3. Severe Conflicts: Frustration-Deprivation
5.3. Ideological Nationalism: Manufacturing a Regulatory Memory
5.3.2. A One-Party State: A Conversation with Self
This study argues that ZANU-PF had its sights on establishing a one-party state from the time of Robert Mugabe’s rise to leadership in exile during the 1970s if not from its original existence as a party, although this is a much less quantifiable premise. This research highlights visible patterns that serve as pointers along the pathway of ZANU-PF becoming a one-party state sourced from the political ideological articulation as well as the behaviour of the ZANU-PF in refusing to reconcile or unify with ZAPU-ZIPRA throughout the liberation struggle despite numerous attempts by frontline states to facilitate this process488, refusing to jointly go to the polls with ZAPU in 1980, and then systematic eradicating all opposition parties and voices of dissent in the 1980s. As the ZANU-PF determined to march toward the distant horizon of a one-party state, the socio-
487 Raftopoulos, B. 2004. “Nation, Race and History in Zimbabwean Politics”. A paper presented at the University of Edinburgh’s Centre of African Studies International Conference on States, Borders and Nations: Negotiating Citizenship in Africa. May 2004.
488 See Chapter 4 – Section 4.4. Ethnicity: Liberation Struggle Years – ‘Sons of the Soil’ or ‘Sons of Segregation’
178 political narratives that were once actively engaged in the production of the vision of the new nation of Zimbabwe became faint and eventually fell away until ZANU-PF was left alone having a conversation with self.
In its first two decades of independence, the ZANU-PF maintained an uneasy alliance between its autocratic and democratic pulsations. However in time, this flirtatious posturing faded away and the more dominating, dictatorial tendencies took root.
“We have heard Left rhetoric from Mugabe most vociferously when forceful popular challenges arise…Mugabe’s radical rhetoric included regular accusations of ‘counter-revolution’ and even a late 1998 promise to resurrect ‘socialism’, repeated vociferously in October 2001. The oratory may have amused – but at this stage, no longer confused – the urban masses whom it was meant to intimidate.”489
The official government call for a one-party state, although often discussed was only opened to a popular debate in the latter 1980s (after the signing of the Unity Accord) and was followed by an intensive public dialogue around its merits and demerits in 1991490. However, this one-party verses multi-party state spectacle appeared to represent yet another one of ZANU-PF’s democratic charades more than a forum of genuine popular, participatory dialogue in the public domain. Traces of one-party statism linger throughout the recorded pre-independence narrative of the ZANU political formations. Only in hindsight did it become evident that the ZANU pre-independence revolutionary rhetoric of one-party statism was to become the foundation of the ZANU-PF post-independence governance principles and policies. Broadcasting on the radio from Mozambique in 1976, Mugabe’s infamous words have echoed through time:
“Our votes must go together with our guns. After all, any vote we shall have, shall have been the product of the gun. The gun which produces the vote should remain its security officer – its guarantor. The people’s votes and the people’s guns are always inseparable twins.”491
489 Bond, P. & Manyanya, M. 2002. Zimbabwe’s Plunge – Exhausted Nationalism, Neoliberalism and the Search for Social Justice. Pietermaritzburg, South Africa: University of Natal Press, xiii-xv.
490 Mandaza, I & Sachikonye, L. (Eds.) (1991). The One Party State and Democracy – The Zimbabwe Debate. Southern Africa: Sapes Books.
491 Meredith, M. 2008. Robert Mugabe: Power, Plunder, and the Struggle for Zimbabwe. Johannesburg &
Cape Town: Jonathan Ball Publishers: (Front-flap).
179 In almost direct contrast to Mugabe’s declaration of the symbiotic relationship between votes and guns, ZAPU’s leader Joshua Nkomo publicly pronounced his
diplomatic intentions as follows: “We can either get there by negotiation or by the gun. If it is through negotiation, then everyone will have a say. By the gun – well, dead people are unable to make up their minds.”492
This only served to accentuate the divide between ZANU and ZAPU, reinforcing Mugabe’s contention that Nkomo and ZAPU were ‘sell-outs’ who had betrayed the nationalist cause by continuing to compromise with the ‘enemy’(the white Rhodesian regime). In turn, ZAPU pointed the accusing finger at ZANU as a divisive, competitive party with violent, power-mongering tendencies.
