Cohen and Riesman (1996) provide insight into the generally unknown cooperation of Serbs in the destruction of the Jews. Although the majority of Muslims were against the Pavelić regime, or at least indifferent, part of the Muslim population supported it, especially those who had been strongly pro-Croat during the interwar period (Tomasevich 2001:491). The future BiH was defined as one of the six republics of the three equal nations: Muslims, Croats and Serbs (Bougarel 1996: 92).
All those openings resulted in the exodus of the Croatian population from the territory held by the Partisans. Tito's patriotic education was not based on a metaphor of fusion, but, on the contrary, emphasized the distinctiveness of the different nations (in the sense of narod) living on the territory of Yugoslavia. These war crimes were one of the best kept secrets and what happened in 1945 and 1946 became taboo.
In the early 1960s, the leaders claimed more power at the level of the republics and increasingly rejected the concept of Yugoslav nationality. This belated recognition of the Bosnian nation is remembered by Bosnians—even Tito nostalgia—as one of Tito's greatest mistakes. This does not mean that nationality did not matter in the social structure of the village, but that in face-to-face contact the personality of the interlocutor ultimately counted.
But it is also a theme present in the stories of both the post-Yugoslavs and the last Yugoslavs.
National Mobilisation and Instrumentalisation of the Past
It began with the reintroduction of the cult of the Virgin Mary as the main national and religious symbol of Catholic Croatia: "During the Great Novena, the Croatian Episcopate carried out an ethnic mobilization and religious awakening of Catholic Croats under the symbolic leadership of the Virgin Mary, known as Perica believes that the apparitions of the Virgin Mary in Medžugor should be understood in the context of the Catholic Church's struggle with communism, the anti-communist reaction after Tito's death, and the deep economic crisis and growing ethnopolitical crisis. tension. The cult of the Virgin Mary and the mass pilgrimage to Medžugorje worsened the already strained relations between the Catholic clergy and Orthodox and Muslim representatives in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The latter two groups saw the Medjugorje movement as a return to Ustashism, not only because Medjugorje was the headquarters of the Ustash during World War II (see Bax 1995).11. The main Muslim leaders were all partisan veterans and the ulama's loyalty to the LKJ was strong. But in the late 1980s nationalist aims found support among some anti-communist Muslim clerics sympathetic to Alija Izetbegovic's religious nationalism.
Growing anti-Muslim sentiments made it easy for Izetbegović to present himself as the sole defender of the Bosnian Muslim nation. 11 To show their disapproval, but also to find another way to achieve their nationalist goal, the Serbian Church started a year-long commemoration of the victims of the Second World War (see Perica 2002). In this statement, he envisioned the Muslims of the world uniting to launch a religious and social revolution.
During the 1980s and early 1990s, Islamic identity (but also the identity of Croats and Serbs) was thus intensively discussed. The reinvention of the term Bošnjak can also be seen as an attempt by Bosnian Muslims to establish a clearer historical connection with the state and territory of BiH. For this reason, Bringa argues that Bosnian identity was conceptualized differently from that of the Croats and Serbs.
In conclusion, we can say that quite a few clergymen in Bosnia and Herzegovina have indeed functioned as bearers of the "national idea", although the extent to which they became involved certainly varies and also changes over time. He made a plea to the Croatian people to make their voices heard and to support those who were the only ones selflessly defending the interests of the Croatian people, referring to the HDZ (Slobodna Bosna, September 8, 2006). Similarly, the religious head of the Muslims of BiH, Reisu-l-ulema Mustafa ef Cerić, made a plea to the Bosnian people to vote for the Bosnian nationalist party, which claimed to end 'apartheid' in Mostar : 'We can see the establishment of Muslim ghettos in Mostar.
War in Mostar and Its Aftermath
At the beginning of the war, the main military formations were the JNA and three types of Croatian units: HVO (Hrvatsko vijeće obrane, Croatian Defense Council), HOS (Hrvatske obrambene snage, Croatian Defense Force) and the regular troops of the Croatian Army. 14 The following overview of the course of the war in Mostar draws heavily on the article "Saving Mostar: The Political-Military Nexus" by Bjelakovic and Strazzari (1999), which provides a more detailed and balanced picture than most other literature. on I am aware of the Mostar war (often written by ex-soldiers of one of the military forces involved). However, the description of the events of the war given here does not claim to be complete.
Due to the lack of a unified command system for the various Croatian-dominated forces and the TO, the JNA gained control of most of the city. But on May 2, 1993, the HVO imposed a blockade and snipers shot at people trying to cross from the Croat-dominated western part of the city to the Bosnian-dominated eastern part. During the 10 months of the Bosnian-Croatian war, the front line remained fairly stable (see Bose 2002).
The situation around the Bulevar is just one example of the urgency of the war in BiH (see Sorabji 1995). The situation was further complicated by the far-reaching powers of the so-called “international community”16 (see Chandler 2000; Dzihic 2010). Most of the Serb population (around 20,000) fled before the war between HVO and ABiH escalated, leaving only a small number of the approximately 2,000 Serbs to stay (or return) to Mostar.
Among those who left Mostar were a large part of the intelligentsia and middle-class professionals. My older interlocutors felt strongly attached to their (pre-war) homes and preferred to return to them rather than move to another part of the city. In addition, they argued that children would not be able to maintain their Serb identity, for example because of the Bosnia-Croat dominated education system in Mostar.
The absence of the state and the proliferation of illicit activities helped to serve personal economic interests (see ICG 2000: 2; see also Bjelakovic and Strazzari 1999: 92). Another central problem was the right of veto of the Bosniak and Croat nations, which they could use when their 'fundamental interests' were threatened. According to the ICG report (ICG 2009), during this time there was a noticeable shift in the positions and agendas of the main political actors in Mostar, HDZ19 and SDA.
The reconstruction of the bridge with its grand reopening celebration had a lot of symbolic meaning. Although often not mentioned, the old bridge does not connect the Bosnian and Croat parts of the city (which are divided by the Bulevar west of the bridge). 21.
Bibliography
Ethnische Säuberungen auf dem Balkan: Nationalismus und die Zerstörung der Tradition, Routledge-Fortschritte in der europäischen Politik. Verhandlung humanitärer Interventionen am Beispiel der internationalen Intervention im Krieg in Bosnien und Herzegowina. In Memory and Power in Post-War Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past, hrsg.
Balkan Babel: The breakup of Yugoslavia from the death of Tito to the fall of Milosevic.
