• Tidak ada hasil yang ditemukan

Power in Organizational Society

3.7 Conclusions

Power is notoriously hard to defi ne, observe and analyze because it is mediated and regulated.

Macro theories of power treat it as a causal force that originates within differentiated social spheres, a power that institutions channel into more general frameworks within which this force can be contained and regulated. Micro-level theo- ries, by contrast, understand power as leverage which individuals gain by virtue of occupying particular positions within social relationships and networks. We have argued that, in our pres- ent social world, it is organizations that mediate and regulate power. Organization-mediated power is embodied in authorities (such as the state, or professional associations), dispersed in the division of labor among various “parties,”

jobs, and positions, and organized into collective purposes that privilege routinization and trust building.

In this chapter, we zeroed in on the organiza- tional level of power dynamics, a level that is more aggregate and abstract than interpersonal

relations but more concrete than the diffusive notion of power held by macro-theory.

Organizations embody and make rules and rou- tines. We sought to reveal how rules, routines, and differentiation obscure the potential for discretion in rule making. Instead, the operation of power in organizations follows a plural, generative, and depersonalized logic so much so that it tends to reduce the perception of domination. With the interstitial spaces and incompatible logics organi- zations also produce, they create expectations for the exercise of one’s creativity and leverage.

The second goal of the paper is to link the meso-approach to power with examinations of power at the macro-level of social formations and the micro-level of exchanges. We argued that even though power at each level acquires distinc- tive structural and symbolic features, exchanges, translations, and conversions of power across the different levels of social units generates new types of social, institutional, and ideological for- mations that can not be reduced to power origi- nating from any given level alone. At these emergent spaces between individual decision- makings, meso-regulations, and macro- institutions, informalities can be an important source of power and the powerless can excel by exploiting structural positions. This chapter thus concludes that regulatory power at the meso-level is both empowering and dominating.

Does our focus on organizations as a matrix of power leave out dynamics that affect people out- side of organizations? Given the retreat of what Davis ( 2009 ) felicitously calls “corporate feudal- ism”—the golden age of organized capitalism in the US where a generalized expectation of stabil- ity and affl uence motivated the emerging middle class to join corporate ranks—it may seem anachronistic to emphasize the organized nature of power in a time of post-fordist fl exible special- ization (see Jessop 1995 ). Yet here we fi nd it use- ful to retrieve an important analytical distinction Rueschemeyer ( 1986 ) makes by juxtaposing Marx and Durkheim.

There are two types of division of labor: the social division of labor, and the manufacturing division of labor. The social division of labor refers to specialization across all social realms. It

is both enabling and constraining: it enhances the potential for individual freedom while increasing individual interdependence. The manufacturing division of labor, by contrast, rests on coercive authority in the workplace through deskilling, or the breaking down of production into simple, mindless steps. The manufacturing division of labor increases the power of those who already are in a position of authority, while it deprives the powerless of even the most basic form of con- trol—control over their labor. Rueschemeyer reminds us that the two types always interpene- trate empirically. As hierarchical organizations multiply, for instance, the experience of the pow- erless will deteriorate, but individuals with the skills and capital to navigate organizational poli- tics will thrive precisely as authority tightens its grip. Competing sources of legitimacy and con- trol tend to also generate a space for new classes of experts invested with the power to assess and rank (DiMaggio and Powell 1983 ; see also Espeland and Sauder 2007 ). What this implies for power in the age of corporate downsizing is that power as effi cacy will multiply at the very interstices of organizational boundaries just as power as coercive control intensifi es within orga- nizational boundaries. States become more puni- tive just as allegedly free markets expand (Harcourt 2011 ). There is tension and contradic- tion between these two trends, which becomes unsustainable when organizations are no longer able to meet their legitimizing criteria of effi - ciency in production and delivery of goods and services. When power turns from generative to destructive, organizations regain the upper hand.

We believe that organizational power will remain the defi ning feature of the twenty-fi rst century.

References

Abrutyn, S. (2013a). Revisiting institutionalism in sociol- ogy: Putting the “institution” back in institutional analysis . New York: Routledge.

Abrutyn, S. (2013b). Reconceptualizing the dynamics of religion as a macro-institutional domain. Structure and Dynamics, 6 (3), 1–21.

Abrutyn, S., & Lawrence, K. (2010). From chiefdom to state: Toward an integrative theory of the evolution of polity. Sociological Perspectives, 53 (3), 419–442.

Adams, J. (2007). The familial state: Ruling families and merchant capitalism in early modern Europe . Ithaca:

Cornell University Press.

