considered as com- plete and the views obtained correspond to a piece of knowledge.
Let us take an example proposed in Desroches et al. (2003). Let us con- sider a truck.
A manufacturer of trucks knows that a truck should simultaneously and permanently satisfy several requirements, i.e. views, in order to be both able and allowed to run on roads (Fig. 3).
When we consider a truck from the viewpoint of road safety it is usual to consider that a moving truck can represent a danger: it is often observed that drivers lose control of their truck with harmful consequences. It is usually because of their speed, of the surface of the road, of the shape of the trajectories that the road allows, the width of the road, and so on.
These dangerous conditions are evoked whenever we consider heavy vehicles such as trucks. They constitute common places of the value system of trucks manufacturers as well as of road safety authorities. They can chal- lenge the “normal” identity of a (moving) truck. If one selects a situation among situations potentially encountered by moving trucks such as the entering of a tunnel, one can then select situations that can turn out to be
4 Actualised views could be also confronted during risk analysis with potential anomalies if they occur during the designing activity and with temporary views.
Uncontrolled overheating of the breaks The entering of a
truck in the tunnel A moving truck
AND
The truck running in the tunnel
AND
Death, injuries and material damages
Fire and explosion
Fig. 3. Dangers and dangerous situations reveal the existence of common places.
Example is taken from (Desroches et al. 2003)
dangerous. This selection again is based upon the knowledge of common places in the study of accidents. Again these situations may challenge the identity of a moving truck and consequently of a truck (if we admit that a truck should be able to move on a road).
We postulate (in Galarreta 2004) that a collection of viewpoints is struc- tured by the existence of entities that manufacturers or designers for in- stance, could assimilate to products, but that we prefer to define as theme and common places:
− A theme is a potential place of correlation of viewpoints, which is es- tablished or verified through use; it is therefore an empirical concept.
− A common place is a realisation of such potential correlations. It can involve several themes.
A system of values in this context is the collection of viewpoints struc- tured by the existence of themes and common places. The study of value systems within a multi-viewpoint semiotics needs to be carried out.
Risks experts strongly suggest that risks are related to perception. This position is congruent with the role that perception plays both in the im- plementation of action and in semiotics. “Perceiving something … is to perceive more ore less intensively a presence. … that is something which on one hand is situated in a certain location with respect to ours and has a certain extent, and on the other hand affects us with a certain intensity”
(Fontanille 1998, p. 37).
Either perception of risks is synonymous with evaluation or: perception of risks is synonymous with focusing attention:
Perception of risks is synonymous with evaluation
“The first objective of risk management is to determine whether the identi- fied risk is acceptable or not with respect to a predetermined scale. Depend- ing on your past history and experience, if there is no scale, your perception of risk and decisions which have to be made to deal with it will be different.
If you are involved in short term activity, you will probably pay more atten- tion to the likelihood of the feared event occurring, a priori quite a weak cri- terion for determining risk which generally will mean nothing. On the other hand, if you intervene for example in a long-term project or activity, the likelihood of risk will be perceived as great and, while taking the seriousness into account, you will act differently when evaluating the risk. It then fol- lows that you will do whatever is needed to reduce all or part of the risk.”
(Desroches 2004, p. 53)
Perception of risks is synonymous with focusing attention
People who work in risk management should doubt “Doubting means first of all, for each stage in a process, identifying elements which might pre- vent us from achieving it. We begin by looking for and consolidating related information which might slow down the operational approach but which will enable us on the other hand to avoid later problems. There has to be a balance between initial considerations and decision-making and corresponding action since doubt should not lead to sclerosis in decision- making and related action” (Desroches 2004, p. 53).
“You can’t see a risk if you don’t look for it. When it becomes ‘visible’, it is often too late to do anything about it. This is the case if we only treat risks by collecting facts which have occurred without paying enough atten- tion to prevention. Everyone knows that any regulation, however perfect it may be at a given time, does not cover all risks and can even become in- efficient in new, rapidly changing environments which go beyond its field of application.” (Desroches 2004, p. 55)
These two acceptations of risk perception correspond to the general distinctions that semiotics make in perception and that we have just mentioned.
4.6 Managing Risks of Knowledge Evolution