At the celebration of Chinhoyi (Sinoia) Day, April 30, 1978 Robert Mugabe exhorted his ZANU followers as such: “Let us also derive inspiration and courage, loyalty and commitment from the Battle of Sinoia and its seven heroes and continue to adhere to the Party lines as the only correct line for all of us.”493 Again, along a similar vein at the ceremony of Chitepo Day, March 18, 1979, Mugabe exerted the role of ZANU-PF as follows:
“These events [détente] put us off balance. We thus needed to reorganise and readjust ourselves so our party could once more reassert itself as the only revolutionary movement in the country…We just had to wriggle out of the clutches of the ANC and its complete lack of revolutionary concern and re-
establish the Party as the overall planner and director of the national struggle.”494 Political difference was never acceptable to the ZANU pre- or post-independence:
“So, the idea of violence [in ZANU-PF’s dealings with opposition] has always been there, it’s not new, it’s not; there has been continuity. We don’t know what happened before ’77 but, if you read Tekere’s book you will see there was this rebellion against Mugabe, you shouldn’t imagine that he was easily accepted, he wasn’t. Then how do you deal with those dissidents within ZANU? So, you see violence. There were people who were sentenced to death, they were going to be hanged here after independence; apparently they were not. You see Nyati, the fellow who led the forces to Nyadzonia; they killed him after independence.”495
492 Meredith, M. 1979. The Past is Another Country – Rhodesia 1890-1979. London: Andre Deutsch, 205.
493 Mugabe, R. 1983. Our War of Liberation – Speeches, Articles, Interviews 1976-1979. Harare: Mambo Press, 131.
494 Ibid: 140.
495 Interview: PN1, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 30/03/07 – (Ndebele historian, author, researcher and archivist). Morrison Nyati was a sectional security officer for ZANU who deserted and led the Rhodesian Selous Scouts to Nyadzonia, a refugee camp in Mozambique.
180 In the after-glow of independence and what seemed to be the dawning of
democracy, the ‘one-party’ sloganeering subsided for a season until the challenging voices of ZAPU as an oppositional political party emerged and the clamouring incidences of ‘dissident’ violence came to the fore in 1981-1982.
“Yes. I think, having immediately come from an armed conflict in terms of which both the ZIPRA and the ZANLA armies were involved in a single agenda ‘to remove the colonial government and establish, you know, majority rule in the country’, at that particular time it was easy to distinguish the enemy from the then-liberators at that particular time, but then once the enemy that time have been removed, there was then a contestation of space; between ZANLA and ZIPRA.
And the ZANLA having had won an election in 1980, it actually sort-of put them in an advantage position, and it was then viewed in their own perspective that they should consolidate their position if they were going to survive. Next, the country was going to relapse into a civil war, something that had been noted in some other African countries immediately after independence. So that could have been the motivation of the government to say that... ‘we have to quickly establish our self and suppress any form of dissent’, and probably that could have been the thinking of the government at that time that could explain the way they reacted and tried to use every single, you know, situation at their disposal to their advantage so that they could establish themselves. The primary motivation then that becomes very clear is that they wanted to ‘quash’ the ZIPRA, establish themselves in authority, and it is very clear that the government of the day at that time had very strong intentions of establishing a one-party state. So they were very intolerant of ‘any’ opposition whatsoever…”496
“…I understand that Mugabe has always wanted a one-party state he’s never been happy with the opposition of any sort that’s why they were having problems that we have at the moment. So the issue of ZAPU being an opposition and being there, he thought he would finish it off, you know, by killing I suppose as many ZAPU officials as he possibly could.”497
“It was like Nkomo wanted to topple the government. And they [ZANU-PF] were singing and wanting [a] one-party state. And I remember in one video-clip they were saying: ‘We want the whole world to know that Zimbabwe wants a one-party state in Zimbabwe…”498
This discussion necessitates an interrogation into the seedbeds that nurtured this thrust toward one-party statism as a legitimate form of governance in Africa. For one
496 Interview: SD1, Johannesburg, South Africa - 18/08/06 – (Shona Human Rights Lawyer).
497 Interview: DN3, Johannesburg, South Africa – 30/10/07 – (Ndebele NGO peace worker facilitating trauma healing and reconciliation among rural Matabeleland communities and survivors of Gukurahundi violence).
498 Interview: AN1, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 12/09/07 – (Ndebele Church leader and Peace activist).
181 interviewee, the notion of a one-party state is embedded in three root governance
systems: in African traditional customs, in the imposed colonial systems, and in the Eastern European and Asian countries that supported the revolutions on the continent.
“You have to understand the dynamics of ‘African succession’; how it happens. If I am king there is no king until I die, that’s how it happens, that’s as simple as all that. And when I die, the next king is my son. So this is the legacy, people
shouldn’t imagine that Africa has no legacy of political governance and stuff like that, they have. For a current leader there are probably two or three sources of ideas on governance. One, is the African past itself, because we used to govern ourselves; then you have the colonial period, and it’s the most recent; then, where white Westerners were intransigent, necessitating the taking up of arms, and the arms came from the East. And so these people began to have contact with the East but as you know, the East was one-party dictatorship. So you have three sources and all three sources from a governance viewpoint were disastrous.”499
Although the one-party state rule may seem to correspond with the traditional hierarchical chiefdom model (respect for age, authority and leadership for life), the inherited colonial expression of nation-state was often stripped of the ancient ‘checks and balances’ of accountability that were part of many well-ordered African societies in the past500. Absolute power and the greed that accompanied access to the accumulated wealth of the modern nation-state overwhelmed many of the independence African leaders.