Bacharach, S. B., & Lawler, E. (1980). Power and politics in organizations: The social psychology of confl ict, coalitions, and bargaining . San Francisco: Jossey- Bass Inc Pub.

Barnes, B. (1988). The nature of power . Urbana:

University of Illinois Press.

Bell, R. S., et al. (2000). Power, infl uence, and legitimacy in organizations: Implications of three theoretical research programs. In S. Bacharach & E. J. Lawler (Eds.), Research in the sociology of organizations (Vol. 17, pp. 131–177). Greenwich: JAI Press.

Blau, P. M. (1956). Bureaucracy in modern society . New York: Random House.

Blau, P. M. (1964). Exchange and power in social life . New York: Wiley.

Blau, P. M., & Schoenherr, R. A. (1971). Structure of organizations . New York: Basic Books.

Bourdieu, P. (1980). The logic of practice . Stanford:

Stanford University Press.

Bourdieu, P. (1984). Distinction . Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Bourdieu, P. (1988). Homo academicus . Stanford:

Stanford University Press.

Bourdieu, P. (1996a). The rules of art: Genesis and struc- ture of the literature fi eld . Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Bourdieu, P. (1996b). The state nobility . Stanford:

Stanford University Press.

Bourdieu, P. (2015). On the state . Cambridge: Polity.

Bourdieu, P., & Wacquant, L. (1992). An invitation to refl exive sociology . Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Bourdieu, P., et al. (1994). Rethinking the state: Genesis and structure of the bureaucratic fi eld. Sociological Theory, 12 (1), 1–18.

Burawoy, M. (1982). Manufacturing consent: Changes in the labor process under monopoly capitalism . Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Burt, R. S. (1992). Structural holes . Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Carpenter, D. P. (2010). Reputation and power:

Organizational image and pharmaceutical regulation at the FDA . Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Clegg, S. (2009). Foundations of organization power.

Journal of Power, 2 (1), 35–64.

Coleman, J. S. (1974). Power and the structure of society . New York: W. W Norton & Company.

Coleman, J. S., Katz, E., & Menzel, H. (1966). Medical innovation: A diffusion study . Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company.

Cook, K. S., & Richard, M. E. (1978). Power, equity and commitment in exchange networks. American Sociological Review, 43 (5), 721–739.

Dahl, R. (1957). The concept of power. Behavioral Science, 2 (3), 201–208.

Dahl, R. (1961). Who governs? Democracy and power in an American city . New Haven: Yale University Press.

Davis, G. F. (2009). Managed by the markets . New York:

Oxford University Press.

DiMaggio, P., & Powell, W. (1983). The iron cage revis- ited: Institutional isomorphisms and collective ratio- nality in organizational fi elds. American Sociological Review, 48 (2), 147–160.

Eisenstadt, S. N. (1993). The political systems of empires . New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

Eisenstadt, S. N. (1995). Power, trust, and meaning:

Essays in sociological theory and analysis . Chicago:

University of Chicago Press.

Emerson, R. M. (1962). Power-dependence relations.

American Sociological Review, 27 , 31–41.

Emerson, R. M. (1964). Power-dependence relations: Two experiments. Sociometry, 27 , 282–298.

Espeland, W., & Sauder, M. (2007). Rankings and reactiv- ity: How public measures recreate social worlds1.

American Journal of Sociology, 113 (1), 1–40.

Fligstein, N., & McAdam, D. (2012). A theory of fi elds . New York: Oxford University Press.

Foucault, M. (1980). Power/knowledge: Selected inter- views and other writings, 1972–1977 . New York:

Pantheon.

Galbraith, J. K. (1958). The affl uent society: the econom- ics of the age of opulence-a literate and expert revision of the basic ideas . Boston: Houghton Miffl in.

Gorski, P. (2013). Bourdieusian theory and historical analysis. In P. Gorski (Ed.), Bourdieu and historical analysis . Durham: Duke University Press.

Hall, D. H. (1987). Careers and socialization. Journal of Management, 13 (2), 301–321.

Harcourt, B. E. (2011). The illusion of free markets:

Punishment and the myth of natural order . Cambridge:

Harvard University Press.

Jessop, B. (1995). The regulation approach, governance and post-Fordism: Alternative perspectives on eco- nomic and political change? Economy and Society, 24 (3), 307–333.

Johnson, V. (2007). What is organizational imprinting:

Cultural entrepreneurship in the founding of the Paris opera. American Journal of Sociology, 113 (1), 97–127.

Lamont, M. (2002). The dignity of working men: Morality and the boundaries of race, class, and immigration . New York: Harvard University Press.

