A study showed that in the early 1970s, 75 percent of all calls were not reaching the called party [30], highlighting a major inefficiency in the busi- ness world and providing a business opportunity. Some businesses used answering services that employed operators to take messages manually for unanswered calls. AT&T realized that technology provided a better answer and tried to sell both the at-home and ECS business system, but was halted by regulators responding to lobbying from answering service business owners who feared a collapse in their business model. Answering service owners, however, could not stop VM products from other vendors with regulation, so they lost anyway. By 1983, users had many options: tradi- tional services, standalone units from vendors such as VMX and Octel, and a few PBX vendors that started to integrate this feature into their products [31]. At this point, growth with the automated VM systems was much slower than expected, with a market of $20 to $30 million [31].
In the early 80s, market uncertainty was high; most systems had funda- mentally different architectures [32]. An open system, such as Ericsson’s or Rolm’s, allowed any incoming caller to leave a message for a mailbox owner. Closed systems, such as Bell’s Dimension, allowed mailbox owners to leave only other mailbox owners a message, a design that proved of lim- ited value. Much experimentation took place as vendors tried to figure out what features would appeal to users. Market growth was slow, as Figure 9.2 shows; by 1985, it was only $200 million [33]. Things were changing, though. By the mid 1980s, VM system cost was down from the
$50,000–$500,000 range, to $15,000–$75,000 [33], creating a bigger market.
By the late 80s, market growth was good, and the regulatory environ- ment for the Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) improved because they could now provide store-and-forward services, including VM [34]. The RBOCs are the pieces of AT&T resulting from Bell’s breakup in 1984 caused by the MFJ. Uncertainty was decreasing, but it was still not low because this was only the third generation of VM systems [35]. The most innovation in fancy features, such as auto attendant and directories, still existed only in standalone systems [36][37]. Now users had even more choices: standalone units, PBX/VM systems, and Centrex.
By the end of the 80s, VM became the fastest growing feature set in PBXs, with roughly 40–50 percent of high-end PBXs having VM options [38].
Centrex was also successful, with 15 percent of these lines having VM service [10]. As expected, Centrex VM had fewer features and less control
Basic Voice Services 147
than standalone or integrated PBX units [10]. Market uncertainty was moderate because vendors and users still had a lot to learn.
As the 90s started, VM was growing, but still did not meet the predic- tions from the mid 1980s [39]. VM features moved to smaller PBXs and KEY systems, showing the commodity nature of the basic feature set. VM (along with ACD) were the applications reviving the PBX industry.
In 2000, as expected, users still had a high interest in VM, and vendors such as Nortel in its CallPilot product were introducing Web-based inter- faces to their VM systems. VM is successful as a Centrex service to business users and in-network answering machines provide simple VM services to residential users. Standalone VM systems from vendors such as Octel3still offer the most advanced features, and Centrex still offers the most basic, with PBXs in the middle. The following timeline shows the highlights of VM evolution. Uncertainty is represented by the roman text, and basic facts are underlined.
Figure 9.2 Growth of voice mail.
1200
83 84 85 86 87 88
Year
Grow vs Predicted Growth of Voice Mail
Total Market in Millions of $
89 90 91 92
1000
800
600
400
200
0
Market Prediction (81) Prediction (86) Prediction (88)
148 Chapter 9
3Notes from a conversation with Nancy Kinchla, Director of Telecommunications at Harvard.
1981 Two VM systems — AT&T for home use and ECS for business — are introduced but halted by regulation.
Study illustrates the need for voice messaging because three-quarters of all calls don’t reach the called party.
1983 VM growth is much less than expected (market is now
$20–30 million).
There are many options for users.
More PBX vendors are integrating VM, different systems (open compared to closed).
1984 Market exceeds 100M.
1985 Market exceeds 200M.
1986 Cost is way down for VM systems.
1987 Market reaches $290 million (less than predicted).
1988 RBOCs are allowed to provide VM.
Less uncertainty occurs in the third generation.
Rolm is the most aggressive PBX vendor.
No standards are in place; all systems are different.
Market reaches $433 million.
1989 VM is the fastest growing PBX option.
Centrex VM (15 percent of lines) offers fewer features, less control than VM in PBXs.
Of high-end PBXs, 40–50 percent have a VM option.
Centrex is growing faster (6 percent versus 3 percent in PBXs), which implies more opportunity in Centrex.
1990 Market reaches $650 million (less than predicted).
1991 VM moves to KEY and small PBXs, showing the com- modity nature of VM.
VM predictions from the 80s prove to have been way too high.
1992 Fifty percent of Merlin Legend PBXs ship with VM.
1994 VM becomes one of the successful PBX applications.
1997 Interest in VM is still high.
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1998 Web-based interface to VM becomes available.
2000 Octel SA VM is still competitive with cutting-edge features.
Applications like VM are generating profits for PBX vendors.