Stepping down or letting go of an official function such as Head of State, relinquishing the power, honour, dignity, respect and wealth afforded to these positions was virtually unheard of. In certain ‘face-saving’ traditional African worldviews to be removed from leadership would represent being publically shamed and disrespected in one’s old age, a humiliation barely imaginable for many. Added to this were the exposure to, and the often blind imitation of the colonial rule which by its nature was hierarchical, power-
499 Interview: PN1, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 30/03/07 – (Ndebele historian, author, researcher and archivist).
500 Ayittey, G. 1998. Africa in Chaos. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Contrary to certain popular assumptions, the traditional African governance systems did have in-built checks and balances that protected village residents from arbitrary dictatorial rule. Despite chieftaincy rule for life, there were numerous processes of empowerment for the people such as collective mass meetings where all people could have a say in the governance of the village and even openly critique their leaders without repression (legislative function), communal justice processes (judicial function) and the fact that most Chiefs could not make unilateral decisions, they were required to make all decisions in consultation with their sub- headman (elders / councils) and in consideration of the will of the people (executive functions). On top of this, aside from the land itself which was owned by the Chief villagers were allowed to accumulate private wealth, travel and barter in open markets of exchange, and corporately require that the Chiefs share their wealth (economic redistribution functions).
182 hungry and economically greedy and corrupt. Finally, compounding this all, many of the global sponsors of African liberation struggles were countries entrenched in the
ideologies of socialist-communist, one-party state regimes themselves.
“…I think its roots were found in Marxist Leninism, you know. I think that Mugabe in 1980 was committed to that ideology. I think he was committed to, at the very least a de facto one party state, and possibly a de jure one party state.
And Joshua Nkomo and his ZAPU party stood in their path. And they were a lot harder to attack because they had been a guerrilla … they had their own guerrilla army. And they were the liberators in their own right so they couldn’t just be dealt with in the way that they dealt with …certain officials like Muzorewa had been dealt with. But I think that the motivation was to create a one party state.”501
“I think there’s a very Socialist-Communist ideology that belies all of this. And in there the most clear and most important thing is the ideology itself. So you’re taught in class and history and school to accept that there is the empowerment of the masses. But the strange paradox no-one ever asked is: How can the masses be empowered by killing the masses, for the cause of empowering the masses? So it’s a sort-of self-defeating exercise where no-one ever questions it. So only now when you stand back do you realize ‘no, no, no, there’s not empowerment of the masses; it’s empowering those who ‘claim’ to represent the masses. And that’s why you can butcher the masses because the masses don’t really count. The key thing is: masses must realize that the only way forward is to support the leader of the masses. And if you don’t realize that then you’re not part of the masses and they wanna butcher you. So theoretically that means that you can actually kill the masses right down to the last person, as long as the leader of the masses stays on top, then the ideology is preserved.”502
In the unwavering race to ensure that Zimbabwe became a one-party state, the ZANU-PF had to declare all formations that propagated alternative national scripts as a threat or even an ‘enemy’ to the State including the media, civil society organisations, unions, legal fraternities, religious institutions and as a matter of urgency any political opposition parties. As long as these formations kept pace with the official ZANU-PF meta-narrative they were afforded fairly expanded freedoms. However, once they began to speak in opposition to ZANU-PF governance and official policies they were quickly declared a menace to Zimbabwe.
“The ‘issue’ of one-party state in Zimbabwe can actually be seen from the actions of the present government, right from the very day that it took over power: from
501 Interview: DC1, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe - 13/09/07 (White Zimbabwean Human Rights Lawyer and politician).
502 Interview: TM1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 01/11/07 – (Shona Businessman whose relative was a prominent leader in the ZANU-PF government).
183 the way it crushed dissent, from the way it nationalized the media, from the way it consolidated its power and trying to stake the majority representation in
government, and from the way it tried to push its own agenda, whether or not that was popular or generally acceptable to the country. And even to the extent that where very prominent people in ZANU-PF itself, went out, you know, the likes of Edgar Tekere, to come ‘out of’ the ZANU-PF and try to fight the imaginations of Robert Mugabe to try and emasculate the whole country into a one-party state.
And even the tampering and the panel-beating of the Constitution to ‘suit’ these goals of trying to create a one-party state. So you can actively discern from the actions right from the beginning, that there was this desire, which was frustrated in the way to create a one-party state.”503
In the end, the ZANU-PF bowed to the will of the people and aborted its efforts to officially declare a one-party state. However, ZANU-PF did not curb its politically ambitious behaviour and maintained its unswerving march toward securing an indefinite tenure as the ruling party of Zimbabwe, and in so doing the unidirectional conversation with itself continued.