Lukes, S. (2005). Power: A radical view . Houndmills:

Palgrave Macmillan.

Mann, M. (2012a). The sources of social power: Volume 4, globalizations, 1945–2011 . New York: Cambridge University Press.

Mann, M. (2012b). The sources of social power: Volume 1, a history of power from the beginning to ad 1760 . New York: Cambridge University Press.

Mann, M. (2012c). The sources of social power: Volume 2, the rise of classes and nation-states, 1760–1914 (2nd ed.). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Mann, M. (2012d). The sources of social power: Volume 3, global empires and revolution, 1890–1945 . New York: Cambridge University Press.

Michels, R. (1959). Political parties: A sociological study of the oligarchical tendencies of modern democracy . New York: Dover.

Padgett, J. F., & Powell, W. (2012). The emergence of organizations and markets . Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Pfeffer, J. (1981). Power in organizations . Cambridge:

Ballinger Pub Co.

Poggi, G. (2001). Forms of power . Cambridge: Polity.

Powell, W., & DiMaggio, P. (Eds.). (1991). The new insti- tutionalism in organizational analysis . Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Reed, I. (2013). Power: Relational, discursive, and performa- tive dimensions. Sociological Theory, 31 (3), 193–218.

Ridgeway, C. L., & Berger, J. (1986). Expectations, legiti- mation, and dominance behavior in groups. American Sociological Review, 51 , 603–617.

Rohlen, T. P. (1979). For harmony and strength: Japanese white-collar organization in anthropological perspec- tive . Berkeley: University of California Press.

Rueschemeyer, D. (1986). Power and the division of labor . Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Scott, W. R. (1992). Organizations: Rational, natural and open systems . New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.

Scott, J. C. (1999). Seeing like a state: How certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed . New Haven: Yale University Press.

Scott, W. R. (2001). Institutions and organizations . Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications.

Selznick, P. (2010). TVA and the grass roots; a study in the sociology of formal organization . Charleston, South Carolina: Nabu Press

Simmel, G., & Wolff, K. H. (1964). The sociology of Georg Simmel . Glencoe: Free Press.

March, H. A. & Simon, J. G., (1958). Organizations . New York: Wiley.

Stainback, K., Tomaskovic-Devey, D., & Skaggs, S.

(2010). Organizational approaches to inequality:

Inertia, relative power, and environments. Annual Review of Sociology, 36 , 225–247.

Steinmetz, G. (2007). The devil’s handwriting:

Precoloniality and the German colonial state in

Qingdao, Samoa, and southwest Africa . Chicago:

University of Chicago Press.

Stinchcomebe, A. L. (1965). Social structure and organi- zations. In J. G. March (Ed.), Handbook of organiza- tions . Chicago: Rand McNally & Company.

Stinchcomebe, A. L. (2001). When formality works:

Authority and abstraction in law and organizations . Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Teiwes, F. C. (1984). Leadership, legitimacy, and confl ict in China: From a charismatic Mao to the politics of succession . London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Thornton, P. H., & Ocasio, W. (1999). Institutional logics and the historical contingency of power in organiza- tions: Executive succession in the higher education publishing industry, 1958–1990. American Journal of Sociology, 105 (3), 801–843.

Thornton, P. H., & Ocasio, W. (2008). Institutional logic.

In R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, K. Sahlin-Andersson, &

R. Suddaby (Eds.), The SAGE handbook of organiza- tional institutionalism (pp. 99–129). Thousand Oaks:

Sage.

Thornton, P. H., Ocasio, W., & Lounsbury, M. (2012). The institutional logics perspective: A new approach to culture, structure and process . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Tilly, C. (1999). Durable inequality . Berkeley: University of California Press.

Tuner, J. H. (2012). Theoretical principles of sociology, volume 3: Mesodynamics . New York: Springer.

Veblen, T. (1934). The theory of the leisure class: An eco- nomic study in the evolution of institutions . New York:

Modern Library.

Wanous, J. P., Reichers, A. E., & Malik, S. D. (1984). The organizational socialization and group development:

Toward an integrative perspective. Academy of Management Review, 9 (4), 670–683.

Weber, M. (1947). The theory of social and economic organizations . New York: Oxford University.

Weber, M. (1978). Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology . Berkeley: University of California Press.

Weber, M. (2004). The vocation lectures . Indianapolis:

Hackett Publishing Company.

William, W., Nocera, J. (2002). The Organizational men . University of Pennsylvania Press.

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 63

S. Abrutyn (ed.), Handbook of Contemporary Sociological Theory,

Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-32250-6_4

Action in Society: Refl exively